JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. - This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 2nd of August, 1999 passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla, whereby appeal of the appellant-defendant (hereinafter referred to as defendant No. 1) against judgment and decree dated 15.3.1996 passed by the learned Sub Judge, had been dismissed. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that respondent, Shangri (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) instituted a suit for declaration that she along with respondents/proforma defendants No. 2 and3 (hereinafter referred to as defendants 2 and 31) were owners in possession of the land measuring 5-3 bighas comprising Khasras Nos. 86, 88 and 89 situate in Chak Malog, Tehsil Jubbal, District Shimla (hereafter referred to as the suit land) and that the sale deed dated 2.2.1974 purporting to have been executed by late Mahantru in favour of the defendant was fake and forged and has no bearings on the rights of the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3. The suit property is jointly owned by the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 and said Mahantru who was brother of grand-father of the plaintiff and proforma defendants 2 and 3. Said Mahantru died issueless and his share in the suit land was inherited by the plaintiff and defendants2 and 3, and thus they became joint owners of the entire suit land and it remained in their peaceful possession. The defendant No. 1, however, forcibly dispossessed them with her might and ill spirit, just to grab the land. Hence, apart from a decree for declaration as aforesaid, possession of the suit land has also been prayed for. 3. Defendant No. 1 and proforma defendants 4 to 7 contested the suit and filed separate written statements. Proforma defendants No. 2 and 3 are ex parte. 4. Defendant No. 1 in her written statement raised preliminary objections that the suit was time barred, that the suit for mere declaration was not competent, that plaintiff has no cause of action, that the suit has been wrongly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, that the plaintiff has no locus standi to institute the suit and that the plaintiff is stopped by her acts, deeds and omission to file the present suit. On merits, the claim as made out in the plaint has been denied and it has been claimed that deceased Mahantru in fact was the owner in possession of the suit land and he sold it to defendant No. 1 vide a sale deed in the year 1972 and she is in possession of the suit land since 1972. The said sale deed was executed by the deceased of his own free consent without any coercion, fraud or inducement and in fact the sale was made to liquidate the debts incurred by the deceased from so many persons. Thus, right, title and interest in the suit land stood legally transferred in favour of the defendant No. 1. It is further averred that in case any piece of land out of the suit land does not find mention in the sale deed, same is in possession of the defendant since 1972 and she has planted apple orchard thereon and thus, in the alternative has become owner in possession by adverse possession. 5. Proforma defendants4 to 7 in their written statement have raised preliminary objections that they are co-parceners being legal heirs are entitled to inherit the share of Mahantru and that the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of necessary parties. On merits denying the pedigree table as given in the plaint defendants 4 to 7 have given their own pedgree table claiming it to be correct. They have supported the claim of the plaintiff to the extent that the alleged sale deed in favour of defendant No 1 is fictitious and was got executed fraudulently and is therefore void and not binding on the concerned parties. Defendants 4 to 7 have also claimed that they were in joint possession of the suit property and at the time of dispossession by defendant No. 1 they were also dispossessed along with the plaintiff. Thus but for claiming their rights qua the suit land, defendants 4 to 7 have supported the claim of the plaintiff. 6. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement of defendant No. 1 have been denied and the claim as made out in the plaint has been reaffirmed. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues:- 1. 6. The plaintiff filed replication to the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 wherein the grounds of defence as taken in the written statement of defendant No. 1 have been denied and the claim as made out in the plaint has been reaffirmed. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff and proforma defendants were to succeed the suit land-left by deceased Mahantru as his legal representative, as alleged? DPP. 2. Whether the sale deed dated 2.2.1974 in favour of the defendant No. 1 is the result of fraud null and void and not binding upon rights of the plaintiff and Performa defendants as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff and proforma defendants are entitled for relief of declaration and possession, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the suit is time barred, as alleged? OPD (1). 