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2003 DIGILAW 1939 (MAD)

J. Baskaran v. Regional Institute of Correctional Administration & Others

2003-11-25

K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM

body2003
Judgment :- The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records connected with the orders of the Director, Regional Institute of Correctional Administration, Vellore the second respondent herein in his order No.E/CR.15/96-97 dated 31.12.1996 and to quash the same. 2. The petitioner claims that he was appointed as a Driver in the Regional Institute of Correctional Administration (hereinafter called as RICA). Though the appointment of the petitioner dated 2.5.1985 is termed as temporary he had continued in service from 2.5.1985 without any break. In fact all the employees have been appointed only on a temporary basis. RICA has been registered under the Societies Registration Act and established with the object of imparting training in Correctional Administration and allied subjects to the officers in the rank of Assistant Jailors to Superintendents of Prisons and equivalent ranks and supervisory Officers of allied Departments of States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The management shall vest with a Board comprising the Inspectors General of the prisons of the four Southern States. One of the above mentioned Inspectors General of Prison shall be the Chairman of the Board for one year by rotation. According to the petitioner, the grants for the administration of SICA is made by the Government inclusive of the cars which are maintained by the Society. The expenditure is met by grants given by the four Southern States. 3. The petitioner further states that he has been continuing in service from 2.5.1985 and that one of the vans was condemned in 1989. However, the petitioner was not ousted and there were only two cars at that time and there were two drivers. The petitioner further contends that at present, there are three vehicles namely two Ambassadar cars and one Swaraj Mazda(mini Bus). There are only two drivers. The petitioner also has a heavy vehicle licence. On 31.12.1996, the Director had passed an order stating that it has been decided by the Board in its meeting held on 13.12.1996 to dispose of the car purchased in 1982 and for the temporary reduction of a driver. Three months notice had been issued for termination of his services. In the order,it is further stated that the petitioner has been punished several times for misconduct and improper duty etc and therefore, it was decided to terminate the service of the petitioner by giving three months notice. Three months notice had been issued for termination of his services. In the order,it is further stated that the petitioner has been punished several times for misconduct and improper duty etc and therefore, it was decided to terminate the service of the petitioner by giving three months notice. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has come forward with the above writ petition. 4. In the counter filed by the respondents, after stating the facts relating to Constitution and working of the institute which was meant for training 48 trainee Officers,it is stated that there were only 20 trainee officers and there were nearly 43 staff members. Among them many of the staff members have no full time work. Therefore, the use of the cars were also minimal. The petitioner was appointed as driver from 2.5.1985 and prior to his appointment , there was already another driver. It is further stated that from 1986 onwards the petitioner was awarded punishments such as fine, stoppage of increment, warning, termination notice etc., The petitioner's attitude towards the Director was not conducive and intolerable. 5. It is further stated that there were two Ambassador Cars and among them one was purchased in the year 1982 and as an economy measure during the 48th meeting of the Board of Management ,it was resolved to dispose off one old Ambassador car bearing Number TNM 4114 to the best advantage of management. In view of the decision to dispose of the Ambassador car, the Board accorded permission to temporary reduction of one post of driver. In the counter reference is also made to Rule 15 of the manual of RICA and it is contended that the action taken by the respondents for the temporary reduction of one post was justified. It is further stated that the post of one driver was sufficient for the present. Certain other allegations which were made in the affidavit were also denied, which are not necessary for the disposal of the said writ petition. 6. Mr.R.Ganesan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raises the following points: a) Though the petitioner was appointed as a temporary employee, a perusal of the manual discloses that the period of probation is only for a period of one year and therefore, the petitioner having been appointed as early as 1985,it was erroneous to contend that he was still a probationer or a temporary employee. b) The quoram for the meeting of the Board of Administration is three in terms of the regulations and in the impugned 49th meeting of the Board of Management which was held on 13.12.1996 and 14.12.1996, only two of the members of the Board had attended and therefore, the meeting was not validly conducted in view of the absence of the quoram. c) Apart from the reasons stated in the impugned order that the temporary reduction was resorted to in view of the disposal of one of the Ambassador cars,certain other reasons were also given namely that the petitioner had been punished several times for misconduct and improper duty and therefore, it was decided to terminate the service of the petitioner. The said imputations amount to causing sigma on the service of the petitioner and hence cannot be sustained. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents however contends that the society is only registered under Societies Registration Act and no writ will be issued as against the society and reliance is placed on the Judgment of Supreme Court in Integrated Rural Development Agency -vs- Rampyare Pandey(1995 Supp(2) Supreme Court Cases,495). 8. The petitioner is only a temporary employee and therefore in terms of Clause 13,14,15, the service of the temporary employee may be terminated by the appointing authority without any reason. Even if the service of the petitioner is to be considered as a permanent employee three months notice will be sufficient in terms of Rule 15(3). 