Judgment :- Radhakrishnan, J. These appeals have been preferred under Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 against the judgment of learned single Judge of this court. Maintainability of the appeals has been questioned in view of Section 100-A introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 2002 with effect from 1.7.2002. Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is extracted below for easy reference. “100-A. No further appeal in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge. Contention was raised that in view of the provisions of Section 100-A of the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2002 appeals filed after 1.7.2002 under Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act are not maintainable and only those appeals which were filed prior to 1.7.2002 would alone be maintainable. Scope of Section 100-A with regard to pending appeals preferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxminarayan v. Shivlal Gujar (2003 (1) Indian Law Decisions 64). Above question came up for decision before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S.Shiva Raja Reddy and others v. S.Raghu Raj Reddy and others (2002 (4) CCC 75 (AP) where in the impact of Section 100-A with respect to appeals preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent 1865 was also examined. Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court have taken the view, after elaborate consideration of the law on the point, that in view of Section 100-A of the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act 2002 appeals filed after 1.7.2002 are not maintainable and only such Letters Parent Appeals saved are those filed prior to 1.7.2002 whether they have been admitted or not. The decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as the division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court have reduced our burden in examining the scope of Section 100-A viz-a-viz Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. After examining both the decisions at length and hearing the counsel on either side, we fully concur with the views expressed by those High Courts with regard to the scope and ambit of Section 100-A as amended by Act 22 of 2002. 2. We may point out that Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court were dealing with appeals filed under Letters Patent. Our High Court is not a chartered court and was not a court in British India. Kerala High Court was established after the formation of the new State under the States Re-organization Act, 1956. Therefore, High Court of Kerala has no letters patent. Kerala High Court Act, 1958 regulates the business and the exercise of powers of the High Court of the State of Kerala. High Court of Kerala has in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution of India, Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and all other powers enabling in this behalf, has also published rules of the High Court of Kerala 1971. The Kerala High Court Act and the Rules framed there under regulate the business and exercise of powers there under. The Kerala High Court Act, 1958 has been enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of the powers conferred under Entry III List II read with Article 225 of the Constitution of India. Administration of justice has been transferred from Entry 3 of List II to Concurrent List 11-A of List III of VII Schedule. Constitutional validity of the Kerala High Act came up for consideration before this court in 1960 KLT 109. Same question again came up before a Full Bench of this court in Kochupennu Kochikka v. Kochikka Kunjipennu (1961 KLT 275) and the Full Bench held that the State Legislature is undoubtedly competent to enact a law to define and regulate the jurisdiction and power of the High Court in the matter of administration of justice. Same question again came up before a Full Bench of this court in Kochupennu Kochikka v. Kochikka Kunjipennu (1961 KLT 275) and the Full Bench held that the State Legislature is undoubtedly competent to enact a law to define and regulate the jurisdiction and power of the High Court in the matter of administration of justice. Jurisdiction and powers of the High Court was regulated by the Rules of the High Court of Kerala 1971. Article 225 states that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by the Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. Entry administration of justice has been transferred from entry 3 List II from the concurrent list and inserted as entry 11-A of List III of VII Schedule. 3. Section 100-A has employed a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force no further appeal shall lie against judgment and decree of a learned single judge. Before the introduction of Section 100-A appeal to the Division Bench is regulated by Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act. The question is whether Section 100-A has taken away intra court appeal provided under Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act 1958 and whether it is legal. In Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey (AIR 1964 S.C. 907) the Supreme Court observed that no party has vested right to have an appeal heard by specified number of judges. Again in Mohd. Meera Lebbai v. Thirumalava Gounder Ramaswamy Gounder and others (1966 (1) SCR 574) the apex court reiterated that no party has vested right to have an appeal heard by one judge of the High Court. In Shyamsunder v. Ramkumar (2001 (8) SCC 24) the apex court observed that no party has vested right to have his appeal heard by more than one judge of the High Court. In Shyamsunder v. Ramkumar (2001 (8) SCC 24) the apex court observed that no party has vested right to have his appeal heard by more than one judge of the High Court. Contention was raised by the appellants placing reliance on the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (AIR 1905 P.C. 369), Sadar Ali and others v. Doliluddin (AIR 1928 Calcutta 640 (FB) and Garikapati Veeraya v. N.Subbiah Choudhury (AIR 1957 SC 540) and contended that the institution of a suit carries with it with the implication all rights of appeal are preserved to the parties till the rest of the career of the suit. The Constitution bench of the apex court in Garikapati Veeraya’s case (supra) however laid down the following principles. 