5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder of the necessary parties, as alleged? OPD-1. 6. Relief. 8. On the basis of the evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Judge vide his judgment dated 15.3.1996 decided issues Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of the plaintiff and issue Nos. 4 and 5 against defendant No. 1, and as a consequence decreed the suit for declaration and possession. 9. The defendant No. 1 being aggrieved by the judgment and decree aforesaid preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Shimla by the impugned judgment and decree, hence this appeal. 10. This appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether there has been mis-appreciation and mis-reading of oral as well as documentary evidences? 2. Whether the registered sale deed in favour of the appellant could have been set aside by the Courts below simply on the grounds that it has not been attested by the marginal witnesses and subscribe and sub-Registrar have not been examined ? 3. Whether suit filed by the respondent was not within limitation qua the relief of declaration as well as for possession? 11. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. Substantial Question Nos. 1 and 2 12. Since both these questions are inter connected, therefore, are taken up together for discussion and disposal. 13. Whether suit filed by the respondent was not within limitation qua the relief of declaration as well as for possession? 11. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. Substantial Question Nos. 1 and 2 12. Since both these questions are inter connected, therefore, are taken up together for discussion and disposal. 13. It was contended by the learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 that valid execution of the sale deed Ex. PW-2/D by Mahantru in favour of defendant No. 1 is duly proved in view of the statements of Shyama Nand (DW-1) and Prem Chand (DW-3) who have stated that the sale deed was executed by Mahantru for consideration received and that the sale deed was duly registered at his residence after it was admitted correct by Mahantru in the presence of DW-2 who had identified the executants before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration of Ex. PW-2/A. Basing his further contentions on the aforesaid submissions, the learned Counsel contended that being a registered document and the endorsement of registration thereon having been proved. Ex. PW-2/A carries presumption of correctness and this presumption coupled with oral evidence of DW-1 and DW-3 fully proves that Ex. PW-2/A was executed by Mahantru. Once it is proved that PW-2/A was executed by the executants, it could not be held invalid on the grounds that it was not attested by witnesses or was registered at the house of the executants for the reasons that it is not requirement of law that the sale deed must be attested by witness(s) and registration of a document at the house of the executants is permissible in law. It was further contended that burden to prove that Ex. PW-2/A was invalid was on the plaintiff whose, pleadings in this regard are cryptic for want of particulars and, further, the plaintiff had failed to lead cogent and reliable evidence to prove that the sale deed Ex. PW-2/A is invalid for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, both the Courts below have ignored the legal evidence on the record without any good reason and have based their findings regarding invalidity of Ex. PW-2/A on no evidence, hence the impugned judgments ad decree are liable to be set aside. PW-2/A is invalid for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, both the Courts below have ignored the legal evidence on the record without any good reason and have based their findings regarding invalidity of Ex. PW-2/A on no evidence, hence the impugned judgments ad decree are liable to be set aside. To substantiate his contention, the learned Counsel relied on Brij Raj Saran v. Alliance Bank, Shimla, Ltd., AIR 1936 Lahore 946; Devinder Singh and others v. The State of H.P. through the Secretary Election Deptt. Govt. of HP. and others, AIR 1976 Himachal Pradesh 19; Ali Hasan (deceased by L.R.) v. Matiullah (deceased by LRs.) and others, AIR 1988 Allahabad 57; Nanda v. Punnu Ram and others, AIR 1982 Himachal Pradesh 38; (Seth) Kanhaya Lai, since deceased (now represented by Seth Hanuman Parshad and another v. The National Bank of India Limited, Delhi, AIR 1923 Privy Council 114; Rangasami Goundar v. K.R. Easwaramurthi Goundan and others, AIR 1967 Madras 437 and 483; M. Ihtishan Ali and another v. Jamna Prasad and others, AIR 1922 PC 56; Gopal Dass and another v. Sri Thakurji and others, AIR 1943(30) Privy Council 83 and State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. K.P.V. Shaik Mohammed Rowther and Co. and another, AIR 1978 Madras 224. 14. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff had contended that Ex. PW-2/A is a fictitious document as it purports to have been executed on a date before which the executant had died vide certificate Ex. PW-5/A. It was further contended that document Ex. PW-2/A even otherwise it is not proved to have been executed by the executant and is not attested by any witness though the names of attesting witnesses are mentioned in the document and the registration had been brought about in shady circumstances as is evident from the statement of Jeet Singh (PW-5). It was further contended for the plaintiff that the courts below have taken the view which is permissible on the evidence on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent findings recorded by such courts do not call for interference by this Court. 15. It was further contended for the plaintiff that the courts below have taken the view which is permissible on the evidence on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the concurrent findings recorded by such courts do not call for interference by this Court. 15. There cannot be any dispute with the propositions of law (i) that a sale deed is not required to be attested by witness(s), (ii) that a document can be registered at the house of the executant (iii) that a registered document duly endorsed by Registrar carries presumption of correctness, (iv) that once the propounder of a deed has proved that it was executed by the executant, the burden to prove that such a document is invalid for any reason is on the person who claims it to be invalid. Thus, the above propositions of law being settled the case law cited by the learned Counsel for the defendant in this regard as pointed out hereinabove, need not be set out in detail. It may, however, be pointed out that any proposition of law is attracted by the facts and circumstances and is applicable to a case when so warranted by the facts and circumstances of such case. 16. In the case in hand, if the execution of the deed Ex. PW-2/A by the executant and its registration in accordance with law is proved without any surrounding suspicious circumstance(s), the facts that the deed is not signed by attesting witness(s) or that it was registered at the house of the executant will be of no consequence as the law does not require attestation of a sale deed by a witness and registration of a deed at the house of the executant is permissible in law. However, if there are suspicious circumstances raising doubt about due execution of Ex. PW-2/A, the non-attestation and registration at the house of the executant are the factors which may weigh against the valid execution of the document. 17. In the case in hand, the sale deed Ex. However, if there are suspicious circumstances raising doubt about due execution of Ex. PW-2/A, the non-attestation and registration at the house of the executant are the factors which may weigh against the valid execution of the document. 17. In the case in hand, the sale deed Ex. PW-2/A vide Para 3 of the plaint, has been challenged on the ground that it had been made fraudulently by defendant No. 1 "whereas as per the death certificate appended with the plaint clearly depicts about the death of the vendor for which the alleged sale deed - based upon which is void and deserves to be made null and void." Vide Para 5 of the plaint, the sale deed is referred to as "based upon the concoction and fraud". The plaint nowhere avers the particulars of the alleged fraud. However, on a combined reading of the aforesaid paras and the death certificate attached with the plaint, the plaintiff’s case appears that Mahantru, the vendor, was no more alive when the sale deed purports to have been executed by him. 18. The first and the foremost question for determination is whether Mahantru had in fact died before 2.2.1974 the date on which Ex. PW-2/A purports to have been executed and registered? In this regard, the learned trial Judge held that sale deed, in all probabilities is "a sham document which has been prepared after the death of vendor Mahantru whose death has also been proved to have taken place on 16.1.1973. Whereas this document Ex.PW-2/A shown to be executed on 2.2.1974 after the death of Mahantru......" The defendants at the appellate stage led additional evidence in this regard. The lower appellate Court differed with the findings of the trial Court and held that as per the entries in the report rojnamcha patwar. Ex.PW-1/A, Mahantru was alive on 31.12.1973, therefore, his date of death as alleged by the plaintiff cannot be accepted. Since this conclusion of the learned District Judge is based on the entries made in the public record, in the discharge of public function coupled with the evidence led by defendant No. 1 to prove execution and registration of sale deed, cannot be said to be based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence nor can this conclusion be said as based on wrong rejection of evidence. 19. 19. The Death Certificate Ex.PW-5/A relied by the plaintiff to prove the date of death of Mahantru is admittedly based on the entries in the Birth and Death Register, a copy whereof bearing Exhibit mark Ex.PW-5/A is on the trial Court file and Ex. RW-1/A on the appellate Court file and is referred to as Ex.PW-1/A hereafter. This document is highly unreliable as the entries therein are highly suspicious for various reasons. Column No. 4 of the format Ex. RW-1/A which is meant to mention the name of the deceased is blank. The date of receipt of information about the death and that of making the entries is not indicated. It is admitted by RW-1 that the official who make the entry has to put his signatures and date below the entry but Ex. RW-1/A does not bear such signatures and date. The register from which this entry has been taken admittedly does not contain the certificate about its pages and this register does not contain any other entry of death. Brijesh (AW-2), Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Nandpur examined by the plaintiff in appeal has stated that death and birth entry register of the concerned area prior to 1993 i.e. the relevant time is not available with Nandpur Panchayat and so is stated by Brij Lal Chauhan (AW-3), the concerned Panchayat Inspector. However a perusal of Ex. PW-2A reveals that it had been issued by the Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Nandpur on 5.12.1988 and Ex.RW-1/A is a photocopy of Ex.PW-5/A. Thus, the absence of any other entry of death in the register and issue of the aforesaid copies by Nandpur Panchayat which is not in possession of the Register and the manner in which entries therein have been maintained clearly render the entry Ex.RW-1/A a fake and manipulated entry and is exposed as such by the contents of Rapat Rojnamcha Wakyati Ex.- PW-1/A proved by Bala Nand, Patwari (PW-1) clearly showing that Mahantru reported death of Surtu, admittedly his nephew, at the Patwar on 31.12.1973. Therefore, the findings of the trial Court that Mahantru had died on 16.1.1973 before the date of execution of Ex.PW-2/A on 2.2.1974 could not be sustained and the findings to the contrary as recorded by the learned District Judge being findings of fact based on material on the record, calls for no interference. Therefore, the findings of the trial Court that Mahantru had died on 16.1.1973 before the date of execution of Ex.PW-2/A on 2.2.1974 could not be sustained and the findings to the contrary as recorded by the learned District Judge being findings of fact based on material on the record, calls for no interference. It may, however, be added here that in view of the above discussion and there being no cogent and reliable evidence and there being no cogent and reliable evidence to prove date of death of Mahantru, it can also not be held that Mahantru had not died at any time during the period 1.1.1974 to 2.2.1974 20. As already stated hereinabove, the trial Court held the Ex. PW-2/A void on the findings that it was prepared after the death of the executant which findings stand reversed. The lower appellate Court has different reasons to hold so. It did not believe the evidence regarding valid execution of Ex.PW-2/A and held it "not genuine" on the grounds that the deed though mentions the names of the attesting witnesses, but is not signed by them, that there are contradictions in the statements of the material witnesses (DW-1 and DW-3) about the place where the deed was executed and registered and also about the persons present at the time of its execution, and signing it by the witnesses, that PW-3 is an admitted stock witness of the plaintiff, that there is cutting/change in the date of presentation of Ex.PW-2/A for registration and the Sub Registrar has not been examined to explain these cuttings/change and that the deed is signed in Hindi whereas according to PW-3, Mahantru used to sig in Urdu. The findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court in. this regard are also based on correct appreciation of the material on record. 21. A bare perusal of Ex. PW-2/A reveals that at the bottom it mentions the particulars of two persons to witness the execution of the sale deed but is not signed by either of them. There is no explanation as to why it was not signed by the named witnesses. According to the evidence of DW-1 Mukhtar of defendant No. 1, this deed was executed and registered in a field in the Nala, whereas according to DW-3, it was scribed and registered at the house of Mahantru. There is no explanation as to why it was not signed by the named witnesses. According to the evidence of DW-1 Mukhtar of defendant No. 1, this deed was executed and registered in a field in the Nala, whereas according to DW-3, it was scribed and registered at the house of Mahantru. DW-1 has stated that at the time of registration of Ex. PW-2/A, only DW-3 was present but according to DW-3, at that time, 6/8persons residents of Malog and Rudal were present. Ex. PW-2/A is not signed by any attesting witness whereas according to DW-3 Ran Bahadur and Kana Singh was the attesting witnesses of this deed. DW-3 has admitted that he had appeared as witness of the defendant in many cases and DW-1 has also clearly and unambiguously admitted so, and has further stated that he keeps DW-3 alone as his witness. In view of these admissions, DW-3 is admittedly a stock witness of DW-1, Mukhtar of defendant No. 1. According to DW-3, Mahantru could read and write Urdu and used to sign in Urdu whereas Ex. PW-2/A is signed in Hindi, h is stated by DW-1 that after registration of Ex. PW-2/A, the Sub Registrar and DW-3 stayed with him for the night whereas according to DW-3, the Sub Registrar had left for Jubbal from the house of Mahantru after registration. Except DW-1 and DW-3, no other witness has bee examined by defendant No. 1 to prove that Ex. PW-2/A was executed by Mahantru. The statements of DW-1 and DW-3, in view of the above discussed lapses and contradictions on material particulars, cannot be relied upon to hold that Ex. PW-2/A was executed by Mahantru. 