Judgment :- The petitioners, who are arrayed as 'A' party in the proceedings, initiated by the first respondent, under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in M.C.No.92/2002/m3, have filed this petition, to call for the records relating to the above said proceedings, and to quash the same, since the proceedings initiated are not in accordance with law. 2. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Thanjavur, on the basis of a report submitted to him, by the Tahsildar, Thiruvaiyur, had initiated a proceedings and issued notice to the parties viz., the petitioners herein, arraying them as 'A' party and respondents 3 & 4 herein, arraying them as 'B' party. 3. The proceedings relate to Survey Nos.458/8, 456/5, 453/2, 452/5, 450/12, etc. situated in Thiruchanampoondi Village, Thiruvaiyaru Taluk. It seems, respondents 3 & 4 have claimed some right over the properties, and on that basis, the Tahsildar satisfied himself, that there would be a law and order problem. The Tahsildar, who has not initiated the proceedings, reported the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer, as per the letter dated 15.7.2002, and it appears, the Revenue Divisional Officer, without satisfying himself, about the disturbance of the law and order problem, mechanically issued a notice to the parties, directing them to appear before him on 16.8.2002 at about 3.00 pm. for enquiry, with necessary documents. 4. 'A' party therein viz., the petitioners, aggrieved by the said notice, have filed this petition as aforementioned. 5. Despite the fact, sufficient time was given, adjourning this case, number of times, there was no representation on behalf of respondents 3 & 4, though the counsel entered into appearance. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in order to quash the proceedings, submits that in view of the previous proceedings between the parties, before the competent civil Court, the proceedings initiated by the first respondent, is not at all maintainable and it is an abuse of process of law, on the basis of the instigation by B party. He further pointed out, when the civil courts have given a categorical finding, that respondents 3 & 4 are not entitled to any declaration, nor entitled to any injunction, or in the alternative for recovery of possession, question of converting the said dispute, once again under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is an abuse of process of law, setting at naught the earlier proceedings, which is impermissible. The learned counsel for the petitioners further pointed out, that the petitioners have filed a petition before the High Court, Madras, and obtained an order of injunction in W.M.P.No.16630/2002, on the basis of the established right, in the previous proceedings. But, unfortunately, the Revenue Divisional Officer, has initiated a proceedings, which is contrary to the established law. On these lines, developing the points, he would urge for quashing, which are not seriously, challenged by the learned Government Advocate. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy in this case, and to decide whether 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings could be initiated or not, we have to see certain facts or established facts, based upon the previous legal proceedings. The first petitioner is the mother of the second petitioner. The third respondent is the son of one Rangasamy and the 4th respondent is the son of one Govindaraju. Krishnasamy, the father of the first petitioner and his brother Rangasamy had owned certain lands jointly. According to the petitioners, there was a division between the brothers and the properties in dispute were allotted to the share of Krishnasamy, but denying the division, the third respondent, and his brother had filed a suit for partition in O.S.No.286/57 on the file of District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru, which was dismissed. The dismissal of the suit was confirmed in A.S.No.115/1963, on the file of the Sub Court, Thanjavur, which was further confirmed by this Court in S.A.No.1551/1969. Thereafter, not satisfied with the dismissal of the partition suit, the third respondent and his brother had filed a suit for declaration and injunction in O.S.No.193/96, on the file of the District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru, which was dismissed and confirmed even by this Court in S.A.No.392/71. Thereafter, once again the third respondent and his brother had filed another suit for partition in O.S.No.272/83, by way of third round of litigation, against the first petitioner and her sisters, as if, properties were not divided, suppressing the previous litigation between the parties, for the same properties. That suit also ended against the third respondent by way of dismissal, which was confirmed in A.S.No.120/1985 on the file of the Sub Court, Thanjavur, later on by this Court in second appeal 1201/1989. It seems, there was some delivery proceedings also, as per the order in E.P.No.50/1964. That suit also ended against the third respondent by way of dismissal, which was confirmed in A.S.No.120/1985 on the file of the Sub Court, Thanjavur, later on by this Court in second appeal 1201/1989. It seems, there was some delivery proceedings also, as per the order in E.P.No.50/1964. Thus from the facts narrated above, as detailed in the petition, which are not contradicted by respondents 3 & 4, the right claimed by respondents 3 & 4, regarding the disputed properties, was negatived finally. Despite the failure in the third round of litigation, it seems, respondents 3 & 4 have not become tired, whereas tirelessly, they have disturbed the possession of the suit property by the petitioners, thereby compelling them to move the High Court, since the police also failed to give protection on complaint. 8. The first petitioner has filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.12353/2002 wherein, she had also filed W.P.M.P.No.16630/2002, seeking interim relief by way of injunction. This court by an order dated 12.4.2002 granted an order of interim injunction, protecting the possession of the first petitioner, in respect of the disputed property, and directing the Superintendent of Police, Thanjavur District to complete the enquiry, within four weeks from the said date. 9. As reported by the Superintendent of Police, Thanjavur District, at present the petitioners are in peaceful possession of the properties and he has not reported any law and order problem or breach of peace, in respect of the enjoyment of the properties. Thus, it is established by the legal proceedings between the parties, that the claim of respondents 3 & 4, in respect of the disputed properties are negatived and in fact, it is held that respondents 3 & 4 are not entitled to any interest in the suit properties, whereas the petitioners alone are entitled to enjoy the same. Having fixed the interest over the disputed properties, now we have to see whether the proceedings initiated by the first respondent, is tenable. 10. Under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., the Executive Magistrate is entitled to initiate proceedings, when he is satisfied from the report of the police officer or upon other information that a dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land. 10. Under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., the Executive Magistrate is entitled to initiate proceedings, when he is satisfied from the report of the police officer or upon other information that a dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land. For that purpose, he should make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, then directing the parties, concerned to attend his Court in person or by pleader, to project the claim, in respect of their actual possession of the subject of the dispute. Thus, it is clear, before initiating any proceedings under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., the Executive Magistrate in this case viz., the first respondent should have satisfied himself subjectively and he ought to have passed an order also, in writing regarding his subjective satisfaction, for initiating the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. 11. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there is no order, passed by the first respondent in writing stating the grounds, under what circumstances and on what basis, he had satisfied himself, that such a dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace. In fact, the disputed notice dated nil, would read that he has received a report from the Tahsildar, as if there is likelihood of causing breach of peace. The subjective satisfaction of the Tahsildar is immaterial, since the proceedings were initiated, only by the Revenue Divisional Officer. At least, at the time of issuing notice under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., the Revenue Divisional Officer ought to have satisfied himself, about the existence of the dispute between the parties, leading to the breach of peace, concerning the land in dispute. My effort to find out any subjective satisfaction, by the Executive Magistrate, ended in vain, the fact being, not even an attempt is made by the Executive Magistrate to satisfy himself, regarding the alleged dispute. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the notice is bereft of particulars and it does not comply the command of Section 145(1) Cr.P.C., is well acceptable and therefore, it is unnecessary for the petitioners, to face an enquiry, without any basis. In this view, certainly, the notice is liable to be quashed, which offended the Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. 12. In this view, certainly, the notice is liable to be quashed, which offended the Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners further urged, that the Executive Magistrate has no jurisdiction, when the civil Court has passed a decree, prior to the initiation of proceedings, under Section 145 Cr.P.C., placing reliance upon a decision of this Court in Kalyaniammal v. Krishnasamy Gounder & 2 others (1993 L.W. (Crl.) 648), wherein, this Court has observed that when civil Court has passed a decree prior to the initiation of the proceedings under S.145 Cr.P.C., there is no scope for Magistrate, to take action and decide question of possession, the fact being, decree of civil Court is binding on the criminal Court. In this case, as aforementioned, respondents 2 & 3 failed in their attempt, to divide the properties and thereafter, alone they attempted to have the declaration or injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession and that attempt also ended in vain, and in the third round of litigation also, they failed, even coming up to this Court. In all the proceedings, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, a finding was arrived at by the competent civil forum, that respondents 3 & 4 have not made out a case for title or possession, as the case may be, and on this basis alone, in the writ petition, an injunction order was granted by this Court, protecting the possession of the first petitioner. In this view of the matter, as ruled by this Court also, the Executive Magistrate has no right, to initiate any proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., which is also further affirmed by this Court in Thathruvasamy, J.A. Dr. vs. Raja ( 1998 (III) CTC 268 ) wherein this Court has elaborately considered the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the powers of the Executive Magistrate, wherein also, a ruling of the Apex Court is quoted which reads: "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is, binding on the criminal court in a mater like the one before us. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is, binding on the criminal court in a mater like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of decree of the Civil Court, the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed". 13. As adverted to above in this case, the civil Court has decided the matter of possession and at present, no civil proceedings are pending between the parties, neither for title nor for possession. When the civil forum has finally concluded, regarding the title and possession in favour of the petitioners, the Executive Magistrate has no right to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that on the basis of the report said to have been given by the Tahsildar, without subjective satisfaction, on the part of the first respondent, that too, without passing an order as contemplated under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C., the proceedings initiated under reference M.C.No.98/2002/A3, is not maintainable and in this view, the same should be quashed. In the result, petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings on the file of the first respondent under reference M.C.No.98/2002/A3. Crl.M.P.No.10163 of 2002 is closed.