JUDGMENT J. P. DEV ADHAR, J. :- As the issues raised in these two petitions arise out of common transaction and common proceedings, both these petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. Facts in Writ Petition No. 2599 of 2002 2. The moot point raised by the Commissioner of Sales Tax in this petition is, on a rectification application filed under section 62 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 (BST Act for short) by a third party who is not directly affected by the adjudication, whether, the Tribunal can recall its order passed under section 55 of the BST Act and rehear the matter on merits? 3. The facts narrated in the petition are as follows: Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL for short) - the respondent No. 2 herein, is engaged in the business of refining and marketing petroleum products. The BPCL inter alia manufactures SKO (LABFS), [LINEAR ALKYL BENEZENE FEED STOCK] ordinarily known as kerosene and sells the same to various parties. The said kerosene manufactured by BPCL contains N-Paraffin. The Reliance Industries Limited (RIL for short) has a Petro Chemical plant at Patalganga wherein Petro chemical products are manufactured. RIL requires N-paraffin for use in its plant. 4. Pursuant to a contract dated 24-8-1992 entered into by and in between BPCL and RIL, BPCL was to supply kerosene containing N-paraffin through a pipeline from BPCLs refinery at Mahur to the plant of RIL at Patalganga. RIL extracted N-paraffin from the said kerosene and returned balance kerosene to BPCL in the return stream. RIL retained 5% of the kerosene in the form of N-paraffin and residual kerosene of 95% is returned by RIL to BPCL. 5. Section 2(35) and (36) of the BST Act read with Rule 4 of BST Rules, 1959 provides that the goods returned by a purchaser or a seller to the dealer within the time stipulated therein is not to be taken into account for determining the turnover of purchase or turnover of sales, as the case may be. In the instant case, there was a dispute as to whether the kerosene returned by RIL after extracting N-Paraffin could be considered as "goods returned" within the meaning of Rule 4 of BST Rules 1959. In the instant case, there was a dispute as to whether the kerosene returned by RIL after extracting N-Paraffin could be considered as "goods returned" within the meaning of Rule 4 of BST Rules 1959. According to BPCL, kerosene with N-paraffin supplied by it to RIL as well as kerosene without N- Paraffin returned by RIL to it were falling within the category of kerosene under B.I.S. Specification and since "kerosene" at the relevant time was covered under Schedule entry C-P-I (26) of BST Act, it was wholly exempt from the tax under Notification entry No. 160 issued under section 41 of BST Act. In other words, according to BPCL, the three transactions namely (1) sale of kerosene with N-Paraffin by BPCL to RIL (2) return of kerosene without N-Paraffin by RIL to BPCL and (3) sale of returned kerosene by BPCL to third parties were exempt from payment of tax in view of the aforesaid notification. 6. With a view to obtain determination on the above disputed questions, the BPCL on 21-4-1992 made an application before the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 52 of the BST Act seeking adjudication on the following issues : 1.Whether the sale of SKO (LABFS) by BPCL to RIL (sale invoice No. 000900 dated 25-4-1992) is liable to tax? 2.Whether the return stream i.e. return of kerosene by RIL to BPCL (sale return credit note No. 147857 dated 1-5-1992) would be legally allowable as sales returns or whether that return will amount to purchase of kerosene by BPCL from RIL? 3.Whether subsequent sale of kerosene affected by BPCL (sale invoice No. 357494 dated 21-5-1994) out of return stream is liable to tax? 7. The Commissioner of Sales Tax after hearing BPCL passed an order on 14-3-1996 determining the questions referred to him as follows: 1.Sale of kerosene by BPCL to RIL under Sale Invoice No. 000900 dated 25-4-1992 being covered by Entry No. 26 in Part I of Schedule C to the BST Act read with Entry No. 160 of Notification issued under section 41 of the BST Act, there would be exemption from payment of tax. 2.On the basis of the admission made by BPCL that RIL extracted N-Paraffin from the kerosene supplied, held that return of kerosene by RIL to BPCL under Sale Return Credit Note No. 147857 dated 1-5-1992 would not be legally allowable as sales return, but it would amount to sale of kerosene (without N-paraffin) by RIL to BPCL, but not taxable as per the aforesaid Exemption Notification. 3. Sale of kerosene (without N-Paraffin) by BPCL to third parties is also not liable to tax, as per the aforesaid Exemption Notification. Thus, the Commissioner, held that all the above three transactions were sale transactions, but sale of kerosene being exempt under entry No. 160 of Notification issued under section 41 of the BST Act, there would be no requirement to pay sales tax. 8. Being aggrieved by the above adjudication order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax pertaining to question No.2, BPCL filed an appeal before the Tribunal under section 55 of the BST Act. There being no dispute regarding the determination of Question Nos. 1 and 3, the appeal filed by the BPCL was restricted to the determination pertaining to Question No.2 only. The Tribunal after hearing BPCL passed an order on 21-4-2001 confirming the order of the Commissioner of Sales Tax by holding that the kerosene returned by RIL to BPCL cannot be said to be goods returned within the meaning of Rule 4 of the BST Rules. The Tribunal held that in view of the admission on the part of BPCL that an important ingredient namely N-paraffin is extracted by RIL from the kerosene supplied by the BPCL, the kerosene without N-Paraffin received by BPCL from RIL cannot be said to be return of the goods originally supplied by BPCL to RIL. In other words, the Tribunal held that the return of kerosene (without N-Paraffin) would constitute sale of kerosene by RIL to BPCL. 9. In view of certain errors noticed in the order passed by the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001, BPCL filed a rectification application No. 41 of 2001 seeking rectification of the said errors. The BPCL also filed a Reference Application No. 95 of 2001 seeking reference on the question of law arising out of the order passed by the Tribunal on 21-4-2001. 9. In view of certain errors noticed in the order passed by the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001, BPCL filed a rectification application No. 41 of 2001 seeking rectification of the said errors. The BPCL also filed a Reference Application No. 95 of 2001 seeking reference on the question of law arising out of the order passed by the Tribunal on 21-4-2001. In the meantime, RIL, respondent No.3 herein, also filed a Rectification Application No. 30 of 2001 seeking rectification of the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 inter alia on the ground that the said order directly affects RIL, who is the opposite party to the transaction between BPCL and RIL. It was contended that treating return of goods by the opposite party to the transaction as sale without hearing the opposite party, in violation of the principles of natural justice and in breach of Rule 62 of BST Rules 1959 was an error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 be rectified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 62 of BST Rules 1959. After hearing BPCL as well as RIL, the Tribunal by its order dated 16-4-2002 allowed the rectification application of RIL. The Tribunal held that RIL was directly affected by the adjudication and, therefore, under Rule 62 of BST Rules, 1959, it was mandatory to hear RIL before passing the final order. It was held that the mistake of not hearing RIL before passing the order under section 55, was an error apparent on the face of the record and with a view to rectify the said error apparent on the face of the record, the Tribunal recalled its judgment dated 21-4-2001 so as to pass fresh order on merits after hearing RIL. As the Rectification Application filed by the RIL was allowed and the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 was recalled, the Rectification Application No. 41 of 2001 as well as the Reference Application No. 95 of 2001 filed by the BPCL were dismissed as in fructuous. 10. As the Rectification Application filed by the RIL was allowed and the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 was recalled, the Rectification Application No. 41 of 2001 as well as the Reference Application No. 95 of 2001 filed by the BPCL were dismissed as in fructuous. 10. Challenging the said order of the Tribunal dated 16-4-2002 wherein the Rectification application of RIL was allowed, the Commissioner of Sales Tax has filed the aforesaid writ petition No. 2599 of 2002, whereas, BPCL has filed Writ Petition No. 3198 of 2002, challenging the order of the Tribunal also dated 16-4-2002 wherein the Rectification Application No. 41 of 2001 as well as the Reference Application No. 95 of 2001, filed by BPCL have been dismissed as in fructuous. 11. Mr. Bharucha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, at the outset, fairly stated that in the present case, the Commissioner of Sales Tax is not averse to hearing RIL, however, the anxiety on the part of the Commissioner of Sales Tax was that if the power of the Tribunal to rectify its own order under section 62 of the BST Act is construed widely, so as to permit the Tribunal to recall its own order and pass fresh order on merits after rehearing the parties, then it will open the flood gate and large number of applications would be filed by persons claiming that they are the affected persons and seek recall to the original order of the Tribunal, thereby frustrating the very object and purpose of section 62 of the BST Act. He submitted that the scope of section 62 of the BST Act is limited to correction of an error apparent on the face of the record. He submitted that the Tribunal had no power to withdraw the order in original, as it would amount to reviewing its own order which is not permissible in law. He submitted that the scope of section 62 of the BST Act is limited to correction of an error apparent on the face of the record. He submitted that the Tribunal had no power to withdraw the order in original, as it would amount to reviewing its own order which is not permissible in law. He relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of T. S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer, Company Circle IV, Bombay vs. Volkart Brothers and others reported in 82 I.T.R 50(SC) and Satyanarayan Laxminarayanan Hegde and others vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 and submitted that the mistake apparent on the record must be obvious and patent mistake and the error, that has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error, apparent on the face of the record. 12. Mr. Bharucha then relied upon the decisions of the Delhi High Court in the case of J. N. Sahani vs. I. T.A. T. and others reported in 257 1TR 16 and decision in the case of Deeksha Suri vs. I. T.A. T. reported in 102 ELT 524 and submitted that review of its own order by the Tribunal is forbidden in law and the Tribunal cannot be permitted to achieve the said object by exercising its power of rectification of mistake. 13. Mr. Bharucha further submitted that RIL is a stranger to the proceedings and is not a party directly affected. He submitted that every case involves sale and purchase and in every case, there are two parties involved. In case of proceedings relating to one party, the other party is not directly affected. Relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of India Tyre and Rubber Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. C. T.O. reported in 47 STC 273, he submitted that RIL is not directly affected by the order, therefore, the rectification ought not to have been allowed at the instance of RIL. He submitted that the Tribunal committed an error in allowing the rectification application of RIL, after holding that the Notification Entry No. 160 covers both the sales/purchases of kerosene as held by this Court in the matter of Bashir Oil vs. Mah. S. T. reported in 90 STC 195. He submitted that the Tribunal committed an error in allowing the rectification application of RIL, after holding that the Notification Entry No. 160 covers both the sales/purchases of kerosene as held by this Court in the matter of Bashir Oil vs. Mah. S. T. reported in 90 STC 195. It was submitted that due to the exemption on sales/purchases of kerosene under Notification Entry No. 160 applicable for the year 1992-93, the order in appeal dated 21-4-2001 did not impose any tax liability on RIL and, therefore, RIL cannot be said to be directly affected by the order passed by the Tribunal and, therefore, the rectification application at the instance of RIL ought not to have been entertained. 14. Mr. Bharucha further submitted that the Rule 62 of the BST Rules, 1959, contemplates notice to a person against whom the tax liability arises directly under the order proposed to be passed by the appellate authority and not if the liability arises as a consequence of the said order. It was submitted that if RIL is affected by the demand cum show cause notice issued to it, then the same can be contested and if the order is adverse, it can be agitated by adopting appeal/revisional proceedings. Alternatively, it was submitted by Mr. Bharucha that if the Court holds that RIL is required to be heard, then the hearing should be in the first instance held by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and be limited to the issue as to whether the sales return amounts to a sale by RIL and not on other issues as RIL cannot be in any manner said to be concerned with the other two issues raised by the BPCL in its application under section 52 of the BST Act. 15. Mr. B. C. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for RIL, on the other hand, submitted that in the instant case, BPCL and RIL had entered into a 10 year contract for supplies and under the contract it was RIL who was to pay all sales tax of both purchases by RIL and sales by BPCL as also further sales by RIL, if any. He submitted that the adjudication order of the Commissioner under section 52 of the BST Act as confirmed by the Tribunal under section 55 of BST Act binds the RIL. He submitted that the adjudication order of the Commissioner under section 52 of the BST Act as confirmed by the Tribunal under section 55 of BST Act binds the RIL. In the present case, without hearing RIL, the Tribunal has passed an order holding that the return of goods by RIL is sale and not goods returned thereby making RIL liable to tax. Mr. Joshi submitted that the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation of Rule 62, directly makes RIL liable to pay tax and in fact, the Sales Tax Officer by his letter dated 9th November, 2001 has sought to raise demand of Rs. 100 crores on the basis of the order passed by the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001. He submitted that the adjudicating authority as well as the appellate authority were bound by the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 and, therefore, the demand raised was bound to be confirmed. Mr. Joshi submitted that under Rule 62 of the BST Rules it was mandatory on the part of the Tribunal to hear RIL and failure to follow the mandatory provisions was an error on the face of the record which could be rectified under section 62 of the BST Act by recalling the order and passing fresh order on merits after hearing RIL. 16. In support of his contentions, Mr. Joshi relied upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Kulko Engineering Works Limited vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in 46 S.T.C. 454 (Bom) and submitted that the decision under section 52 of the BST Act binds all the Sales Tax authorities below the rank of Commissioner and also binds different dealers who are similarly situated, for all times. Mr. Joshi then relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of I. T. O. vs. Ashok Textiles reported in 41 ITR 732 (SC) and submitted that the power of rectification are much wider than the powers of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Mr. Joshi then relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of I. T. O. vs. Ashok Textiles reported in 41 ITR 732 (SC) and submitted that the power of rectification are much wider than the powers of review under Order 47 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Joshi then relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and others reported in 118 STC 297(SC), wherein it is held that a person who has to pay to the contractor and is liable to TDS is also a person aggrieved by any action of the Sales Tax Officer and, therefore, he can file a Writ Petition as an aggrieved person. Mr. Joshi then relied upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Shakuntalabai Krishna Bhoyar and ors. vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1986 Mh.L.J. 669 = AIR 1986 Bom. 308 and submitted that if a legislative provision is overlooked, then it can be rectified as an error apparent on record. 17. Mr. Joshi then relied upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of Khusalchand B. Daga vs. T. K. Surendra, 4th I. T. a. reported in 85 I. T.R. 48 (Bom) and submitted that the Tribunal has inherent powers to rectify the mistakes committed by it even after the prescribed period of limitation. He relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tripura Goods Transport Association and anr. vs. Commissioner of Taxes and ors., reported in 1998(2) SCC 264 and submitted that an order based on admission and consent of the parties which is inconsistent with the provisions can be recalled. He then relied upon the decision in the case of Rajendra Kumar Ram Gopal vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. reported in 93 STC 82 (Allahabad) and submitted that the order passed on rectification is nothing but an order in appeal itself. He then relied upon the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ram Kripal vs. Union of India reported in 1998(103) ELT 8 (Guj) and submitted that palpably erroneous order on merit is also rectifiable by recalling the order. By relying upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Ramco Cement Distribution Co. He then relied upon the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ram Kripal vs. Union of India reported in 1998(103) ELT 8 (Guj) and submitted that palpably erroneous order on merit is also rectifiable by recalling the order. By relying upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Ramco Cement Distribution Co. P. Ltd. vs. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Rajapalayam reported in 33 STC 180, he submitted that where the statute gave exemption but the same was not claimed by mistake overlooking the statute, exemption must be granted by rectification. 18. Mr. Joshi, lastly relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Ballaph Prasad Agarwalla reported in 233 ITR 354 and submitted that the act of a Court, including Tribunal, should not prejudice a party and in such a case, it would not be just and proper to drive the party to file a reference application and it must be left to the Tribunal to reopen the appeal if it finds that it has committed an error on the face of the record. Accordingly, Mr. Joshi submitted that the recalling order passed by the Tribunal is in accordance with law and no interference of this Court is called for in a Writ jurisdiction. 19. Mr. Chinai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of BPCL submitted that if the order of the Tribunal dated 16-4-2002 recalling its order dated 21-4-2001 is sustained, then, he has no grievance as the matter would be reheard on merits. On the other hand, if the order of the Tribunal is set aside, then the rectification application as well as the reference application filed by the BPCL must be heard on merits. Mr. Bharucha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Commissioner of Sales Tax fairly agreed with the above submission of Mr. Chinai and stated that if the petition of the Commissioner is allowed and the order of the Tribunal dated 16-4-2002 is set aside, then the rectification application as well as the reference application filed by the BPCL is liable to be heard on merits by the Tribunal. 20. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the BST Act. 21. 20. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the BST Act. 21. The BST Act, 1959 regulates the law relating to levy of tax on the sale or purchase of certain goods in the State of Maharashtra. Tax under the BST Act is defined to mean sales tax, turnover tax, purchase tax or additional tax as the case may be, payable under the BST Act. Under section 3, every dealer whose turnover either of all sales or of all purchases, during the year has exceeded or exceeds the limit prescribed therein, is liable to pay tax on his turnover of sales and on his turnover of purchases. Sections 7 and 8 of the Act provide for single point levy of sales tax on declared goods specified in Schedule B and Schedule C respectively. Every dealer liable to tax under the Act is required to obtain registration certificate under section 22 of the Act. Every registered dealer is required to file return under section 22 of the Act for such period and by such dates, as may be prescribed. Section 33 deals with the powers of the prescribed authority to assess the amount of tax due from a dealer. Section 55 of the Act provides for filing an appeal from every original order, before the appellate authority set out therein. Section 57 deals with the power of revision. Section 62 deals with the powers of the Commissioner as well as the Tribunal or an appellate authority, to rectify within 2 years from the date of the order passed by them, if any mistake in the order is brought to their notice by any person affected by such order. 22. Powers of the Commissioner under section 52 of the Act to decide disputed questions referred to him is a unique provision under the BST Act. The said power is restricted to such questions, which are not subject matter of any Court proceedings and such questions which are not the subject matter of any proceedings initiated by a Competent Authority. Thus, even before any proceeding is initiated to impose tax, the dealer can move the Commissioner under section 52 and seek determination on the disputed questions. The said power is restricted to such questions, which are not subject matter of any Court proceedings and such questions which are not the subject matter of any proceedings initiated by a Competent Authority. Thus, even before any proceeding is initiated to impose tax, the dealer can move the Commissioner under section 52 and seek determination on the disputed questions. Unlike under the I. T. Act where an Advance Ruling given by the Authority under section 245R of the I. T. Act binds only the applicant and the I. T. Department, under the BST Act the decision of the Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 52 of the BST Act on interpretation of a provision of the BST Act or decision on a question based on certain facts placed before the Commissioner, not only binds the applicant and the authorities below the rank of Commissioner, but also binds all persons, whose facts are identical. Once a question is determined by the commissioner, same question cannot be again referred to the Commissioner but can be challenged in Appeal or revision, as provided under section 52(3) of the BST Act. Against an order passed by the Commissioner under section 52, an appeal is provided under section 55 of the BST Act. 23. Ordinarily rectification of an order passed by an authority can be sought for only by the parties before that authority and not by any other person. However, under section 62 of the BST Act any person affected by the order passed by the Commissioner/Appellate Authority/Sales Tax Tribunal can file rectification application before the respective authority and seek rectification of the mistake apparent on the face of the record. Even Rule 62 of the BST Rules is unique as it makes obligatory to give notice of hearing to a person other than the Appellant/Revisional Applicant who is likely to be affected adversely by the order to be passed in Appeal or in Revision. In other words, Rule 62 of the BST Rules provide that before passing an order in appeal or revision, the concerned authority must hear any person other than the appellant who is likely to be affected by their order. 24. Rule 62 of the BST Rules, 1959 made by the State Government in exercise of its power, under section 74 of the BST Act reads as under : HR. 62. 24. Rule 62 of the BST Rules, 1959 made by the State Government in exercise of its power, under section 74 of the BST Act reads as under : HR. 62. Notice to person likely to be affected adversely.- Before an appellate or revising authority passes an order in appeal or revision which is likely to affect any person other than the appellant adversely, it shall serve on such person a notice in form 40 and shall give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." Thus, under Rule 62, before passing an order in appeal under section 55, it is obligatory on the part of the tribunal to give notice of hearing to a person who is likely to be affected adversely by its decision. The words any person in Rule 62 is restricted to the person with whom the Appellant before the tribunal has entered into a transaction. To illustrate, in a transaction between A and B, if the Tribunal finds that its decision in the appeal filed by A is likely to affect B, adversely then under Rule 62 notice of hearing must be given to B before passing the order. 25. In every case of sale and purchase there are two parties involved and in case of proceedings relating to one party, ordinarily, the other party is not directly affected. However, in exceptional cases the decision in the case of one party may adversely affect the other party directly, who is not before the appellate or revisional authority. To overcome such difficulties, Rule 62 has been framed so that in a transaction between A and B, if the decision in the case of A is likely to affect B adversely, then B must be heard before passing the order. Even though, A enters into sale transactions with C, D, E etc. which is similar to the transaction with B, under Rule 62 it is only B who is required to be heard because, the decision of the Tribunal is in respect of the transaction between A and B and since B is not a party to the appeal, he should be heard if the decision of the Tribunal is likely to affect B adversely. Though the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the transaction between A and B binds C, D, E etc., notice of hearing is not required to be given to them under Rule 62 because it is the transaction between A and B which is the subject matter of Appeal or Revision. To hold that all affected persons like C, D, E, etc. should be heard before passing order under section 55 would render the provision unworkable, because it will be impossible to ascertain as to how many transactions would be affected by the decision rendered in the transaction between A and B. Moreover, it is B alone who can be directly affected person by the aforesaid decision. In the facts of the present case, RIL being a party to the transaction with the Appellant BPCL, if the decision of the Tribunal was likely to affect RIL, then, notice was required to be given to RIL before passing the order in the Appeal. According to RIL, it was affected by the decision dated 21-4-2001, which was passed without hearing RIL. Therefore, RIL took out Rectification application under section 62 of the BST Act. 26. Section 62(1) and (2) of the BST Act which is relevant in the present case reads as under: "62. Rectification of mistakes. - (1) The Commissioner may at any time within two years from the date of any order passed by him, on his own motion, rectify any mistake apparent from the record, and shall within a like period rectify any such mistake which has been brought to his notice by any person affected by such order: Provided that, no such rectification shall be made if it has the effect of enhancing the tax or reducing the amount of a refund, unless the Commissioner has given notice in writing to such person of his intention to do so and has allowed such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply to the rectification of a mistake by the Tribunal or an appellate authority under section 55 as they apply to the rectification of a mistake by the Commissioner." Thus, under section 62, rectification of a mistake apparent on the face of the record can be done suo motu by the authority who passed the order or, on an application made by any person affected by such order. 27. 27. Now, turning to the facts of the present case, on an application made by BPCL under section 52, the Commissioner of Sales Tax on the basis of the admission made by BPCL held that the kerosene returned in return stream by RIL to BPCL is not goods returned to dealer within the meaning of Rule 4 of BST Rules. The Commissioner held that although the supply and return of kerosene was under a common transaction between BPCL and RIL, in view of the fact that admittedly N-Paraffin was extracted by RIL from the kerosene supplied, the kerosene returned by RIL cannot be said to be return of the same goods, and it was sale of different goods. In other words, the Commissioner held that there were two sale transactions between BPCL and RIL i.e. (1) sale of kerosene by BPCL to RIL and (2) sale of kerosene by RIL to BPCL. However, both sales being that of kerosene, the Commissioner held that they were exempt from tax as per the notification issued under the Act. On Appeal by BPCL, the Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner. On a rectification application filed by RIL, under section 62 of the BST Act, the Tribunal found that there was error on the face of the record in not hearing RIL a directly affected party, as contemplated under Rule 62 of the BST Rules and with a view to rectify the error, the Tribunal recalled its original order passed under section 55 of the BST Act, so as to hear RIL and pass a fresh order on merits. 28. According to Mr. Bharucha, the power of rectification under section 62 of the BST Act is limited to correction of an error apparent on the face of the record and the Tribunal has no power to withdraw the order in appeal so as to review its own order. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of T. S. Balaram (supra) and Satyanarayan L. Hegde (supra) wherein it is held that a mistake apparent on the face must be an obvious and patent mistake and the error that has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. While we agree with the proposition of Mr. While we agree with the proposition of Mr. Bharucha that mistake apparent on the face of the record must be an obvious and patent mistake and not a mistake that has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning, we do not agree with the proposition of Mr. Bharucha that the power of rectification under section 62 of the BST Act is limited to correction of an error, apparent on the face of the record and the Tribunal has no power to withdraw the order in appeal even if the error or the mistake in the order goes to the root of the matter and to eliminate the error it is necessary to recall the order. In the case of Blue Star Engineering Co. (Bombay) (P.) Ltd. vs. C.LT., 73 ITR 283 at page 299, this Court held as follows :- "If the rectification involves an amendment, which will affect the whole of the order, it cannot be said that simply because of the use of the word "amend", which normally may not mean the cancellation of the whole order, the Income-tax Officer should be powerless to rectify the mistake or error which is apparent on the face of the order. The word "amend" with reference to legal documents means correct an error and the expression "amend the order" would mean correct the error in the order. Under section 154 power to rectify the error is to be exercised by correcting the error in the order and the correction must, therefore, extend to the elimination of the error. What the affect of the elimination of the error will be on the original order will depend upon each case. It may be that the elimination of the error may affect only a part of the order. It may also be that the error may be such as may go to the root of the order and its elimination may result in the whole order falling to the ground. It may be that the elimination of the error may affect only a part of the order. It may also be that the error may be such as may go to the root of the order and its elimination may result in the whole order falling to the ground. In our opinion the Income-tax Officer will be able to amend or correct the order to the extent to which the correction is necessary for rectification of the error and such correction may extend either to the whole of the order or only to a part of it." The words amend any order contained in section 154 of the I. T. Act is not there in section 62 of the BST Act. Thus, the power to rectify an order under section 62 of the BST Act is not restricted to amending the order but it extends to eliminating the error on the face of the record. Accordingly, we hold that in appropriate cases where the error apparent on the face of the record goes to the root of the matter and to eliminate that error, if it becomes necessary to recall the order, the concerned authority is entitled to do so. We would like to make it clear that the power of recall cannot be resorted to review the order in the garb of rectification. As pointed out by Mr. Bharucha, in the case of J. N. Sahani (supra) and Deeksha Suri (supra), it was rightly held by the Delhi High Court that where an order is passed on merits under section 254(1) of the I.T. Act after hearing both parties, that order could not be recalled at the instance of the same parties on a rectification application filed under section 254(2) of the I. T. Act. An error or mistake noticed in an order passed on merits after hearing the parties stands on a different footing from the order passed without hearing the parties. In the present case, admittedly RIL was not heard before passing the order dated 21-4-2001 and if RIL was likely to be affected adversely, then under Rule 62 it was obligatory to hear RIL before passing the order. 29. Mr. Bharucha, strongly relied upon the Judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of India Tyre and Rubber Co. In the present case, admittedly RIL was not heard before passing the order dated 21-4-2001 and if RIL was likely to be affected adversely, then under Rule 62 it was obligatory to hear RIL before passing the order. 29. Mr. Bharucha, strongly relied upon the Judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of India Tyre and Rubber Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and submitted that the facts in that case are more or less identical to the facts of the present case and the decision of the Madras High Court squarely applies to the present case. In our opinion, that decision is distinguishable on facts. In the case before the Madras High Court, the dealer had filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the assessment order, and in that appeal, the opposite party to the transaction wanted to be impleaded as a party to the appeal. There were no provisions under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 for an affected party being heard by the Tribunal. In those circumstances, it was rightly held by the Madras High Court, that in appeal, it is a matter exclusively between the dealer and the authorities and there is no scope for anybody else entering the arena either in support of the assessee or against the assessee. In contrast, section 55 of the BST Act read with Rule 62 of the BST Rules specifically provide that before passing an order in appeal which is likely to affect any person other than the Appellant adversely, then the Tribunal shall serve upon such person a notice in Form 40 and shall give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thus, the statutory provisions under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax and under the Bombay Sales Tax being wholly different, the decision of the Madras High Court