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2003 DIGILAW 2114 (ALL)

JAI PRAKASH; PARAM SINGH v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE RAMPUR

2003-09-12

K.K.MISRA, S.RAFAT ALAM

body2003
Both these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are directed against the order of the District Magistrate, Rampur, dated 31-1-2003 detaining the petitioners under Section 3 (2) of the Natinal Security Act, 1980, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on account of their involvement in Case Crime No. 761 of 2002 under Section 302/307, IPC, P. S. Tanda, district Rampur. 2. Counter and refounder affidavits have been exchanged and they are on record. 3. We have heard Sri Taha Bin Islam, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned AGA appearing for respondents No. 1, 2 and 4, and Sri D. S. Lal, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 Union of India. 4. In both the petitions the impugned orders of detention are based on similar accusations against the petitioners and pleadings of the parties are also similar and identical to each other and as agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties, are heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. 5. Although the impugned order of detention is challenged on several grounds but during the course of argument learned counsel for the petitioner confined his submission to the point that the petitioner was not communicated the fact that he had a right to make representation to the detaining authority before approval of the detention order by the State Government. Learned counsel further drew our attention to the grounds of detention which provides that the detenu is being informed that he can make representation to the detaining authority/district Magistrate against his detention but such representation must be received before the approval of the detention order by the State Government, Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that a plain reading of the grounds of detention indicates that the right to make such representation to the detaining authority has not been conveyed and what was conveyed is the option to make such representation, and there is material difference between the option to make representation and right to make representation. He further placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sushil Singh v. District Magistrate, Kheri & others, reported in 2003 (1) JIC 639 (AII) (LB), wherein it has been held that the absence of communication of right to make representation to the detaining authority amounts to partial communication of his fundamental right and such partial communication would be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed to a detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, opposed the writ petition and sought to argue that there is no violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and, therefore, the order of detention on that ground has not been vitiated. 6. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. From a plain reading of the impugned order of detention it is apparent that the right to make representation to the detaining authority before approval of the order of detention by the State Government, has not been conveyed to the petitioners and there was only partial communication about their right to make representation to the State Government and the Central Government, which is infraction of their valuable right guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. 7. It is the duty of the Court to see as to whether the valuable right of a detenu guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution has been conveyed to him in unequivocal terms making him fully aware of the fact that he has a right to make representation to the detaining authority as well. 8. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, (supra), the Apex Court has held that non-communication of the right of detenu to make representation to the detaining authority would constitute an infraction of the valuable constitutional right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution and such failure would make the order of detention invalid. Recently, the Honble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, 1985, in Criminal Appeal No. 782 of 1984, Vinod v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2003) SCC (Crl.) 14, relying on its earlier judgment in the case of K. Mohanan v. State of Kerala, (2000) SCC (Crl.), 1228, observed that before conducting search the police officer concerned cannot merely ask the accused whether he would like to be produced before the Executive Magistrate or a Gazetted officer for the purpose of search, but inform him of his right in that behalf under law. Therefore, mere communication of information that he can make representation is not enough and cannot be considered as communication about his right under law to make such representation before the detaining authority as well and thus, we are of the view that there is violation of the valuable right guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. 9. In the result, both the petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders of detention dated 31- 1-2003 are hereby quashed. The petitioners shall be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed .