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2003 DIGILAW 196 (HP)

Y. S. Parmar University v. State of H. P.

2003-07-22

KAMLESH SHARMA

body2003
JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J. 1. The Petitioner, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Solan (hereinafter called "the University") is aggrieved by the order dated 15.11.1995 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector/Solan, whereby the application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') filed by Respondent No. 3 Chandan Mehta, was allowed and he was held entitled for the enhanced amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 4,000/- per bigha along with other benefits as per award dated 5.10.1990 of the District Judge, Solan, District Solan, which was further upheld by this Court vide order dated 19.5.1994 passed in RFA No. 81 of 1991. 2. It is not in dispute that the land of Respondent No. 3 Chandan Mehta comprised inKhasra No. 198/7/1 and 198/7/2/1 measuring 10 biswas, situated in village Nando, Tehsil and District Solan along with lands of other land owners was acquired for the establishment of the University. The notification under Section 4 of the Act acquiring the land of Chandan Mehta and others was issued on 13.7.1971. He did not prefer reference under Section 18 of the Act, but filed first application under Section 28A of the Act on 1.7.1991 for enhanced compensation on the basis of award dated 4.3.1991 passed by the District Judge Solan in Land Reference Tara Wati v. State. The said application was dismissed as time barred by the Land Acquisition Collector, Solan, vide order dated 4.10.1993, Annexure P-1 to the writ petition. 3. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed another application under Section 28A on 25.8.1994 before the Land Acquisition Collector, Solan for enhancement of compensation basing his claim on another award dated 5.10.1990 of District Judge, Solan, which was subsequently affirmed by this Court by judgment 19.5.1994 passed in RFA No. 81 of 1991. This application was allowed by the impugned order and the objections raised by the University were rejected. One of the objections was that the second application was not maintainable in view of the order dated 4.10.1993 whereby the first application was dismissed. The other objection was that it was hopelessly time barred. This objection was dismissed holding that limitation would run from the date of judgment of this Court, i.e. 19.5.1994. 4. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The other objection was that it was hopelessly time barred. This objection was dismissed holding that limitation would run from the date of judgment of this Court, i.e. 19.5.1994. 4. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The impugned order dated 15.11.1995 cannot be upheld in view of the settled legal position that three months' limitation for filing the application under Section 28A starts from the date of the award of District Judge passed in a reference petition and not from the date of the judgment of the High Court preferred against the award. 5. A Bench of two Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Babua Ram and Ors. v. State of UP. and Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 689, has held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of award by the Civil Court or the Judicial Officer which becomes a judgment and decree under Section 26 of the Act. The same view was reiterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Karnail Singh and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 728. This was further followed by a Bench of three Judges of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumari and Ors. (1995) 2 SC 736, wherein it was held that benefit under Section 28A can be had within three months from the date of award of the reference court on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. But the earlier two decisions in the cases of Babua Ram and Karnail Singh (supra) were over-ruled on the limited question that the right to seek redetermination should confine to the earliest award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28A into the Act. The learned Judges have held that there is nothing in Sub-section (1) of Section 28A of the Act to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award made by the Court. This view of three Judges Bench was affirmed in Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 273. But this Court need not further elaborate on this point as it is not in issue. 6. In Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr. This view of three Judges Bench was affirmed in Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 273. But this Court need not further elaborate on this point as it is not in issue. 6. In Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses and Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr. (1996) 1 SCC 88, it was observed that the following two questions were required to be considered by a larger Bench of five Judges: 1. Whether the award of the Court, i.e., civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate Court under Section 54? 2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree (if answer on Question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28A when Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions? The above stated questions referred to the larger Bench were answered by three Judges Bench in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodigueses and' Anr. v. Land Acquisition Collector and Anr. (1996) 6 SCC 746, in the following terms: 5. ...So far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of the Reference Court's order on the basis whereof the redetermination is sought. In the present case, the redetermination was sought on the basis of the Reference Court's order long after three months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the applications were clearly time barred.... 7. In a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tripura and Anr. v. Roop Chand Das and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 421, it has been again reiterated that period of limitation has to be computed from the date of Court's award under Section 18 on the basis where of redetermination is sought which may or may not be the earliest award. 8. Coming to the case in hand, Chandan Mehta had filed the application under Section 28A of the Act on 25.8.1994 seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of award dated 5.10.1990, which was subsequently affirmed by this Court on 19.5.1994 in RFA No. 81 of 1991. 8. Coming to the case in hand, Chandan Mehta had filed the application under Section 28A of the Act on 25.8.1994 seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of award dated 5.10.1990, which was subsequently affirmed by this Court on 19.5.1994 in RFA No. 81 of 1991. As per the settled legal position, he had a right to file application under Section 28A of the Act within a period of three months from the date of award, i.e. 5.10.1990 passed by the District Judge in a land reference and not from the date of judgment of this Court affirming the said award in appeal. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned order dated 15.11.1995 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Solan set aside on the ground of limitation alone. 9. So far the second point as raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is concerned that the second application was not maintainable in view of the order dated 4.10,1993 whereby the first application was dismissed as time barred, it is also valid. After the dismissal of the first application under Section 28A of the Act whereby redetermination was sought on the basis of award dated 4.3; 1991. Chandan Mehta had no right to file another similar application seeking redetermination on the basis of another earlier award dated 5.10.1990 on the ground that it was subsequently upheld by the High Court vide judgment dated 19.5.1994 in RFA No. 81 of 1991. Moreover, Chandan Mehta had accepted the order dated 4.10.1993 dismissing his first application as time barred and had not filed any appeal against it. 10. Therefore, the present writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.11.1995 passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Solan is set aside with the result that the application of Chandan Mehta under Section 28A of the Act is dismissed as time barred. He is not entitled for redetermination of compensation of his. land under Section 28A of the Act on the basis of award dated 5.10.1990. There is no order as to costs.