VINEET SARAN, J. By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 31-5-1984 as also the order of respondent No. 3, the Committee of Management, Janta Uchhatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Bargawan-Kooban, District Mirzapur dated 3-10-1988. A further prayer has been made to direct the respondents to treat the petitioner as regular Class IV employee of the institution and pay him salary accordingly. 2. Undisputed facts of this case are that respondent No. 3 institution was duly recognized and aided upto Junior High School. In the year 1984 it was accorded recognition as High School but the High School section remained unaided by the Government. Admittedly, there were only three Class IV posts sanctioned till it was a recognized institution as Junior High School and after 1984 three extra posts of Class IV were sanctioned though not under the grant in aid scheme of the Government. Thus the total sanctioned post of Class IV became six in number. In pursuance of the sanction of additional three posts, the respondent institution initially appointed two persons on Class IV posts namely Nirbhay Singh (respondent No. 5) and Bachan Lal Singh (respondent No. 6) on 4-4-1984. Thereafter, by order dated 25- 4-1984, the petitioner had been appointed on the third post. A true copy of the appointment letter has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition, which goes to show that the appointment was purely temporary and terminable on one months notice. The papers relating to the appointments of three subsequent persons on Class IV posts had been forwarded by the management to the District Inspector of Schools for its approval, who vide order dated 31-5-1984 continued the approval of the three Class IV employee who were already working in the Junior High School Section but refused to grant approval to the new appointments of respondent Nos. 5, 6 and the petitioner on the ground that under the reservation policy, appointment of scheduled caste had to be made. Accordingly, the respondent institution appointed one Arjun Ram (respondent No. 4) in place of the petitioner. 5, 6 and the petitioner on the ground that under the reservation policy, appointment of scheduled caste had to be made. Accordingly, the respondent institution appointed one Arjun Ram (respondent No. 4) in place of the petitioner. Thereafter, on 3-10- 1988 the services of the petitioner is said to have been terminated by the respondent institution on the ground that as per reservation policy and the order dated 31-5-1984 of the District Inspector of Schools, one scheduled caste person had to be appointed and as such in place of the petitioner one Arjun Ram had been appointed for which due approval had already been given by the District Inspector of Schools on 16-6-1984. Aggrieved by the orders of the District Inspector of Schools dated 31-5-1984 refusing to grant approval and also of the institution dated 3-10-1988, this writ petition has been filed. 3. I have heard Sri I. N. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri N. C. Tripathi, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as well as learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and have perused the records. 4. The first contention of Sri I. N. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in case if the reservation policy had to be followed as per roster, the first post ought to have been filled up by a scheduled caste candidate. It has been contended by him that the selection on the first post was made of respondent No. 5 Nirbhay Narain Singh, on the second post of respondent No. 6 Bachan Lal Singh on the third post of the petitioner Lallan Singh. Thus, according to him if at all the reservation policy had to be applied, the appointment of respondent No. 4 Arjun Ram ought to have been made on the first post in place of Nirbhay Narain Singh and not of the petitioner. He has placed before me the roster under the Act of 1994 by which the first post must be filled up by the scheduled caste candidate, second by the general category candidate and the third by other backward class. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not placed before me any roster which was applicable in the year 1984 at the time when the appointment in question was made. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not placed before me any roster which was applicable in the year 1984 at the time when the appointment in question was made. In my view no reliance can thus be placed on the roster on 1994 which has been placed before me. 5. Sri N. C. Tripathi, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents has submitted that even if the roster was applicable then also it would be the petitioner Lallan Singh, who was admittedly appointed last, had to go. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the apex Court in R. K. Sabharwal and others v. State of Punjab and others, 1995 (1) LBESR 693 (SC) : (1995) 2 SCC 745 , to establish that the first position would go in favour of scheduled caste. While dealing with a case of filling in 16% post of scheduled caste and background class the roster was provided, according to which in a lot of 100 post, those falling at Serial Nos. 1, 7, 15, 22, 30. . . . . . . . had been reserved and earmarked in the roster for the scheduled caste. 7. As already stated above since no roster as applicable in the year 1984 for filling up the post in question has been placed before me, the said decision will have no application in the fats of the present case. Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the roster of 1994 Act would be applicable, then too the appointment of the petitioner would not stand. If the first post goes to a scheduled caste candidate (respondent No. 4) then the appointment of respondent No. 5 would be shifted to the second post, and that of respondent No. 6 to the third post. Thus the third appointment of the petitioner made subsequently would have to be cancelled and not of the one appointed first. 8. It was then submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the termination order has been passed without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner. Thus the third appointment of the petitioner made subsequently would have to be cancelled and not of the one appointed first. 8. It was then submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the termination order has been passed without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the respondent has stated that the petitioner was not in service after 1984 ever since the appointment of respondent No. 4 Arjun Ram had been made and it was only in connivance with the then officiating Principal of the college that in the year 1988 the order of termination had been issued although the same was not necessary as the petitioner was not in service. No salary had ever been paid by the institution to the petitioner when the appointment of respondent No. 4 had been made and duly recognized by the District Inspector of Schools on 16-6-1984. 9. In my view, such questions are disputed facts which cannot be looked into in extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and can best be considered in ordinary civil jurisdiction where detailed evidence can be adduced by the parties at the time of deciding of the issues. Even otherwise the terms of appointment letter clearly mentions that the same would be terminable on one months notice. It has nowhere been stated in the writ petition that the petitioner was ever paid salary by the Committee of Management on Class IV post. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place any service rules governing the service of the petitioner which may require opportunity of hearing or show cause notice to be issued before the termination of a temporary employee. Thus, the second submission of the petitioner also has no force. 10. It was lastly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the District Inspector of Schools was not authorized to approve or disapprove the appointment of the petitioner nor was he authorized to grant financial sanction in the case of appointment of the petitioner as the High School section of the institution was not under grant in aid. 10. It was lastly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the District Inspector of Schools was not authorized to approve or disapprove the appointment of the petitioner nor was he authorized to grant financial sanction in the case of appointment of the petitioner as the High School section of the institution was not under grant in aid. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in Om Prakash v. District Inspector of Schools and others, 1992 UPLBEC 232, in support of this contention that the approval of the District Inspector of Schools is not required for appointment made on Class IV post. I have perused the said judgment. The District Inspector of Schools refused to grant approval on the ground that the reservation quote had not been filled. The High Court directed payment of salary to the person appointed in spite of the disapproval of the District Inspector of Schools on the ground that the vacancies had been filled up by general category candidate, as the scheduled caste candidate was not available. This decision in on the facts of that particular case as it was categorically stated before the Court that there were only three scheduled caste candidate, out of which only two appeared and one candidates did not. As such only two appointment of scheduled caste candidates could be made. Accordingly, it is held that the appointment of non-scheduled caste candidate on the reserved post in case of non-availability of scheduled caste candidate could not be held to be illegal. In the present writ petition it is not a case where the scheduled caste candidate was available for appointment of Class IV post. As such in my view the ratio of the said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case. 11. Further a perusal of the order dated 31-5-1984 does not show that any financial approval has been granted or refused by the District Inspector of Schools. The approval of appointment is necessary in a recognized institution. The sanctioned strength of the institution is undisputedly required to be determined by the Educational authorities. 11. Further a perusal of the order dated 31-5-1984 does not show that any financial approval has been granted or refused by the District Inspector of Schools. The approval of appointment is necessary in a recognized institution. The sanctioned strength of the institution is undisputedly required to be determined by the Educational authorities. The appointment made have also to be approved by the Educational authorities even though it may not be covered under the grant in aid scheme as the institution has to follow the norms fixed by the educational authorities in case it is desirous of later getting the institution under grant in aid scheme and as such it cannot be said that the order dated 31-5- 1984 refusing to grant approval to the appointment made on Class IV post is incorrect even if the reservation policy had not been followed. Thus, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools. 12. For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the impugned orders passed by the authorities do not require any interference. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .