JUDGMENT : S.K. Kar, J. 1. This is an application for condonation of delay in filing MAC Appl. No. 1/03. Both the parties were Heard. The appellant, State of Mizoram, has intended to condone a delay of 208 days in presenting the appeal against judgment and order dated 12/4/02 passed by Member, MACT, Aizawl in MACT Case No. 76/98 (Sh. Kaphmingthanga v. Commandant I.R. Bn. Khuangleng Post). Learned Tribunal passed an award of Rs. 1,54,500/- in favour of father in connection with death of a child of age 4 years in vehicular accident taking place on 25,9.1996 involving vehicle No. MZ 01-9796. 2. Briefly stated, the cause for delay is stated to be due to processing of the file in the government departments and for the getting sanction of a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for making the statutory deposit for presenting the appeal etc. 3. In this affidavit-in-opposition the respondent/O.P has objected by contending that the explanation given for the delay cannot be termed as a 'sufficient cause' under the facts and circumstances of the case, and that there is no explanation why the decision taken to file the appeal, which was communicated by the law department, vide I.D. No. L.J. 11/2002/258, dated 14.5.2002, to Home Department on 14.5.2002, the Homo Department needed 125 days for the reply which came only 19.9.2002. This is a clear case of dealing with the matter most casually. It was further contended that as per the statement on the petition though the appeal was ready by 22.10.2002 to be presented it could not be presented on that day but filing deferred till 6.2.2003 on the ground that sanction for deposit of Rs. 25,000/- could not be made available to the government advocate by the Government Department concerned and this delay of another 104 days has no explanation. Therefore, it was submitted the delay cannot be condoned, the explanation being neither sufficient nor satisfactory. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has referred me to decisions of this court reported as (2001) 1 GLT 34 and that Hon'ble Apex Court, P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, I have given due attention to the submission made on either side and considered the laws cited. 5. There is no dispute that limitation for preferring appeal u/s 173 of Motor Vehicle Act, is 90 days and there is a proviso. State of Kerala and Another, I have given due attention to the submission made on either side and considered the laws cited. 5. There is no dispute that limitation for preferring appeal u/s 173 of Motor Vehicle Act, is 90 days and there is a proviso. Appended to Section 173 will goes as follows : "Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time." Therefore, what is needed is that the appellant is to satisfy this court that it was presented by 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in time. This provision of law is similar to that given in time. This provision of law is similar to that given in Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Act 36 of 1963). Now the wording/phrase 'sufficient cause' as contained in proviso to Section 173 as quoted above as well as contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been defined anywhere. If we refer to the Limitation Act we will find from annotations therein that the courts were trying to interpret to the scope and limit phrase 'sufficient cause', inter alia, as follows : "It means a cause, which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the Act. The test, whether or not a cause is sufficient, is to see whether it is a bona fide cause, in much as nothing shall be taken to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done in due care and attention." The words 'sufficient cause' are very wide and comprehensive in their meaning and so no attempt should be made to define precisely or rigidly their scope. Therefore, from the quotations above and on a study of the different case-laws in this context, it will be seen that 'sufficient cause' is a question of fact to be determined by the court with particular reference to individual cases and the boundary of the same has never been defined but it is given to the discretion of the court to decide the same in a judicious manner in order to find whether the cause shown is satisfactory and acceptable. 6. 6. Although Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes no distinction between the State and individuals with regard to need to establishing 'sufficient cause', sometimes the explanation of delay by the state is taken a little liberally in absence of any presumption of laches. But than, it cannot be denied that an approach to the application by the State u/s 5 of the Limitation Act cannot fundamentally be different from the approach to private individual cases. There is a myriad of case-laws in this context to explain what is and what is not 'sufficient cause' under a particular facts and circumstances of the case. It was opined that the Legislature in its wisdom has rightly left it with the discretion of the court to decide what is 'sufficient cause' in a particular case in order to do substantial justice to the party where for certain reasons, not within its control, a party could not comply with the provision of the Limitation Act, Limitation Act is an law of procedures like that of the CPC and accordingly is an adjective law. The rules of limitation are, prima facie, rules of procedure and they do not create any right in favour of any person, nor do they define or create cause of action; they simply prescribed that the remedy can be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond that. 7. In (2001) 1 GLT 34 the court has discussed the divergence views expressed by courts on different occasions. Some courts, under ascertained facts and circumstances of that case, had held that 'sufficient cause' should be liberally construed whereas courts on other occasions, on facts, held that there is no power for court to extent this statutory period of limitation by giving such liberal construction and statute is to be rigorously enforced. It was one of the fundamental principles to be adhered to, while dealing with 'sufficient cause' as contained u/s 5 of Limitation Act, the rules of limitations as are intended to induct the claimant to be prompt in claiming relief. 8. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, Hon'ble Supreme Court also expressed the following view to bring this principle into forefront while it stated as follows : "6. 8. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Another, Hon'ble Supreme Court also expressed the following view to bring this principle into forefront while it stated as follows : "6. Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extent the period of limitation on equitable grounds". In other word, to summarise the discussion aforesaid the court will have to be satisfied that the applicant was prevented by cause which may be regarded as sufficient under the particular facts and circumstances to give him the benefit of Section 5 of Limitation Act or other clause prescribing such limitation. 9. Here in the instant case, the appellant has given no circumstances to find and hold that the delay of 208 days was not due to any laches on the part of the appellant State. On the contrary it has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that after getting the letter dated 14.5.2002 from the Law Department the Home Department wrote to the Government Advocate about intention to file the appeal only after an unexplained delay of 125 days. There is no explanation, whatsoever, in the application for condonation why the communication by Home Department had to take 125 days for directing the Government Advocate to file the appeal. It cannot be supposed that the Government had no information about the law of limitation being 90 days. Then again, there was further delay for getting sanction of the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000 to be made along with presentation of the appeal. There was a scope for presenting the appeal within time, praying for time to make the statutory deposit in extreme cases of difficulties. It is seen that the law department promptly dealt with the matter by forwarding the letter within a month to Home Department on 14.5.2002 (impugned judgment is dated 12.4.2002). But the Home Department informed the Government Advocate its intention to file the appeal only on 19.9.2002, i.e., after about 4 months. This inordinate delay for taking a decision has nowhere been explained by the appellant. Had there been no such delay for 4 months the appeal could have been presented in time. But the Home Department informed the Government Advocate its intention to file the appeal only on 19.9.2002, i.e., after about 4 months. This inordinate delay for taking a decision has nowhere been explained by the appellant. Had there been no such delay for 4 months the appeal could have been presented in time. It will be seen that in present case there was further unexplained and unreasonable delay in furnishing with the materials and making necessary sanction for deposit of the statutory amount, which is demonstrative of callous functioning. 10. Concluding the discussions, I find that there was no 'sufficient cause' to explain delay of 208 days and accordingly the benefit of the proviso to Section 173 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (as amended up-to-date) cannot be extended to the appellant. 11. And petition for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.