B.Subhashan Reddy, C.J.: This writ petition is filed questioning the order of dismissal of the petitioner in disciplinary action. The recommendation for dismissing the appellant was accepted by the first respondent in G.O.Ms.NO.1377, Public (Special-A) Department, dated 10.10.2000. The prayer is to set aside the same and to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity of service and payment of arrears of salary, allowances and other attendant benefits. 2. The petitioner was a practising advocate having enrolled during the year 1967 and when the selection of District Munsif was notified, he applied for the same and was selected during the year 1974. After 10 years, he was promoted to the post of Sub-Judge and after another 10 years, he was promoted as District Judge Grade II. Before his removal from service, he was the Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tuticorin. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated when he was in that post. He received a memorandum issued by the second respondent on 3.1.1997 with some statements recorded by the Special Officer (Vigilance Cell) of this Court. Explanation was sought for from the petitioner, which the latter had complied with. Enquiry was initiated on the basis of complaint made by members of the Pudukkottai Bar Association. Four charges were levelled against the petitioner as mentioned below: Charge No.1: That you Thiru S.Thirupathy, while functioning as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, passed a common order in 22 M.C.O.Ps. including M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1994 on 29.8.1996 awarding a sum of Rs.67,000 as compensation to the petitioner in the said M.C.O.P.; that when Thiru Meganathan, Advocate for the respondent in the said M.C.O.P. brought to your notice about that the claim amount was only for Rs.50,000 in the said M.C.O.P., you, on the next day, without any petition being filed, changed the compensation amount from Rs.67,000 to Rs.50,000 and thus you have violated the procedural laws in the disposal of M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1994 and committed the acts of misuse of power, abuse of the process of law and conduct becoming of a Judicial Officer and thereby rendered yourself liable to be punished under Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Charge No.2: That you Thiru S.Thirupathy, while functioning as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, passed a common order on 29.8.1996 in 22 M.C.O.Ps. Charge No.2: That you Thiru S.Thirupathy, while functioning as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, passed a common order on 29.8.1996 in 22 M.C.O.Ps. awarding a sum of Rs.67,000 as compensation to the petitioner in the M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1994; that some days later, you have changed the last 15 lines of the common order earlier pronounced in 22 M.C.O.Ps. on 29.8.1996 and awarded a sum of Rs.50,000 instead of Rs.67,000 as compensation; that as you have changed the last 15 lines, the steno-typist, Varadarajan had to remove pages 33, 34, 45 and 46 in the common order and replaced the pages 33, 34, 45 and 46 by typing in separate sheets as per the changed order; that you have also initialed in the ‘A’ Diary for striking off the line and for the alteration of the amount from 67,000 to 50,000, and thus you have committed the act of misuse of power, abuse of process of law and conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and thereby rendered yourself liable to be punished under the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Charge No.3: That you Thiru S.Thirupathy, while functioning as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, on cross-examination of the accused Kumarasamy in S.C.No.22 of 1996, came to know about the relationship of Kumarasamy, accused in S.C.No.22 of 1996 with the petitioner Tmt.Vijaya in M.C.O.P.No.409 of 1993, (the case you have reserved orders); when the accused was waiting down in the Court hall, after arguments were over, you have called Kumarasamy near to you by hand signal and asked him to come to your chamber; and when he came to your chamber, you demanded a sum of Rs.50,000 for rendering a favourable judgment in the said S.C. and M.C.O.P.; and that he refused; that you, after some days, convicted him and thus you have indulged in corrupt practices, misuse of power, abuse of the process of law and conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and thereby rendered yourself liable to be punished under Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Charge No.4: That you Thiru S.Thirupathy, while functioning as Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, after hearing the arguments in S.C.No.13 of 1996, on one Wednesday, when the case was posted on 31.7.1996 for judgment; that