B. J. SHETHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant-petitioner was serving as Peon with the respondent- college since 1977. By an order dated July 14, 1986 he was placed under suspension on the ground that on that day i. e. on 14. 7. 1986 at 12. 30 p. m. when the registrar, Shri N. J. Shahani, asked him to go to the office of the Administrator, gandhidham Collegiate Board for official work, he not only disobey the order, but also started speaking loudly. When the principal rushed in the office, on hearing his shouts and when asked him to behave properly with the higher officers and to obey his orders, he once again refused to follow their orders. This being serious misconduct he was placed under suspension with immediate effect by the principal of the College as per the order at annexure-A to the main writ petition. In the order of suspension it is clearly mentioned that it was not the first occasion where he misbehaved. There were serious complaints against him in the past also of similar nature. In 1982, he refused to obey the orders of In-charge, Heat Hangines laboratory and insulted him in presence of students of final year D. M. E. for which he was served with memo dated 14. 9. 1982. In 1984 also he refused to obey the orders issued by Shri Hari G. Tejwani, Head of department (Elec.) to attend some urgent work at A. V. Theatre on 21. 9-1984 at 11. 30 a. m. for which memo dated 22. 9. 1984 was issued. In 1985 he threatened Shri u. D. Managwani, Senior Clerk on duty with his life and beat him for which memo dated 15. 10. 1985 was issued. In response to the charge sheet, he submitted his reply dated 15. 7. 1986 (Annexure-B ). By letter dated 14. 10. 1986 (Annexure-C) he was asked to remain present before Inquiry committee consisting of (1) Prof. J. D. Sabhani; (2) Prof. S. T. Mangtani and (3) prof. B. D. Kripalani on 20-11-1986 at 10. 30 a. m. failing which ex-parte inquiry will be held against him. ( 2 ) WE are really surprised to note that though the appellant was a Class-IV servant, by letter dated 27-10-1986 (Annexure-D) he raised objection before the Principal regarding Constitution of the committee. The said objection was overruled. Thereafter, by letter dated 20. 11. 30 a. m. failing which ex-parte inquiry will be held against him. ( 2 ) WE are really surprised to note that though the appellant was a Class-IV servant, by letter dated 27-10-1986 (Annexure-D) he raised objection before the Principal regarding Constitution of the committee. The said objection was overruled. Thereafter, by letter dated 20. 11. 1986 he requested to adjourn the inquiry till his representative is engaged in the Committee and the members of the inquiry Committee are not changed and also requested to defend his case through one Shri Prem Lalwani, Secretary of their union. However, his request was not granted. Thereafter, regular inquiry was held by the Committee and before the committee the appellant-petitioner participated and the Committee came to the conclusion that the appellant- petitioner had grossly misbehaved and the charges levelled against him are established. Since all the charges were proved beyond doubt, therefore, the committee recommended the Principal to take further action as per the rules. Considering the report of the Committee, the Principal of the College by his order dated 25. 11. 1986 dismissed the appellant- petitioner from service with immediate effect. This was challenged by the appellant-petitioner before this court by way of writ petition i. e. Special Civil application 6472/86. The said petition came up for final disposal before the learned Single Judge of this court on 18. 2. 1998. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended that he was not supplied with the inquiry report, therefore, the impugned order of dismissal was bad. This contention was rejected by the learned single Judge in view of the judgment of the honble Supreme Court in case of managing DIRECTOR, ECIL VS. B. KARUNAKER reported in JT 1993 (6) SC 1. Second contention raised before the learned Judge was that the penalty was grossly disproportionate. The learned judge was not much impressed by that contention as according to him the charges of insubordination was so serious that called for the maximum penalty of dismissal from service. Therefore, the learned Judge dismissed that contention. Hence, this appeal. ( 3 ) BEFORE us learned counsel Shri japee appearing for the appellant- petitioner firstly submitted that before the inquiry Committee, out of four charges, two charges were stale. They were of 1982 and 1984. He, therefore, submitted that the inquiry was not justified in those incidents for dismissing the appellant- petitioner from service. Hence, this appeal. ( 3 ) BEFORE us learned counsel Shri japee appearing for the appellant- petitioner firstly submitted that before the inquiry Committee, out of four charges, two charges were stale. They were of 1982 and 1984. He, therefore, submitted that the inquiry was not justified in those incidents for dismissing the appellant- petitioner from service. This contention of mr. Japee has no substance. It seems that the appellant-petitioner was in habit of misbehaving with his superiors. First incident took place in September, 1982 for which he was served with memo dated 14. 9. 1982, which was followed by second incident of September, 1984 for which he was served with memo dated 22. 9. 1984. Once again he committed similar misconduct in October, 1985. The last incident happened on 14. 7. 1986. It seems that though he was served with three memos he never improved. The last incident was shocking, therefore, the principal had no option but to immediately place him under suspension. It is clear from the report of the Inquiry Committee that on earlier occasion he was placed under suspension for similar type of misconduct. But on showing mercy that suspension order was recalled. Unfortunately, he had not improved. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority committed any error while passing the impugned order of dismissal from service taking into consideration those two stale incidents. For those incidents of 1982 and 1984 the appellant-petitioner was given full opportunity to meet with the same in the inquiry. Therefore, it will not be open to him to contend for the first time before this court when this contention was not raised by the appellant-petitioner before the learned Single Judge in his writ petition. ( 4 ) MR. JAPEE then submitted that though the appellant-petitioner has asked for an opportunity of providing him assistance in the inquiry, he was not given the assistance of one Shri Prem Lalwanit secretary of his Union. Therefore, the inquiry is vitiated. This contention was also not pressed into service before the learned Single Judge. Be that as it may. merely because the inquiry was conducted before the Committee of three professors, that does not mean that the appellant- petitioner was entitled to defend himself in the inquiry through assistance of Shri prem Lalwani. Therefore, the inquiry is vitiated. This contention was also not pressed into service before the learned Single Judge. Be that as it may. merely because the inquiry was conducted before the Committee of three professors, that does not mean that the appellant- petitioner was entitled to defend himself in the inquiry through assistance of Shri prem Lalwani. it seems that for the sake of raising such contention said application was submitted before the Inquiry committee. In fact, Inquiry Committee had no jurisdiction to grant permission to the appellant-petitioner to defend himself through the choice of his person. He should have made such request to the Disciplinary authority i. e. the Principal. Mr. Japee was not in a position to show any rule under which the appellant-petitioner was entitled to defend himself in the inquiry through the assistance of his choice. In that view of the matter, this second contention of mr. Japee requires to be rejected and accordingly it is rejected. ( 5 ) MR. Japee then submitted that he was not supplied with the inquiry report by the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, the inquiry is vitiated. It was a case of 1996, therefore, as per the judgment of Honble supreme Court in case of UNION OF india VS. MOHD. RAMZAN KHAN reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 he was not entitled to any inquiry report. Even otherwise, in absence of any prejudice being caused to him we would not like to interfere with such order of dismissal on this ground. Hence, this third contention of mr. Japee is rejected. ( 6 ) MR. Japee then tried to submit that the inquiry Committee and Disciplinary authority both committed grave error in relying upon the fact that the petitioner was running mobile food shop in the name of his minor son, therefore, he was not able to devote full time towards his duty as a peon. He submitted that this was not a charge framed against him. Therefore, it ought not to have been relied upon by the disciplinary Authority while passing the order of dismissal. It is true that this was not the charge initially framed against the appellant-petitioner. If this was only the ground, then perhaps we would have interfered with the order of dismissal. Therefore, it ought not to have been relied upon by the disciplinary Authority while passing the order of dismissal. It is true that this was not the charge initially framed against the appellant-petitioner. If this was only the ground, then perhaps we would have interfered with the order of dismissal. But at the cost of repetition, we may state that he was charge sheeted for insubordination at least on four occasions and the Inquiry committee as well as Disciplinary authority have clearly found that all these four charges are proved against him and they are of very serious nature and, therefore, no other order of punishment than the order of dismissal was called for. ( 7 ) LASTLY it was submitted by mr. Japee that penalty of dismissal is grossly disproportionate. He submitted that on the ground of insubordination such maximum penalty of dismissal ought not to have been awarded. This very contention was raised before the learned Single judge. But the learned Single Judge, in his discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was not at all satisfied with this submission as according to him the charges were of very serious nature, therefore, held that except the order of dismissal no other order was called for in this matter. From the facts of this case, we are also fully convinced that no other order than the order of dismissal was called for in this case. It is clear that the appellant-petitioner was habituated and totally indifferent towards his duties probably because he was having side business of selling food in his mobile shop. One can be leniently dealt with for first time but cannot be dealt with leniently every time. We have to take judicial notice of the fact that nowadays insubordination is everywhere. Therefore, it should be viewed seriously. It is true that power of judicial review while considering the quantum of punishment is there, but such powers should be exercised sparingly only in a fit case where the court is fully satisfied that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct which is found to be proved, otherwise not. As stated earlier, facts of this case are really shocking. Hence, this last contention of mr. Japee is required to be rejected and accordingly it is rejected. ( 8 ) IN view of the above discussion, this appeal fails and is hereby summarily dismissed. .