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2003 DIGILAW 2043 (ALL)

Bhup Singh Gaur v. D. I. O. S.

2003-09-05

VINEET SARAN

body2003
JUDGMENT : Vineet Saran, J. This writ petition has been filed with a prayer for quashing the order dated 8.8.1988, passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Jalaun whereby the approval granted earlier to the appointment of the Petitioners as Assistant Teachers, C.T. Grade had been withdrawn. A further prayer has also been made for a direction to the Respondent not to interfere in the performance of the duties of the Petitioners as C.T. grade teachers. 2. It is the case of the Petitioners that they were duly qualified for appointment as C.T. grade teachers in a recognised High School. Allegedly on a vacancy having been notified by the Committee of Management, Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Babina, district Jalaun, the Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 had applied and were duly appointed by the Committee of Management vide appointment letters dated 3.10.1987 and 15.10.1987 respectively filed as Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition. Approval for such appointments was subsequently accorded by the District Inspector of Schools vide orders dated 13.11.1987 and 28.10.1987 respectively, which order have been filed as Annexures-1A and 2A to the writ petition. Thereafter, the District Inspector of Schools, on 8.8.1988, withdrew the approval granted to the appointment of the Petitioners on the basis that the same had been obtained on the basis of wrong information furnished by the institution. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Petitioners have filed this writ petition. 3. I have heard Dr. R.S. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioners as well as Sri R. K. Awasthi, learned standing counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1, the District Inspector of Schools and Sri Laxman Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2, the Committee of Management. 4. The main contention of the Petitioners is that once their appointment had been approved by the District Inspector of Schools, the same could not have been withdrawn without issuing any show cause notice and affording an opportunity of hearing to them. It has been contended that in the absence of any notice having been issued to the Petitioners, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the Petitioners would be entitled to continue to work as Assistant Teachers. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance on a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Ram Jiwan Singh and Ors. v. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur and Ors. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance on a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Ram Jiwan Singh and Ors. v. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur and Ors. 1995 (3) AWC 1562 wherein it has been held that cancellation of the appointment of a teacher without affording any opportunity of being heard would be illegal, being violative of principles of natural justice. It has further been submitted that in view of the Government orders declaring C.T. grade as dying cadre, once the Petitioners have completed five years of service as C.T. grade teachers, the Petitioners would be entitled to be treated as L.T. grade teachers and be paid their salary accordingly as has been held by this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Meerut and Ors. 1995 (3) ESC 21. 5. On being questioned as to under which provision of law the appointment of the Petitioners had been made, Sri Dwivedi submitted that since the appointment was for filling up short term vacancy, the procedure prescribed under the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Second Order, 1981, would be applicable. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the writ petition has it been stated as to whether the appointment was made on a permanent vacancy or short term vacancy. Still accepting the submission of the Petitioners that the appointments had been made for filling up short term vacancies, the provisions of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981, are being looked into. Clause 2 (iii) of the said Order provides that the management shall intimate the vacancies to the District Inspector of Schools and shall also immediately notify the same on the notice board of the institution, requiring the candidates to apply to the manager of the institution. It is also provided that the selection would be made on the basis of the quality point marks and after compilation of the quality point marks under the personal supervision of the Head of the Institution, the names and particulars of all the candidates, whether selected or not, along with the quality point marks allotted to them, shall be forwarded by the manager of the District Inspector of Schools for prior approval. 6. 6. In the present case, from the record it is clear that the conditions of Clause 2 (iii) of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order had been complied with by the manager. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Committee of Management also, such position has not been clarified. It is not the case of the Petitioners that the vacancies had been intimated to the District Inspector of Schools prior to the issuance of the appointment letters. Even otherwise, the said clause provides for prior approval of the appointment by the District Inspector of Schools whereas in the present case the appointment letters had been issued by the Committee of Management on 3.10.1987 and 15.10.1987, whereas the alleged approval was granted on subsequent dates. It has not been stated that the vacancies had been properly notified or advertised. Further the other conditions for selection to be made on the basis of quality point marks also does not seem to have been observed nor the names and particulars of the candidates selected (i.e., the Petitioners) and also other candidates along with the quality point marks allotted to them had been forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools for his prior approval. Thus, clearly the Committee of Management had admittedly not followed the procedure prescribed under the said Second Removal of Difficulties Order, 1981. Accordingly, in my view the approval granted by the then District Inspector of Schools had wrongly been done without following any procedure of law. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has not been able to point out any other provision under which the Petitioners could have been appointed without the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. 7. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Inspector of Schools, in paragraph 3 it has been categorically stated that against 11 posts sanctioned in the institution in question, 15 teachers were already working, out of which 4 were being paid salary on the strength of interim orders granted by this Court. Learned standing counsel has submitted that even if the Committee of Management has made the appointment, unless there are sanctioned posts, the State would not be liable to make payment of salary, as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Gopal Dubey Vs. District Inspector of Schools, Maharajgani and another, (1999) 2 AWC 962 . Learned standing counsel has submitted that even if the Committee of Management has made the appointment, unless there are sanctioned posts, the State would not be liable to make payment of salary, as has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Gopal Dubey Vs. District Inspector of Schools, Maharajgani and another, (1999) 2 AWC 962 . Under law there cannot be a presumption regarding sanction of post. The Petitioners have not been able to place any material on record to show that their appointments had been made on sanctioned post, whether on permanent or on short term vacancy. 8. As regards the opportunity of hearing not having been afforded to the Petitioners, learned standing counsel has submitted that if the quashing of an order, which is said to be in breach of principles of natural justice, is likely to result in the revival of another order which is in itself illegal, the principles of natural justice would not be required to be complied with. In support of this contention, he has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Aligarh Muslim University and Others Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 , as well as the decision in the case of Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1966 SC 828 , wherein it has been held that it would be a useless formality to set aside an order of such nature, merely on the basis that opportunity of hearing was not afforded. 9. Although it is true that the "useless formality" theory is only an exception and not a rule but in my view since in the present case, the initial order itself had been made without any legal sanction or authority, which the Petitioners have not been able to justify even before this Court, the quashing of the subsequent order dated 8.8.1988, merely on the basis that opportunity of hearing had not been afforded to the Petitioners would not be proper as the same would amount to revival of an order which was itself illegal and had been passed without following any procedure prescribed under law. In the circumstances, this Court would thus refrain from interfering with the impugned order while exercising its discretionary power under writ jurisdiction. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief and this writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, this Court would thus refrain from interfering with the impugned order while exercising its discretionary power under writ jurisdiction. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief and this writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.