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2003 DIGILAW 194 (MAD)

Sugumaran v. The Commissioner of Police & Another

2003-02-10

K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM, P.SHANMUGAM

body2003
Judgment :- K.P.SIVASUBRAMANIAM, J. The petitioner, having been detained under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 questions the order of detention dated 10.4.2002, detaining him as a goonda. 2. Apart from five adverse cases, on 10.3.2002, he is alleged to have been proceeding to meet his friend near Appollo Hospital at about 5.30 p.m. The detenu and his friend Philips are alleged to have wrongly restrained one Gopi and are alleged to have restrained him from proceeding further by using and threatening and abusive words. They are further alleged to have demanded Gopi to part with his gold ring and as Gopi resisted, Philips took out a knife from his hip and placed it on Gopi's neck. His ring was forcibly snatched and by holding the victim, he asked the detenu to search his pockets. The detenu searched his pocket and took away the purse with a cash of Rs.250/-. While the victim tried to free himself, Philips threatened him with dire consequences, if he would complain to any one and told him that every one in the area knew about them and were afraid of Philips and Sugumaran (detenu). The victim, Gopi raised alarm and when both Philips and the detenu tried to run towards eastern direction, they were intercepted by a police party. But both of them threatened the police personnel also and picked up soda bottles from a hand cart and hurled them at the police and the public who had gathered there. Several bottles were broken into pieces on the road. The members of the public became panicky and ran from the spot and a traffic jam also resulted due to the violent behaviour of the detenu and his friend Philips. However, the police party with the help of the public apprehended both of them and also recovered the knife used by them. 3. They were later taken to the police station. The victim, Gopi also lodged a complaint and the Inspector of Police took up the investigation by visiting the place of occurrence and seizing the material objects under mahazar. The detenu and his friend were also arrested. 3. They were later taken to the police station. The victim, Gopi also lodged a complaint and the Inspector of Police took up the investigation by visiting the place of occurrence and seizing the material objects under mahazar. The detenu and his friend were also arrested. Subsequently, on the request of the Inspector of Police, the detention order was passed by the detaining authority, the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, claiming to have been satisfied that the conduct of the detenu was prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and that recourse under normal Criminal Law will not have the desired effect. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in the detention order while dealing with the facts relating to the orders of remand passed by XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, the detaining authority has mentioned that the detenu was a remand prisoner till 29.3.2002 and subsequently, the remand was periodically extended till 19.4.2002. But no copy of the remand order had been issued in the said context. It is further contended that the special report said to have been furnished by the sponsoring authority was not accompanied by a supplementary affidavit or a covering letter from the sponsoring authority. 5. A perusal of the booklet discloses that the periodical requisitions for the renewal of the remand have been filed and finally a special report has been furnished to the detaining authority stating that the detenu was arrested on 10.3.2002 and produced before the XIV Metropolitan Magistrate on 11.3.2002 who remanded him till 22.3.2002 and that subsequently, on requisition by the police, the remand was extended from 22.3.2002 to 5.4.2002 and from 5.4.2002 to 19.4.2002 and that at present, he was at Central Prison, Chennai. Though several rulings were relied upon by both sides on the issue as to whether the remand order should be furnished or whether a special report would be sufficient and whether the special report should be accompanied with a supplementary affidavit or a covering letter, we have already considered the issue in detail and held that a special report was sufficient and that it need not be accompanied with a supplementary affidavit or a covering letter vide judgment in HCP No.1888 of 2002 dated 23.1.2003. 6. 6. In Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India and Another ( 1991 (1) SCC 128 ), the Supreme Court had clearly laid down that in a case of person being in custody, a detention order could be passed, if the authority passing the order was aware of the fact that he was actually in custody. 