Judgment :- The accused 2 to 4 in C.C.No.623/03 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Court, Ambattur, have filed this petition, to quash the proceedings in the above calendar case. 2. The respondent/complainant has filed a final report against these petitioners and another for appropriate punishment under Sections 44 (1)(c) and 39(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, alleging that the accused have tampered the meter, consumed electricity, thereby committed theft, causing loss to the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, to the tune of Rs.47,68,041/-, which was noticed on surprise check, by the Assistant Executive Engineer, on 13.12.1999 at about 11.45 a.m. 3. The case filed by the respondent/complainant was taken on file by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur as C.C.No.623/2003 and it appears, the case is posted for further proceedings. At that stage, the petitioners have filed this petition, for quashing the proceedings. 4. The petitioners and another are the owners of Hotel Maharajya situated at PC.6, Collector Nagar, Dr. J.J. Nagar, Chennai-50. The said hotel is having four electricity supply connections. On 13.12.1999 at about 11.45 a.m., the officials of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board have inspected the premises and noticed that the electricity consumption meters had been tampered with. Thereafter, they have issued a show cause notice, calculating the consumption of energy and the loss sustained by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, on account of theft of energy committed by these petitioners, quantifying the amount at Rs.47,63,041/-. The connected proceedings are pending, not only before the High Court, but also before the department, which we are not very much concerned in this petition. 5. On the report filed by the Assistant Executive Engineer, the police have investigated the matter and came to the conclusion, that these petitioners and another have committed theft of electricity energy and therefore, they should be dealt with under Sections 39(1) & 44(1)(c) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. In this view, a final report was filed in the year 2003 and the case was taken on file. Thereafter, summons were issued to the petitioners for their appearance and at that stage, this petition is filed, to quash the proceedings. 6. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. In this view, a final report was filed in the year 2003 and the case was taken on file. Thereafter, summons were issued to the petitioners for their appearance and at that stage, this petition is filed, to quash the proceedings. 6. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. R. Krishnamurthy would contend, that the final report filed by the police, is barred by limitation, despite this fact, the trial Court had committed an error, in taking the case on file, which is not permissible under law, that too, in view of the fact, when the complainant has not filed any petition, to condone the delay. For the quashing of C.C.No.623/2003, no other ground was urged before me. Therefore, we have to see, what is the date of offence, when the case was filed, in addition to the commencement of period of limitation also, as contemplated under the Criminal Procedure Code. 7. Under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, the maximum period of imprisonment contemplated is three years. Section 468 Cr.P.C. prescribes period of limitation, for taking cognizance of an offence. Under this section, the period contemplated for taking cognizance, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years, is three years and therefore, if a complaint or a final report is filed after three years, the Court is barred, to take cognizance of that offence. 8. Section 473 Cr.P.C. contemplates extension of period of limitation, in certain cases. Under this provision, the Court is empowered to take cognizance of an offence, after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained, or that it is necessary to do so, in the interest of justice. This section does not contemplate any independent application, for the condonation of delay. Therefore, even in the absence of any formal application, for condonation of delay in launching the prosecution, after expiry of period of limitation, if the prosecution had explained the delay, at least in the final report, to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court perusing the same, satisfying that it is necessary to condone the delay, in the interest of justice, even without formal application, could condone the delay. In this case, the period of limitation, for filing the final report is three years, which is not disputed by the learned Government Advocate also. It is an admitted position that the offence is said to have been committed on 13.12.1999 at about 11.45 a.m. Therefore, from the said date of the commission of the offence, in the normal course, the complainant/respondent, ought to have filed the final report, before the competent court, having jurisdiction, on or before 13.12.2002. As submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, which is not disputed by the learned Government Advocate, a final report was filed in this case, elsewhere in the year 2003 and summons were issued on 2.11.2003, directing the petitioners, to appear before the Court on 30.12.2003. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the complaint was not filed within the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. It is not known how the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence, since the offence is punishable with imprisonment, for a term not exceeding three years. 9. When the case came up before me on 1.12.2003, the learned Government Advocate was directed to verify, as to whether the case was filed in time and if not, any application was filed, to condone the delay and to report the same to this Court. The learned Government Advocate has admitted, that the complaint was not filed within the period of three years, from the date of commission of the offence and it is also the further submission of the learned Government Advocate, that no application was filed, to condone the delay. As said supra, it is not necessary to file a formal application, for the condonation of the delay, provided, there was a prayer in the final report itself, seeking condonation, assigning reason. On that basis, if the Court had considered the matter, satisfied itself and taken the case on file, on the ground that the delay should be condoned, in the interest of justice, then at present the accused petitioners could not have any grievance. But unfortunately, as seen from the final report, filed along with the petition, no prayer is made for condonation of delay and in fact, there is no explanation of any kind, for not filing the final report in time. But unfortunately, as seen from the final report, filed along with the petition, no prayer is made for condonation of delay and in fact, there is no explanation of any kind, for not filing the final report in time. It seems, as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel, it is also not the case of the learned Judicial Magistrate, that the cognizance was taken, even after the expiry of the period of limitation, satisfying on the facts and circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so, in the interest of justice. It seems, as a routine work, mechanically, without applying the mind, the learned Judicial Magistrate has taken the case on file, despite the fact that the complaint was filed after three years, from the date of commission of the offence. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the learned Judicial Magistrate has committed an error, violating Section 468 Cr.P.C., in taking the case on file, though it is barred specifically. 10. Section 468 Cr.P.C. reads: "Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be - (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years." 11. As mentioned supra, the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term, not exceeding three years and therefore, under this Section, the Court is barred from taking cognizance of the offence under Sections 39 & 44 of the Indian Electricity Act. Ignoring the basic principle and without applying the mind, the trial Court has committed an error or illegality, which should be set right by quashing the proceedings, as rightly urged by the learned senior counsel, for the petitioners, for which there is no answer from the learned Government Advocate. 12. Ignoring the basic principle and without applying the mind, the trial Court has committed an error or illegality, which should be set right by quashing the proceedings, as rightly urged by the learned senior counsel, for the petitioners, for which there is no answer from the learned Government Advocate. 12. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that even hereafter, no petition could be filed to condone the delay and in this view also, keeping the case on file, would not serve any purpose, placing reliance upon a decision in Ubaidur Rahman, K.M. v. K.E. Theerthamalai, Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (1984 LW Crl. 222). In the case involved in the above decision, it seems the accused therein raised an objection to the maintainability of a prosecution, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. At that stage, it seems, the complainant filed a petition under Section 473 Cr.P.C. to condone the delay. Objecting the conduct of the complainant therein, the accused filed a petition to quash the proceedings, contending that the Court can condone the delay, only before cognizance and not thereafter, since the Court has no power, to exercise its discretion after it has failed to do, at the time of taking cognizance. This Court, upholding the contention has concluded - "If not at the time of taking cognizance, at least when the attention is drawn to the fact, the magistrate should decide whether the delay has been properly explained or whether it was necessary to proceed further in the interest of justice, On the facts and circumstances of the case. It is only after recording his satisfaction that the magistrate can proceed further. In the present case the Magistrate has failed to exercise his power under S.473 of the Crl.P.C., and consequently the bar embodied in S.468 of the Crl.P.C. continues to operate." On that basis, concluding that the proceedings is illegal, the same is quashed. 13. A division bench of this Court in Kathamuthu v. Balammal (1985 L.W. (Crl) 252), has considered the effect of Section 468 Cr.P.C. as well as Section 473 Cr.P.C., in its elaborate judgment. The division bench has held that the condonation of delay should precede the taking cognizance of the offence, thereby concluding, question of condoning the delay would not arise, subsequent to the taking cognizance of the offence. The division bench has held that the condonation of delay should precede the taking cognizance of the offence, thereby concluding, question of condoning the delay would not arise, subsequent to the taking cognizance of the offence. Therefore, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel, there is no possibility for the complainant also, to move the Court for condonation of delay, since admittedly, there was no explanation, for not filing the report within the time stipulated and no prayer for seeking condonation of the delay also. It is further held by the Division Bench that, "S.468(1), Cr.P.C., which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of the categories of offences in respect of which the periods of limitation have been prescribed under sub-S.(2) of that section, after the expiry of such periods of limitation, vests a valuable right in the persons sought to be prosecuted. The main object of such a prohibition is to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and to shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused persons from unnecessary harassment but to seek their remedies within the statutory periods fixed by the legislature." While considering the duty of the Court, as well as its satisfaction, the bench has observed, "When once the Court is satisfied that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary for the Court so to do in the interest of justice, then there cannot be any restriction or limit or fetter in the exercise of such power. Needless to say that the discretion should not be exercised in a capricious or arbitrary manner or for fanciful reasons. This discretionary power vested in the Court can be exercised by applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the reasons offered by the complainant in justification of his request for condonation of delay, which reasons can be made either in the complaint or the charge sheet, as the case may be, or in a separate application filed for the purpose, or the Court itself may suo motu condone the delay on its being satisfied, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, that it has become necessary so to do in the interests of justice. In any case, the exercise of power under S.473, extending the period of limitation by condoning the delay in launching the prosecution, should precede the taking cognizance of the offence." 14. Admittedly, in our case, before taking cognizance of the offence, no application was filed to condone the delay and in the final report also, no explanation is offered, why the complaint was not filed within three years from the date of the offence and urging the Court, to condone the delay also. Therefore, the complainant failed in its duty, as well as the Court also failed in its duty, in not perusing the complaint properly, in order to find out, whether it could take cognizance of the offence or not, considering the period of limitation. 15. The learned Government Advocate also unable to satisfy the court, by producing any other materials, that the delay was condoned or something like that and in fact, he conceded fairly that no steps were taken under Section 473 Cr.P.C. for the condonation of the delay. In view of the admitted position, that the offence took place on 13.12.1999, that a final report was filed, after a lapse of three years, that at the time of filing of the complaint, no formal application was filed, to condone the delay and that no explanation is also offered in the final report, I am of the considered opinion, the trial Court has committed illegality, in ignoring Section 468 Cr.P.C. and taking cognizance of the offence, thereby issuing summons to the accused, warranting interference of this Court, to invoke the inherent power, to give effect to the above said Section and to prevent abuse of process of Court, thereby to secure the ends of justice. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings against the accused petitioners in C.C.623/2003 on the file of Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur. Crl.M.P.No.11449 of 2003 is closed.