JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J (Oral).: The above-noted Civil Writ Petition No. 260 of 1993 as well as Regular second Appeal No. 378 of 2000, are being disposed of by this single judgment. 2. The parties are being hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed in Civil Writ Petition No. 260 of 1993. 3. Land measuring 5 bighas comprising of khasra No. 309/3/2 of village Sataun, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur was allotted to the petitioner Shiva Nand under the HP. Utilization of Surplus Area Scheme, 1974 (for short: the Act) vide Patta No. 1224 dated 25.3.1976 by the Collector, Sirmaur. This land has now been depicted as khata/Khatoni No. 78/125 and khasra No. 458/309 as per jamabandi for the year 1985-1986. 4 Respondents 3 to 6 who are reaf brothers of the petitioner, on 23.11.1992 approached the Deputy Commissioner, Sirmaur exercising the powers of the Commissioner under paragraph 14-A of the Scheme by way of a revision petition assailing the order by virtue of which the land was allotted to the petitioner. The Commissioner after holding the inquiry vide order dated 8.1.1993 (Annexure P1) cancelled the allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner by holding that since the father of the petitioner was alive at the time of allotment, the petitioner was not eligible for allotment of the land under the Scheme in view of the definition of landless person" and "eligible person" under section 3(h) and Section 3(1), respectively, of the HP. Ceiling on Land; Holdings Act, 1972 (for short: the Act) 5. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court by virtue of the present writ petition under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India assailing the order of the Commissioner as at Annexure P1 on the ground that while revoking the allotment in favour of the petitioner, the Commissioner has relied upon the definition of "landless person" and "Eligible person" which came to be introduced in the Act by way of amendment carried putout in the year, 1987. 6. 6. Before respondents 3 to 6 had approached the deputy Commissioner by way of a revision petition under paragraph 14-A of the Scheme, they had filed a suit being Civil Suit No. 9/1 of 1997/91 on 19.6.1991 before the Sub Judge 1st Class, Paonta, for a declaration to the effect that they had the present petitioner are the owners of the land in equal shares in view of the oral sale dated 3.10.1964 in favour of their father Sahi Ram and further that the entries in the revenue record showing the State of H.P. as owners of the land and the subsequent allotment of the same in favour of the petitioner under the Scheme was bad. By way of consequential relief, permanent injunction restraining the petitioner and the State -defendant from interfering in their possession w as claimed. Such suit was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge, vide judgment and decree dated 13.3.1997. The appeal preferred by the respondents 3 to 6 being Civil Appeal No. 12-N/13 of 1997 was also dismissed by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur on 6.5.2000. Though in the Civil Suit and in the appeal it was held that the land in question had been purchased by Sahi Ram father of the petitioner and respondents No. 3 to 6 orally in the year 1964, the relief of declaration and injunction was refused in favour of respondents 3 to 6 on the ground that since the land stood vested in the State under the Act and subsequently allotted to the petitioner under the Scheme, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of either vestment of the land under the Act or the Question of validity or otherwise of the allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner under the Scheme in view of Section 18 of the Act. The learned District Judge further held that the respondents No. 3 to 6 had neither fecus standi nor the cause of action to file the suit since Sahi Ram, their father was alive as on the date of filing of the suit and during his life time respondents No. 3 to 6 could not have claimed any title or right in the land alleged to have been orally purchased by him in the year 1964. 7. 7. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Paonta Sahib as well as the learned District Judge, Sirmaur, respondents No.3 to 6 have come up before this Court by way of a second appeal being RSA No. 378 of 2000. Such appeal came to be admitted on the substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission on 16.8.2000. 8. The case put-forth by respondents 1 and 2 is that the Deputy Commissioner exercising the powers of the Commissioner had the power and jurisdiction to revise the order vide paragraph 14-A of the Scheme. It is further contended that the amendment carried out in the Act by Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 in so far as the definitions of "landless person" in Section 3(h) and "eligible person" in Section 3(1) is concerned, the same would operate retrospectively and as such the allotment was rightly cancelled by the Commissioner exercising the revisional powers. - 9. There is no dispute that the land in question originally was owned and . possessed by one Amar Singh son of Dhianu Ram of village Sataun. Such land upon having been declared surplus came to be vested in the state under the Act. Be it stated that the vestment of the land in the State under the Act was neither assailed by the said Amar Singh either by way of a writ petition or by taking recourse to the, provisions of the Act before a competent Forum or by Sahi Ram, the father of the petitioner and respondents 3 to 6 or even by respondents 3 to 6 at any time, save and except, that the suit for declaration was filed by respondents 3 to 6 as aforesaid. In view of the fact that the vestment of the land in the State under the Act never came to be assailed, the question of such vestment has become final and cannot be gone into in the present proceedings. 