Judgment :- M.Thanikachalam, J. The accused, who was found guilty under Sections 326 and 302 I.P.C. in S.C.No.99/2000 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Vellore, convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and 3 years R.I. for the offence under Section 326 I.P.C., is the appellant. 2. The respondent/complainant, had filed a final report against the accused/appellant, seeking appropriate punishment, under Sections 326 and 302 I.P.C., contending that on 7.10.1999 at about 7.15 p.m., the accused with an intention to commit murder, threw Sulfuric Acid upon Vijayarani, thereby caused burn injuries on her left face, chest and left hand and in view of the said injuries, she succumbed on 5.11.1999 and that in the same incident, he voluntarily caused grievous hurt to one Azhagesan also. 3. The learned trial Judge upon consideration of the materials placed before him, felt that there is a prima facie case against the accused, resulting framing of two charges, one under Section 302 and another under Section 326 I.P.C. After framing of the charges, when the accused was questioned, he refused to plead guilty, denying the prosecution case. 4. In order to make out a case on behalf of the prosecution, 13 witnesses were marched in, armed with 19 documents and 4 material objects. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, weighing the above materials and scanning the same from its proper perspective, came to the conclusion, that both the charges framed against the accused/appellant are proved, beyond all reasonable doubt. Thus concluding, he slapped the conviction and imposed the sentences, as aforementioned, which are impugned in this appeal. 5. Brief facts leading to the conviction are as under: (a) Godwin (P.W.2) is the brother of one Vijayarani. Vijayarani was married to one David. Because of the family dispute, the marriage between David and Vijayarani broken and thereafter, Vijayarani separated from her husband about 20 years ago. Though the accused, by name Srinivasan was already married, he was living with Vijayarani, as husband and wife for the past 20 years. The accused, who has no job of his own, demanding money from Vijayarani, often disturbed her, giving torture. In the joint living of Vijayarani and accused also, there was a crack, because of the family feudal, resulting their separate living for the past one year prior to the incident. The accused, who has no job of his own, demanding money from Vijayarani, often disturbed her, giving torture. In the joint living of Vijayarani and accused also, there was a crack, because of the family feudal, resulting their separate living for the past one year prior to the incident. (b) On 7.10.1999, at about 7.00 p.m. (Vijayarani) was travelling in a rickshaw driven by Azhagesan (P.W.1) to go to Bethlehem. When the rickshaw had crossed the bridge, the accused came there, with M.O.4, which contained sulfuric acid and threw the same, upon Vijayarani, which caused injuries not only to Vijayarani, but also to P.W.1. P.W.1 and Vijayarani, due to burning sensation, raised alarm and on hearing the same, P.W.3, Balasubramaniam came to the spot and had noticed the accused, proceeding towards Reddithoppu after throwing M.O.4. This incident was also witnessed by P.W.11, who came through that way. (c) P.W.2, on information, came to the spot and made arrangements, for admitting Vijayarani as well as P.W.1 in the hospital, for treatment. When P.W.1 and Vijayarani were brought to the hospital, Dr. Ravindran (P.W.4) admitted both of them and gave treatment. He had noted the injuries found on Vijayarani in Ex.P.3 and Ex.P.4 is the accident register copy issued by P.W.4, for the injuries sustained by P.W.1. The fact that Vijayarani and P.W.1 sustained burn injuries due to acid throw, was informed to the police station at about 8.30 p.m. under Ex.P.3. On receipt of Ex.P.3, P.W.10 went to the hospital, examined Vijayarani, recorded her statements under Ex.P.14. On the basis of Ex.P.14, P.W.10 registered a case under Section 326 I.P.C. in Cr.No.755/99, for which he submitted the printed F.I.R., Ex.P.15 to the court concerned, marking the copy to the higher authorities for investigation, etc. (d) Thavamani, (P.W.12) the then Sub Inspector of Police, Ambur Police Station, took the case for investigation on 8.10.1999 at about 6.00 a.m. Rushing to the scene of occurrence at 6.15 a.m., he prepared observation mahazar, Ex.P.9, in the presence of P.W.6 and another witness, in addition to the preparation of the sketch Ex.P.16. During investigation, P.W.12 recovered M.O.4 as pointed out by P.W.3, under Ex.P.10 in the presence of the same witnesses. Thereafter, he examined P.Ws.1, 2 and other witnesses also and recorded their statements, then and there. From Vijayarani, he had recovered M.Os.1 to 3 under Ex.P.1. During investigation, P.W.12 recovered M.O.4 as pointed out by P.W.3, under Ex.P.10 in the presence of the same witnesses. Thereafter, he examined P.Ws.1, 2 and other witnesses also and recorded their statements, then and