1. That the legal pursuit of a remedy suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. 2. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. 3. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. 4. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit of proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. 5. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. It is therefore evident from the aforementioned decisions that though right of appeal is vested one same can be taken away by subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment. 5. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. It is therefore evident from the aforementioned decisions that though right of appeal is vested one same can be taken away by subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment. Therefore, the question that falls for consideration is whether Section 100A takes away right of appeal accrued at the time of institution of the suit which impliedly carried with it all rights of appeal then in force including under Section 5 (2) of the High Court Act. 4. The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 contains the law relating to the procedure in suits and civil proceedings. The Code has been amended from time to time by various Acts of Central and State Legislatures. Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1999 was enacted with a view to cutting short the delays at various levels. Law Commission of India in its 163rd report also dealt with the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1997 which was enacted later on as the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. Parliament has made further amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 2002 (22 of 2002). Section 100-A has been substituted by Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1999. Act 46 of 1999 and Act 22 of 2002 have come into force with effect from 1.7.2002. Section 100-A was introduced to minimize the delay. Non obstante clause appended to Section 100-A was enacted with a view to give the enacting part of the Section an overriding effect over the Acts or the instruments having the force of law mentioned in the non obstante clause. Such a clause was introduced as a legislative device to give overriding effect to certain provisions. In our view non obstante clause contained in Section 100-A will take away the effect of Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act 1958. Therefore, by virtue of Section 100-A as amended by the amendment Act 2002 no appeal is maintainable under Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment of the learned single judge. Therefore, by virtue of Section 100-A as amended by the amendment Act 2002 no appeal is maintainable under Section 5 (2) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment of the learned single judge. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2003 (1) SCC 49) the apex court while dealing with Section 100A opined that no prejudice would be caused to the litigants by not providing for intra court appeal even where the value involved is large. In such cases the apex court opined, the High Court Rules could provide that Division Bench would hear the regular appeal. The apex court found no illegality in the amended provision Section 100A. 5. We may also examine the question as to whether Sec.100-A would affect appeals which have already been filed prior to 1.7.2002. We are of the view, prospective operation of the Section shall not extend to and is not applicable to such of those appeals which were filed and pending adjudication. We endorse the view there is no retrospective operation of Section 100-A in respect of pending appeals filed on or before 1.7.2002. The apex court in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd v. Union of India (AIR 2000 S.C. 811) dealt with the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and held that the court has to look at the provisions in the rule which has been introduced after omission of the previous rule to determine whether a pending proceeding will continue or lapse. On a close scrutiny of the provisions of Section 100-A we are in agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court that no appeal which is covered within the ambit and scope of the language used in Section 100-A of the Code would lie after 1.7.2002, but appeal filed prior to 1.7.2002 would not be affected. Senior Counsel Sri P.N.K.Achan raised a contention that event though the appeal was filed after 1.7.2002 if the time taken to get the certified copies of judgment and decree is excluded, the appeal field by him would be in time and therefore be treated as appeal filed prior to 1.7.2002. Senior Counsel Sri P.N.K.Achan raised a contention that event though the appeal was filed after 1.7.2002 if the time taken to get the certified copies of judgment and decree is excluded, the appeal field by him would be in time and therefore be treated as appeal filed prior to 1.7.2002. Reference was made to the Book on Limitation by Rustomji, Eighth edition and also to the decision of the apex court in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel and others (AIR 1964 S.C.1099). This contention has no force due to the introduction of Section 100-A which provides no second appeal after 1.7.2002 and therefore the question of filing an appeal after 1.7.2002 after condoning the delay does not arise. 6. In the light of the aforementioned discussion, we hold that by virtue of the provisions of Section 100-A amended by Act 22 of 2002 appeals preferred under Section 5 (2) of the High Court Act after 1.7.2002 are not maintainable and only such appeals are saved which were filed prior to 1.7.2002. Since both these appeals are filed after 1.7.2002, we hold they are not maintainable and hence dismissed. Before we conclude we place on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Senior Advocate Sri S.V.S. Iyer as amicus curiae on our request.