22. The sale deed Ex. PW-2/A is a registered document. It is true that its registration cannot be held bad in law merely for the reason that it was registered on the spot. But there are contradictory versions as of witnesses of defendant No. 1 as to the place where it was registered and the persons who were present at that time. Mahantru, admittedly, was not personally known to the Sub Registrar and was allegedly identified by DW-3, an admitted stock witness of DW-1, husband and Mukhtar of defendant No. 1. Therefore, proper and correct identity of the person who might have been identified by DW-3 as Mahantru is also doubtful. Mahantru, admittedly, was not personally known to the Sub Registrar and was allegedly identified by DW-3, an admitted stock witness of DW-1, husband and Mukhtar of defendant No. 1. Therefore, proper and correct identity of the person who might have been identified by DW-3 as Mahantru is also doubtful. The registration itself having been done when it is said to have been done is also doubtful for there as on that according to PW-2, the endorsement on the copy of sale deed kept in the Sub Registrar office bears only the seal and not the signatures of the Sub Registrar. He has further stated that under the signatures of the Sub Registrar on the (sic), the date as initially given i.e. 30.1.1974 contains cuttings and it has been changed to 2.2.1974, and the copy of the deed on the record of the Sub Registrar does not contain signatures of the executant whereas it is required to be signed by the executant. It may also be pointed out that even in the certificate of registration appended to Ex. PW-2/A, the serial number of the deed and Part number of the Bahi wherein it was entered had not been given. It may also be noticed that the date of issue of the stamp papers on which Ex. PW-2/A has been scribed has not been mentioned. The stamp vendor, scribe of Ex. PW-2/A and the Sub Registrar had not been examined to clarify the above suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution and registration of Ex. PW-2/A. As per contents of Para 2 of her written statement on merits, defendant No. 1 has claimed that the suit land was sold to her by Mahantru by a sale deed in 1972 but no sale deed of 1972 has been brought on record and Ex. PW-2/A relied as such sale deed purports to have been executed in the year 1974 and that too for 1/2 share of the land and not the suit land as a whole. In view of these circumstances, the presumption of correctness attached to the registered documents, endorsements and certificates appended by the Sub Registrar, stands controverted. 23. The case law cited for defendant No. 1 is, thus, not of any help to the defendant No. 1. 24. In view of the above discussion, the lower appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence and it correctly came to the conclusion that Ex. 23. The case law cited for defendant No. 1 is, thus, not of any help to the defendant No. 1. 24. In view of the above discussion, the lower appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence and it correctly came to the conclusion that Ex. PW-2/A is not proved to be a genuine document. Both these questions are decided accordingly. Substantial Question No. 3 25. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the defendant that the date of sale deed Ex. PW-2/A is 2.2.1974, whereas the suit to set aside the sale or seeking declaration that the sale deed is void had been instituted on 21.8.1986, therefore it is barred by limitation in respect of both reliefs claimed i.e. declaration and possession. 26. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff had urged that the relief of declaration is just formal and the suit is basically for possession based on title and had been instituted well within 12 years of the dispossession of the plaintiff, therefore, is within limitation. 27. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the suit is within limitation though for different reasons. This is not a suit simplicitor to set aside Ex. PW-2/A or for declaration alone but is also for possession of the suit land on the basis of title. The alleged sale deed has bee found not a genuine document, hence incapable of transferring any right, title or interest in favour of defendant No.1. The suit not being for declaration alone, but for possession based on title, the limitation will be governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which provide as period of 12 years to sue for possession of immovable property from the date when the possession of the person sued against becomes hostile. 