ORDER: The revision petitioner who is the mother of the deceased has filed the above criminal revision case against the acquittal judgment dated 11.11.1993 rendered in S.C.No.43 of 1997 by the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore on averments such as that the accused contracted into a bigamous marriage with the petitioner’s daughter, the deceased on 29.5.1994; that demanding money and jewellery from her as dowry the first respondent started ill-treating the deceased for quite sometime; that on 22.6.1994 at about 2.00 p.m. the accused in pursuance of the aforesaid demand picked up a wordy quarrel with the deceased and thereafter with the intention of causing her death poured kerosene upon her and set fire on her resulting in the deceased sustaining extensive burn injuries and dying of shock and septicemia; that charge-sheet was laid against the accused for an offence punishable under Sec.302 of the I.P.C. 2. In the affidavit filed in support of the above criminal revision case, the petitioner would submit that lot of evidence was putforth by the prosecution before the trial Court in proof of the guilt of the accused and in fact the prosecution examined 19 witnesses for oral evidence and marked 22 documents as exhibits for documentary evidence; that on the part of the accused absolutely no evidence has been brought forth and inspite of that the lower Court had arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges as against the accused for an offence punishable under Sec.302 of the I.P.C. Beyond reasonable doubt, thus registering an acquittal Judgment on record. 3. The revision petitioner would further submit that the main ground to discard the prosecution case according to the Courts of Sessions below was that P.W.8 had not certified Ex.P-11 to the effect that the deceased was in a disposing state of mind at the time of making declaration; that it is not the correct enunication of law as it is indeed a hyper-technical view when P.W.9 Magistrate and P.W.8 doctor have categorically admitted that they were satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at that time when P.W.9 recorded her dying declaration. The petitioner would therefore, stating that the trial Court eschewing all the corroborative materials placed and circumstances shown in the case, has unreasonably and in an erroneous manner acquitted the accused and on such grounds has come forward to file the above criminal revision case to set aside the judgment of the lower Court as aforementioned. 4. During arguments the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, besides narrating the facts involved in the above case would further submit that the trial Court has given a finding that the doctor made endorsement in the dying declaration has not stated whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind while giving her statement; that in a criminal case, the accused should raise all their points during the cross-examination and that they cannot raise them during arguments; that the accused failed to raise such pleas when there was no defence putforth during the cross-examination of the witness concerned and hence he cannot raise the point at a belated stage; that the statement of the deceased had been recorded immediately after the occurrence. The learned counsel would also cite two judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the first one reported in Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State of Gujarat, (2002)8 Supreme 419 and the second one reported in P. V.Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003)5 Supreme 98 . 5. So far as the first judgment cited above reported in Kanaksingh Raisingh Rav v. State of Gujarat, (2002)8 Supreme 419 is concerned, on facts of a murder by pouring kerosene and setting ablaze his wife, while assessing the Evidence Act particularly Sec.32 regarding the dying declaration given to a doctor since the Judicial Magistrate was not available, their Lordships have held that in a case of dying declaration recorded by a doctor found voluntary, and truthful, it can be made the sole basis of conviction under Sec.302, I.P.C. To quote from the judgment it is held: "In our opinion, law is settled, i.e., if the declaration is made voluntarily and truthfully by a person who is physically in a condition to make such statement, then there is no impediment in relying on such a declaration. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W.5 the doctor very clearly shows that the deceased was conscious and was medically in a fit state to make a statement. In the instant case, the evidence of P.W.5 the doctor very clearly shows that the deceased was conscious and was medically in a fit state to make a statement. It is because of the fact that a Judicial Magistrate was not available at that point of time, he was requested to record the statement which he did. His evidence in regard to the state of mind or the physical condition of the deceased make such a declaration has not been challenged in the cross-examination. That being so it should be held that the deceased was in a state of mind to make a declaration as held by the Courts below. The next question for our consideration is whether this statement is voluntary and truthful. It is not the case of the defence that when she made the statement either she was surrounded by any of her close relative who could have prompted her to make an incorrect or false statement. In the absence of the same so far as the voluntariness of the statement is concerned, there can be no doubt because the deceased was free from external influence or pressure. So far as the truthfulness of the statement is concerned, the doctor (P.W.5) has stated that she has made the said statement which, as noted above, is not challenged in the cross-examination. The deceased in her brief statement has, in clear terms, stated that because of the quarrel between her and the accused, the accused had poured kerosene and set her on fire which, in our opinion, cannot be doubted." 6. In the second judgment cited above, which is also concerned with Sec.32 of the Evidence Act pertaining to the dying declaration, their Lordships have held that ‘dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness, Court has to be on guard that such a statement was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination and that deceased was in a fit state of mind. No absolute rule of law that dying declaration could not form sole basis of conviction unless it was corroborated. No absolute rule of law that dying declaration could not form sole basis of conviction unless it was corroborated. Rule requiring corroboration was merely a rule of prudence so far as the principles governing dying declaration.‘ On such arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner would seek to allow the Revision setting aside the judgment dated 11.11.1997 passed by the Court of Sessions, Vellore in S.C.No.43 of 1997, further seeking to convict the accused and sentence him to such punishment for the offence punishable under Sec.302, I.P.C. 7. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent would submit that it is only a revision against the acquittal judgment and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution; that regarding the power of revision against acquittal, the learned senior counsel would cite a judgment reported in Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh and another,1968 Crl.L.J. 865, wherein an appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Patna setting aside the acquittal of the appellant ordered by the first Additional Sessions Judge, Gaya and directing its retrial, while answering the question whether the High Court in exercising its revisional powers under Sec.439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acted in accordance with the principles settled by the Apex Court for interference with acquittal by way of revision filed by a private party, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held: "Looking to all the circumstances that have been brought to our notice, we are satisfied that the Sessions Judge acted within his rights in deciding the case which to us appears also to be somewhat doubtful in many respects and the High Court was therefore in error in taking upon itself the duty of hearing a revision application as if it was an appeal and setting aside the acquittal not by convicting the accused but reaching the same result indirectly by ordering a retrial. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand." 8. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand." 8. Continuing to argue, the learned counsel would apprise this Court that evidence has been thoroughly appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge; that it is not as though he was acquitted on the only ground that the dying declaration did not reveal whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give such statement; that P.W.3 and P.W.4 who are the parents of the deceased admitted that they were present at the hospital till the death of the deceased; that the deceased was tutored to give such statement; that P.Ws.3 and 4 were against the marriage of the deceased with the accused since the accused belongs to a different caste; that they did not even attend her marriage; that the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners denotes that there may be on endorsement by the doctor. However, the Magistrate must be satisfied that the dying declaration was in a fit state of mind though there may not be a certificate from the doctor; that the dying declaration was recorded at 4.30 p.m. and it reached the Magistrate after six hours wherein the distance is only one km.; that legally the proposition given by the Sessions Judge was correct; that it is a case wherein the parents of the deceased were against her marriage with the accused and therefore, they were anxious to implicate the accused. 9. The learned senior counsel would also cite the following judgments reported in (i) Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram,1974 (Crl.) 168; (ii) Satyendra Nath Dutta and another v. Ram Narain,1975 Crl.L.J. 577; (iii) Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.R.Singh and others v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and another,2002 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1448. 10. So far as the first judgment is concerned, it is held: “The High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. 10. So far as the first judgment is concerned, it is held: “The High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under Secs.435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, as if it is hearing an appeal in spite of the wide language under Sec.435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding sentence or order sand as to the regularity of any proceeding and also in spite of the fact that under Secs.439 it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a Court of appeals under Sec.423, Criminal Procedure Code. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system.” 11. In the second judgment cited above it is held: “Sec .439(1) which deals with the revisional powers of the High Court provides that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal. As the Court of appeal is entitled under Sec.423(1)(a) to reverse an order of acquittal or to direct a retrial, the High Court in the exercise of its revisional powers would also be entitled to record a conviction by reversing the order of acquittal. But Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.439 provides expressly that nothing contained in the section”shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.” 12. In the last judgment cited above, it is held: “That High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial Court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec.401, Crl.P.C. against a judgment of acquittal. The judgment of the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec.401, Crl.P.C. against a judgment of acquittal. The judgment of the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial Court took the opposite view. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the Court of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such case is not warranted." On such arguments, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent would seek to dismiss the above revision case. 13. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such case is not warranted." On such arguments, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent would seek to dismiss the above revision case. 13. In consideration of the facts pleaded, having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, it could be assessed that the case has been registered as against the first respondent/accused on the death of the daughter of the revision petitioner in an incident alleged to have occurred at her newly set up residence after getting married with the accused, the first respondent herein, and becoming the second wife of the accused, since admittedly he was already married and had a wife living, and the complaint has been lodged by the deceased herself with the police on her being admitted to the hospital by her husband himself and on intimation sent to the police and the jurisdictional Magistrate having been requested, the deceased gave a voluntary dying declaration before the Magistrate as to the cause of injuries and in both, she has directly and strongly alleged that there was a quarrel in between herself and her husband on account of demand of dowry and regarding divorcing the first wife and when the wordy altercation became serious, he poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire resulting in the injuries found on the body of the deceased having come to be sustained which was certified by the Doctor as 100% on account of which she died later. 14. In this context, it has become incumbent on the part of this Court to go into the relevant factors connected to Sec.32 of the Evidence Act relating to the dying declaration of the deceased, leading to the cause of her deaths later. 14. In this context, it has become incumbent on the part of this Court to go into the relevant factors connected to Sec.32 of the Evidence Act relating to the dying declaration of the deceased, leading to the cause of her deaths later. The salient features of dying declaration and the requirements of the recording of the same, since some doubts have been created by the trial Judge regarding the genuineness of the dying declaration stating that P.W.8 Doctor had not certified Ex.P-11 dying declaration to the effect that the deceased was in a disposing state of mind at the time of making the declaration before P.W.9 Magistrate and in fact, this so called defect seems to have preyed heavily on the mind of the Judge to discard the entire dying declaration, so as to arrive at a conclusion to acquit the accused, without placing reliance on the vital aspects of evidence made available in this case i.e., the dying declaration and therefore it has become highly necessary on the part of this Court to go into the details on the subject of dying declaration and the warranting procedures to be adopted at the time of recording of the dying declaration by the Magistrate so as to add strength to the dying declaration and the circumstances under which the dying declaration came into existence in the case in hand. 15. Generally the law on the subject of the dying declaration has been built on the Maixim that, "no one would be willing to meet his/her maker with the lie in his/her lip" and therefore, all the other legal requirements that are necessary and mandatory for the proof of a fact in a Court of law by oral evidence, that is by whomsoever the statement has been made and recorded, the person, who gave the statement and the person who recorded the same should be examined on oath in the witness box, with due opportunity for cross-examination by the other side when alone the facts alleged would become the evidence for appreciation on application of which, the decision could be arrived at by the Judge. 16. But, all these legal requirements which are generally necessary for the fact to take the place of evidence are not at all necessary in the case of a dying declaration because of the Maxim extracted supra. 16. But, all these legal requirements which are generally necessary for the fact to take the place of evidence are not at all necessary in the case of a dying declaration because of the Maxim extracted supra. The upper forums of law, particularly the Hon’ble Apex Court has, time and again held that conviction could be based solely on the dying declaration, without any other corroborative evidence made available and such is the value of the dying declaration in evidence and the case in hand is not an exception to this rule. 17. While so, on facts, the prosecution case is that the accused husband in the height of a wordy altercation with the deceased in their separate abode when she started questioning his demand of dowry and regarding the divorcing of his first wife, he poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on flames is the definite case lodged by the deceased herself in her complaint and there is no denying of the fact that it was the husband, who was present at the time the petitioner lodged the complaint and even Ex.P-7 the accident register would clearly show that the injured was accompanied by her husband only. 18. In the above scenario, the injured deceased has given the complaint to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Guidyatham who rushed to the spot and has recorded the same, based on