relied upon by the petitioner is wholly distinguishable on facts and do not apply to the facts of the present case. 30. Thus, the statutory provisions under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax and under the Bombay Sales Tax being wholly different, the decision of the Madras High Court relied upon by the petitioner is wholly distinguishable on facts and do not apply to the facts of the present case. 30. With all this background, the basic question now to be answered is, in the facts of the present case, whether, RIL can be said to be directly affected by the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 and if so, whether failure on the part of the Tribunal to hear RIL as per Rule 62 of the BST Rules before passing the order under section 55 of the BST Act constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record which could be rectified under section 62 of the BST Act? In the present case, the order in original in the first instance was passed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax on the basis of the admission made by BPCL. BPCL admitted before the Commissioner that RIL returned kerosene after extracting N-Paraffin from the kerosene supplied by BPCL to RIL. This factual admission was not disputed by BPCL even in the appeal filed by it before the Tribunal. The Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner on the basis of the undisputed admission made by BPCL. Even RIL in its rectification application has not specifically disputed the factual admissions made by BPCL. The only grievance of RIL is that the decision of the Tribunal directly affects RIL and, therefore, no order could be passed without hearing RIL, as contemplated under Rule 62 of the BST Rules. No evidence was brought on record by BPCL before the Commissioner regarding the process adopted by RIL in extracting N-Paraffin from the kerosene supplied by BPCL to RIL and the only submission was that even after extraction of N-paraffin, the goods remained kerosene as per BIS specification. Thus, in the present case, the determination of the issue as to whether the goods returned were different goods or not was based on admission and not on evidence. The Tribunal decided the matter on the basis of the above admission of BPCL and not on evidence and even the rectification application of RIL was allowed without giving any finding as to how the decision of the Tribunal based on undisputed facts adversely affected RIL. The Tribunal decided the matter on the basis of the above admission of BPCL and not on evidence and even the rectification application of RIL was allowed without giving any finding as to how the decision of the Tribunal based on undisputed facts adversely affected RIL. If on recall, the issue whether the kerosene returned after extracting N-paraffin can be said to be return of the same goods supplied or not is to be determined by the Tribunal by permitting the parties to lead evidence, then, as suggested by the Commissioner, it can as well be led before the first authority i.e. the Commissioner of Sales Tax. In this view of the matter, without going into the questions as to whether the RIL was a directly affected party or not and whether there is error apparent on the face of the record or not, we think it appropriate to accept the alternate submission of Bharucha and permit the Commissioner of Sales Tax instead of the Tribunal to decide the question No.2 afresh after hearing both BPCL and RIL. It will be open to the parties to adduce such evidence as they deem fit before the Commissioner of Sales Tax. As rightly contended by Mr. Bharucha, the appeal filed by BPCL against the order of the Commissioner was only on question No.2 see para 2 and 10 of the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 i.e. whether the return of kerosene by RIL to BPCL is "goods returned" or was it a sale and no appeal was filed by BPCL against the decision of the Commissioner of Sales Tax on question Nos. 1 and 3. Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner on question Nos. 1 and 3 have become final and the same cannot be disturbed. 31. Under the circumstances, we set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 21-4-2001 as well as the order dated 16-4-2002 and restore the matter to the file of the Commissioner of Sales Tax to decide the question No.2 set out in para 6 above afresh after hearing both BPCL and RIL. It will be open to the parties to lead evidence pertaining to the question No.2 if they choose to do so. WRIT PETITION No. 3198 OF 2002 32. In view of our decision in Writ Petition No. 2599 of 2002, nothing survives in this petition and hence it is dismissed as in fructuous. It will be open to the parties to lead evidence pertaining to the question No.2 if they choose to do so. WRIT PETITION No. 3198 OF 2002 32. In view of our decision in Writ Petition No. 2599 of 2002, nothing survives in this petition and hence it is dismissed as in fructuous. 33. Accordingly, both the petitions are disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs. 34. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of the order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court. 35. Issuance of certified copy is expedited. Petition dismissed.