M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) A law point of considerable consequence has been agitated in this appeal and having regard to the fact that the fall out would be of considerable importance and applicability in a large number of similarly situated cases, we have heard the learned Counsel representing the contesting parties at considerable depth. The issue involves the interpretation of Section 110 (b) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. This Section exempts certain buildings and lands from property tax and Sub-clause (b) deals with Choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and Choultries the rent charged for occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes. ( 2 ) A brief reference to the facts is very essential. The petitioners in W. P. No. 7131/94 are the Trustees of Mr. Justice N. D. Krishna Rao Memorial Trust (registered) which institution, we are informed is a public charitable trust formed with the object of promoting education especially among backward members of society by awarding scholarship to students and involving itself in public charitable causes set out in the trust deed. The B. D. A. had allotted the trust a civic amenity site at 13th Main, H. A. L. II Stage, Bangalore on which they had put up a structure entitled NDK Kalyana Mandir. The trustees contend that the aim of the trust was not to accumulate profit because the income generated from the utilisation of the Kalyan Mantap was being spent by the trust totally for charitable purposes. The contention raised in the writ Petition was that having regard to the fact that whatever rent or charges are levied for the use of the Kalyana Mantap are earmarked entirely for charitable purposes, that the trustees and the institution would qualify for exemption from payment of property tax under S. 110 (b) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. The basic prayer was for quashing of the order dated 23rd September 1993 passed by the Taxation Appeals Committee of the Corporation confirming the order dated 5. 3. 1990 which was passed by the Deputy Commissioner as also the notice dated 19. 2. 1994 calling upon them to pay the tax demanded as they did not qualify for exemption. The basic prayer was for quashing of the order dated 23rd September 1993 passed by the Taxation Appeals Committee of the Corporation confirming the order dated 5. 3. 1990 which was passed by the Deputy Commissioner as also the notice dated 19. 2. 1994 calling upon them to pay the tax demanded as they did not qualify for exemption. The essential submission canvassed before the learned Single Judge proceeded on the footing that the institution was a choultry and since it was earmarking all its income for charity that it qualified for exemption from property tax under S. 110 (b ). The Corporation had resisted this Contention because the finding recorded was that the institution was not a choultry, that it was a kalyana mantap and that consequently, it did not qualify for exemption. The learned Single Judge upheld the petitioners contention and has effectively recorded a finding that the Kalyana mandir was effectively a choultry, that there is no distinction between the two and that consequently, the petitioners did qualify for the exemption from tax. However, after having decided the law point the learned Single Judge remanded the case for a factual examination of the question as to whether or not the petitioners would qualify vis-a-vis other requirement of S. 110 (b) namely as to whether no rent was charged or whether the rent charged was earmarked exclusively for charitable purposes. The Corporation has assailed the order in question through the present appeal. ( 3 ) THE main thrust of the submission canvassed by the appellants learned Advocate is to the effect that it is impermissible to equate a choultry with a kalyana mantap because the two are entirely different concepts. For purposes of illustrating this contention, the appellants learned Advocate drew our attention to a decision reported in A. I. R. 1933 Madras, page 782 (KOTHANDARAMA PILLAI and ANOTHER vs MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TRICHINOPOLY and ANOTHER) and in particular, to the following passage: -In wilsons Glossary, P. 108, it is stated that the word chavadi becomes choultry when corrupted an that choultry means a public lodging place, a shelter for travellers. In the same book at P. 104, the word chatram which is the vernacular corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram is explained as a place where refreshment is given gratuitously especially to Brahmins. In the same book at P. 104, the word chatram which is the vernacular corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram is explained as a place where refreshment is given gratuitously especially to Brahmins. The same distinction between a resting place for travellers and a place where refreshment is given is also mentioned in Macleans Manual where at P. 160 choultry is stated to be a corruption of the word chavadi and is explained as a hall used by travellers as a resting place and also intended as a place for the transaction of public business as in the expression village chavadi. And at page 188 chatram is explained as a corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram and as a house where pilgrims and travelling members of the higher casts are entertained and fed gratuitously for a day or two and as charitable foundations for the lodging and entertainment of a certain number of guests for a specified time. ( 4 ) NEXT, reliance is placed on the dictionary definition of the term choultry which reads as follows: -In the Indian subcontinent an open shed used as a travellers rest house, the colonnade of a temple, a meeting house, a court house. ( 5 ) THE appellants learned Counsel has also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R. 1974 Supreme Court page 521 (Municipal Council, Tirupathi vs Tirumalai Tirupathi Dewasthanam) wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to observe as follows:-Choultry is indeed an ancient institution and is principally meant for lodging of pilgrims and travellers. Effectively, the Supreme Court was concerned with a dispute with regard to the question as to whether the choultry at Tirupathi qualified for exemption or not and the Supreme Court had occasion to also examine the genesis of this expression and the relevant passage is reproduced below: -Choultry: Chatram. A choultry is a corruption of chavadi. It means a shelter or resting place for travellers. A chathram (corruption of the Sanskrit Sathram) is a house where pilgrims and travellers are fed. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, choultry is described as an Anglo Indian word being corruption of Telugu chawadi and its meaning is given as A caravanserai. In Wilsons Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, second edition, page 103, the word is given in different forms such as Chawati or Chauti. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, choultry is described as an Anglo Indian word being corruption of Telugu chawadi and its meaning is given as A caravanserai. In Wilsons Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms, second edition, page 103, the word is given in different forms such as Chawati or Chauti. Currently, Choltry or Choultry and the meaning is given as A public lodging place, a shelter for travellers. ( 6 ) ON the basis of this material, the learned Counsel submitted before us that in actual effect a choultry is nothing other than a darmashala or a residential centre for pilgrims and that irrespective of the colloquial habit of equating kalyana mantap or Kalyana mandir with the expression choultry that when it comes to the question of tax or when it comes to the question of examining the legal character of the institution that the Court would have to draw a distinction between the two. Mr. Harnahalli basically submitted that a choultry would really be a place where persons who have come from a long distance or from another town are allowed to rest or allowed to reside for a nominal payment or even free and that such an institution bears no resemblance to a kalyana mantap where marriages and other ceremonies are held, but effectively it is the celebrations which are predominant. The submission canvassed was that this is a purely commercial activity and learned Counsel had occasion to point out to the Court that judicial notice will have to be taken of the fact that by virtually exploiting the abnormally high levels of demand that are occasioned on these institutions, staggering amounts of money are charged for the use of the place and that this is not within the ambit and scope of S. 110. Learned Counsel submitted that S. 110 only exempts from property tax for good reason places of worship and certain categorise of religious and charitable institutions and that Kalyana mantaps even if they are closely referred to as choultries cannot be equated with the choultries in the traditional sense of the term. Learned Counsel submitted that S. 110 only exempts from property tax for good reason places of worship and certain categorise of religious and charitable institutions and that Kalyana mantaps even if they are closely referred to as choultries cannot be equated with the choultries in the traditional sense of the term. It is in this background that he submitted that the findings of the learned Single Judge are liable to be set aside adding that this finding or this decision could open the flood gates as far as the corporation is concerned because everyone of the institutions would immediately try and take full advantage of the ratio of this case. ( 7 ) THE respondents learned Counsel started by pointing out to us that this institution has been set up in memory of a very well known and well respected and reputed Judge and that the objective behind the entire exercise was in order to ensure that philanthropic and well deserving social projects and causes are catered to, that effectively, this institution was making available a venue for marriages for that a class of persons who could not afford the exorbitant cost of the traditional Kalyana mantaps and that all the earnings are earmarked hundred percent for educational and charitable purposes and that therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge require to be confirmed. Learned Counsel was quick to highlight that the decision which applied to the facts of the present case would not necessarily create a precedent as far as the other institutions are concerned and that therefore, the argument canvassed on behalf of the corporation that it would virtually play havoc with the collection of property tax is totally uncalled for. While we do not dispute the fact that the Trust in question is a reputed one, that it was set up to perpetuate the memory of a good and a great Judge and that it is also devoted towards a lot of excellent charitable and philanthropic activity monitored by a set of trustees who are themselves very highly reputed and esteemed but we need to add here that the issue is not with regard to the character of the Trust or the activity but is limited to the question as to whether the institution comes within the definition of a choultry. ( 8 ) FROM the passages that have been reproduced above, there can be no two opinions about the fact that a choultry can only be an institution where persons reside for short durations. S. 110 (b) is reproduced below: - s. 110. General Exemptions:-The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax (a) (b) choultries for the occupation of which no rent