there. From Vijayarani, he had recovered M.Os.1 to 3 under Ex.P.1. In continuation of the investigation, he had arrested the accused on 16.10.1999. Vijayarani, who was treated in the hospital, owned by P.W.4, had not fully recovered and therefore, she was taken to Vellore Hospital, for further treatment. Despite the fact, treatments were given to Vijayarani, she succumbed to injuries on 5.11.1999, at about 2.20 p.m. which was informed to P.W.12. On that basis, the case originally registered under Section 326 I.P.C., was altered into 302 I.P.C. Thereafter, the investigation was continued by P.W.13, the Inspector of Police. (e) On 5.11.1999, after altering the case under Section 302 I.P.C., under Ex.P.18, P.W.13 continued further investigation. In that process, he went to C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore, conducted inquest, in the presence of Panchayatdars, between 9.30 and 11.30 a.m. and the result is Ex.P.19. In order to ascertain the real cause of death of Vijayarani, P.W.13 gave requisition Ex.P.11 through P.W.8, to conduct autopsy. (f) P.W.7, Dr. Yasmin, conducted autopsy on 6.11.1999 at about 12.30 p.m. During autopsy, P.W.7 had noticed the following external injuries: "Extensive burns involving the face, neck, chest, abdomen & full back, both upper limbs up to hands & both thighs. Extent of involvement of burns is up to muscle thickness. The entire burns surface covered with yellowish slough & pus." The doctor, considering the effect of external injuries, opined under Ex.P.12, that the deceased died due to septicemia due to extensive burns, caused probably by chemical burns. The investigating officer, P.W.13 examined other witnesses, including the doctor, was of the opinion that Vijayarani died only due to the act of the accused. P.W.1 also sustained grievous hurt in the same incident. In this view, he filed the final report, leading to trial, ending in conviction. 6. The learned trial judge accepting the oral evidence of P.Ws.1, 3 and 11, coupled with other attending circumstances, came to the conclusion that the accused alone poured sulfuric acid, which caused the death of Vijayarani, as well as causing grievous hurt to P.W.1 and ignored the delay said to have been caused in sending the printed F.I.R. to the court. The learned trial judge accepting the oral evidence of P.Ws.1, 3 and 11, coupled with other attending circumstances, came to the conclusion that the accused alone poured sulfuric acid, which caused the death of Vijayarani, as well as causing grievous hurt to P.W.1 and ignored the delay said to have been caused in sending the printed F.I.R. to the court. Thus, rejecting the defence also, he slapped the conviction. 7. Heard the learned counsel, Mr. V. Parthiban appearing for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant, submits that there is an inordinate delay in the first information report reaching the court, which should create reasonable doubt about the genesis of the case, which were not properly considered by the trial Court. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that there is an irreconcilable material contradictions in the ocular evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution, which were not properly considered by the learned trial judge. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, that P.W.11 could not be the eye witness and therefore, placing reliance upon his oral testimony, is not desirable. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the appellant is, that Exs.P.14 and P.15 were prepared not as mentioned therein, but they might have been prepared, at later point of time, on the advice of the Inspector of Police and that is why, a delay had occurred in the first information report, and the complaint reaching the Court, which is lost sight of, by the trial Court. On the above lines, elaborating the same, with available materials, a vehement submission was made for acquittal, in addition to the alternative plea of reducing sentence also, since the act said to have been committed by the accused would not come within the meaning of murder. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor, while opposing the above contentions submits that P.W.1 as an injured witness, had accounted the incident very vividly, without giving any shadow of doubt, which is supported by the oral evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.11 and in fact there is no grey area in their testimony, which should follow, the acceptance of their testimony by the trial Court should get the approval of this Court also. 10. 10. The incident had taken place on 7.10.1999 at about 7.15 p.m. Ex.P.14 complaint was registered on the same day at about 9.15 p.m. on which basis Ex.P.15 F.I.R. was also registered. The distance between the police station and the scene of crime is only 1 kilometer and the court also appears to be very near to the police station. But as admitted by P.W.10, Exs.P.14 and P.15, reached the court only on 11.10.1999. Thus, indisputably there is a delay of three days, in submitting the complaint and the printed F.I.R. to the court concerned. Taking advantage of this fact, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that Exs.P.14 and P.15 would not have come into existence on 7.10.1999 and if at all, they should have come into existence, at later point of time and that is why they should have reached the court on 11.10.1999. Though the argument appears to be some what reasonable, prima facie, considering this fact alone, we are unable to subscribe our view, to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that Exs.P.14 and P.15 would not have come into existence on 7.10.1999 or this document should be the handy work of the Inspector of Police at later point of time. 11. As spoken by P.W.2, immediately Vijayarani and P.W.1 have been admitted in P.W.4's hospital. P.W.4 informed the fact of admitting Vijayarani, in the hospital forthwith, as seen from Ex.P.3. On receipt of Ex.P.3, as seen from the oral evidence of P.W.10, he rushed to the hospital and recorded the statement from the deceased Vijayarani at about 9.30 p.m. Only in despatching the printed F.I.R. and Ex.P.14, as pointed out by us supra, there is a delay. We find no material, by utilising this delay, of course which is not explained, the accused is implicated falsely, so as to wreck vengeance, due to enmity or something like that. We find no delay in preferring the complaint and there is no iota of evidence also, to suspect about the origin of Exs.P.14 and P.15 and the time mentioned therein. If there had been a delay, even in preferring the complaint, then in reaching the court also, if there was a considerable delay, then only it will loom large, spreading a dark cloud, over the prosecution case, shading the genesis or the genuineness of the case, as the case may be. If there had been a delay, even in preferring the complaint, then in reaching the court also, if there was a considerable delay, then only it will loom large, spreading a dark cloud, over the prosecution case, shading the genesis or the genuineness of the case, as the case may be. In this case, by the pouring of acid, P.W.1 and deceased Vijayarani sustained injuries and a case was registered under Section 326 I.P.C. Death of Vijayarani had taken place only on 5.11.1999. Probably because of this, originally, police have not thought of the matter, very serious and in that view it seems to us, that they have not despatched the first information report forthwith to the court concerned and there was some slackness on the part of the police. When the case was originally registered under Section 326 I.P.C., this delay had occurred and the delay would not cause any dent or abrasion over the prosecution case, in view of the fact that the incident is well picturised by an injured eyewitness, whose presence is not doubted or questioned. Considering the ocular testimony of injured eyewitness viz., P.W.1 and the supportive evidence of P.Ws.3 and P.W.11, we are fully satisfied, that the delay caused in this case, in despatching the F.I.R from police station to the Court, is immaterial and on that ground, we are unable to entertain any doubt, so as to give that benefits, to the accused, thereby allowing him to escape from the clutches of the law. In this view, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the accused is entitled to the benefits of doubt, on the basis of the delay, in sending the printed F.I.R. to the court, is rejected. 12. The fact that P.W.1 had sustained acid burn injuries, over his right hand, knee, shoulder, neck is not very much challenged. The doctor P.W.4 would state, that P.W.1 Azhagesan sustained acid burns to an extent of 16% over right hand fore arm, left side of chest, neck, legs as well as left side of the face. He has further opined that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 viz., Azhagesan, are grievous in nature and to that effect, he had also issued Exs.P.4 and P.5. The case spoken by P.W.4 regarding the nature of injuries, is not seriously challenged, as seen from the cross examination. He has further opined that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 viz., Azhagesan, are grievous in nature and to that effect, he had also issued Exs.P.4 and P.5. The case spoken by P.W.4 regarding the nature of injuries, is not seriously challenged, as seen from the cross examination. Even during the cross examination, P.W.4 asserted that the injury sustained by Azhagesan over the face, is grievous in nature and other injuries are simple in nature, probably there was disfiguration of face. It is not even suggested to P.W.4 that P.W.1 had not sustained any grievous hurt due to acid burn. P.W.1 had sustained number of injuries and one of the injury appears to be grievous and others are simple in nature, and that is why, the doctor has opined that other injuries are simple in nature, thereby excluding face injury i.e. Grievous. Under the above circumstances, accepting the oral evidence of P.W.4, we conclude that in the incident narrated in the final report, P.W.1 sustained grievous hurt. If this injury had been inflicted by the accused, voluntarily, by throwing acid over him, then he should be answerable under Section 326 I.P.C., which we will discuss infra. 