10. Section 3(h) of the Act, pertaining to the definition of "landless person" as originally enacted reads as under: "Landless person1 means a person who, holding no land for agricultural purposes, whether as an owner or a tenant, earns his livelihood principally by manual labour on land and intends to take the profession of agriculture and is capable of cultivating the land personally" 11. By virtue of an amendment vide Amendment Act No. 11 of the 1987, a proviso came to be added to section 3(h) of the Act as under: "provided that a person whose father is alive or whose annual income from all sources exceeds RS. 3000/- shall not be deemed to be a landless person" 12. Similarly, by virtue of the Amendment Act No.11 of 1987 clause (1) came to be added in section 3 of the Act for the purpose of making some other persons eligible for allotment of land under the Act and the Scheme framed there under. 13. Vide clause(1) added by Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 "other eligible persons" have been defined as under: "other eligible person1 means a person,- (i) who, holding for agricultural purposes land less than one acre whether as an owner or a tenant, earns his livelihood principally by manual labour on land and intends to take the profession of agriculture and is capable of cultivating the land personally; (ii) whose father is not alive; and (iii) whose annual income from all sources does not exceed Rs. 3,000/- and shall not include a person who holds a share or a portion of estate jointly owned or cultivated by two or more persons." 14. In the Act, which was in force at the time of allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner, admittedly, neither the definition of "other eligible person" existed nor the proviso to Section 3(h) of the Act existed. Under the original provisions, the petitioner, whose father though was alive, was a landless person within the meaning of Section 3(h) of the act as originally existed and as such was eligible for allotment of the land under the Act and the Scheme framed there under. The amended definitions of "landless person" incorporated vide Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 has been given effect to from the date of commence meant of the original Act of 1972, cannot be put into service for the purpose of divesting a person of right which has already vested in it. 15. The amended definitions of "landless person" incorporated vide Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 has been given effect to from the date of commence meant of the original Act of 1972, cannot be put into service for the purpose of divesting a person of right which has already vested in it. 15. It is by now well settled that unless the term of the statute expressly so provides or-necessarily requires it, retrospective operation is not to be given to it so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation of impose a new liability otherwise than as the matter of procedure. In other words, a statute is required to be interpreted. If possible, so as to respect the vested rights. 16. Though the amendments to the Act vide Amendment Act No, 11 of 1987 have been given retrospective effect from the date the Acct as originally enacted came into force, the question arising for determination is - whether the legislature intended to take away the vested substantial rights which had accrued to the petitioner and other similarly situated persons. 17. In Dinesh Kumar v. State of H.P. and others {1994 (suppl.) Sim. L.C, 385} where a provision was added to sub-section (9) of Section 104, H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 vide Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 in the following terms:- "Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to such land which is either owned by or is vested in the Government under law, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, and is leased out to any person." 18. Such amendment was given retrospective effect from the date of coming into force of the principal act of 1972. A question arose whether on the basis of such amendment the persons to whom proprietary rights were conferred prior to the amendment could be divested of such proprietary rights on the basis of the amendment made in 1987. Answering the question in the negative Seamed Single Judge of this Court held that such persons who were conferred proprietary rights prior to the amendment of 1987 could not be divested of such proprietary rights. 19. The above ratio applies to the facts of the present case. Answering the question in the negative Seamed Single Judge of this Court held that such persons who were conferred proprietary rights prior to the amendment of 1987 could not be divested of such proprietary rights. 19. The above ratio applies to the facts of the present case. The land stood vested in the petitioner as a result of allotment made in is favour under the Scheme much prior to the Amendment Act No. 11 of 1987 and having derived a vested interest therein, he could not be divested there from on the basis of the amendments carried out in 1987. 20. Another contention raised on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 is that the petitioner had obtained the allotment of the land in his favour by suppression of material facts that is, with regard to his father being alive at the relevant time. This objection has no merit, inasmuch as, under the provisions, which existed at the time of the allotment of the land in favour of the petitioner, the fact whether the father of the petitioner was alive or not was not material. Therefore, on-disclosure of the fact by the petitioner that his father was alive would not be a suppression of material fact. This objection would be relevant only after the definition of the "landless person" was amended vide Act No. 11 of 1987. 