Judgment Prabhat Kumar Sinha and Braj Nandan Prasad Singh JJ. 1. The sole appellant aforesaid stands convicted under sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code ("The Code", in short), 302 read with section 34 of the Code and under section 27 of the Arms Act and, for offence under section 302 read with section 34 of the Code the appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for five years under section 27 of the Arms Act. However, no separate sentence was recorded for offence under section 302 simpliciter of the Code. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Pertinent it will be to note that in this case after investigation the Police submitted charge sheet against the appellant as well against co-accused Ashok Singh, Sanjay Singh and Lallu Singh showing Sanjay Singh and Lallu Singh as absconders. As recorded in the judgment of the lower court, before commitment Ashok Singh and Lallu Singh had expired. Sanjay Singh remaining absconder, the trial had proceeded against the appellant alone. 2. Wife of the deceased Devendra Kumar, namely, Damianti Devi is the informant and the prosecution story, minus the details, as coming out from the fardbeyan of the informant recorded on the date of occurrence (10.10.1985) at about 1.00 P.M. is that her husband at the time of occurrence had come from the field and in the inner courtyard (Angan) he was washing his hands and feet at which time the ladies and children from family of her Gotia (Vishwamohan Singh) came and claimed that the appellant had assaulted them and had fired a shot. In the meantime, the appellant alongwith other accused, also named, came in the Angan and this appellant fired at the mouth portion of the husband. Hulla was raised by her and Barahil (Vijoy Yadav, P.W. 2), at which her Gotni with her son, and the maid servant also came there. Thereafter, Sanjay Singh also fired on the right side of the head of the informants husband. In the last Lallu Singh fired on the right shoulder of the deceased. The assailants noticing that the village-people were coming, fled away. Husband died. 3. Thereafter, Sanjay Singh also fired on the right side of the head of the informants husband. In the last Lallu Singh fired on the right shoulder of the deceased. The assailants noticing that the village-people were coming, fled away. Husband died. 3. The reason for this ghastly murder as given in the first information report is that the father-in-law of the informant were four brothers including one Firangi Singh who died issueless, having 88 bighas of land in his share on which land appellant Dinesh Singh, informants "Jaut", had continued in forcible possession, refusing to give share to others in the family. He committed the murder as share was demanded, and a Panchayati was threatened. 4. The defence in course of trial as coming out from the trend of examination of eye-witnesses was that the husband was killed by extremists and the appellant was implicated falsely because of enmity. Out of the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution in course of trial, P.W. 7 is Dr. B.P. Keshaw, who had conducted autopsy upon the dead body whereas P.W. 6, Girija Prasad Verma was the Investigating Officer. Out of other witnesses, P.W. 1 Ram Rati Devi though supported the murder of Devendra Kumar, also stating that she had seen eight to ten persons coming out of the gate (of the house) of the deceased, denied having identified any. She was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the prosecution which failed to elicit anything from her which might have favoured the prosecution, though in the cross-examination by the defence she said that there was no well or hand-pump inside the house whereas a hand-pump was outside the gate. She also admitted that the deceased was killed by Naxalites and since Firangi Singh was issueless he had gifted his land to the appellant but that co-sharers were demanding share. P.W. 2, as stated, was Barahil, said to be an eye-witness, who also did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He denied having given such statement before Police as ascribed to him. He claimed that at the time of occurrence he was there and the deceased was at the hand-pump outside the gate of the house when ten to twelve persons came, killed Devendra Kumar and went away shouting "Lal Salam Zindabad". He claimed to have identified none. He denied having given such statement before Police as ascribed to him. He claimed that at the time of occurrence he was there and the deceased was at the hand-pump outside the gate of the house when ten to twelve persons came, killed Devendra Kumar and went away shouting "Lal Salam Zindabad". He claimed to have identified none. As per his evidence the appellant was Mukhia of the Panchayat at the time of occurrence and was living elsewhere. He also said that the deceased had died near the hand- pump and, later, the dead body was brought inside. RWs. 3 and 4 were brother-in-law (sala) and the brother of the deceased, respectively, but they have not claimed to be witness to the occurrence rather their evidence is hearsay on that point. On the other aspects of their evidence, we will revert to later. 5. Therefore, it is only the informant, P.W. 5, who has come forward to support the prosecution case as propounded by her in the first information report. 