P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Smt. Bhaskara Lakshmi, counsel for the appellants and Sri K. S. R. Murthy, counsel for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE appellants represented by the G. P. A. Holder had instituted a suit O. S. No. 275/75 on the file of Principal District munsif, Parvathipuram. The suit was originally instituted for the relief of permanent injunction and subsequent thereto amended for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The Court of first instance on the strength of the respective pleadings and after settlement of Issues and after recording the evidence of P. W. 1 and p. W. 2 and D. W. 1 to D. W. 3 and marking exs. A-1 to A-19 and Exs. B-1 to B-12 ultimately had arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree and aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful defenants - respondents in the present second Appeal, preferred A. S. No. 27/88 on the file of Subordinate Judge, parvathipuram and the appellate Court had reversed the Judgment of the Court of first instance and aggrieved by the same as against the said reversing Judgment, the appellants had presented this Second appeal through the Power of Attorney agent and since the G. P. A. Holder who had been prosecuting the matter had expired in the present Second Appeal a memo was filed by the plaintiffs/appellants requesting the Court to permit them to engage an advocate to further prosecute the matter by deleting the name of the G. P. A. and likewise at present the original plaintiffs in the suit are now prosecuting the present Second appeal. The Second Appeal was admitted in view of the substantial questions of law raised in Ground No. 11 of the memorandum of Appeal. As can be seen from the material available on record, the appellate Court mainly had reversed the judgment viewing all the revenue records with suspicion in the light of the fact that the power of Attorney holder was the Sarpanch of the village and the Village Munsif was his close relative. The questions of law raised in the present Second Appeal can be specified as hereunder, (1) Whether the reversal of the well considered Judgment of the trial court by the appellate Court, disbelieving Ex. The questions of law raised in the present Second Appeal can be specified as hereunder, (1) Whether the reversal of the well considered Judgment of the trial court by the appellate Court, disbelieving Ex. A-14, despite the presumption available under section 6 of the A. P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act 1971 is sustainable? (2) Whether the reversing Judgment of the appellate Court can be sustained in the light of the fact that all the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiffs had been disbelieved only on the ground that the G. P. A. Holder was the Sarpanch and the Village Munsif is a relative of him? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited for non-examination of any of the plaintiffs and in view of the fact that only the G. P. A. holder was examined as P. W. 1? ( 3 ) AT the outset it may be stated that Question No. 3 was raised by the counsel for the respondents on the ground that such question being a pure question of law, the respondents are entitled to raise such a question even in the Second Appeal. Contentions of Smt. Bhaskara Lakshmi, ( 4 ) COUNSEL for the appellants Smt. Bhaskara Lakshmi had taken me through the Grounds of Appeal and also the findings recorded by the appellate Court while reversing the Judgment of the trial court and had pointed out that the main ground on which all the revenue records were viewed with suspicion is that the power of attorney holder was the Sarpanch and the Village Munsif was a close relative of the said G. P. A. holder. The learned counsel submitted that viewing so many documents with suspicion when the evidence is over-whelming, definitely cannot be sustained. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to State of Tamil nadu v. Ramalinga , Chenchulakshmamma v. D. Subramanya , M. Chayanna v. K. Narayana and had submitted that in view of the fact that the appellate Court also had arrived at a conclusion that in the light of the nature of the reliefs prayed for the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the learned counsel did not elaborate her submissions on this aspect. In all fairness, the learned counsel submitted that in a suit for ejectment, the burden is on the plaintiffs. In all fairness, the learned counsel submitted that in a suit for ejectment, the burden is on the plaintiffs. But however, on perusal of the revenue records, it is clear that there can be no suspicion and reversal on the grounds specified by the appellate Court is definitely unsustainable. The learned counsel had taken me through all the documents in general and to Ex. A-14, a-5 to A-13, Ex. A-18 and Ex. A-4 in particular. The learned counsel also had taken me through the contents of the general Power of Attorney-Ex. A-1 and also the other documents Exs. A-2 and Ex. A-3. Elaborate arguments had been advanced relating to Ex. A-14 and also Section 6 of the a. P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks act, 1971. Reliance also was placed on achanta Seetharamayya v. Bhamidipati gopalakrishna Murthy and others and m. Narasimha Reddy v. Superintending engineer, Irrigation, Warangal and others. Contentions of Sri K. S. R. Murthy, ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents had raised an objection at the threshold that the plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited for non-examination of any one of the plaintiffs. The learned counsel submitted that it is a question of law on admitted facts and hence such question of law can be raised even at the stage of Second appeal. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to the contents of Ex. A-l and placed strong reliance on K. Bharathi v. Labour Officer , Ismath Ahmedizade Mahmoodi abidi v. Kurshidunnisa Begum , Salar Jung museum v. Atiya Talat. Elaborate arguments were advanced on the scope and ambit of order 3 Rule 1 C. P. C. . The learned counsel further pointed out that Ex. A-14 is in favour of the 1st plaintiff only, but both the plaintiffs had filed the suit. At any rate, in view of the non-examination of any one of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited and the same was rightly done by the appellate Court. The learned counsel meticulously had taken me through Ex. A-2, a-3, A-4, Ex. At any rate, in view of the non-examination of any one of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited and the same was rightly done by the appellate Court. The learned counsel meticulously had taken me through Ex. A-2, a-3, A-4, Ex. A-14 and other revenue records and had contended that the orders passed if any are not binding on the respondents since it was without notice to them and without their knowledge and the learned Counsel also pointed out that both the parties had not produced any patta and in this view of the matter also the plaintiffs are bound to fail. The learned counsel had taken me through the findings recorded by the appellate Court and had submitted that these are all findings recorded on appreciation of evidence and after perusing the revenue records relating to the factual details and even otherwise the presumption available relating to Ex. A-14 is a rebuttable presumption and in view of the circumstances the appellate Court was right in disbelieving Ex. A-14. The learned counsel also had placed reliance on State of h. P. v. Keshav Ram , Vidyadhar v. Mankikrao , gurucharan Koeri and others v. Bibi shamsunissa. ( 6 ) QUESTIONS 1 and 2, The factual matrixas reflected in the respective pleadings of the parties are as hereunder, ( 7 ) IT is pleaded that Ganti Markandeyulu acquired the suit land along with some other lands from the Zamindar of Kurupam in or about the year 1940 by virtue of Zirayati patta No. 51 and the said patta lands are locally called as "vepamanu Isthuva" lands. That he was exercising full rights of ownership by paying cist and land revenue and by selling part of the land locally called as ("tiotfer6;^ St> 4) zandyxxa") to Ajjada Appoji and another person of Sumitrapuram village by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 8-4-1946. It was further pleaded that until the year 1971 when Markandeyulu died, the lands were under the personal cultivation of the said Markandeyulu and after his demise his two sons who are the plaintiffs, have inherited and they have been in enjoyment by paying land revenue. It was also pleaded that after the abolition of kurupam estate in 1954, survey and settlement operations had taken place. The suit land is covered by R. S. No. 182/9 to an extent of Ac. It was also pleaded that after the abolition of kurupam estate in 1954, survey and settlement operations had taken place. The suit land is covered by R. S. No. 182/9 to an extent of Ac. 1-21 cents and it was pleaded that the defendants are having lands covered by S. No. 182/10 which are nearby the suit lands and it was wrongly noted in the name of Markandeyulu as pattadar in respect of S. No. 182/10 in the fair Adangal and the defendants name in the fair Adangal against R. S. No. 182/9 due to a mistake. After filing of a petition for rectification, the special Tahsildar corrected the mistake after enquiry and had given patta in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs executed a registered General Power of Attorney dated 2-11-1974 in favour of Gadapu appalaswamynaidu to manage the suit lands. The defendants are closely interrelated and taking advantage of the situation of the suit schedule land being nearby their village and taking advantage of the two plaintiffs working in distant places the defendants proclaimed to trespass during the first week of May 1975. It was further pleaded that after the land was entrusted to the Power of Attorney holder, the Power of Attorney holder filed a petition under Section 144 Cr. P. C. in m. C. No. 10/1975 and obtained exparte orders and raised seed bed. The Power of attorney holder got the land manured and transplanted and raised paddy crop. The defendants have no respect for law and order and taking advantage of the orders in i. A. No. 975/75 dismissing the said petition and also taking advantage of the orders in c. M. A. No. 2/1976 dismissing the appeal by the plaintiffs, the defendants trespassed into the suit schedule property without any manner of right on 10-8-1977. The defendants are now in wrongful possession and denying the title of the plaintiffs. ( 8 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement denying all the allegations. It was also pleaded that the suit lands covered by s. No. 182/9 are part of Zeroithi lands of the defendants. The defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have been enjoying them with absolute rights for the last more than 50 years and they had been regularly paying cist to Zamindar prior to the abolition and thereafter land revenue to the government. It was also pleaded that the suit lands covered by s. No. 182/9 are part of Zeroithi lands of the defendants. The defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have been enjoying them with absolute rights for the last more than 50 years and they had been regularly paying cist to Zamindar prior to the abolition and thereafter land revenue to the government. It was further pleaded that the ganti people have no title to or interest in the said lands and that the alleged Power of attorney holder is the Sarpanch of Vallari gudaba village and the Village Munsif is his nephew and those people are inimically disposed towards the defendants and have been trying to grab away the suit land under some pretext of other. The defendants have cultivated the suit lands in the year 1974. It was also pleaded that the defendants were granted Ryotwari patta in their favour for the land covered by S. No. 182/9. It was also contended that neither the Sub-Collector nor the Special Patta Separation Tahsildar have any right to enquire and correct the settlement records prepared by the survey and settlement authorities and prayed for dismissal of the suit. ( 9 ) DEFENDANTS 2 and 3 had adopted the written statement filed by the 1st defendant and subsequent to the amendment of the plaint, the 1st defendant filed a written statement denying all the allegations of trespass and pleading that the Settlement officer granted a ryotwari patta in respect of the land covered by S. No. 182/9 in favour of the defendants. As such the Settlement officer alone is competent to decide as to who is the lawful ryot as per the provisions of Act XXVI of 1948 and hence this Court has no jurisdiction. ( 10 ) BASING on the respective pleadings, the following Issues were settled, (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration that Ganti Madhu sarma and Prabhakarrao have title to the suit land? (2) Whether the alleged trespass by the defendants into the suit lands on 10-8-1977 is true? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit lands after eviction of defendants therefrom? (4) Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits? (2) Whether the alleged trespass by the defendants into the suit lands on 10-8-1977 is true? (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit lands after eviction of defendants therefrom? (4) Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to future profits? (6) To what relief?on the s trength of the oral and documentary evidence, i. e. , the evidence of p. W. 1 and P. W. 2, D. W. 1 to D. W. 3 and exs. A-1 to A-19 and Exs. B-1 to B-12, the trial Court had decreed the suit and the appellate Court had reversed the same. ( 11 ) P. W. 1 is the G. P. A. holder who had deposed about Ex. A-l to A-19 in detail. Ex. A-l is the G. P. A. executed by plaintiffs in his favour. Ex. A-2 is the extract of the settlement register in respect of s. No. 182/10. Ex. A-3 is the notice under section 9 (2) of the Surve y and Boundaries act regarding S. No. 182/9 issued to Ganti markandeyulu. Ex. A-4 dated 1-10-1975 is the Order issued in Form d Rule 11 by the tahsildar, Parvathipuram to Ganti Madhu sarma and another. Exs. A-5 to A-13 are the cist receipts. Ex. A-14 is the ryot pass book for S. No. 182/9 in the name of Ganti Madhu sarma. Ex. A-15 is the registration extract of sale deed executed by. Ganti Markandeyulu in favour of Ajjada Appaji and two others. Ex. A-16 is a certified copy or Village settlement Adangal of S. No. 182/9 and s. No. 182/10 of Vallarigudaba. Ex. A-17 is a certified copy of 10 (1) account of vallarigudaba in the name of defendant for s. No. 182/10. Ex. A-18 is a certified copy of settlement Adangal of Vallarigudaba relating to S. No. 182/9 and 182/10, Ex. A-19 is a photostat copy of No. 2 Adangal in the name of Ganti Markandeyulu. ( 12 ) THE suit land is of an extent of Acs. 1-21 cents wet covered by S. No. 182/9 and old J. P. No. 51 and the present J. P. No. 109. P. W. 1 had narrated all the details. P. W. 2 had deposed that P. W. 1 had cultivated the lands for one year with his assistance. ( 12 ) THE suit land is of an extent of Acs. 1-21 cents wet covered by S. No. 182/9 and old J. P. No. 51 and the present J. P. No. 109. P. W. 1 had narrated all the details. P. W. 2 had deposed that P. W. 1 had cultivated the lands for one year with his assistance. As against this evidence, the 1st defendant was examined as P. W. 1 and d. W. 2 is a resident of Sumitrapuram. D. W. 3 also is a resident of Sumitrapuram. The evidence of D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 is of general nature. Exs. B-1 to B-8 are cist receipts. Ex. B-9 is the petition copy in m. C. on the file of Taluq Magistrate, parvathipuram under Section 144 Cr. P. C. Ex. B-10 - Notice issued by Taluq Magistrate, parvathipuram to respondents in M. C. No. 10/75. Ex. B-11 Orders in M. C. No. 6/75 of Taluq Magistrate, Parvathipuram. Ex. B-12 is yet another cist receipt. A finding had been recorded that none of the parties had filed any patta granted relating to the suit land. The trial Court had appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in detail and in view of the entries in revenue records, a finding had been recorded that a mistake had crept in and the defendants cannot take advantage of such a mistake and arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs prayed for. The said judgment and decree of the trial Court was reversed by the appellate Court by recording reasons at paragraphs 12 to 26 and had arrived at a conclusion that all these documents are to be viewed with suspicion. However, at paragraph 27 of the Judgment, the appellate Court had recorded finding that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to try a suit of this