13. Tmt. Vijayarani though sustained injuries on 7.10.1999, she died only on 5.11.1999. The postmortem doctor, P.W.7 would state, that Vijayarani died due to septicemia, which was caused by extensive burns, probably by chemical burns. He has also stated, that if acid is thrown over a person, it will cause burn injuries as described in Ex.P.12 and those injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. When such an evidence was given by the doctor, it is not disputed. Therefore, safely we could conclude, that because of the injuries sustained by the deceased Vijayarani on 7.10.1999 by throwing of acid, she died later on and in this view, it should be confirmed that she succumbed to the injuries sustained by her, on 5.11.1999. When such an evidence was given by the doctor, it is not disputed. Therefore, safely we could conclude, that because of the injuries sustained by the deceased Vijayarani on 7.10.1999 by throwing of acid, she died later on and in this view, it should be confirmed that she succumbed to the injuries sustained by her, on 5.11.1999. Therefore, if it is made out that the accused with an intention to commit murder of Vijayarani, had thrown the acid over her, then he is answerable to section 302 I.P.C. On the other hand, if the accused had no intention to commit murder, but however, had thrown or poured Acid over Vijayarani, then his act may not amount to murder, but it would attract some other penal provisions, probably 320(8) I.P.C., then followed by section 326 I.P.C. and it all depends upon the mens rea or motive of the accused, as the case may be, at the time of the incident. 14. In Ex.P.14, though the deceased had described the incident in detail and the injuries sustained by her as well as P.W.1, she has not stated about the presence of the eye witnesses viz P.W.3 and P.W.11. On this basis, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that P.W.3 and P.W.11 could not be described as eyewitnesses. We are unable to agree. The very fact, that the presence of P.W.3 and P.W.11 is not mentioned in Ex.P.14, makes it very clear that it is not a document concocted at later point of time, as contended, whereas it should be the spontaneous expression of the deceased, when she was examined by P.W.10, as a sufferer of burn injuries. Vijayarani would not have thought of giving the particulars regarding the persons, who were present and in the natural way, she had explained the act of the accused. Therefore, considering the fact that F.I.R. is not an encyclopedia, the non mention of the names of P.W.3 and P.W.11 would not loom large and it will not have the effect of removing these two, from the definition of eyewitnesses, provided they pass the test of trustworthiness. Even ignoring the oral evidence of P.Ws.3 and 11, we could not find any reason to discard the testimony of P.W.1, as untrustworthy, whereas his evidence should command respect and acceptability. Admittedly P.W.1 had no grudge over the accused. Even ignoring the oral evidence of P.Ws.3 and 11, we could not find any reason to discard the testimony of P.W.1, as untrustworthy, whereas his evidence should command respect and acceptability. Admittedly P.W.1 had no grudge over the accused. It is not the case of the defence that P.W.1 is inimically disposed towards the accused or so closely connected with the deceased, thereby compelling him to give evidence, indicting the accused, despite the fact accused has not involved in the commission of the offence. Unless P.W.1 is the victim in the hands of the accused, there would not have been any necessity at all for P.W.1 to connect him with the crime. As seen from the cross examination of P.W.1, the identity and acquaintance of P.W.1 with the accused is well established, and even we could say it is an admitted fact. Though P.W.1 failed to speak, that he knew about the accused even prior to the incident, it is clarified, during the cross examination that he knew the accused, very well even before the incident. It is elicited from P.W.1, that as rickshaw puller, he had taken the deceased and the accused in his rickshaw on certain occasions. It is also not the defence, that the accused is not known to P.W.1 previously. In this view, we conclude that the accused is very well known to P.W.1, even prior to the incident. 15. P.W.3, though came to the scene of occurrence later, had deposed that he had seen the accused at the scene of crime, as well as his throwing of M.O.4, near the bridge. Cross examination reveals that the accused was having some connection with P.W.3, since P.W.3 had said that the accused used to come to his tailoring shop. It is also not the case of the accused, when P.W.3 was cross examined, that he is unknown to him prior to the incident. 