6. Before coming to the points on which on behalf of the appellant Sri P.N. Pandey, the learned counsel, had attacked and assailed her evidence, a glance over that she had said in the court. This witness said that on 10.1.1985 at 1.00 P.M. her husband had come to house and was washing his hands and feet in the Angan at which time wife of Gotia Viswa Mohan came with children and complained that Diensh Singh had assaulted them and had resorted to firing. While she was talking with her, Dinesh with Ashok, Lallu and Sanjay came to her husband whereafter Dinesh catching hold of her husband, took out pistol and fired in mouth at which her husband fell down. The Brahil raised hulla along with her on which wife of Raj Kumar, another Gotia came and tried to stop Dinesh. As per evidence, Sanjay thereafter took out a pistol and fired on the right side of the fore-head of her husband whereafter Lallu fired at the right shoulder. She said that at that time the maid servant also had come. The assailants fled away on coming of the village people but by that time the husband has breathed his last. 7. She said that at that time the maid servant also had come. The assailants fled away on coming of the village people but by that time the husband has breathed his last. 7. Giving genesis of the occurrence she said her father-in-law were four brothers out of whom Firangi Lal was issueless whose lands were being cultivated by Dinesh Singh for which a meeting was also held earlier. She admitted that in the night of the occurrence her brother and Devar (P.Ws 3 and 4) had also come who were told by her about the incident. 8. This witness also admitted that relating to this land earlier no quarrel had taken place nor any case was instituted. She also claimed that on account of firing in the face, the teeth also had broken. However, admitting that the wife and son of Raj Kumar besides the Brahil and the maid servant also were eye-witness to the occurrence, said that they had gone in connivance of the appellant, also saying that the Brahil would not give evidence as Dinesh Singh had given him land. However, the Brahil, P.W. 2 was examined as witness before the informant herself was examined. 9. Therefore, out of many eye-witnesses, only the informant took to the witness-stand to support the prosecution case. Undisputedly, it is that quality that counts, not the quantity of evidence. But in this case not only the informant but other relative witnesses have also admitted previous differences with appellant Dinesh on account of his having allegedly usurped the entire lands in the share of Firangi Lal. Therefore, in this case animus between the two sides is admitted. One small discrepancy in that regard is evidence of the witness that Panchayati was held, whereas other witness denied that any Panchayati was held. Obviously, evidence of P.W. 5 has been assailed on the ground that she was not only on inimical terms with this appellant, but was also an interested witness, her husband having been done to death. 10. It is also well settled that evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved or to be brushed aside on account of his/her being an interested witness or related to the deceased or on account of enmity. 10. It is also well settled that evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved or to be brushed aside on account of his/her being an interested witness or related to the deceased or on account of enmity. But it also is equally established that in such a case the evidence of such a witness has to be scrutinized with a fine toothcomb, that is, with utmost care and caution. To give a verdict of guilt against an accused on account of solitary evidence the evidence has to be so unblemished as to inspire confidence in the court over its truthfulness. It is on this touchstone that the evidence of P.W. 5 alongwith the attending circumstances has to be evaluated. 11. Sri Pandey, while assailing the testimony of this witness has gone to the extent to submit that she had given false evidence and had perjured herself. It is submitted that not only in her evidence she claimed that Ashok Singh also had accompanied the other accused and was with them when the occurrence took place but had made similar claim in the first information report. P.W. 6, the Investigating Officer, in his evidence during cross-examination has admitted that this Ashok Singh was in jail since 17.10.1984 in connection with G.R. Case no. 4043 of 1984 pending in a Patna Court in which case he was released on bail on 15.1.1985. This clear statement of the Investigating Officer, it was argued, prove that on the date of occurrence he was in jail. Hence, it was not possible that he would also have participated in the occurrence. Learned counsel also argued that in this case for occurrence having taken place at 1.00 P.M. the fardbeyan in the village was recorded by Police at 5.15 P.M. which was time enough to take a decision as to whom to implicate for a murder which was committed by some-one else and in that context not only this appellant but persons who were known to be close to him were also named, including Ashok Singh. 12. 12. Sri Pandey also argued that the Investigating Officer in his evidence had said about preparing inquest report (Exhibit-4) upon which, as witness, Vishwa Mohan Prasad Singh and his wife Dayamanti Devi had signed but the informant in her evidence claimed that inquest report having been prepared before her it was she and Vishwa Mohan who had signed over that. From the exhibit, which is the carbon copy, it is not clear as to who was the first signatory upon that, but P.W. 6 has asserted that it was not this appellant (Damianti Devi) but Dayamanti Devi who has signed upon this. Citing these examples learned counsel asserted that this witness, therefore, could lie. 13. Learned counsel also argued that there was much scope in the evidence to doubt the place of occurrence. According to the clear case of the informant in the first information report the husband had come and was done to death when he was