nature and in the light of the findings recorded on Point No. 1, no doubt, the appeal was allowed. ( 13 ) EX. A-14 is ryotwari passbook. It does not bear the date and the ryotwari passbook was issued in relation to the plaint schedule property in favour of one of the plaintiffs. ( 13 ) EX. A-14 is ryotwari passbook. It does not bear the date and the ryotwari passbook was issued in relation to the plaint schedule property in favour of one of the plaintiffs. It is needless to say that when in revenue records and the record of rights the name of one of the family members had been recorded, it may enure to the benefit of the other family member also and hence on such a ground Ex. A-14 cannot be viewed with suspicion. It is no doubt true that the suit is for declaration of title and for recovery of possession, inasmuch as the suit for permanent injunction was amended praying for these reliefs. The respondents/ defendants, except adducing the evidence of d. W. 1 and also D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 which is of general nature and marking certain cist receipts and asserting that they have been in possession of the property from a long time, had not even produced the patta though they had taken a specific stand in that regard. It is no doubt true that the plaintiffs also had not produced any patta and the power of Attorney holder alone was examined as P. W. 1, apart from the evidence of P. W. 2 which is also of general nature. When there is serious controversy relating to the revenue records, which are all certified copies and also public documents, it would have been advisable and desirable to summon the original records and also to examine the Officers concerned with the department for the purpose of clarifying instead of the Court taking upon itself the burden of viewing every such document with suspicion and reversing the Judgment of the trial Court. In this view of the matter, i am of the opinion that the findings recorded viewing all the documents with suspicion by the lower appellate Court on the ground that the G. P. A. Holder was the sarpanch and the Village Munsif was his relative, cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 14 ) EX. A-14 is the ryotwari pass book issued under A. P. Rights in Land and pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as "act" in short. ( 14 ) EX. A-14 is the ryotwari pass book issued under A. P. Rights in Land and pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as "act" in short. Section 6 of the Act dealing with Presumption of correctness of entries in record of rights reads as hereunder,"every entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or until it is otherwise amended in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Any mortgage or charge created earlier to a mortgage or charge created in favour of a credit agency shall lose its priority if it is not entered in the Pattadar pass book. "in the decision referred (4 supra), it was held that every entry in record of rights shall be presumed to be true until contrary is proved or until it is amended and the authenticity of the entries therein cannot be doubted. In y. Vijayabharathi v. Y. Manikyamma no doubt it was held that record of rights are not records of documents of title and entries therein are not to be taken as basis to fix the title. In V. Goutham Rao v. R. D. O. Jagtial, karimnagar District and another it was held that the mere entries in record of rights would not confer any title, but they only show prima facie evidence and ultimately it is the finding of the Civil Court which governs the field and which has to be given effect by authorities and make entries accordingly. In b. C. Lakshman (Died) By L. Rs. v. Joint collector, Ranga Reddy District and others it was held that mutation of entries in revenue records do not decide the title to the land. In p. Jagannadharao v. G. Venkatinaidu it was held that record of rights is not a document of title, but however, the Court is entitled to draw a presumption from the entries that a certain person is the owner of the land in question and the presumption is rebuttable presumption and specific findings need not be adduced to rebut the said presumption and the presumption may stand rebutted from the facts and circumstances appearing in the case. The same view was expressed in secretary to Government to India v. Indira devi. The same view was expressed in secretary to Government to India v. Indira devi. In Yettlapalle Sidda Reddy v. Kona venkatramana it was held that entry in pattadar passbook produced by the defendant in the said suit to show the extent of land possessed by him have presumptive value. It is pertinent to note that in he present case, apart from Ex. A-14 several other revenue records are there which had been produced and marked for the purpose of establishing the mistake and also for the purpose of establishing the enjoyment of the father of the plaintiffs and subsequent thereto of the plaintiffs in relation to plaint schedule property. It is no doubt true that for the reasons explained, the plaintiffs who had been away all along had appointed a g. P. A. under Ex. A-1 for the purpose of prosecuting this litigation. Hence, in the light of the above discussion and in the light of the fact that apart from Ex. A-14, the other documentary evidence also is available, in the fitness of things, the G. P. A. Holder who had conducted the litigation could have established and proved all the revenue records by examining the persons either concerned with the revenue records or at least could have taken steps to