D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner seeks a declaration that the communication in proceedings no. SE/tgp/cdp/db/d3/w/120/198m dated 8-3-2001 issued by the 1st respondent - Superintending Engineer (Telugu Ganga project) Circle, Cuddapah, is illegal and arbitrary. ( 2 ) THE factual matrix is that the petitioner is the registered contractor, executing civil works. He undertook work relating to "formation of earthen bund" for a certain extent by virtue of the agreement No. 1/88- 89. The petitioner was the lowest tenderer. The due date for the completion of contract work was fixed as 4-9-1990. It appears that even at the threshold of commencement of work in the year 1989, the design of the bund was changed by the authorities resulting in substantial alteration of the accepted work. However, the respondents extended the period of the contract from time to time even without imposing any penalty, since the non-completion of work was admittedly not attributable to the petitioner. However, the petitioner had to stop the work on 9-2-1991, since the rates calculated by him at the time of contract became totally unworkable due to the supervening circumstances like the gulf war etc. , and on account of which a representation had been made by the petitioner to the Government on 4-3-1991 seeking variation of rates. Having been convinced about the justifiability of the claim, the authorities fixed new rates with effect from 29-8-1993, taking into account the standard specific regulation rates of the financial year 1992-93. Since the quantum of work to be handled by the petitioner increased substantially, fixation of new rates was necessitated for the additional works entrusted to the petitioner. Basing on the memo dated 29-8-1993 issued by the government, the petitioner entered into four supplemental agreements with the respondents i. e. , 16/93-94,1/95-96,3/96-97 and 25/96-97 dated 17-9-1993, 2-5-1995, 22-6-1996 and 7-8-1996 respectively. Accordingly the petitioner completed the work on 21-8-1996. The petitioner was paid the amounts also covered by all the bills in terms of the supplemental agreements. The other details as regards the rates mentioned in the supplemental agreements vis-a-vis additional works etc. , are not very relevant. But the fact remains that as per the terms and conditions agreed upon, by both the parries, the works entrusted to the petitioner have been successfully executed in the year 1996. The other details as regards the rates mentioned in the supplemental agreements vis-a-vis additional works etc. , are not very relevant. But the fact remains that as per the terms and conditions agreed upon, by both the parries, the works entrusted to the petitioner have been successfully executed in the year 1996. However, the allegation is that the further security deposit and the earnest money deposit , which approximately comes to about Rs. 16,00,000. 00 has not been paid. This particular issue is not in serious controversy. Further the petitioner was awarded the work relating to widening of the lining relating to Telugu Ganga Project main Canal to a certain extent under an agreement No. 25/98-99 and the petitioner completed the work substantially well within the period. Relating this transaction also, the petitioner makes certain allegations, which again are not relevant for the present purpose. ( 3 ) WHILE so, the 2nd respondent issued a communication dated 8-11-2000 pointing out that in terms of the audit objection an amount of Rs. 59. 18 lakhs has been determined as recoverable from the petitioner on the ground that excess payment had been made to that extent, on account of erroneous computation under all the four supplemental agreements covered by the work agreement No. 1/88-89. So the controversy is with regard to the alleged excess payments which are liable to be recovered from the petitioner, pertaining to the work of 1/88-89. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the respondents issued another communication, which is impugned herein, pointing out that excess payment had been made on account of mistake committed in computation of the rates specified in supplemental agreements and further it was revealed from the audit objection that an amount of Rs. 68. 34 lakhs was found recoverable from the petitioner and accordingly it was decided to recover the said amount from the work bills covered by the recent works undertaken by the petitioner under the agreement no. 25/98-99. It is the specific allegation that before issuing this communication, no notice whatsoever was issued by the respondents indicating all the details or the exact basis on which the amount was arrived at. Hence, the attempt on the part of the respondents in trying to recover the amounts from the present works on the ground of alleged erroneous excess payments made in the contract of the year 1988-89, is the present controversy. Hence, the attempt on the part of the respondents in trying to recover the amounts from the present works on the ground of alleged erroneous excess payments made in the contract of the year 1988-89, is the present controversy. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contends on the following lines, that the claim of the respondents must be legal and sustainable under law; that there is no foundation under the contract entered into between the parties to make such a claim i. e. , in other words, there is no condition in the contract about the recoverability; that it is only on the representation of the petitioner, respondents agreed to apply the S. S. R. rates of the year 1992-93; that in all the supplemental agreements, specific rates have been prescribed and it was never pointed out by the respondents that in fixing the rates, a mistake has crept in so far as loading and unloading is concerned; that as per all the four supplemental agreements, the work has been successfully completed, without any breach of any of the terms and conditions of the contract and the works were completely executed to the satisfaction of the respondents; that further after several years, first time claiming recovery of amount on some mistake allegedly committed by the respondents themselves is unilateral and arbitrary; that even if there is such mistake, that is not on the part of the petitioner and hence no recovery can be made; that any such claim regarding the mistake in estimating the rates should and could have been at the earliest point of time, but not after several years; that Clause 71 of the A. P. Detailed Standard Specifications (for short a. P. D. S. S. ), which is being relied on by the respondents has no application in the present case, inasmuch as there is no breach of the terms and conditions of the existing contract, i. e. , in other words according to him, Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. can be invokved only when there is breach of contract, which resulted in loss to the State and which can be recoverable either by way of damages or penalty, that too after an adjudication either by an arbitrator or a competent civil court; that the contract is the primary document and only in a case where something is silent A. P. D. S. S. have to be applied; and that assuming that the government has a claim under the contract, the respondents have no right to withhold the amounts from other contracts, when the claim has not crystallized into a definite sum and in such a case the claim of the respondents will become inexecutable, otherwise called as "inchoate claim. " ( 6 ) PER contra, the learned Government pleader while repelling the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that A. P. D. S. S. is part and parcel of every contract between the state and Contractor and the terms and conditions of the contract, should be read in conjunction with the clauses of A. P. D. S. S. In other words, he contends that contractual agreement cannot be read in isolation. He further submitted that depending upon the nature of the work undertaken by the petitioner, the charges for loading and unloading have to be fixed and in fact have been fixed, in accordance with A. P. D. S. S. He further submitted that as per the A. P. D. S. S. loading and unloading charges for earthen work cannot be awarded twice to the contract. In the instant case, according to him, loading and unloading charges have been calculated twice, instead of only once and as a result of this mistaken calculation, the contractor was paid some excess amounts and the State is entitled to recover from the contractor from the amounts to be paid to him from any subsisting contract. He further contends that Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. and its effect had been interpreted and upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in executive Engineer, I. C. v. C. Raghuva Reddy. ( 7 ) IN order to advert to the above contentions, it is necessary to extract clause 71 of the A. P. D. S. S. as under: recovery of money from contractor in certain cases:in every case in which provision is made for recovery of money from the contractor, government shall be entitled to retain or deduct the amount thereof from any moneys that may be due or may become due to the contractor under these presents and/or under any other extract or contracts or any other account whatsoever". ( 8 ) HEAVY reliance is placed by the counsel for the respondents on the Division bench judgment of this Court in C. Raghava Reddy s case (supra), which was rendered following the judgment of the Apex Court in m/s. H. M. K. Ansari and Co. v. Union of India. ( 8 ) HEAVY reliance is placed by the counsel for the respondents on the Division bench judgment of this Court in C. Raghava Reddy s case (supra), which was rendered following the judgment of the Apex Court in m/s. H. M. K. Ansari and Co. v. Union of India. The relevant portion of the Division Bench judgment is extracted as under:"in the light of the decision in HMT ansari ( AIR 1984 SC 29 ), it was not necessary that the amount has been "presently due and payable" or must have been either admitted or determined by the court or Arbitrator. The only requirement was that there was a "claim for payment of money arising out of the contract" to justify action under Clause 71 for recovery as was found by the Division Bench in c. Raghava Reddy ( AIR 1988 AP 53 )" ( 9 ) BEFORE the application of the said principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, it is necessary to look into the facts of the case. The petitioner therein was a contractor. There was an agreement entered into between the petitioner and the government for execution of certain works. Even before the works were completed within the stipulated period, the contractor could not perform the works as agreed. The petitioner pleaded for extension of time on certain reasons, to complete the work. There was no extension granted. But however a request was made by the contractor to enhance the rates. He further intimated that unless the higher rates were sanctioned, he would withdraw from the contract. Since no extension of time was granted, as intimated, he withdrew from the works. The actual measurements of the works, which was withdrawn also, were intimated. Final measurements to the extent of completed works were taken in the presence of the agent of the petitioner. Consequently the executive authority requested his counter part to withhold the amounts to the petitioner in terms of Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. Thereupon the petitioner filed a civil suit seeking appointment of an Arbitrator under section 20 of the Arbitration Act. In that he filed an I. A. seeking injunction from claiming or recovering any amount from him on the alleged default in completing the works. The said LA. was rejected. In that he filed an I. A. seeking injunction from claiming or recovering any amount from him on the alleged default in completing the works. The said LA. was rejected. Subsequently he filed another I. A. against stoppage of payments due to him under other contracts. The civil court passed an ex parte interim order to maintain status quo. After the respondents entered appearance, the status quo order was modified to the effect that the petitioner should not claim of withdraw fifty per cent of the amount, which was directed to be withheld. Aggrieved by the modification, the petitioner filed A. A. O. contending that the order of the civil court passed in his petition for injunction, amounted to dismissal. ( 10 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner filed writ petition assailing the direction of the superintending Engineer to withhold the payments due to the petitioner in other contracts and sought for a writ of mandamus. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and the said order was challenged by way of a writ appeal and the Division Bench made the above extracted observations. ( 11 ) FROM a perusal of the judgment in h. M. K Ansari s case (supra) it is clear that the dispute was with regard to supply of goods. The contract therein was to supply the goods required by the respondent - government. The contractor could not fulfil the terms of the contract, resulting in breach of the contract and further resulting in cancellation of the contract. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities of the Government invoked Clause 18 of the terms and conditions of the contract and withheld the amounts payable to the contractor in relation to other works being performed by the same contractor. The said clause 18 of the contractual agreement is akin to Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. When the petitioner moved an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act before the civil Court, the High Court following the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry held that court could grant injunction restraining the respondents from appropriating or recovering the amount of damages claimed from the appellant s other pending bills. But no order restraining the Union of India from withholding the payments could be issued under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, inasmuch as it would amount to a direction to pay the amount due under the bills against which the matter was carried to the supreme Court. In those circumstances, the supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the order of injunction granted in arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court while dealing with the effect of the injunction, referred to its earlier judgment rendered in raman Iron Foundry case. The observations of the Apex Court in Raman Iron Foundry case at paragraph No. 8 are extracted as under:"it is true that the words "any claim for the payment of a sum of money" occurring in the opening part of clause 18 are words of great amplitude, wide enough to cover even a claim for damages, but it is a well settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to instruments as to statutes that the meaning of ordinary words is to be found not so much in strict etymological propriety of language nor even in popular use as in the subject or occasion on which they are used and the object which is intended to be attained. The context and collocation of a particular expression may show that it was not intended to be used in the sense which it ordinarily bears. Language is at best an imperfect medium of expression and a variety of meanings may often lie in a word or expression. The exact colour and shape of the meaning of any word or expression should not be ascertained by reading it in isolation, but it should be read structurally and in its context, for its meaning may vary with its contractual setting. We must, therefore, read the words any claim for the payment of a sum of money occurring in the opening part of clause 18 not in isolation but in the context of the whole clause, for the intention of the parties is to be gathered not from one part of the clause or the other but from the clause taken as a whole. It is in the light of this principle of interpretation that we must determine whether the words any claim for the payment of a sum of money refer only to a claim for a sum due and payable which is admitted or in case of dispute, established in a court of law or by arbitration or they also include a claim for damages which is disputed by the contractor. " ( 12 ) THE Division Bench of this Court in c. Ragliava Kiddy s case (supra) had referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Lakshmichand and Balchand v. State of a. P. But it was found by the Division bench of this Court that the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Lakshmichcmd s case (supra) was not in line with ansari s case (supra), which was rendered by a Bench consisting of three judges. Hence the Division Bench of this court followed the principle laid down in ansari s case (supra), as being more relevant, since it was rendered by a Bench of larger strength. Further the question that had fallen for consideration in lakshmichand s case (supra) was different. However, the fact to be noted is that in that case also the dispute arose because of breach of contract. However, the issue in the said case was as to whether clause 71 can be invoked even before the amount sought to be adjusted was yet to be determined as a liability against the contractor. Since the Division Bench of this court had already held that the ratio laid down in Lakshmiclwnd s case (supra) cannot be applied, any further comments, in my view, are not necessary. ( 13 ) BUT it is to be noted that the significant and common factor that fell for consideration in all those cases referred above, is whether the Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. could be invoked because of the breach of the contract between the Government and the Contractor. But I could hardly