7. We are therefore, inclined to hold that once it is established that the detenu was already in custody or under remand, for the purpose of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, it was sufficient to show that there were reliable materials to the satisfaction of the authority that the accused was on remand on the date of passing the detention order. It could be by filing the copy of the remand order or by a special report by the sponsoring authority giving details of the remand. In this case, such a special report is available and hence we do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel. 8. In fact, we find support for our view from one of the judgments of a Division Bench of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner himself in Chinna Ponnu vs. The Secretary of Prohibition and Excise Department, Govt. Of Tamil Nadu, Fort St. George, Chennai-9 and Another (2000 (2) MWN (Crl) Page 52 and it is held as follows:- "In this case, the detaining authority made his order by taking note of the fact that the detenu was on remand. That fact he gathered from a perusal of the special report prepared by the sponsoring authority. It cannot of course be said that the detaining authority was in error in doing so, it was open to him to act on such a report which he considered as reliable" 9. We therefore do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the issue of non supply of the remand order is that the detenu had specifically asked for a copy of the remand order for the purpose of showing that he was subjected to ill-treatment while in custody and that he had reported about the same to the Magistrate and in order to deal with the same, he had sought for a copy of the remand order dated 11.3.2002. This was not supplied with in spite of his demand and hence he was very much prejudiced. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner, heavily relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in 2000 (2) MWN (Crl.) 52, cited above. It is true that the Division Bench held that when a prisoner had complained about the alleged ill-treatment, he was entitled to get a copy of the same and it will not be sufficient to rely upon the special report alone since the allegation of ill-treatment cannot be gathered from a special report and can be ascertained only on a perusal of the actual remand order. The Division Bench was dealing with a case where the detenu had made a demand for a copy of the remand order in order to make an effective representation. In this case, the detenu was remanded on 11.3.2002 and the detention order came to be passed on 10.4.2002. The representation demanding the copy of the remand order was made for the first time only on 22.8.2002 which is nearly 4-1/2 months after the remand order and after the alleged ill-treatment. The right of a detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution should undoubtedly be viewed in the most liberal manner in favour of the detenu. But at the same time, the detention cannot be set aside on a point which is not raised in a bona fide manner and is raised apparently on false and invented grounds, on the basis of judgments rendered in other cases on the particular facts and circumstances relating to those judgments. The undue delay in making a demand for a copy of the remand order after the alleged ill-treatment is glaring and exposes total lack of bona fides in this case. Even so, to satisfy ourselves we had called for the file relating to the remand and the copy of the remand order being furnished before us, we have satisfied ourselves that in the remand order dated 11.3.2002, there is no complaint of any ill-treatment. Therefore, we are unable to sustain this point. 11. Learned counsel further contends that the statement of facts leading to the arrest has not been correctly stated which would disclose non-application of mind. Therefore, we are unable to sustain this point. 11. Learned counsel further contends that the statement of facts leading to the arrest has not been correctly stated which would disclose non-application of mind. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to extract the relevant portion of the contention order which is to the following effect:- "Taking advantage of the panic situation, Tvl. Philips and Sugumaran tried to escape from the spot. However the police party with the help of public surrounded Tvl. Philips and Sugumaran and apprehended Tvl. Philips and Sugumaran at the spot and retrieved the knife and later they were taken to F4 Thousandlights police station and Tr. Gopi lodged a complaint in this regard. Tr. S.Sundaram, Sub Inspector of Police, Crime, F4 Thousandlights Police Station registered a case in F4 Thousandlights P.S.Cr.No.285/2002 u/s 341, 336, 397 and 506(2) IPC. Tr.B.Nandakumar Inspector of Police, Crime, F2 Egmore Police Station under whose control the crime detachment of F4 Thousandlights Police Station comes, took up the investigation and the Inspector of Police visited the spot and prepared observation mahazar. The Inspector of Police seized the broken bottle pieces found scattered under cover of mahazar. The Inspector of Police examined the witnesses and recorded their statements. Later the Inspector of Police arrested Tvl. Philips and Sugumaran and examined them and also recorded their statements and later they were produced before the XIV Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Egmore, Chennai and lodged at Central Prison, Chennai as remand prisoner till 22.3.2002. The remand was periodically extended till 19.4.2002". 12. From the above extract, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the fact of arrest has been stated lastly, after the preparation of the mahazar and after recording of statement of witnesses, whereas the arrest card shows (Page No.87) that the arrest was at 6.30 p.m., whereas the observation mahazar (Page No.98) mentions the time of its preparation as 8.00 p.m. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the sequence of events have not been properly understood or appreciated by the detaining authority and hence the order is vitiated due to non-application of mind. We have considered the aforesaid points and are inclined to hold that the narration of events as above should be read and understood as a whole. The mere usage of the word "later" alone cannot be interpreted in an isolated manner. We have considered the aforesaid points and are inclined to hold that the narration of events as above should be read and understood as a whole. The mere usage of the word "later" alone cannot be interpreted in an isolated manner. In the earlier portion of the order, reference is made to the victim Gopi lodging the complaint and the registration of the case as Crime No.285 of 2002. This was done, in fact, after apprehending Philips and the detenu and having taken them to the police station viz., at 6.30 p.m. as recorded in FIR (Page No.70). It is at this juncture, they are actually arrested. Therefore, the timing given in the arrest card as 6.30 p.m. is correct. At 6.40 p.m., the gold ring is seized from Philips (Page No.88) and at 6.45 p.m., the purse belonging to Gopi Rs.250/- is seized from the detenu (Page No.88). Confession statement of both Philips and the detenu are also recorded at 6.45 p.m. and 7.30. p.m. respectively (Page Nos.90 to 97). Then at 8.00 p.m., investigation commences and the Inspector proceeds to the spot and prepares the observation mahazar (Page No.98). Therefore, the timings given in the aforesaid documents are correct. Subsequently, the accused are brought again to the police station and confined. It is in this context, the expression "later" as mentioned in the detention order while dealing with the arrest of the detenu has to be appreciated, namely, the accused having been actually confined at the police station, after the completion of the investigation. The usage of the word "later" cannot be interpreted in a manner, ignoring the entire sequence of events and hence, we are unable to sustain the said point. 13. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that some of the pages of the booklet are not at all clear and are ill-legible and in spite of demand for copies, they were not supplied. In the representation dated 22.8.2002, Page Nos.10,46, 47, 65, 67, 71, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96 and 97 are mentioned. We have perused the booklet. Page Nos.10, 46, 47, 71, 90, 91, 92 and 94 are clear and readable. We are unable to appreciate the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Page Nos.64 and 65 relate to the English version of the FIR dated 5.3.2002 which are undoubtedly ill-legible and not clear. We have perused the booklet. Page Nos.10, 46, 47, 71, 90, 91, 92 and 94 are clear and readable. We are unable to appreciate the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Page Nos.64 and 65 relate to the English version of the FIR dated 5.3.2002 which are undoubtedly ill-legible and not clear. But a clear copy of the same FIR in Tamil has been furnished at Page Nos.66 and 67. 14. The contention that there was no continuity of the statements at Page Nos.95 and 96 cannot also be sustained. Page Nos.90 to 92 contain the confessional statement of Philips and Page Nos.93 to 97 contain the statement of the detenu. While compiling the booklet, the pages have been mixed and page No.96 should have been placed next to page No.90. This is made clear on reading both the statements and such a minor mistake in stitching and compiling the booklet cannot be exaggerated. Therefore, we find no basis for this objection also. 15. It is further contended that there is discrepancy in the designation of the authority who arrested the detenu. In the detention order, it is stated that the Inspector arrested the accused whereas the arrest card is signed by the Sub-Inspector of Police. We do not agree. The arrest card is only a record of the police station which is prepared and signed by the Sub-Inspector. There is no mention of the Sub-Inspector having actually arrested the accused and there is no column giving the details of the Officer, who actually arrested the accused. Therefore there is no discrepancy. 16. Reference was also made to the discrepancy in the dates mentioned in the supplementary confessional statement of Philips who is the other accused. While the statement is said to have been recorded on 12.3.2002, Inspector had signed the same on 15.3.2002. The statement relates to implicating one Johnson who has not been mentioned in the earlier statement. On the basis of the said supplementary statement, the accused is taken to Tirupathi (Page No.21) to apprehend the said Johnson. Thereafter, the Inspector submits all the documents on 15.3.2002 before the Magistrate, requesting for judicial custody till 22.3.2002. This explains how the statement obtained from Philips is signed by the Inspector on 15.3.2002. On the basis of the said supplementary statement, the accused is taken to Tirupathi (Page No.21) to apprehend the said Johnson. Thereafter, the Inspector submits all the documents on 15.3.2002 before the Magistrate, requesting for judicial custody till 22.3.2002. This explains how the statement obtained from Philips is signed by the Inspector on 15.3.2002. Moreover, neither this document is relied upon by the detaining Officer nor has it anything to do with the ground case which took place on 10.3.2002 nor is it relevant for the detenu in this case. 17. Therefore, we do not find merit in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the detenu. HCP is dismissed.