is charged and choultries the rent charged for occupation of which is used exclusively for charitable purposes. It is necessary to emphasis that under both the sub clauses of this Section the accent is on the word occupation. This is totally in consonance with what has been reproduced by the Courts in the passages that have been quoted by us and supports the view that a choultry is an institution where pilgrims or worshippers or persons who have done certain amount of travel are permitted to rest, relax and reside for a limited period of time. The character of such an institution is entirely different from that of a Kalyana mantap where nobody is allowed to reside and where effectively a celebration takes places. ( 9 ) MR. Holla, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that it is now customary because it is impracticable to hold wedding ceremonies within the precincts of a temple, to hold a religious ceremony in the Kalyana mantap and he was insistent on pointing out that this is an activity that would normally have been conducted in a place of worship and that this is the main reason why a kalyana mantapa would qualify for being equated with a choultry. What Mr. Holla overlooks is the fact that it is not a question as to whether a religious quasi religious function takes place within the precincts of that structure but the real issue is that at a wedding ceremony it is basically the celebration that takes place there or in other words, the reception which is basically a large social function. The Kalyana mantap is specially geared to cater to the celebration part of the wedding and even assuming the ceremony is performed there that is incidental. Again if the definition of choultry is examined, it will be seen that it is the residential aspect which is predominant and whether it forms a part of a place of worship is of no consequence. Again if the definition of choultry is examined, it will be seen that it is the residential aspect which is predominant and whether it forms a part of a place of worship is of no consequence. The fact that a religious ceremony may be held would therefore not assist the respondents at all. As regards the remaining submissions canvassed by the learned Counsel which really revolve around the charitable and philanthropic activities of the respondents, in our considered view, unless their structure answers to the basic definition of choultry, the nature of their public charitable activities, and the fact that this is a Trust would be wholly irrelevant. ( 10 ) THERE is another aspect to the case in so far as the respondents learned Counsel has filed before us statement of objections filed by the Corporation in W. P. No. 22713/1993 and it is true that in this case the Corporation has virtually equated the expression choultry with that of Kalyana Mantap. Mr. Hollas submission is that a public body cannot be allowed to adopt conflicting contentions before different Courts and in different proceedings and that there is required to be a level of consistency which includes defence in judicial proceedings and he submits that the Corporation is bound by the stand adopted by it in the earlier proceedings. Mr. Holla has almost equated the Corporations position with a situation in which the bar of legal estoppel is being pleaded against the body. The appellants learned Counsel submitted that the case in which those contentions were taken up related to a dispute under S. 343 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act wherein the question arose as to whether in the case of a Kalyana Mantapa a licence is required or not because catering activity or in other words, serving of food and drink is part of the celebration. His submission was that some stray submissions that were made in another proceeding cannot fatter the legal defence which the Corporation is eligible to plead in this case and we need to record that this position is correct in so far as there can be no estoppel in law against the Corporation in a situation such as the present one. His submission was that some stray submissions that were made in another proceeding cannot fatter the legal defence which the Corporation is eligible to plead in this case and we need to record that this position is correct in so far as there can be no estoppel in law against the Corporation in a situation such as the present one. It matters little as to what was the submission canvassed either orally or in writing in that case because the function of this Court is limited to considering the legal validity and tenability of the arguments canvassed before us dehors what is taken us any other proceeding and having done so, we have absolutely no hesitation in holding that a Choultry cannot even for the remotest of reasons be legally equated with a Kalyana Mantap or a Kalyana Mandir. The appellants learned Counsel is perfectly justified in having assailed the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and in our considered view he is equally justified in pointing out that these findings in the present proceedings would virtually open the flood gates and result in very serious loss of revenue to the Corporation if this principle is to be extended to all other cases. ( 11 ) WE have carefully reviewed the record before us and we have also reconsidered the line of reasoning and the conclusions reflected in the impugned order dated 1. 4. 1999. Having done so, in our considered view, it is essential that the order be set aside in its entirety. The findings of the Taxation and Appeal Committee of the Corporation in the order dated 5. 3. 1990 are upheld. The appeal succeeds and stands disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 12 ) THE respondents learned Counsel has requested for stay of this order for a period of six weeks. The application is granted. --- *** --- .