find any case where Clause 71 or a similar provision was invoked or allowed to be invoked by any Government, after the contract was successfully completed to the satisfaction of the authorities. In the cases referred to supra, there was no successful completion of the works. But I could hardly find any case where Clause 71 or a similar provision was invoked or allowed to be invoked by any Government, after the contract was successfully completed to the satisfaction of the authorities. In the cases referred to supra, there was no successful completion of the works. It is further to be noted that in all those, one way or the other or for one reason or the other, there was default on the part of the contractor and the works were stopped without completion, followed by cancellation of the contract and only in such cases, the concerned authorities had a claim to recover amounts from the contractor. In other words, all the cases referred supra are instances when discharge of the contract was owing to breach of contract. It is to be noted that the established modes of discharge of contract are both by way of performance and by breach of contract, apart from other modes like agreement or consent; by impossibility; by lapse of time; and by operation of law, as envisaged under section 37 of the Indian Contract Act. ( 14 ) THERE is a visible contrast between the facts of the case on hand and the cases referred to above i. e. , in all the cases referred to above clause 71 or a similar provision was invoked when there was a discharge of contract because of breach of contract. But in the present case, the work was executed as per the terms of the contract and to the satisfaction of the authorities and the payment of the bills in terms of the contract was also made. In other words, the present dispute arose after the cessation of the contract i. e. , after the discharge of contract by performance. It is further to be noted that at no point of time either during the subsistence of the contract or within a reasonable period after the completion of the work under the contract, no objection by the authorities was raised. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the only question that falls for consideration is whether Clause 71 of a. P. D. S. S. can be invoked even after the discharge of the contract by performance, by both the parties and when there was no breach or default directly or indirectly attributable to the contractor during the subsistence of the contract? ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the only question that falls for consideration is whether Clause 71 of a. P. D. S. S. can be invoked even after the discharge of the contract by performance, by both the parties and when there was no breach or default directly or indirectly attributable to the contractor during the subsistence of the contract? ( 16 ) IT is on record that the works under the original contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondent- government in contract No. 1/88-89 was successfully completed in the year 1996 as per the original contract and also under the supplemental contracts entered into between the parties from time to time. Further the rates were revised after the original contract was entered into as requested by the contractor and accordingly the supplemental contracts were also executed from time to time. In all the supplemental contracts, the rates prescribed for a particular kind of work i. e. , excavation of earth for loading and unloading were also prescribed. Now it is the contention of the respondents that the contractor was paid charges for loading and unloading twice i. e. , at the point of excavation and at the other point and hence the same is violative of standard specifications. These payments, according to the respondents, were paid by mistake. A perusal of the impugned proceedings dated 8-3-2001 also reveals the same. In other words, the admitted mistake on the part of the respondents was the only reason. ( 17 ) THEREFORE it is clear that no other ground or fraud or misrepresentation was attributed to the contractor. It is further interesting to note that this mistake was unearthed after about five years i. e. , in the year 2000. In fact through a communication dated 8-11-2000, it was pointed out by the respondents that in terms of the audit objection an amount of Rs. 59. 18 lakhs has been determined as recoverable from the petitioner on the ground that excess payments were made on account of erroneous computation under all the four supplemental agreements covered by the work agreement No. 25/98-99. Subsequently another communication which is impugned herein dated 8-3-2001 was given, wherein it was specifically pointed out that so called excess payments were to the tune of Rs. 68. 34 lakhs. Subsequently another communication which is impugned herein dated 8-3-2001 was given, wherein it was specifically pointed out that so called excess payments were to the tune of Rs. 68. 34 lakhs. ( 18 ) THEREFORE, from the above facts it is clear that for the first time after about five years, the respondents claimed that they made excess payments due to erroneous calculations and application of A. P. D. S. S. i. e. , payment of charges under loading and unloading twice. As a result the government was put to loss of Rs. 68. 34 lakhs. In this context it is to be further seen that in the earlier proceedings, the amount was quantified at Rs. 59. 18 lakhs. In the later proceedings, which are impugned herein, the amount is quantified at Rs. 68. 34 lakhs. However, this is another controversy, which is not very relevant. ( 19 ) THE only pertinent question is whether Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. Can be invoked and the amounts can be withheld in the other works of the contractor, in a situation whether (sic. where) the works were executed as per the terms of the contract and particularly when the alleged amount to be recovered is because of the alleged mistaken application of the a. P. D. S. S. , on the part of the respondents. ( 20 ) THE answer in my opinion is that invocation of Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. in the circumstances of the present case is not permissible. Therefore I am of the considered view that the principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in raghavareddy s case (supra), which was delivered following the judgment of the apex Court in Ansari s case (supra) though unexceptionable, cannot be made applicable to the present set of facts. ( 21 ) IT is to be further seen that as already pointed out that there were two communications by the respondents mentioning two amounts, which indicate that even the quantification is in dispute. In such circumstances, it is not for one party, in the present case the respondents to invoke clause 71 automatically, just because there is a claim. ( 21 ) IT is to be further seen that as already pointed out that there were two communications by the respondents mentioning two amounts, which indicate that even the quantification is in dispute. In such circumstances, it is not for one party, in the present case the respondents to invoke clause 71 automatically, just because there is a claim. It is to be reiterated that any claim as contemplated under Clause 71 should be only during the subsistence of the contract, owing to breach of the contract or any amount paid in excess even under a mistaken impression. In other words even such a mistake should be pointed out and brought to the notice of the contractor with due diligence and promptitude during the course of performance of the contractual obligation. ( 22 ) TO put it in a different way when once there is a cessation of the relationship of employer and contractor owing to execution of works and discharge of contract by performance, and payment of amounts without any objection, invocation of clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. is far from rationality and this amounts to vesting with the government unbridled power exercisable at all times to come, particularly on the ground of mistake on the part of the respondents themselves after fulfilment of contractual obligation by the contractor by execution of the works and after payment of the bills. ( 23 ) IT is further to be noted that in a case like the present one, the petitioner should be put on notice indicting as to how and why the so called excess payments should not be recovered, particularly when the mistake is not attributable to the petitioner and is attributable to the respondents themselves. In such a case permitting the respondents to invoke Clause 71 of A. P. D. S. S. automatically, where there was initial consensus ad idem at the time of entering into original contract or supplemental contracts and after the execution of the works under the contract without any default or breach, and also after the payments of the amounts for the works done, is not permissible. ( 24 ) FURTHER the impugned order almost amounts to modifying the terms of the contract unilaterally, that too after discharge by performance by both parties, one being no other than the executive authority of the government itself. ( 24 ) FURTHER the impugned order almost amounts to modifying the terms of the contract unilaterally, that too after discharge by performance by both parties, one being no other than the executive authority of the government itself. In my view this action on the part of the respondents in issuing the impugned proceedings straightaway quantifying the amounts and ordering withholding of the amounts payable to the petitioner in other works, is violative of the principles of natural justice. ( 25 ) 1 am of the further view that even the mistake in applying A. P. D. S. S. is a question of fact and it has to be established by the respondents. Some times by way of practice also rates would be prescribed depending upon the necessity and nature of the work to be extracted from the contractor by relaxing such rules and regulations or slight deviations from the specified regulations and this may be implicit or explicit in writing or has to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 26 ) SINCE both the parties entered into the original contract and after certain relaxation of rates and because of the difficulties expressed by the petitioner, time was extended and the rates were also rescheduled and consequently four supplemental agreements were entered into fixing certain rates for a specified work. In view of these facts, it is difficult to jump to the conclusion that the alleged excess payments were contrary to A. P. D. S. S. ( 27 ) NO doubt, if some amounts are paid in excess to the contractor and if he has knowledge of the same, party who is at loss is always at liberty to recover the same, inasmuch as the other party cannot be permitted to get enriched unduly. ( 28 ) IN the instant case certain rates were fixed towards loading and unloading in the excavation works and those works went on, considerably for some time and the petitioner could not proceed further because of various reasons and upon his request, the contract was rescheduled, resulting in entering into four supplemental agreements, applying the A. P. D. S. S. rates during the relevant years. At no point of time, the so called mistake was pointed out by the respondents. The payment under the R. A. bills was also made after the execution of the works within the stipulated period. At no point of time, the so called mistake was pointed out by the respondents. The payment under the R. A. bills was also made after the execution of the works within the stipulated period. The works went on for about six years and the impugned proceedings were issued after five years of the execution of works entrusted to the petitioner under the agreement. ( 29 ) IN Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mantora Oil Products Pvt. Ltd, a case where the respondents therein took a insurance policy with the appellants covering certain amount. There was a mistake on the part of the appellants in collecting the premium. The contention of the appellant - Insurance company is that it was by mistake less premium was mentioned and on that score, the insurer sought for recovering the amounts after the maturity of the policy. In these set of facts, the Apex Court observed at paragraphs 4 and 5 as under. LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company has contended that in view of the circular dated 7-3-1986, the premium should have been paid at the rate of 50% and not at the rate of 30% as was done by the respondent. We are not prepared to accept this contention. 