JUDGMENT P. K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, C.J. — The preliminary question involved is whether these Letters Patent Appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letter Patent read with Orissa High Court Order, 1948 can be entertained after coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 46 of 1999, as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, Act 22 of 2002 on 1.7.2002. These appeals were filed prior to 1.7.2002. But they have not so far been admitted after a scrutiny under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this situation, the question to be decided is whether these appeals are maintainable or can be entertained after the insertion of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure as it now exists. 2. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure was insert¬ed by Amendment Act 104 of 1976. The Section as then inserted read thus :- “S. 100 A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwith¬standing anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal.” Section 97 of Amendment Act 104 of 1976 by Sub-Section 2 (n) saved Letters Patent Appeals which had been admitted before the commencement of the amended Section with effect from 1.2.1977. For convenience, we may extract Section 97 (2) (n) of Act 104 of 1976 hereunder :- “(n) Section 100A, as inserted in the principal Act by Section 38 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal against the decision of a single Judge of a High Court under any Letters Patent which had been admitted before the commencement of the said Section 38; and every such admitted appeal shall be disposed of as if the said Section 38 had not come into force;” Thus, the bar on filing appeals against Second Appellate decrees was introduced. But, the above provisions saved appeals filed against Second Appellate decrees provided they had been admitted prior to 1.2.1977. But, the above provisions saved appeals filed against Second Appellate decrees provided they had been admitted prior to 1.2.1977. No bar was introduced on the filing of Letters Patent Appeals from judgments of single Judge in exercise of their First Appellate jurisdiction. But then, the said provision underwent an amendment by Act 46 of 1999 which read as follows : “100A. No further appeal in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force,- (a) where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided. (b) where any writ, direction or order is issued or made on an application under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitu¬tion. by a single Judge of High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge.” Section 32 (2) (g) of Act 46 of 1999 also saved all appeals admitted prior to the coming into force of that Act. But, these provisions were not brought into force. The Section was again amended by Act 22 of 2002. As amended, the Section reads thus : “100A. No further appeal in certain cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original, or appel¬late decree or order is heard and decided by a single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such single Judge.” Thus, an appeal from a decree passed in exercise of First Appellate jurisdiction by a single Judge was also brought within the purview of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, it was provided that no Letters Patent Appeal would lie against a second appellate judgment or a first appellate judgment. The constitutional validity of the above amendment came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu etc. v. Union of India ( AIR 2003 SC 189 ). In paragraphs 13 to 15 of that judgment, their Lordships dealt with the question of validity of Section 100A of the Code and its validity was upheld. The constitutional validity of the above amendment came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu etc. v. Union of India ( AIR 2003 SC 189 ). In paragraphs 13 to 15 of that judgment, their Lordships dealt with the question of validity of Section 100A of the Code and its validity was upheld. As noticed, Section 32 (2) (g) of Act 46 of 1999 saved all appeals admitted prior to the coming into force of Section 100A as inserted. Section 32(2) (g) of Act 46 of 1999 was omitted by Section 16 of Act 22 of 2002. In Section 16 of Act 22 of 2002 dealing with Repeal and Savings, nothing was mentioned about Section 100A of the Code as amended by Act 22 of 2002. In other words, there was no provision corresponding to Section 32(2) (g) of Act 46 of 1999 or corresponding to Section 97(2) (n) of Act 104 of 1976. 3. A right of appeal is obviously a conferred right and not an inherent right, but it is recognized by a host of deci¬sions like the ones in Garikapati Veeraya V.N. Subbiah Choudhury and others ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ) and State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., ( AIR 1960 SC 980 ) that a right of appeal once conferred, is a vested right and not merely a proce¬dural right and in view of Section 6 of General Clauses Act and the line of enquiry being not whether the right of appeal is pre¬served but whether the right is destroyed, it is clear that the right of appeal would be preserved unless there be something in the newly introduced provision or in the Repealing Act which compels the Court to come to the conclusion that the right stands extinguished. Therefore, normally, notwithstanding the introduc¬tion of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the right of appeal available under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Bihar High Court as adopted in Orissa, would continue subject to whatever may be provided by the repealing provision in the Amend¬ment Act. Section 100A of the Code taking away the right of appeal against the First Appellate decrees was thus introduced by Section 4 of Act 22 of 2002. Section 100A of the Code taking away the right of appeal against the First Appellate decrees was thus introduced by Section 4 of Act 22 of 2002. It was the substitution of a new provision in the place of the existing one with a further re¬striction. Section 16 of Act 22 of 2002 merely provided for repeal of any amendment made or any provision inserted in the Principal Act by the State Legislature or the High Court before commencement of that Act, except and to the extent that the amendment or provision was consistent with the Principal Act as amended by Act 22 of 2002. Sub-Section (2) of Section 16 which provided for restriction of rights in respect of provisions re¬ferred to therein, without prejudice to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, does not make any provision affecting Section 4 of that Act substituting Section 100A in the place of the one that existed by virtue of Act 104 of 1976. Though an amendment of Section 100 A was proposed by Section 10 of Act 46 1999, and Section 32 (2) (g) of that Act provided for saving of appeals admitted prior to the commencement of that Section, this provi¬sion was not brought into force when Section 100A was again amended by Act 22 of 2002. Section 32 (2) (g) of Act 46 of 1999 was also omitted and no provision was enacted as a transitory provision as regards Section 100 A. Thus, going by the present amendment or insertion of Section 100A of the Code, it is merely a case of substitution of the Section in the place of the Section that existed from 1.2.1977 in practical terms, since the amend¬ment introduce by Act 46 of 1999 was never brought into force. When a new provision is enacted or a new provision is substituted in the place of the old, it is normally the rule that it will be prospective in operation unless it relates to a matter of proce¬dure. As summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edi¬tion, Volume 44, paragraph 922,- “922. Presumption against retrospection. When a new provision is enacted or a new provision is substituted in the place of the old, it is normally the rule that it will be prospective in operation unless it relates to a matter of proce¬dure. As summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edi¬tion, Volume 44, paragraph 922,- “922. Presumption against retrospection. The general rule is that all statutes, other than those which are merely declaratory, or which relate only to matters of proce¬dure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospec¬tive effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature. Similarly, the Courts will construe a provi¬sion as conferring power to act retrospectively only when clear words are used. xxx xxx xxx It is also in reliance on the presumption that the Courts have frequently held pending proceedings to be unaffected by changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination of substan¬tive rights. In the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action was commenced, and this is so whether the law is changed before the hearing of the case at first instance or while an appeal is pending.” The right of appeal being a substantive right, once it is conferred and not being a mere matter of procedure, in the normal course, Section 100A of the Code inserted by Act 22 of 2002 could have operation only prospectively. 4. The question then is whether Section 97 (2) (n) of Amending Act 104 of 1976 brings about any change in this situa¬tion. It was Act 104 of 1976 that originally inserted Section 100A of the Act into the Code preventing the filing of further appeals from Second Appellate decrees but saving those appeals already filed and which had been admitted under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as on the date of the coming into force of that Act, namely, 1.2.1977. It is no doubt true that a right of further appeal from a Second Appellate decree was lost not only in suits instituted subsequent 1.2.1977 but also in appeals actually filed but not admitted under Order 41, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure prior to 1.2.1977. Therefore, notwith¬standing Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, a clear contrary intention was expressed by the Amending Act by virtue of Section 97(2) (n) thereof. but, the amendment brought about by Act 104 of 1976 only related to the right of appeal against Second Appellate Decree. The embargo on filing an appeal against a First Appellate decree is created and brought into force only by Act 22 of 2002 which came into force on 1.7.2002. Considered i the context of rights saved by operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and taking note of the fact that a right of further appeal from a first appellate decree had accrued to the suitor when he insti¬tuted the suit giving right to such an appeal, it is clear that the provision cannot destroy the right of appeal which had al¬ready accrued to the suitor, since the filing of a suit carries with it the right of appeal conferred by the Statute. There is nothing in Amending Act 22 of 2002 which destroys that right. It is also not possible to resort to Section 97(2) (n) of Act 104 of 1976, to import a theory that only appeals admitted under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure prior to .1.7.2002 are saved since Section 97(2) (n) is not part of Act 22 of 2002 which introduced the present Section. Going by the general principle that a right of appeal accrues to the suitor on his instituting the suit and that right is not destroyed retrospectively, unless otherwise provided, we have no hesitation in holding that the bar created by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act 22 of 2002 will apply only in cases where suits are instituted subsequent to 1.7.2002, the date on which the provision was brought into force. 5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had the occasion to consider this question in a recent decision reported in Shiva Raja Reddy and others v. S. Raghu Raj Reddy and others ( 2002 (5) A.L.D. 181 ). 5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court had the occasion to consider this question in a recent decision reported in Shiva Raja Reddy and others v. S. Raghu Raj Reddy and others ( 2002 (5) A.L.D. 181 ). In that decision, a Division Bench, after referring to various decisions on the question including the oft-quoted passage from Colonial Sugar Refinding Co. v. Irving (1905 AC 369), held that appeals already filed, admitted and pending final disposal as on 1.7.2002 are in no way affected by the newly amended provision. The restriction imposed by the amending provi¬sion is not so rigorous as to affect appeals already admitted. Those appeals had been subjected to a preliminary scrutiny and the Court having found a prima facie case for admitting them they had to be finally decided and no intention was discernible either express or by necessary implication to hold that the newly in¬serted Section would affect even those appeals already admitted. We do not think it necessary to refer to the various decisions referred to in that decision and we have also no hesitation, with respect, in agreeing with the reasoning in the that regard. But, their Lordships have not stopped there. Their Lordships went on to say that all Letters Patent Appeals presented or filed before 1.7.2002, are maintainable whether those appeals were admitted or not and those appeals are excluded from the operation of the newly inserted provision. Their Lordships have also held that no appeal can be filed after 1.7.2002 in view of the insertion of Section 100A of the Code. With respect, we find it difficult to agree with this part of the reasoning and conclusion. With re¬spect, we may point out that if appeals filed before 1.7.2002 are held to be save, it will be difficult to postulate that the right to appeal thereafter in suits instituted prior to that date is destroyed. In the absence of any provision in the repealing Section of Act 22 of 2002 which inserted Section 100A into the Code like Section 97 (2) (n) of Act 104 of 1976, we are inclined to hold that the bar created by Section 100A will have operation only in cases where suits are instituted subsequent to 1.7.2002, the date of the coming into force of Section 100A of the Act inserted by Section 22 of Act 22 of 2002. 6. 6. Since Section 97(2) (n) of Act 104 of 1976 was only a repealing provision relating to the amendments made by that Act, it has application only to the provisions inserted by that Act and its ambit cannot be enlarged so as to rope in amendment subsequently introduced. Hence, the said transitory provision cannot be resorted to, to control the right to appeal against First Appellate decree or to give retrospective effect to Section 100A of the Code, as introduced by Act 22 of 2002. As observed in Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 740 ), an amend¬ment of substantive law is not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by necessary implication. There is neither express nor implied taking away of the right of appeal against First Appellate decrees in suits pending as on 1.7.2002. Hence, it must be held that in all suits instituted prior to 1.7.2002, the right to appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent survives and the bar is attracted only in cases where suits are instituted after 1.7.2002. 7. In that view, it is clear that these appeals are main¬tainable. These appeals will therefore be posted for further steps in cases in which they are defective, and for admission under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code where they are ready for being sent up for admission. Appeals allowed.