9. As regards quoram, the learned counsel contends that the Chairman concurred with other members and approved the minutes of the meeting and therefore there was no basis for the contention that the impugned resolution of the society was invalid due to want of quoram. 10. I have also considered the submissions made by both sides. 11. It cannot be disputed that the respondents society is a wing of the Government. The society was in fact formed with the four Inspectors General of the prisons of the four southern states and the contention of the petitioner that the institute is vested with the object of the imparting training to the officers in the rank of Assistant Jailors to Superintendents of Prisons and equivalent ranks and supervisory officers of allied departments of the four States is not disputed by the respondents. Therefore, the mere fact that the respondent society is registered under the Societies Registration Act, cannot result in classifying the respondent society as a private society and as not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner will not be applicable as in the said Judgment itself, the learned Judges have made it clear that the society which arose for consideration in that case was a society not constituted under any statute nor owned or controlled by or an instrumentality of the State Government . In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the respondent society is run purely on the basis of the funds and grants allocated by the State Government for the purpose of training prison officials and is administered by a Board comprising four Inspectors General of the four Southern States. 12. Coming to the status of the petitioner,it is strange for the quasi-government establishment like the respondent to keep an employee as a temporary employee for more than 11 years. It is not disputed that the petitioner was appointed on 2.5.1985 and the impugned orders have been passed on 13.11.1996. In terms of the rules, the period of probation is only one year. Therefore, the mere failure on the part of the respondents to declare the probation of the petitioner and to make him permanent cannot disentitle the petitioner to assert his legal rights. In fact, in the counter, the stand taken by the respondent is that he is a temporary employee. Therefore, the fact that no separate orders have been passed confirming the probationary period of the petitioner is of no help to the respondents. The attitude of a public institution like the respondent in keepting an employee as temporary for many years cannot at all be appreciated. 13. The contention that under Clause 15(3) , the service of a permanent employee can be terminated by a notice of three months or on payment of salary for such period, cannot also be sustained. The said Clause can be invoked only if the post to which he has been substantively appointed is abolished. In the present case a perusal of the resolution of the Board in its 49th meeting, ( the impugned order) discloses that what was resolved was only for temporary reduction of one post out of two posts. The said Clause can be invoked only if the post to which he has been substantively appointed is abolished. In the present case a perusal of the resolution of the Board in its 49th meeting, ( the impugned order) discloses that what was resolved was only for temporary reduction of one post out of two posts. Clause 15(3) can be invoked only if there is a total abolition of the post. Temporary reduction of the post is not contemplated under Clause 15(3). Moreover, the reasons stated for the temporary reduction of one post namely due to selling away one of the cars cannot be a proper reason for terminating the services of a driver who was working in the respondents institute for more than 11 years. 14. On the issue as to whether the 49th meeting was properly conducted or not, it is not disputed that in terms of the regulations , the quoram for the meeting of the Board shall be three. There is also no dispute over the factual position that in the impugned meeting, only two members had attended. The fact that the Chairman being one of the members had countersigned , the resolution subsequently on circulation cannot validate the initial defect of lack of quoram. No rule has been shown enabling approval of a resolution by circulation. If there is no such rule, it is not open to the respondents to contend that the required quoram was satisfied by circulating the file. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that 49th meeting and the resolution passed thereon which is the basis of the impugned order cannot be sustained. The procedure has to be strictly followed failing which the prescription of the quoram is meaningless. 15. I am also inclined to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order results in casting stigma on the petitioner. In the impugned order itself, it is stated that the petitioner had been punished several times for misconduct and improper duty. Therefore,on the face of it, the said order cannot be sustained. Any order of termination of service casting sigma can be given effect to only after proper enquiry. Not being satisfied with the facts mentioned about the alleged conduct of the petitioner in the impugned order, in the counter, several details of the alleged misconduct and past punishments are enlisted. Therefore,on the face of it, the said order cannot be sustained. Any order of termination of service casting sigma can be given effect to only after proper enquiry. Not being satisfied with the facts mentioned about the alleged conduct of the petitioner in the impugned order, in the counter, several details of the alleged misconduct and past punishments are enlisted. At this stage, it is not necessary to consider as to whether there is any truth or otherwise in the alleged punishments which have not been brought to the notice of the petitioner before the order of termination was passed. The respondents cannot be allowed to plead different reasons namely that the administration wanted to temporaily reduce to one post and at the same time contend that the conduct of the petitioner was not proper. Nothing prevented the respondents from taking appropriate action against the petitioner if he had committed any misconduct. Mere reference to several incidents cannot justify the termination of service of the petitioner without a separate enquiry. The impugned order has been passed without any proper enquiry.