16. P.W.11, an independent eye witness, in its true sense, had stated that the accused threw acid over Vijayarani. It is suggested to P.W.11, that the accused is not known to him previously. P.W.11 is also residing in the same village and the same street, where Vijayarani and the accused were living jointly, for considerable period. 16. P.W.11, an independent eye witness, in its true sense, had stated that the accused threw acid over Vijayarani. It is suggested to P.W.11, that the accused is not known to him previously. P.W.11 is also residing in the same village and the same street, where Vijayarani and the accused were living jointly, for considerable period. This would indicate that P.W.11 might have, had the occasion to see the accused even prior to the incident and in this way alone, he would have identified the accused at the time of the incident. In this view, if P.Ws.1, 3, 11 had spoken about the presence of the accused, at the time of the deceased sustaining injuries, then we should be compelled to accept the same, since their evidence is not tainted with animosity or enmity and there is no possibility at all even to imagine that these witnesses would have implicated the accused falsely. Thus, fixing P.Ws.1, 3 and 11 are independent witnesses, and their evidence are worthy of acceptable consideration, not giving any room to doubt, next we have to see, whether they have implicated the accused with the crime said to have been committed by him. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the injuries sustained by Vijayarani and P.W.1 are not in tune with the evidence given by P.Ws.1 and 3 and therefore, their evidence is not worthy of acceptance. P.Ws.1, 3 and 11 have been examined at the end of 2000 for the incident which had taken place on 7.10.1999. Therefore, there bound to be some natural decay, in the sense, some variation. All the variations or discrepancies available in the evidence of the ocular witness, are not fatal to the prosecution, unless it is shown, those variations or discrepancies are material contradictions, cutting the root of the case. When acid is thrown, depending upon the velocity of the air, it would fall upon the target, causing corresponding injury. Therefore, if a man threw acid from the left side, it is not always mandatory that, injury should be always on the left side of the target. Even it may cause injuries, sometimes on the right side of the body also. In this view, the discrepancy pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, fails to inspire us to remove the eye witnesses from the scene of crime. 18. Even it may cause injuries, sometimes on the right side of the body also. In this view, the discrepancy pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, fails to inspire us to remove the eye witnesses from the scene of crime. 18. Thiru Azhagesan as P.W.1 had stated that on the date of the incident at about 7.00 p.m., at the request of Bethlehem Vijayarani, he took her in his rickshaw and proceeded through Reddithoppu Railway bridge. He would state further, when they have crossed the bridge, the husband of Vijayarani viz., the accused, poured something over Vijayarani, from the bottle, then ran away. It is not the case of P.W.1, at the first instance that the accused poured acid. Only after the irritation and burn injuries, he came to know, that the material came out from the bottle is acid. On that basis alone, he would further state, he sustained injuries on his right hand, leg, near the neck, etc. The evidence given by P.W.1, regarding the injuries, is fully supported by medical evidence and we find no contradiction at all. P.W.1 has deposed further, when they have raised alarm, P.W.2 came there, took them to Bethesda hospital. His evidence is corroborated, not only by the oral testimony of P.W.1, but also confirmed by P.W.4, supported by Exs.P2, P4 and P5. We find no reason to eschew the oral evidence of P.W.1, since his evidence, in our opinion, is very very natural, acceptable, deserving full acceptance. An attempt to dislodge his evidence, during cross examination not only ended in vain, but it affirmed the evidence given during the examination in chief. Even regarding the light aspect also, it was elicited only during the cross examination. Very fairly, he concedes during the cross examination that immediately to the incident alone, others have reached the scene of crime, which is the case of P.W.3 and P.W.11 also. 19. P.W.3 would state that when he was in his tailor shop at about 7.10 p.m. or so, he heard the noise, which impelled him, to come out from the shop. He would state further, that at that time, he had seen the accused throwing M.O.4 near the bridge and proceeding towards Reddythope. Only at the instance of P.W.3, the investigating officer had recovered M.O.4 under Ex.P.10. There is nothing strange in this recovery, by the identification of P.W.3. He would state further, that at that time, he had seen the accused throwing M.O.4 near the bridge and proceeding towards Reddythope. Only at the instance of P.W.3, the investigating officer had recovered M.O.4 under Ex.P.10. There is nothing strange in this recovery, by the identification of P.W.3. It is not the case of the prosecution that after the arrest of the accused, on confession, M.O.4 was recovered. The consistent case of the prosecution is that after throwing acid, the accused threw the bottle and left the scene of crime. The person who had seen this act of the accused, immediately on the arrival of the investigating officer, shown the bottle and the I.O. also recovered the same, which is in conformity with the normal conduct and naturality. 