21. Since in passing the impugned order, the Commissioner has primarily relied upon the definition of "landless person" and "other eligible person" as contained in Sections 3(h) and 3(1), respectively, of the Act, as amended by Act No. 11 of 1987, by giving retrospective effect to such definitions, the impugned order as at Annexure P1 of the Commissioner cannot be sustained since it has divested the petitioner of a already vested right Such order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. : 22. In view of the fact that the allotment of the land under the Scheme in favour of the petitioner has been held to be valid and its revocation vide Annexure P1 has been held to be wrong, the first substantial question of law arising in R.3A No. 378 of 2000 is - whether Civil Court has the jurisdiction to go into the question of vesting of land in the State under the Act? 23. 23. There is no denying that the power to declare a land as surplus and its consequent investment in the State under the provisions of the H.P. Ceiling on land Holdings Act, 1972, lies with the Collector. An order passed by the Collector declaring the land as surplus and its consequent investment in the State is appeal able under Section 20 of the said Act. Such appeal lies before the Divisional Commissioner. A revision lies to the Financial Commissioner against the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner in appeal, 24. Section 18 of the H.P. Ceiling on land Holdings Act, 1972, bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with any matter which under the Act is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, Divisional Commissioner or the Collector. This Section reads: "18. Bar of jurisdiction- (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to- (a) entertain or proceed with a suit for specific performance of a contract for transfer of land which affects the rights o the State Government to the surplus area under his Act or (b) settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector. (1) No order of the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector made under or in pursuance of this Act, shall be called in question in any court." 25. In the suit filed by the respondents 3 to 6, out of which the present second appeal has arisen, the relief of declaration as prayed for by them cannot be possibly granted unless and until the orders of the Collector declaring the land as surplus and its consequent vestment in the State as well as its subsequent allotment in favour of the petitioner under the Scheme are set aside. Such orders of the Collector are net open to challenge by way of a Civil Suit in view of the bar contained in Section 18, quoted above. 26. Such orders of the Collector are net open to challenge by way of a Civil Suit in view of the bar contained in Section 18, quoted above. 26. This Court in Rajeshwar Singh and others v. State of H.P. and others, Civil Suit No. 83 of 1991, decided on 7.8.2002, while dealing with the question of bar of Civil Courts jurisdiction under Section 18 of the H.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, has held:- "According to the scheme of the Act ail matters pertaining to declaration of surplus area, amount of compensation payable in respect thereof, taking of possession of such land and all other matters connected and ancillary thereto a re to be dealt with by the officers/authorities specified therein and the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of such matters is barred." 27. The two Courts below, therefore, have rightly held that the suit filed by the respondents No. 3 to 6 was not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 28. There is yet another respect of the case. Admittedly, Sahi Ram, the father of the petitioner and respondents 3 to 6 was alive as on the date of the filing of the suit. Admittedly, he died on 3.10/1993 during the pendency of the suit. It was the case of the respondents No. 3 to 6 themselves that the land in question had been orally purchased by their father in the year 1964, The respondents No. 3 to 6, therefore, could not have claimed any right, title or interest in such land during the life time of their father. They could have succeeded to the same and derived an interest, title or right therein only after the death of their father. Therefore, the learned District Judge has rightly held that the respondents No. 3 to 6 were not having the locus standi as on the date of the filing of the suit and as such, the suit at their instance was not maintainable. 29. In view of the fact that neither the Civil Court has the jurisdiction nor the respondents No. 3 to 6 had the locus standi to maintain the suit on the day the same was instituted, other questions of law on which the present appeal No. 378 of 2000 was admitted need not be gone into as they no more survive for consideration. 30. 30. Resultantly, the writ petition being Civil Writ petition No. 260 of 1993 is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.1.1993 (Annexure P1) passed by the deputy Commissioner exercising the powers of the Commissioner exercising the powers of the Commissioner under the Scheme is set aside and the allotment of the land as originally made under the Scheme in favour of the petitioner is restored. The appeal being Regular Second Appeal No. 378 of 2000 preferred by respondents No. 3 to 6 is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 31. All interim orders passed in the Writ Petition and Regular Second Appeal shall stand vacated.