1. If it was a mistake, the same should have been pointed out to the respondent during the period of the policy but the appellant did not raise thi s objection at any time during the continuance of the policy cover. The respondent also fulfilled its obligations under the ______policy and paid the premium as was agreed to between the parties. If there was a mistake on the part of the appellant in collecting the premium, the same should have been pointed out at the time of entering into the contract or immediately thereafter. After having received the benefit under the policy of insurance from the respondent by way of premium, it is not open to the appellant to contend that there was a mistake on their part in charging the premium at a rate lower than the rate at which it should have been charged by them. If the parties were not ad idem on this vital part of the contract of insurance, it would have an adverse effect on the contract itself. If the parties were not ad idem on this vital part of the contract of insurance, it would have an adverse effect on the contract itself. Since the period of policy is over, the appellant is under an obligation to refund the extra premium in terms of the policy. It cannot itself unilaterally make any adjustment from the amount of unutilised premium and retain a part of it on the ground that the premium charged was less than what it should have been charged. ( 30 ) THE learned Government Pleader contended that the writ petition is not maintainable in matters relating to contracts. No doubt in contractual matters, in normal course, scope of judicial review by this Court under Article 226 is limited. But when a statutory obligation is vested with the executive and the commissions or omissions, which are palpably irrational or contrary to the principles of natural justice, this court under Article 226 of the constitution of India can certainly exercise its power under judicial review. ( 31 ) IN the decision reported in Dwarkadas marfatia and Sons v. Bombay Port Trust, the apex Court while dealing with the aspect of contractual obligations and the judicial review, had taken into account various decisions and held that the action of the state within Article 12 of the Constitution of india, in the field of contract or any other field, must be reasonable and taken upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. It further held at paragraph No. 27 that if a governmental policy or action even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. To come to this conclusion, the Apex Court had taken into consideration its earlier observations in the decisions reported in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State ofjammn and Kashmir7 and R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India further the Apex Court had taken into consideration the observations of Lord justice Diplock in Counsel for Civil Services v. Minister for The Civil Services, wherein His lordship classified three grounds, which are subject to control of judicial review, viz. , illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. ( 32 ) THE Government, through the respondent is a party to the contract and hence for the present purpose, the action in question is executive in nature. , illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. ( 32 ) THE Government, through the respondent is a party to the contract and hence for the present purpose, the action in question is executive in nature. In other words even though the dispute is with regard to contractual obligation, it is the executive who is a party to the contract and it cannot exercise its jurisdiction unilaterally and contrary to the principles of natural justice. Further it is to be noted that the a. P. D. S. S. are guidelines in nature for executive authorities. By virtue of the a. P. D. S. S. being part of the Government contracts, the same cannot be treated as statutory. They are always subject to judicial scrutiny by courts whether they are under the Contract Act or the Constitution of India or under other laws. ( 33 ) IN view of the above discussion, I am to hold that the action of the respondent in issuing the impugned proceeding dated 8-3-2001 is not only irrational, but also unilateral and contrary to the principles of natural justice. ( 34 ) IT is further to be noted that A. P. D. S. S. also contains Clause 73, which deals with the remedy available to the parties. The remedies are of two fold. One is by way of arbitration and another is by way of filing of a suit. It is specified in that said clause that as regards the dispute up to Rs. 50,000. 00 arbitration has to be resorted to, and beyond that the dispute has to be resolved by a competent civil court in a suit and there is no dispute with regard to this position. Hence, the respondent - Government is always at liberty to file a suit and establish the mistake on its part and the knowledge of the same to the petitioner and the consequent undue enrichment by the petitioner and seek recovery of the amounts to the extent quantified and established. ( 35 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, the impugned proceeding dated 8-3-2001 is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. No costs.