20. P.W.1 had spoken about the actual act of the accused, and P.W.3 had spoken about his seeing the accused at later point of time and moving away from the scene of crime. If we read these evidence, jointly, the irresistible conclusion that should emanate, in the normal course must be, the accused alone should have thrown the acid, not only over Vijayarani, but also over P.W.1. 21. P.W.11 is a resident of New Bethlehem Ambur, where the deceased and the accused were living together. He has stated that on 7.10.1999 at about 7.15 p.m., he along with one Palani was proceeding to Ambur Town, through railway bridge, in order to purchase household articles and at that time, he had seen Vijayarani coming in the rickshaw driven by P.W.1. He had further stated at that time, the accused came there and poured acid from M.O.4, which caused injuries to Vijayarani as well as rickshaw driver, P.W.1. During the cross examination, it is clearly elicited, that he had witnessed this incident even at the time of throwing the acid over P.W.1 and Vijayarani. He has further deposed, that he was examined by the police on 8.10.1999 i.e. the very next day. Though there is some delay in sending the 161 statement to the court concerned, it could be ignored considering the natural evidence available in this case. He has further deposed, that he was examined by the police on 8.10.1999 i.e. the very next day. Though there is some delay in sending the 161 statement to the court concerned, it could be ignored considering the natural evidence available in this case. Thus, P.W.11 also fully corroborated the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3, thereby clinchingly proving that the accused alone had committed the act viz., throwing acid over Vijayarani and P.W.1, which had caused burn injuries, as indicated in the postmortem certificate, as well as in the Accident Register and wound certificate of P.W.1. 22. The deep consideration of the above evidence compels us, to take only the above said view and there is no other possibility, to take contra view. The investigating officer as P.W.12 had spoken about the commencing of his investigation, on 8.10.1999 at about 6.15 as well as examination of the witnesses, arrest of the accused on 8.10.1999 at about 9.00 a.m. He has further confirmed that Vijayarani was competent and oriented to give statement, which was recorded by P.W.10. The doctor has also certified about the consciousness of the deceased Vijayarani at the time of her giving her statement, Ex.P.14. It is also not the case of the defence, empathetically, that Vijayarani was unconscious and therefore, she would not have given any statement. Thus accepting the investigation also, we are constrained to confirm the act of the accused viz., throwing acid, which was in M.O.4. Thus, fixing the accused as the cause for the injuries sustained by P.W.1 and Vijayarani, next we have to see, what are the offences made out. 23. Section 326 I.P.C. contemplates punishment for causing grievous hurt, voluntarily by dangerous weapons or means, which includes corrosive substance viz., acid also. Acid is a corrosive substance, which could not be in dispute. P.W.1 did nothing, except taking the wife of the accused to her house. There is no case of any provocation by P.W.1 or by the deceased Vijayarani. The accused due to strained relationship with Vijayarani, as spoken by P.W.2, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to P.W.1 also. Though his aim was to hurt Vijayarani, this act should attract 326 I.P.C. and the trial Court properly considering this aspect, had slapped a conviction upon the accused under Section 326 I.P.C. for causing grievous hurt to P.W.1, which should stand, since there is no chance of taking different view. Though his aim was to hurt Vijayarani, this act should attract 326 I.P.C. and the trial Court properly considering this aspect, had slapped a conviction upon the accused under Section 326 I.P.C. for causing grievous hurt to P.W.1, which should stand, since there is no chance of taking different view. Therefore, we confirm the finding as well as the conviction regarding 326 I.P.C. 24. As contemplated under Section 299 I.P.C. culpable homicide is one, where death is caused by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. Therefore, if there was no intention of causing death, then certainly the act done by any person, even if it caused death, it would not attract 302 I.P.C. Even, to bring the act of the accused under Section 304 I.P.C., it is essential that the act by which the death is caused, is done with the intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Further, even to bring the act of the accused under Section 304 (ii), it should be established, that the act done by the accused is, with the knowledge, that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury, as is likely to cause death. Therefore, we have to see under what circumstances, the accused threw acid over Vijayarani, whether he had any such intention to cause death, or whether he had the knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death. 