washing his hands and feet in the inner courtyard (Angan). She also asserted in course of cross-examination that what she had said before the Police was that her husband was washing in the inner courtyard, denying that she had told the Police that he was washing his hands in the field in front of the house. But P.W. 6, when confronted with this, admitted that the informant had told him that the husband was washing in front of the house, in the field. In that context evidence of P.W. 5 was also pointed out in which she was asked questions about the situation of her house and surrounding areas. She has said that after the exit of the house there was a compound with boundary containing one guava tree. Thereafter she also admitted that after the main exit towards east there was land which was open in which land there was a well and a hand-pump. The Investigating Officer also found the dead body on Osara, outside the house and stated that he had found blood outside the house and from that spot the double storey house of the deceased was about twenty feet away. The Investigating Officer also found the dead body on Osara, outside the house and stated that he had found blood outside the house and from that spot the double storey house of the deceased was about twenty feet away. Learned counsel argued that, therefore, the evidence rather prove that the deceased had not even gone inside his compound wall but was in an open field where he met his death, hence there was no question of his coming inside the house precincts muchless into the inner courtyard. It was also pointed out that while describing the place of occurrence the Police Officer did not say about finding of any well or a hand-pump in the inner courtyard (Aangan) or about finding any utensil or bucket in the Aangan with help of which deceased might be washing himself. It, therefore, appears that the place of occurrence, as claimed by the informant, when read with evidence on record is shrouded in confusion. 14. Learned counsel also submitted that the informant in her evidence had clearly stated as to which of the assailants had fired at which portion of the body of her husband and reading that with the evidence of Dr. B.P. Keshaw, it was submitted that the medical evidence did not conform to what the informant had claimed. In that regard the evidence of P.W. 5 is categorical that Dinesh had fired in the mouth/ face (Moonh), whereafter Sanjay had fired on the right side of his fore-head (Lilar) whereafter Lallu had fired on the right shoulder. The doctor witness, in course of autopsy, found following injuries on the person of the deceased "(i) A wound of entry measuring 3/4" x 1" irregular charred margin, inverted in the right deltoid region. The wound of exit 2" x 2 and 1/2" over the clavicular region destroying the major neck vessels, right clavicle fractured. (ii) Another wound of entry over the left temporal region 3/4" x 1" inverted charred margin, wound of exit : 4" x 3" irregular with multiple fracture of mandible specially in right half and multiple fracture of middle cranial fossa and claveria. (iii) Wound of entry over the occipital eminence i.e. back of head. No outlet could be detected." 15. (ii) Another wound of entry over the left temporal region 3/4" x 1" inverted charred margin, wound of exit : 4" x 3" irregular with multiple fracture of mandible specially in right half and multiple fracture of middle cranial fossa and claveria. (iii) Wound of entry over the occipital eminence i.e. back of head. No outlet could be detected." 15. In so far as the first information report is concerned, the claim was same as made in the evidence, so far Dinesh Singh was concerned and about Sanjay Singh it was claimed that he had fired on the right side of the head which has come as the right side of the fore-head in the evidence. In the first information report, the same claim about the firing by Lallu Singh was made. Learned counsel pointed out that though the evidence was that Sanjay had fired on the right fore-head, the doctor found wound of entry at the left temporal region and a wound of exit, with multiple fracture of mandible. Another wound of entry was found at the occipital region which also was not claimed by the informant. In so far as injury no. 1 is concerned, from findings of the doctor it would appear that the shot, after having been fired at the right deltoid region had travelled a bit upward. P.W. 5 had admitted that after having been shot by Dinesh Singh, her husband had fallen down. Lallu is said to have fired last, i.e., when the deceased was lying down. In that posture such an injury is unlikely when fired from any higher level. 16. Learned counsel argued that she has claimed to be the eye-witness to the entire occurrence along with some others but she alone came to prove what she had alleged against the appellant and other accused. But difference in between her evidence and the factual findings of the doctor would further weaken the prosecution case and make her testimony open to doubts. 17. On behalf of the prosecution it was suggested that so far the discrepancies as pointed out were concerned, the evidence was recorded in the case more than a decade after the occurrence, hence it was simply not possible for any witness to give evidence with razor-thin precision without entering into some natural discrepancies. 