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2003 DIGILAW 219 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Ibrahim Kalubhai Kazi

2003-02-21

A.M.KHANWILKAR

body2003
JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This appeal against acquittal filed by the State takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune dated March 27, 1987 in Sessions Case No. 256 of 1986. The respondent original accused Nos. 1 along with two others, was charged under sections 498-A and 306 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that they subjected Saira to cruelty of grave nature, which resulted her in committing suicide by setting fire on 17th September, 1985 at Chakan and thereby resulting in her death on 19th September, 1985 in Sasoon Hospital, Pune. The charge as framed against the accused 1 to 3 reads thus:- "1. That you either individually or in furtherance of your common intention between 25th March, 1984 to 17th September, 1985, near Ambethan Chowk, Mouje Chakan, District Pune, treated Sou. Saira Ibrahim Kazi, aged about 22 years residing at Chakan, subjected her to cruelty by wilful conduct of beating her by demanding amount of 10,000/- and not supplying her food of such nature as or likely to drive her to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health mentally or physically to the said woman and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 498(A) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. 2. That on 17th September, 1985 at about 10.30 a.m. Sou. Saira Ibrahim Kazi, aged 22 years, committed suicide by burning herself at her residence near Ambethan Chowk, Mouje Chakan, Taluka Khed, District Pune, and that you accused abetted its commissions in furtherance of your common intention by beating her and treating her with cruelty and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 306 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance." 2. Briefly stated, respondent original accused No. 1 was married to Saira on 24th March, 1984. Original accused No. 2 is the mother of accused No. 1 and mother-in-law of deceased Saira. Whereas, original accused No. 3 is the sister of accused No. 1 and sister-in-law of deceased Saira. The prosecution case in substance is that after the marriage, Saira started living with her husband at her matrimonial home. She was being ill-treated by her husband, who was addicted to drinking. Whereas, original accused No. 3 is the sister of accused No. 1 and sister-in-law of deceased Saira. The prosecution case in substance is that after the marriage, Saira started living with her husband at her matrimonial home. She was being ill-treated by her husband, who was addicted to drinking. The said Saira later on stayed with her father at Supe, District Pune, where she has disclosed that she was being ill-treated by the accused. Inspite of this, the father of Saira invited accused No. 1 and his parents for the Urus which was to take place in August, 1985 at his village. Pursuant to the said invitation, accused attended the said Urus. Soon thereafter, the father of Saira had bethoral ceremony of cousin brother of Saira for which the accused was also invited. That was 15 days after the Urus ceremony. At that time, it is stated that accused No. 1 demanded sum of Rs. 10,000/- from Sairas father Shaikh Hussein P.W. 3 for enabling him to start some business. It is the prosecution case that when Saira was staying with her father, she had disclosed to her family members that she was being ill-treated and the accused was demanding sum of Rs. 10,000/-. The said Saira thereafter, joined the accused at the matrimonial home. Soon thereafter, on 17th September, 1985, the incident in question occurred at about 10.30 a.m. when the accused were not present in the house. Saira set fire to her saree and in that condition, she came out of the house and sought help of the neighbours who managed to extinguish the fire. Since the accused got this information, they rushed Saira to Sasoon Hospital. Statement of Saira was recorded purported to be dying declaration, in which she has not made any incriminatory statement against the accused, but stated that fire was caught accidently while she was working. As mentioned earlier, Saira succumbed to burn injuries on 19th September, 1985. Thereafter, application Exhibit 20 was sent by the father of deceased Saira P.W. 3 to Chakan Police Station which was treated as complaint and investigation proceeded further. On that basis, panchanama of scene of offence was recorded on 22nd September, 1985, but nothing incriminating was found on the spot. Thereafter, application Exhibit 20 was sent by the father of deceased Saira P.W. 3 to Chakan Police Station which was treated as complaint and investigation proceeded further. On that basis, panchanama of scene of offence was recorded on 22nd September, 1985, but nothing incriminating was found on the spot. Eventually, after investigation, offence was registered under C.R. No. 22 of 1986 on 7th February, 1986 and charge-sheet came to be filed after arrest of the accused on 27th February, 1986. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Pune, who framed the aforesaid charge. After the trial, Sessions Court, on analysing the evidence on record, found that the prosecution has failed to establish the fact that Saira committed suicide. On the other hand, in all probability, she met with an accident sustaining burn injuries. The trial Court, therefore, held that the case was obviously not covered by section 498-A of the Code, but still proceeded to examine the prosecution case of harassment caused to the deceased Saira by the accused. On meticulously analysing the entire evidence, the trial Court has found that there is no specific evidence against accused Nos. 2 and 3 at all of having subjected Saira to cruelty as alleged. As regards the case of beating of Saira, the allegation was only against accused No. 1. In so far as the allegation regarding not providing food to Saira is concerned, even that has been negated by the trial Court, on analysing the evidence on record. In so far as the allegation of demand of Rs. 10,000/- is concerned, even that has been rejected by the trial Court, holding that there is material contradiction in the case, as made out by the prosecution with regard to this allegation. Accordingly, the trial Court found that no offence under section 498-A, much less, under section 306 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was made out against any of the accused. The trial Court was pleased to acquit all the accused in respect of the charges levelled against them and set them at liberty by the impugned judgment and order. 