V.K. Jhanji, C.J. (Acting) 1. The plaintiff, namely, the appellant herein, was the plaintiff in the Civil Original Suit No. 9/1976 (1/86). In the suit, the appellant sought declaration to the effect that the registered deed dated November 26, 1975 executed by defendant No. 1, Abdul Razak, whereby the registered adoption deed dated July 27, 1973, Exhibit P1, was cancelled, be declared null and void, inoperative and ineffectual so for as the appellant was concerned. He further sought declaration to the effect that he continues to be adopted son of defendant No. 1 and entitled to half share of his estate in terms of the adoption deed. 2. In brief, the facts are that Abdul Razak, defendant No. 1 in the suit, had two daughters, namely, Mst. Sakeena and Mst. Dodally (defendant No. 2). Mst. Sakeena was married to Abdul Majid, appellant, as a `Khana-nishin daughter. According to the appellant, he remained in the house of defendant No. 1 as `Khana-damad and fulfilled all the needs of life of the executant and his wife. Unfortunately, Mst. Sakeena-appellants wife and defendant No.1s daughter-died tow years after the marriage and defendant No.1, being an old man and weak in health and having no scope of having a male issue, adopted the appellant to be his adopted son vide registered adoption deed dated July 27, 1973, Exhibit P1, Further, According to the appellant, he was adopted because defendant No.1 was unable to manage the domestic affairs and he wanted the appellant to manage his domestic affairs and, on his death, to perform his last rites, besides perpetuating the name of the family. In the adoption need dated 27th July, 1973, it was specifically mentioned, that the property of defendant No.1, to the extent of its half, shall vest in the appellant and the remaining half shall vest Mst. Dodally, defendant No. 2, namely, the respondent herein. According to the plaintiff-appellant, in the adoption need, it was mentioned that Abdul Razak, defendant No.1, shall have no right to cancel the adoption deed. It was also the case of the appellant that, because of the influence of defendant No. 2, i.e., the respondent herein, defendant No. 1 cancelled the adoption deed 27th July, 1973. He pleaded that the cancellation of the adoption deed was illegal, null and void and not binding on his right in property which had already come to be vested in him. He pleaded that the cancellation of the adoption deed was illegal, null and void and not binding on his right in property which had already come to be vested in him. 3. Upon notice of the suit, the defendants, in their joint written-statement, admitted that the appellant was married to Mst. Sakeena, but they denied that Mst. Sakeena was married as `Khana-nishin daughter or that appellant was brought as `Khana-damad. It was also averred that the adoption deed was a fake and fictitious document and that the same was got executed from defendant No. 1 while he was lying sick. Defendants further stated that the appellant did not render any service to defendant No. 1 and so he cancelled the adoption deed vide cancellation deed dated 26th September, 1975. In regard to the adoption deed, defendants further stated that the parties to the suit are governed by their personal law, i.e., Muslim law with regard to inheritance and that, there being no custom prevailing in the family where son-in-law could be adopted as adopted son after the death of his wife by the father-in-law, therefore, the adoption deed was invalid, inoperative and ineffectual against them. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed as many as twelve issues. On the basis of the evidence led by the parties, the trial court recorded a finding that the institution of adoption is not recognized by Islamic law governing the parties and that the custom of adoption of son-in-law by his father-in-law was non-existent in the families of the parties and was also immoral. The trial court, however, did not accept the stand of the defendants that the adoption deed was a fake and fictitious document or that it was got executed when Abdul Razak, Defendant No. 1, was lyng sick. In fact, the trial court came to a finding that the adoption deed was executed out of love and affection by Abdul Razak, defendant No. 1, for the services rendered by the appellant while living as `Khanadamad to him and his wife. The trial court treated the adoption deed in question as gift executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the appellant and, accordingly, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. The trial court treated the adoption deed in question as gift executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the appellant and, accordingly, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. It may be mentioned here that defendant No. 1, Abdul Razak, died during the pendency of the suit before the trial court and information in this regard was conveyed to the trial court by the parties. 5. In appeal by defendant No.2, namely, the respondent herein, the 1st. Appellate court has set-aside the finding of the trial court treating the adoption deed to be a gift deed and, resultantly, the suit has been dismissed. Hence the appeal by the plaintiff. 6. The substantial questions of law to be determined in this appeal are whether the trial court was justified in treating adoption deed to be a gift deed and whether the 1st appellate court committed any error of law and/or fact in setting-aside the finding of the trial court in this regard. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully gone through the record of this case. 8. It is now well settled law that, in determining the construction of a document, court must look to the intention of the executant. The intention has to be ascertained from the language used in the document itself and the document has to be read as a whole for that purpose. The recitals in the adoption deed dated 27th July, 1973, Exhibit P1, indicate that Abdul Razak adopted the appellant to be his adopted son because of his old age and weak health and there was no hope of his getting any male issue. Therefore, in order to manage the domestic affairs and for providing service to him and his wife, as also for performing his last rites, he adopted the appellant. The recitals further show that, on the death of the executant, property was to vest in the appellant and respondent herein in equal shares; meaning thereby that the transfer of the property was to take effect after the death of the executant. Undisputedly, the adoption deed was cancelled by the executant, defendant No. 1, by a cancellation deed dated 26th November, 1975 and, on cancellation of the adoption deed, the property, which, on the death of the executant, was to vest in the appellant and the respondent, reverted back to the executant. Undisputedly, the adoption deed was cancelled by the executant, defendant No. 1, by a cancellation deed dated 26th November, 1975 and, on cancellation of the adoption deed, the property, which, on the death of the executant, was to vest in the appellant and the respondent, reverted back to the executant. In this view of the matter, the intention of defendant No.1 conveyed in the document, Exhibit P1, even if it be assumed to have been one of vesting half of his estate, on his death, in the appellant on the latters fulfillment of the conditions contained therein, Pales into insignificance, since the sheet-anchor of the claim of the appellant was removed by none other than the defendant No. 1 himself. 9. That apart, under Muslim Law, gift or `Hiba is a voluntary transfer of property (moveable or immovable) or any rights therein, by the owner of the property to another person immediately, unconditionally, without an exchange and consideration. If there is a condition attached to the transfer of the property, it is not enforceable, as being repugnant to the gift. As per the adoption deed, Exhibit P1, the property was sought to be transferred to Abdul Majid, appellant, on the condition that he would manage the domestic affairs and perform the last rites of the executant and shall render every kind of service to the executant and his wife. The property was neither transferred immediately nor the transfer was unconditional and, therefore, the trial court was not justified in treating the adoption deed to be a gift deed. The fining of the Ist Appellate Court, that the adoption deed could not be treated as a gift deed, is correct and the finding of the trial court to the contrary has rightly been set aside by the Ist Appellate Court. 10. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, if the adoption deed, Exhibit P1, is not to be treated as gift deed, then the same may be treated as a Will as the intention of the executant was that, on his death, his property should be inherited by the appellant and respondent in equal shares. 11. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, if the adoption deed, Exhibit P1, is not to be treated as gift deed, then the same may be treated as a Will as the intention of the executant was that, on his death, his property should be inherited by the appellant and respondent in equal shares. 11. It is true that by executing the adoption deed, Exhibit P1, the intention of the executant was not only to adopt the appellant as his adopted son, but also, that on his death, the property, to the extent of its half, should be inherited by him. However, the adoption deed came to be cancelled by a subsequent deed dated 27th July, 1975 and, on cancellation, the Will, if any, would be deemed to have been revoked. Otherwise too, under Muslim Law, bequest in excess of one-third of estate cannot take effect unless such bequest is consented to by heirs after the death of the testator. In this case, the bequest was for more than one-third of the estate of the deceased, defendant No. 1, and there is no evidence that other heirs of the deceased consented to such a bequest. In fact, the appeal before the Ist Appellate Court was by defendant No. 2, respondent herein, who was the sole surviving heir of the deceased and she had challenged the very execution and validity of the adoption deed, Exhibit P1. 12. In view of the above, no case for interference with the judgment and decree of the Ist Appellate Court is made out. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.