Shakilamary v. The Secretary to Government & others
2003-11-21
P.K.MISRA, T.V.MASILAMANI
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- T.V. MASILAMANI, J. The petitioner has come forward with this petition challenging the order of detention passed by the second respondent-Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai, Chennai against her son, Edwin @ Edmand, by virtue of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootlegger, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, and Slum Grabbers Act 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) read with G.O.Ms.No.130 Prohibition and Excise Department dated 18.7.2003 issued under Section 3(2) of the Act treating the detenu as a GOONDA. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate (Criminal side) appearing for the respondents and perused the records of the case. 3. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has made an attempt in his argument to show that the representations sent on behalf of the detenu were not considered by the detaining authority promptly, the records available disclose that both the representations were dealt with without any undue delay and disposed of by the detaining authority and therefore we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioner's counsel on this aspect of the matter. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the sponsoring authority had miserably failed to place the copy of the petition and orders in Crl.M.P.Nos.7296 and 7932 of 2003 dated 23.7.2003 and 12.8.2003 respectively before the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that there was no imminent possibility to the detenu to come out on bail in the adverse cases as the said bail applications were dismissed by the Sessions Court. Hence, he has urged that the failure on the part of the sponsoring authority to furnish copies of the said petitions and orders to the detenue, and that the same had not been placed before the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction would vitiate the impugned order. In such view of the matter, we accept and uphold the contentions of the petitioner in this respect. 5.
In such view of the matter, we accept and uphold the contentions of the petitioner in this respect. 5. Further, he has relied on 2003 (1) CRIMES 446 (S.C.) (DARPAN KUMAR SHARMA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS) in support of the proposition that a solitary instance of the detenue committing robbery in a public place is not sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority that such an occurrence was enough to cause disturbance to the general peace and tranquillity or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. He has referred us to the adverse cases under Sections 379 I.P.C.; 380 and 511 I.P.C.; and 457 and 380 I.P.C. to fortify his argument that in view of the proposition of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the said decision, the solitary instance of committing the robbery as per allegations in the ground case is not sufficient enough to warrant the detention of the detenu under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. 6. On a careful reading of the said decision in the light of the facts and circumstances involved in this case, we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down therein squarely applies to the facts of this case also. In such view of the matter, we are constrained to hold that the detaining authority had not applied his mind to arrive at the subjective satisfaction to conclude that there was imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail for the reason that the earlier bail applications were dismissed by the Sessions Court. Similarly, he had also failed to apply his mind to find out whether a solitary occurrence of robbery is sufficient in the circumstances to warrant the detention of the detenu under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 especially in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the decision referred supra. Hence, we are of the considered view that the order of detention of the detenu is liable to be quashed. 7. In the result, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention is quashed and the detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in connection with any other case.