3. The present appeal has been filed by the State against order of acquittal only against accused No. 1. The trial Court was pleased to acquit all the accused in respect of the charges levelled against them and set them at liberty by the impugned judgment and order. 3. The present appeal has been filed by the State against order of acquittal only against accused No. 1. Learned A.P.P. submits that no appeal has been filed against the order of acquittal in favour of accused Nos. 2 and 3. Although, respondent original accused No. 1 has been served, none appears. 4. According to the learned A.P.P., the trial Court has misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence which has come on record. According to him, the case was squarely covered by the provisions of section 498-A as well as section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. With the assistance of learned A.P.P., I have gone through the evidence on record, including the judgment, which is subject matter of challenge in this appeal. Having considered the entire material and the submissions advanced across the bar, I find that the present appeal is devoid of merits. As observed earlier, State has not filed any appeal in respect of order of acquittal in favour of original accused Nos. 2 and 3. This appeal is therefore confined only against accused No. 1 husband. The charge as framed, against all the accused was very specific, that they had subjected the deceased Saira to cruelty, which drove her to commit suicide. The first question, therefore, which needs to be considered is: whether there is sufficient evidence to record finding that Saira committed suicide, as alleged. After having gone through the entire evidence, I find no reason to interfere with the conclusion reached by the trial Court that there is absolutely no direct or circumstantial evidence to show that Saira committed suicide. It is not in dispute that none of the accused were at home when the incident had happened. Whereas, on getting the information, accused No. 1 immediately rushed Saira to Sassoon Hospital. In the statement of Saira, recorded at the hospital, there is no mention about her attempt to commit suicide, but a specific statement is made that she caught fire due to accident, while working. No doubt, the trial Court has discarded this statement, which was in the nature of dying declaration, as having tutored by the accused. In the statement of Saira, recorded at the hospital, there is no mention about her attempt to commit suicide, but a specific statement is made that she caught fire due to accident, while working. No doubt, the trial Court has discarded this statement, which was in the nature of dying declaration, as having tutored by the accused. What is relevant to note is that there is no positive evidence brought on record by the prosecution to establish the fact that deceased sustained burn injuries on account of attempting to commit suicide. The trial Court has rightly found that even the treatment papers of the hospital have not been produced by the prosecution on record, which would enure to the advantage of the accused. Analysing the evidence of all the witnesses, I find no reason to disturb the conclusion reached by the trial Court that in all probability, it was a case of accident because no direct or circumstantial evidence regarding attempt to commit suicide has come on record. The trial Court has discussed this aspect in paragraphs 8 and 9 as well as paragraph 13 in the impugned judgment. As that finding is affirmed, it necessarily follows that prosecution would fail in respect of both the charges under sections 498-A as well as under section 306 even against the present respondents original accused No. 1. 5. To get over this position, the learned A.P.P., contends that the prosecution, nevertheless, has brought on record sufficient material to indicate that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by willful conduct of beating her, demanding an amount of Rs. 10,000/- and not supplying her food. According to him, all these circumstances have been established and it was a clear case of harassing and coercing the deceased or any person related to her to meet the unlawful demand and the harassment was on account of the failure of the deceased and her relatives to meet that demand. According to learned A.P.P., the case would be, in any case, covered by section 498-A(b) of the Indian Penal Code. It is in this context, the matter needs to be further examined. However, on analysing the evidence on record once again, I find no infirmity either in the approach or in the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court on this aspect. It is in this context, the matter needs to be further examined. However, on analysing the evidence on record once again, I find no infirmity either in the approach or in the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court on this aspect. It needs to be noted that the prosecution has examined P.W. 1 Y.N. Kotwal, who is the cousin brother of deceased. He has generally deposed about the fact that the deceased told her that accused No. 1 demanded Rs. 10,000/- and other two accused compelled her to starve and were not ready to accept the food prepared by her. This evidence pertains to period prior to August, 1985. In so far as period after August, 1985, when the accused had attended the Urus at Supe, it is stated that the accused No. 1 had demanded sum of Rs. 10,000/- from his Uncle. This is obviously hearsay evidence. This witness, however, has thereafter, stated that after Saira had joined her matrimonial home on the day prior to the incident, he happened to visit her home, and he could not talk to her because of the presence of the accused, and he gathered impression that Saira wanted to talk to him. Prosecution has examined P.W. 2 Murad Hussein Kotwal, mother of deceased Saira. This witness has stated that the deceased had disclosed to her that accused No. 1 had demanded sum of Rs. 10,000/- for starting business. Besides, this witness stated that her husband told her that accused No. 1 was demanding Rs. 10,000/-. This witness has also deposed about the ill-treatment meted out to Saira during the relevant period. The crucial witness examined by the prosecution is P.W. 3, the father of deceased. This witness has deposed that deceased had told him that accused No. 1 was demanding Rs. 10,000/- for starting business. This demand perhaps coincides with the period prior to August, 1985. With regard to demand subsequently made to this witness by accused No. 1, as stated in paragraph 4 that on his query to the accused No. 1 as to why he was harassing Saira, he demanded Rs. 10,000/- for starting a business. Accepting that version as it is, it is not possible to even remotely suggest that the prosecution has very clearly established the fact that the harassment which was caused to deceased, had any causal connection with the demand of Rs. 10,000/-. 