when the accused Kuttiyan alias Andi and Ashokan alias Andi were waiting for the judgment in the Court; that on 31.7.1996, at about 4.30 p.m. you called two accused in the said S.C.No.13 of 1996, waiting in Court, to your chamber and demanded a sum of Rs.10,000 from them for rendering a favourable judgment in the said S.C.; that as they pleaded their inability, subsequently, you imposed a sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment on the first accused and thus you have indulged corrupt practices, committed the acts of grave misconduct, abuse of powers and conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and thereby rendered yourself liable to be punished under Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. They were replied to and an enquiry was held by a 2-Judge Committee of this Court, which found him guilty on all the four charges. The Administrative Committee of this Court has accepted the findings of the 2-Judge Enquiry Committee, and directed the placing of the matter before the Full Court and the Full Court has also accepted the same and the result is the impugned order of dismissal, which reads: PUBLIC (SPECIAL.A) DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.NO.1377 Dated:10.10.2000 Vikrama, Purattasi - 25 Thiruvalluvar Aandu - 2031 Read: 1. G.O.,Ms.No.822, Home Department, dated 2.4.1974. 2. Proceedings of Administrative Committee ROC.NO.210/96 Con-B2, dated 27.10.1997. 3. Written statement of defence of Thiru S.Thirupathy, dated 16.11.1997. 4. Additional Written Statement of defence of Thiru S.Thirupathy, dated 13.12.1997. 5. Findings of the Hon’ble Enquiring Judges dated 14.10.1999. 6. High Court’s official Memorandum ROC.210/96/Con.B-2, dated 16.11.1999. 7. Further representation/Reply submitted by Thiru S.Thirupathy, dated 3.12.1999.8. Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the High Court, Madras, dated 13.3.2000. 9. Minutes of the Full Court Meeting dated 27.3.2000. 10. From the Registrar General, High Court, Madras, D.O.Lr. No.210/96 - Con-B.2, dated 31.3.2000 and dated 27.6.2000. ORDER: Thiru S.Thirupathy was appointed as District Munsif in the Government Order first read above. Subsequently he was promoted as Sub-Judge and then as District Judge. 2. 9. Minutes of the Full Court Meeting dated 27.3.2000. 10. From the Registrar General, High Court, Madras, D.O.Lr. No.210/96 - Con-B.2, dated 31.3.2000 and dated 27.6.2000. ORDER: Thiru S.Thirupathy was appointed as District Munsif in the Government Order first read above. Subsequently he was promoted as Sub-Judge and then as District Judge. 2. The Administrative Committee constituted by the High Court, Madras, in its proceedings dated 27.10.1997 in the reference second read above had framed the following four charges against Thiru S.Thirupathy, formerly Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai and now Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai. Charge No.1 to .... Charge No.4 .... 3. The delinquent Officer was required to submit his written statement of defence within 15 days from the date of receipt of the proceedings second read above. He had submitted his written statement of defence and additional written statement of defence and the same was considered by the Administrative Committee. The said committee appointed Thiru Justice P.Shanmugam and Thiru Justice P.Thangavel as Enquiring Judges to conduct the departmental enquiry against the said officer and to render findings. The Enquiring Judges had conducted the departmental enquiry as against the said delinquent officer and rendered findings holding that all the charges viz., charge numbers: 1, 2, 3 and 4 stand proved and the delinquent officer is guilty of those charges. 4. The findings of the Enquiring Judges was considered by the Administrative Committee of the High Court and as resolved by the said committee, a copy of the findings was furnished to the said delinquent officer and he was required in the reference sixth read above to submit his further representation if any, to the findings and he was also required by the High Court to show cause as to why the findings should not be accepted and the punishment of dismissal from service should not be imposed on him. The delinquent officer had submitted his further representation/reply to the show cause notice in the reference seventh read above. 5. The findings of the Enquiring Judges further representation/reply submitted by the delinquent officer and the relevant records were considered by the Administrative Committee in the meeting held on 13.3.2000. The Administrative Committee resolved to impose the penalty of “dismissal from service” on the said delinquent officer as the charges proved against him are serious in nature and also placed the matter before the Full Court. 