28. As per the plaint, the plaintiff and defendants 2 and3 were in possession of the suit land but during settlement operations, they were forcibly dispossessed by defendant No. 1 and came to know that defendant No. 1 had fraudulently concocted a sale deed dated 2.2.1974 in her favour. On the other hand, the pleaded case of defendant No. 1 is that she was in possession of the suit land since 1972 when it was sold to her by a sale deed. 29. On the other hand, the pleaded case of defendant No. 1 is that she was in possession of the suit land since 1972 when it was sold to her by a sale deed. 29. PW-1 (plaintiff) has stated that the suit land after death of Surtu and Mahantru was in joint possession of her aunt and Pipi (predecessor in interest of defendants 4 to 7). She has further clarified that even during life time of Mahantru, the suit land was in their joint possession and after his death it remained in the joint possession of his successors, namely, PW-1, her sister and Pipi and the family members of defendant No. 1 took possession 5 or 6 years before. The witness was examined on 5.1.1990, therefore, according to her, the successors of Surtu and Mahantru were dispossessed from the suit land sometimes in 1984 or 1985. Dharam Singh (PW-4) has stated that he had seen the suit land in possession of the plaintiff and other heirs of Mahantru for 5 or 6 years after his death. Even Nathu Ram (PW-6) who has otherwise supported the case of defendant No. 1 has stated that till Mahantru was alive, he cultivated the suit land Thus, he had belied the claim of defendant No. 1 that she is in possession of suit land since 1972. Krishan Dass (PW-7) who is Lambardar of the concerned area has stated that the land revenue of the suit land was paid by Mahantru till his death and, therefore, it is paid by his heirs, namely Hirmu (defendant No. 4) and the plaintiff (PW-1). In his cross-examination, it had been suggested to him that Hirmu (defendant No. 4) etc. had informed him that after 4 or 5 years of death of Mahantru, defendant No. 1 was trying to take forcible possession of land. It is implicit in the suggestion that defendant No. 1 tried to take forcible possession after 4 to 5 years of the death of Mahantru. Be it stated that copy of jamabandi for the years 1970-71, forming part of sale deed Ex. PW-2/A shows that suit land in self cultivation of the owners, namely, Surtu and Mahantru in equal shares. In view of these entries, Mahantru could not sell the entire suit land nor could put defendant No. 1 in possession of entire suit land in 1972 or thereafter. PW-2/A shows that suit land in self cultivation of the owners, namely, Surtu and Mahantru in equal shares. In view of these entries, Mahantru could not sell the entire suit land nor could put defendant No. 1 in possession of entire suit land in 1972 or thereafter. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence led by the plaintiff, it can be held unless rebutted, that the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 7 were dispossessed from the suit land sometimes in 1984-1985. Therefore, the suit instituted on 21.8.1986 within limitation. 30. In rebuttal, DW-1 has stated that he had been in possession of the suit land since 1972. It is not clarified by him as to in what capacity he or defendant No. 1 was in possession thereof prior to 1974. DW-1 claims to have purchased the suit land vide Ex. PW-2/A on 2.2.1974 and to have continued in possession since 1972 whereas according to the pleadings of defendant no. 1, she purchased the suit land by a sale deed in 1972. The contents of Ex. PW-2/A however, mention about delivery of possession of 1/2 share in the suit land to defendant No. 1 at the time of its alleged execution and not from 1972 nor there is anything therein from which it maybe gathered that possession of suit land as a whole was given to the defendant in 1972 or at a later stage. DW-3 though has stated that defendant No. 1 was already in possession of the land but he has also in stated as to since when she was in possession of the suit land. The defendant No. 1 has not led any other evidence to prove that she had been in adverse possession of the, suit land since 1972 or for a period of 12 years before the institution of the suit. She herself has not chosen to enter the witness box and there is no reason stated or explained for her not appearing as her own witness. This also raises suspicion about the truthfulness of her case that she is in possession of the suit land since 1972. Thus, the evidence led by defendant No. 1 is incapable of rebutting the evidence led by the plaintiff.. This also raises suspicion about the truthfulness of her case that she is in possession of the suit land since 1972. Thus, the evidence led by defendant No. 1 is incapable of rebutting the evidence led by the plaintiff.. In any case, there is no evidence led by defendant No. 1 to prove that she had been in adverse possession over the suit land for 12 years immediately before the institution of the suit. The sale deed, thus, having been found not genuine, the suit for possession cannot be held time barred. Thus, he concurrent findings of the courts below do not call for interference on this count though slightly for different reasons. The Substantial Question is accordingly decided. 31. As a result of the above findings, this appeal merits dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. -