which, Ex.P-19 F.I.R. has been framed. Then on intimation sent to P.W.9 Magistrate, he would come and record Ex.P-11 dying declaration, of course, following the basic norms of recording the same, in which the Magistrate has clearly stated that the deponent was conscious and was in a position to give statement, meaning thereby, that she was in a sound disposing state of mind. Moreover, the Medical Officer in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded has also endorsed the dying declaration to the effect that, “patient conscious. Dying declaration taken in my presence, duly signing the said original statement”. It is this dying declaration that the lower Court comments that it not been certified to the effect that the injured was in a disposing state of mind and based on this aspect alone as the main factor and pointing out certain other minor inconsistencies, the learned Judge was able to arrive at his conclusion to not only discard the dying declaration, but to register an acquittal judgment. 19. 19. Now the point for consideration is whether legally the leaned Judge could discard or reject Ex.P-11 dying declaration and whether there had been any legal necessity or compelling circumstance on the part of the learned Judge to reject the dying declaration in consideration of the law on the subject as discussed supra and whether this has not served as the main cause for acquittal resulting in grave miscarriage of justice in deciding the above criminal case by the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore. In short whether the law on the subject of dying declaration has been properly applied by the trial Judge for a valid decision to be arrived at, particularly in view of the proposition of law on the subject being that the dying declaration of the deceased itself could from the basis for conviction of the accused, even in the event no corroborative evidence is adduced on the part of the prosecution. on the part of the deceased while she was struggling for life nor the dying declaration was made which is an admitted case on the part of the defence and while so, in view of the position of law being that the dying declaration could alone form the basis for conviction, the trial Judge is not justified in rejecting the dying declaration, in spite of it being cogent and coherent and to the point that harassment by the newly married husband for whom it is the second marriage and the deceased, a graduate, demanded to keep up his promise to divorce the first wife but himself asking her to get dowry from her parents, for doing so, not only he poured the kerosene on her, but also set her on fire which is the definite case of the deceased in the complaint recorded by the S.I. of Police, Gudiyatham and the same has been unequivocally repeated in her dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate and countersigned by the duty doctor both declaring that the patient was conscious and which stood the test of recording dying declaration and in such a straight forward case put up by the prosecution, based on such strong evidence, the trial Judge is not at all justified in rejecting the whole of the dying declaration and ultimately allowing the case of the prosecution to end up in acquittal of the accused simply stating that in the dying declaration, it has not been mentioned that the deponent was in a disposing state of mind. 21. On the contrary of the facts and circumstances encircling the whole affair while pointing to the guilt of the accused particularly establishing the genuineness of the confession statement made by the deceased on a flimsy reason assigned which is not mandatory in law rejecting the whole of the dying declaration as unreliable is nothing short of an act resulting in grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, it has become necessary on the part of this Court to cause its interference into the decision of the trial Judge in acquitting the accused in the case in S.C.No.43 of 1997 and therefore it has become incumbent on the part of this Court to set aside the Judgment dated 11.11.1997 rendered in this case by the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore. 22. 22. At the same time, this Court is of the view that while declaring the law on the subject of dying declaration in consideration of which only a different conclusion could be arrived at regarding Ex.P-11 dying declaration made on the part of the deceased and therefore in application of dying declaration in evidence for proper appreciation in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case and the other evidence made available both oral and documentary, it is the duty of the trial Judge to arrive at his own conclusion on an overall consideration of all the relevant factors and law and therefore it has become necessary on the part of this Court to remand the above criminal revision case for a decision to be made by the same Court based on such evidence and the clarification rendered regarding the dying declaration borne by Ex.P-11 and hence the following order: In result, (i) The above criminal revision case succeeds and is allowed setting aside the judgment dated 11.11.1997 rendered in S.C.No.43 of 1997 by the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore; (ii) However, the case is remanded to the trial Judge for re-consideration in the manner required under law and in the light of Ex.P-11 dying declaration with further opportunity for the counsel for both to argue the matter on materials already made available and to arrive at a valid decision on merits and in accordance with law; (iii) Since it is a long pending matter, a further direction is issued to the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore to expedite the remaining procedures as contemplated above in a time bound manner and deliver the judgment at any cost within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.