6. The Administrative Committee resolved to impose the penalty of “dismissal from service” on the said delinquent officer as the charges proved against him are serious in nature and also placed the matter before the Full Court. 6. The Full Court after considering the above matter in its meeting held on 27.3.2000 had resolved to accept the decision of the Administrative Committee and also resolved to recommend to the Government to dismiss Thiru S.Thirupathy, delinquent officer from service. 7. The High Court in its reference 10th read above has forwarded to Government, a copy of the charge proceedings, findings of the Enquiring Judges dated 14.10.1999 (in original, further representation/reply to the show cause notice submitted by Thiru S.Thirupathy, dated 3.12.1999 (in original), copy of the Minutes of the Administrative Committee meeting and copy of the minutes of Full Court meeting and requested that the orders of the Appointing Authority imposing the penalty of “dismissal from service” on Thiru S.Thirupathy, formerly Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, and now Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, may be obtained and communicated. 8. The Governor of Tamil Nadu after careful and independent examination of the case along with the connected records sent by the High Court has decided to accept the recommendation of the High Court, Madras, for imposing the punishment of “dismissal from service” on Thiru S.Thirupathy, formerly Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, and now Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai. Accordingly, the Governor of Tamil Nadu, hereby imposes the penalty of “dismissal from service” on Thiru S.Thirupathy, formerly Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai, and now Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai for the charges held proved against him. A.P.MUTHUSWAMI. CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT. Hence, this writ petition. 3. The High Court has control over subordinate Courts under Art.235 of the Constitution of India. In order to ensure strict discipline among the judicial officers of the State, a strict vigilance is necessary and so also a strict view in dealing with the Judicial Officers/Delinquents. That is necessary to weed out the corrupt officials in the judiciary so as to ensure the purity of justice to hand out impartial justice. Justice delivery system is one of the basic pillars of democracy and is a basic feature of Constitution. The High Court has a great deal of responsibility in this regard. That is necessary to weed out the corrupt officials in the judiciary so as to ensure the purity of justice to hand out impartial justice. Justice delivery system is one of the basic pillars of democracy and is a basic feature of Constitution. The High Court has a great deal of responsibility in this regard. Equally, the High Court has got the responsibility to see that independence of judiciary is not in peril and that subordinate Judges are not subjected to undue harassment at the hands of unscrupulous litigants and advocates and see that independence of judiciary is not shaken and the judicial officers are placed in such a safe and strong position enabling them to function efficiently without fear. The moment fear is inculcated in the minds of the judicial officers, justice delivery system suffers a setback as a result of brow-beating by the disgruntled persons. More should be the care and caution when a litigant before a subordinate Judge himself is the complainant and who had an axe to grind having suffered an adverse judgment. 4. There are some leading judgments rendered by the Supreme Court in this regard. They are Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others, (1985)3 S.C.C. 378 ,Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (1988)3 S.C.C. 370 ,Yoginath D.Badge v. State of Maharashtra, (1999)7 S.C.C. 739 and Zunjar Rao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others, (1999)7 S.C.C. 409 . 5. It was held in Anil Kumar’s case, (1985)3 S.C.C. 378 , that disciplinary enquiry is a quasi judicial enquiry and a well reasoned report of the enquiry is essential and the said report should be on the basis of enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice. It was held in Ishwar Chand’s case, (1988)3 S.C.C. 370 , that domestic enquiry must be based on existing relevant material and such conclusion is open to judicial review. In that case, it was held that conclusion was based on non-existent and irrelevant material and unsubstantiated allegations and as such, the order of termination was set aside reinstating the delinquent officer with continuity of service, arrears of salary, allowances and other attendant benefits. In that case, it was held that conclusion was based on non-existent and irrelevant material and unsubstantiated allegations and as such, the order of termination was set aside reinstating the delinquent officer with continuity of service, arrears of salary, allowances and other attendant benefits. It was also held that High Court should not readily form adverse opinions and act against judicial officers merely on the basis of unjustified resolutions passed by the bar associations or complaints made on trivial matters against them and that the High Court must guide and protect the honest judicial officers. In Yoginth D.Badge’s case, (1999)7 S.C.C. 739 , the facts were exactly similar as in the instant case where the accused facing criminal trial were the complainants. Ultimately, the Supreme Court had set aside the penalty imposed upon the delinquent judicial officer on the ground that there was no basis for finding the delinquent guilty. It was held in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar’s case, (1999)7 S.C.C. 409 , that adjudicators need to protect them from falling into disrepute on baseless allegations as otherwise, the entire system will fall into disrepute if the officers in justice delivery system are inhibited in performing their functions without fear or favour by subjecting them to constant threat of disciplinary proceedings. 6. Keeping these principles in view, we shall now proceed as to whether the impugned order against the petitioner is sustainable. The entire action emanated from a resolution of the Bar Association, Pudukkottai. A reading of the said resolution dated 16.11.1996, signed by 13 advocates, shows allegations against the petitioner in the context of his alleged favourtism towards ten advocates, who have been named. But none of the signatories to the said memorandum has been examined. In fact, no advocate has been examined to say anything against the petitioner. The only advocate who has been examined is P.W.2 Meganathan, whose evidence is not adverse to the petitioner but in fact supports the stand of the petitioner relating to charges Nos.1 and 2. Charges Nos.1 and 2 are one and the same and can be clubbed and dealt with together. The charge is that in a batch of 22 cases, including M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1994, compensation was granted by the petitioner at Rs.67,000 each for the injuries suffered by the claimants therein. The decrees have been passed against Maruthu Pandian Transport Corporation. Charges Nos.1 and 2 are one and the same and can be clubbed and dealt with together. The charge is that in a batch of 22 cases, including M.C.O.P.No.480 of 1994, compensation was granted by the petitioner at Rs.67,000 each for the injuries suffered by the claimants therein. The decrees have been passed against Maruthu Pandian Transport Corporation. P.W.2 Meganathan is an advocate, who appeared on behalf of the said Corporation to defend against the claimants. It is his case that after the judgment had been delivered, he along with the counsel for the claimants Mr.Rajakkali, had mentioned to the petitioner in open Court regarding the error that claims have been made only at Rs.50,000 each while the award has been at Rs.67,000 each and that this need to be corrected. Only on the joint statement of both P.W.2 and the counsel for the claimants Mr.Rajakkali, the error was corrected as the award was more than the amount claimed, even though, under several heads, the award could be passed for Rs.67,000. Under O.20, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment, which has been delivered cannot be altered or added to, save as provided by Sec.152 or on review. In the instant cases, because of the error apparent on the face of the record, as the award should not be more than the claim, the petitioner had ordered correction invoking his powers under Sec.152, Code of Civil Procedure and that too, with the consent of both the counsel for the claimants as also the counsel for the Transport Corporation and what is more, on a mention having been made in the open Court. There are no secrets, which could be attributed to the petitioner. The Court staff, who have been examined as P.Ws.1, 5, 6 and 7 support this. In fact, the action of the petitioner has to be lauded as when the above error was pointed out in the open Court, he has dictated in the open Court for correction and he is justified in doing so. It may be relevant to point out as to what has been stated by this Court in Syndicate Bank, Salem Town v. M/s.Salem Slate Forms, (1997)3 C.T.C. 507 . It may be relevant to point out as to what has been stated by this Court in Syndicate Bank, Salem Town v. M/s.Salem Slate Forms, (1997)3 C.T.C. 507 . Laying down the principle that the errors of the above nature can be corrected under Sec.152 of Code of Civil Procedure, even suo motu, the said judgment has been rendered by this Court basing upon several judgments rendered earlier and particularly of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Janakirama Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 688,Samarendra v. Krishna Kumar, (1968)1 S.C.J. 68: A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1440 and Manohar Lal v. N.B.M. Supply, Gurgaon, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1267: (1970)1 S.C.J.129. As such, we do not see any basis for punishing the petitioner under charges 1 and 2. 7. Coming to charges 3 and 4, there are absolutely no witnesses to prove the said serious allegations of corruption excepting the litigants, that too accused in criminal cases. The testimony of P.W.9 Vijaya is no evidence at all as her evidence cannot be called as corroborated version since she is the daughter of P.W.8 Kumarasamy. Her evidence is only hearsay from P.W.8, who is none other than the accused in a criminal case, tried by the petitioner, convicted and punished by him to undergo a sentence of five years under Sec.304, Part II of Indian Penal Code. Even P.W.9 is a litigant in M.C.O.P.No.409 of 1993. Motive is attributed to the petitioner that the adjudication in M.C.O.P.No.409 of 1993 has been unduly delayed. That is the only reason for believing the allegation made by P.W.9. But it was lost sight of by the Enquiry Committee that M.C.O.P.No.306 of 1993 filed by Mr.Kalaiselvan, senior maternal aunt’s son of P.W.9, was also connected and I.A.No.379 of 1986 was filed to re-open the arguments and even before delivery of the judgment, which was fixed on 29.11.1996, the petitioner was transferred from that place to another place on 19.11.1996. Then, we take the evidence of P.W.34 Kuttaian and P.W.8 Ashokan. The evidence of P.W.3 is relating to charge No.4 while that of P.W.8 relates to charge No.3. Then, we take the evidence of P.W.34 Kuttaian and P.W.8 Ashokan. The evidence of P.W.3 is relating to charge No.4 while that of P.W.8 relates to charge No.3. Under charge 4, the petitioner is accused of demanding a bribe of Rs.50,000 for acquitting P.W.8 and after the arguments in S.C.No.22 of 1996, wherein P.W.8 and his brother Ganesan were accused, he was called by the petitioner signaling his hand to the place where he was present that he went inside the petitioner’s chamber, that then the petitioner had asked him as to whether P.W.9 was his daughter and that he answered in the affirmative, that he asked whether Madhavan, who died in the accident, was related to him and he said that he was his son-in-law, i.e. husband of P.W.9 and then the petitioner asked him to pay Rs.50,000 to do favour of acquitting him in the murder case and also grant compensation in Motor Vehicle Accident case in favour of his daughter and then he replied to the petitioner that he could not afford that amount whereupon the petitioner asked him to quit the place immediately and he came out and then the Judge, i.e., the petitioner, occupied his seat and stated that his case has been adjourned the next day and he went home, and thereafter he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for five years while his younger brother was acquitted. In so far as P.W.3 is concerned, he is an accused facing murder charges in S.C.No.13 of 1996 along with one Ashokan. His case is that the petitioner asked himself and his brother to give Rs.10,000 for acquittal and when he told them that they were poor, the petitioner sent them away and adjourned the case next day and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and one year rigorous imprisonment to his son-in-law i.e., Ashokan. History is also same that when himself and Ashokan were sitting in the Court and on being told that the petitioner has called for both of them into the chamber and then the petitioner has demanded the money. P.W.4 is Ashokan. History is also same that when himself and Ashokan were sitting in the Court and on being told that the petitioner has called for both of them into the chamber and then the petitioner has demanded the money. P.W.4 is Ashokan. His case is that Mr.Anbazhagan, Advocate, came at 4.30 p.m. to the Court and has shown the chamber of the petitioner and then went away and as directed by their lawyer, himself and P.W.3 went into the Judge’s chamber and on seeing them, the petitioner asked them to pay Rs.10,000 in lieu of acquittal and when they said that they had no money, the petitioner has asked both of them to go out and then they came out and waited in the Court and then they were told that the case was adjourned next day and on the next day, there was a verdict given by the petitioner sentencing him to one year rigorous imprisonment and five years against P.W.3. There is utter contradiction in between the statements of P.W.3 and P.W.4. P.W.3 has never stated that his advocate came on that day and asked them to go into the chambers of the petitioner by showing the chamber. While P.W.4 states that it was the advocate who had shown the chambers indicating them to go into the chamber, to a Court question, P.W.3 states that they were told by one tall dark complexioned person that the petitioner is calling them to his chamber and then they went into the petitioner’s chamber. Who is that dark complexioned person is not stated. P.W.4 does not corroborate this version. Neither advocate Mr.Anbazhagan nor the tall dark complexioned person has been identified or examined. They are very material witnesses to prove this serious charge and no relevance can be placed on the uncorroborated testimony of P.Ws.3 and 4 and that too with utter contradictions as pointed out above. In the Court, there will be some persons, if not more. Even according to the statements of P.Ws.3, 4, 8 and 9, there used to be 40 to 50 persons present whenever they attended the Court. But it can be taken for granted that there will be some persons, litigants or their advocates. It is totally unacceptable that excepting the Presiding Officer and either P.Ws.3 and 4 and 4 on one day and P.Ws.8 and 9 on another day, no other person was present. But it can be taken for granted that there will be some persons, litigants or their advocates. It is totally unacceptable that excepting the Presiding Officer and either P.Ws.3 and 4 and 4 on one day and P.Ws.8 and 9 on another day, no other person was present. Even if there is no litigant or advocate, the Court staff and sub-staff will be there. It is beyond one’s imagination to believe that the petitioner, who has the status of District Judge, had called P.Ws.3, 4 and 8 in the open Court signaling himself and then demanding money in the chamber and on their refusal came back to the Court, sat on the Bench and then by adjourning the case to next day, rendered an adverse verdict against them. These allegations are illusory and afterthought to wreak vengeance against the petitioner. Judgment in S.C.No.13 of 1996 was rendered on 1.8.1996 and in S.C.No.22 of 1996 on 26.9.1996. There was no allegation from any quarter, including that of P.Ws.3, 4 and 8 or for that reason P.W.9 and only during the enquiry by the Vigilance Officer, some allegations have been made to spite on the petitioner and that is believed as the Gospel truth punishing the petitioner. From the date of judgment, the first allegation is only through the statement made by the above witnesses during the enquiry by the Vigilance Officer on 4.12.1996. 8. All these vital factors were never considered by the enquiry committee, and in fact, there are no reasons at all to sustain the charges except saying that the witnesses are rustic villagers and that their statements are natural. These reasons are hardly sufficient to conform to the principles of fair play to hold the petitioner guilty of serious charges of corruption and inflict punishment of dismissal. In a judicial review, normally, appreciation of evidence is not resorted to. But, when the failure on the part of the authority to look into the material facts or evidence, which cut at the roots of the allegation and that too, a serious one like in the instant case, and the disciplinary proceeding being quasi-judicial in nature, not only should there be reasons, but those reasons should have supporting material. But, when the failure on the part of the authority to look into the material facts or evidence, which cut at the roots of the allegation and that too, a serious one like in the instant case, and the disciplinary proceeding being quasi-judicial in nature, not only should there be reasons, but those reasons should have supporting material. If the litigants, who suffer adverse decisions from the Judge, who handed out the judgments are allowed to have their say in this matter, it is very difficult for the judicial officers to sustain. As already stated above, we have to balance the severity of the allegations with that of sustaining the independence of judiciary, and only when the evidence is so overwhelming and beyond all reasonable doubts that the judicial officer can be inflicted punishment. The analysis of the evidence, which has not been done by the enquiry committee and the vital contradictions not having been considered and there being non-existent facts, we find that the charges 3 and 4 levelled against the petitioner are also unsustainable. 9. In result, we set aside the impugned order of dismissal contained in G.O.Ms.No.1377, Public (Special.A) Department, dated 10.10.2000 and order re-instatement of the petitioner and payment of all the salary and other emoluments as allowable and attached to the post of District Judge Grade II to the petitioner, and restore his due seniority in the cadre of District Judges Grade II. This order shall be complied forthwith. The writ petitions is allowed accordingly. No costs.