17. On behalf of the prosecution it was suggested that so far the discrepancies as pointed out were concerned, the evidence was recorded in the case more than a decade after the occurrence, hence it was simply not possible for any witness to give evidence with razor-thin precision without entering into some natural discrepancies. This would be true but in this case it has come in the first information report itself as to which of the accused had hit at which portion of the body of the deceased. The medical evidence, evidently, does not fully conform to what has been claimed in the first information report. The material facts having already come in the first information report not only about the injuries but also about participation of Ashok Singh in the occurrence, the argument about lapse of memory after more than a decade is not available to the defence. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant in this regard has also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lallu Manjhi V/s. State of Jharkhand,; J.T. 2003 S.C. 1 [: 2003 (2) PLJR (SC) 35 : 2003 (2) JLJR (SC) 23], relating to the evaluation of evidence of a sole eye-witness. Their Lordships held that such evidence could be classified in three categories, namely, (1) Wholly reliable, (2) Wholly unreliable, and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The courts have no difficulty in coming to a conclusion if the evidence is within first two categories, but if the evidence of solitary witness falls in the third category, the courts, observed their Lordships, have to be circumspect and have to look for, and to locate, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. I find that the testimony of P.W. 5 falls in the third category but any search for corroboration is futile, no other eye-witness having taken the witness stand to describe the occurrence. The circumstances also do not favour the prosecution case, as already discussed. 19. Evidently, the parties were on inimical terms, as asserted by witnesses who were related to the deceased, on account of his having forcible possession of a large chunk of land belonging to Firangi Lal, to the exclusion of other co- sharers. The circumstances also do not favour the prosecution case, as already discussed. 19. Evidently, the parties were on inimical terms, as asserted by witnesses who were related to the deceased, on account of his having forcible possession of a large chunk of land belonging to Firangi Lal, to the exclusion of other co- sharers. P.W. 4 in paragraph 12 has admitted that Naresh Singh was the brother of the appellant but he did not know if Firangi Lal had given the property to them in his will. But this witness admitted that a Probate case was going on, filed by those two brothers, also giving the number of that case and mentioning the court where the Probate case was proceeding but, in reply to a question he also said that he did not know as to whether that Probate case had been decided in favour of Dinesh Singh and his brother. It has also come in evidence that not only that Dinesh Singh was cultivating the lands belonging to Firangi Lal (Firangi Singh) but also the receipts for the land were being issued in his name. In that regard the defence has brought on record Exhibit-F, the judgment in the Probate case. 20. There is much force in the argument of Sri P.N.Pandey. In such circumstance, enmity cutting both ways, it was more probable for the informant side to falsely implicate the appellant than for the appellant going for the murder. As per the evidence, the lands were in cultivating possession of Dinesh Singh, in whose favour receipts were being issued and in relation to which a Probate case was also instituted by Dinesh Singh and his brother which the defence claimed to have been decided in their favour. It was, therefore, argued that in such circumstances, they hardly had any reason to go and commit the murder while the informant side, on the same very ground, if a murder had been committed in the family by someone else, not known, had reason to falsely implicate him to keep him out of the way. 21. In such a case, it has to be seen, enmity cutting both ways, as to on which side the enmity was more likely to operate. On this score also there is force in the arguments on behalf of the appellant. 22. 21. In such a case, it has to be seen, enmity cutting both ways, as to on which side the enmity was more likely to operate. On this score also there is force in the arguments on behalf of the appellant. 22. P.W. 6 had admitted that at about 3.30 at the Police Station Chaukidar Sharwan Paswan had come and had intimated about murder of the deceased for which Sanha no. 173 of that day was registered. In reply to a question this Police Officer said that the Chaukidar had not named any one as the assailant. It was argued that if the informant and other witnesses had seen the appellant and others committing the crime and had identified them, then it was highly unlikely that the Chaukidar, after getting the information, would have gone to the Police Station and informed about the murder but without naming any one. Neither the Chaukidar has been examined in this case nor the Sanha entry appears to have been brought on the record so that the facts in this regard could be verified. This is another lacuna in the prosecution case. 23. In view of what has been discussed above, we are of the opinion that the solitary evidence of P.W. 5 is not such on which reliance could be placed to return a verdict of guilt, and convict the appellant. In view of the evidence on record and the attending circumstances, in our opinion, the appellant deserved benefit of doubt. In view of this finding, it is of no use to discuss the defence evidence on the record. 24. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the order of conviction and the sentences imposed upon the appellant, are hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. He is directed to be released from the custody forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case.