25. Neither P.W.1 nor P.W.3 nor P.W.11 has stated that the accused threw Acid over Vijayarani, with an intention to commit murder or the accused might have had knowledge that the injury caused is likely to cause death. From the evidence of P.W.2, it is seen that there was some strained relationship between Vijayarani and accused. Though Vijayarani after abandoning the first husband, was living with the accused, as husband and wife, at later point of time, their relationship was not cordial, that too because of the conduct of the accused viz., unemployment. By the survival of Vijayarani, the accused would have benefitted since he may have the chance of extracting money from Vijayarani, who was an earning member. By the survival of Vijayarani, the accused would have benefitted since he may have the chance of extracting money from Vijayarani, who was an earning member. By murdering her, the accused is not going to be benefitted. There was no immediate provocation to create any intention in the mind of the accused, to commit the murder of Vijayarani also. Only to teach a lesson, probably the accused might have thought of causing injuries to Vijayarani and that is why he had chosen this method viz., causing injuries by throwing acid. If really he had the intention to commit murder, definitely, in our considered opinion, the accused would have chosen some other method, such as stabbing or assaulting with deadly weapons. The very fact, that the accused not even uttering any words, expressing his intention to commit murder, threw acid, would go to show, that he had no intention to commit murder, and he had no knowledge also that the injury is likely to cause death. The accused may not have the knowledge, that the injury caused by acid burn, would cause immediate death. In this view also, we are unable, to attribute knowledge to the accused, that he had the intention of causing such bodily injury, as is likely to cause death. In this view, we are unable to bring the act of the accused either under Section 302 or 304 (i) or (ii) I.P.C. and if at all the act of the accused should come only under Section 320(8) I.P.C. then taking him to 326 I.P.C., since the accused by his act, caused hurt to Vijayarani, endangering her life. 26. Section 320(8) I.P.C. defines "grievous hurt" and it reads as follows: "any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." By the act of the accused, the life of Vijayarani was in danger and subsequently she succumbed to the injuries also, thereby endangering her life. As aforementioned, at the time of causing injuries, the accused had no intention of any kind to murder Vijayarani or even he had no intention to cause grievous hurt. As aforementioned, at the time of causing injuries, the accused had no intention of any kind to murder Vijayarani or even he had no intention to cause grievous hurt. In this view, in our considered opinion, the act of the accused comes under Section 320(8) I.P.C., then taking to 326 I.P.C. Admittedly, Vijayarani died not forthwith, whereas she died only after 30 days, which would show that the injury inflicted by the accused is not the immediate cause for the death and its aftereffect alone caused the death, creating septicemia. In this view, the accused is liable to be punished only under Section 326 I.P.C. for causing hurt, endangering the life of Vijayarani. Under the above circumstances, we are persuaded to set aside the conviction and sentence slapped by the trial Court, against the accused under Section 302 I.P.C., modifying the same under Section 326 I.P.C. The accused is in custody, from the date of conviction viz., 11.1.2001 i.e. for three years short of ten days. There was no pre-planned act, by the accused, while committing the offence and he did the same voluntarily, probably to teach a lesson to Vijayarani, which unfortunately took away her life. In order to meet the ends of justice, considering the over all facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the period already undergone by the accused, would serve the purpose and he need not be unnecessarily detained further. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Section 302 I.P.C. are set aside and instead, he is convicted under Section 326 I.P.C., for which, he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The conviction imposed by the trial Court under Section 326 I.P.C. is confirmed and for that also the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith, unless he is required in connection with any other case.