10,000/- for starting a business. Accepting that version as it is, it is not possible to even remotely suggest that the prosecution has very clearly established the fact that the harassment which was caused to deceased, had any causal connection with the demand of Rs. 10,000/-. It is only when the prosecution can be said to have established this nexus, one can proceed to examine the efficacy thereof in the context of section 498-A(b) of the Indian Penal Code. For, that provision postulates that "harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." In other words, any harassment of a married woman by itself would not attract the rigourous of section 498-A of the Code, but it is only when the harassment is referable to the demand of any property or valuable security and on account of failure by the woman or her relatives to meet such demand, that the offence can be said to have been made out. In the present case, however, there is absolutely no evidence that the harassment was caused on account of non-fulfillment of demand as made. The trial Court has, on analysing the evidence, rightly found that, in so far as the allegation of wilful conduct of beating of deceased is concerned, the same has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses is too general. Besides, the case at best made out by the prosecution, is that, the respondent original accused No. 1 was beating his wife under the spell of intoxication, as he was addicted to drinking. That cannot bring the case within the purview of section 498-A of the Code. 6. In so far as the allegation of not supplying food to the deceased, even that has been thoroughly considered by the trial Court and I find no reason to take a different view of the matter. The trial Court has considered that aspect in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment and found that the evidence would only suggest that food prepared by Saira was not upto the taste of the family members, and therefore, she was not allowed to take part in cooking. The trial Court has considered that aspect in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment and found that the evidence would only suggest that food prepared by Saira was not upto the taste of the family members, and therefore, she was not allowed to take part in cooking. The trial Court, has rightly observed that there is no grievance made in the letter written by Saira about the fact that she was required to starve due to non-supply of food to her. The trial Court has also rightly observed that on the other hand, the subsequent conduct of the parties would suggest that the relations between the parties were normal. In as much as, the accused No. 1 was invited for the Urus at Supe and soon thereafter, after fifteen days, for the bethoral ceremony. I have no hesitation in affirming the finding as recorded by the trial Court that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegation of non-supply of food to the deceased, thereby, subjecting her to cruelty. In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that the deceased was not supplied food, so as to coerce her and her relatives to meet the unlawful demand or on account of their failure to meet such demand. The learned A.P.P., was not able to point out any legal evidence on record to even remotely suggest the above ingredient. If that is so, then the provisions of section 498-A will have no application to such a fact situation. 7. The only other circumstance or allegation which remains to be examined is, the prosecutions case about demand of Rs. 10,000/- made by the accused No. 1. In the first place, assuming that accused No. 1 had made that demand, as observed earlier, there was no evidence forthcoming that the harassment was caused to deceased either for coercing the deceased or her relatives to meet that unlawful demand or on account of non-compliance of the said demand. If that is so, mere demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the accused No. 1 for starting business, even if accepted, at its face value, per se would not fall within the purview of section 498-A of the Code. Be that as it may, the trial Court has, in substance, found that, that case is afterthought. If that is so, mere demand of Rs. 10,000/- by the accused No. 1 for starting business, even if accepted, at its face value, per se would not fall within the purview of section 498-A of the Code. Be that as it may, the trial Court has, in substance, found that, that case is afterthought. The trial Court has discussed that aspect in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment, and there is no reason to take a different view. The direct evidence regarding the demand is of P.W. 3, the father of deceased. In the cross-examination, this witness in paragraph 7, has however, stated that demand of Rs. 10,000/- was made by accused No. 1 in Yawat Bazar, after the bethoral ceremony. This witness has admitted that after Yawat Bazar incident, the accused No. 1 dropped letter Exhibit 8. What is interesting to note is that in this letter, there is no mention about the demand, which fact has been admitted by P.W. 3. If the accused No. 1 was so particular about the demand of Rs. 10,000/-, then surely, he would have made specific reference to that demand, may be without adverting to the actual figure. On the other hand, as observed by the trial Court, the relations between the two families were normal. In any case, there is no evidence forthcoming that the alleged harassment of beating the deceased and not supplying her food was referable to coercing the deceased and her relatives to meet that unlawful demand of Rs. 10,000/- or on account of their failure to meet such demand. If that is so, no further investigation of the matter would be required, as the rigours of section 498-A of the Code will have no application. 8. Accordingly, I find no reason to interfere with the conclusions reached by the trial Court in recording acquittal in favour of all the accused, including the respondent original accused No. 1 of the alleged charges. There is no substance in this appeal. The same is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. -----