prove the said documents in accordance with law so as to convince the Court that there is no element of suspicion at all. But however, reversing the Judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground of such suspicion alone disbelieving the overwhelming documentary evidence let in by the plaintiffs, in my considered opinion, cannot be sustained, especially in the light of the provisions of the Act referred to supra. ( 15 ) QUESTION No. 3, As already referred to supra, this question was raised and argued with all vehemence by the counsel representing the respondents. It is no doubt true that the suit itself was instituted by a general Power of Attorney holder representing both the plaintiffs. It is also true that the General Power of Attorney holder alone was examined as P. W. 1 and P. W. 2 is a formal witness. Neither of the plaintiffs had been examined. No doubt P. W. 1 had deposed about all the factual aspects relating to the plaint schedule property and also about the documents, which had been marked on the plaintiff side. Neither of the plaintiffs had been examined. No doubt P. W. 1 had deposed about all the factual aspects relating to the plaint schedule property and also about the documents, which had been marked on the plaintiff side. Since this question of law emerges on the admitted facts, it is permitted to be raised in the present second appeal. Order 3 Rule 2 of the civil Procedure Code dealing with recognized agents reads as under,"the recognized agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are- (a) persons holding powers of attorney, authorizing them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties; (b) persons carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court within which limits the appearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorized to make and do such appearances, applications and acts. "order 3 Rule 2 (a) refers to persons holding powers of Attorney authorizing them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties. Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 reads as under,"all persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or nay other cause of the same kind". In the decision referred (6 supra), at page 430 it was held as under,"i have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions and carefully perused the impugned order. I am of the considered view that word acts used in Rule 2, Order 3 cpc does not include the act of Power of Attorney Holder of a party to appear as a witness on behalf of the petitioners. Power of Attorney Holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity to speak about the facts which are within his personal knowledge about the case, but, he cannot appear as a witness on behalf of a party in the capacity of that party. Power of Attorney Holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity to speak about the facts which are within his personal knowledge about the case, but, he cannot appear as a witness on behalf of a party in the capacity of that party. It has been observed in the impugned order that the executant of General power of Attorney by name Bharathi has been attending to her cases personally and non-examination of her in APSEC No. 4 of 1996 will result in great injustice to the second respondent. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to Section 118 of the indian Evidence Act which reads that "all persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the question put to them or giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind". Thus, testimonial compulsion is the very foundation of the Law of Evidence for without such compulsion every refusal to give evidence will render administration of justice impossible. It is not a legal fetish. It is a necessity and also the general rule. The petitioners cannot stay back without entering into witness box and subjecting themselves to cross- examination by the second respondent. Further, even if the petitioners are unable to appear in Court, a commissioner for recording their evidence my be taken out under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil procedure. "in Shambhu Dutt Shastri v. State of rajasthan it was observed,"a general power of attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party, but he become a witness on behalf of the party. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in witness-box on behalf of himself. To appear in a witness-box is altogether a different act. A general power-of- attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of he plaintiff. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in witness-box on behalf of himself. To appear in a witness-box is altogether a different act. A general power-of- attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of he plaintiff. " in Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain it was held that power of attorney holder is not entitled to appear as witness for party appointing him power of attorney holder and the word "acts" in Order 3 Rule 2 CPC does not include act of power of attorney holder to appear as witness on behalf of a party. In the decision referred (8 supra), while dealing with Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of civil Procedure and Section 118 of the evidence Act, 1872 it was held that a general Power of Attorney of a party can be allowed to give evidence as a witness on behalf of the said party to speak to facts of the case not as GPA but as a person having personal knowledge and Order 3 Rures 1 and 2 of CPC are not concerned with examination of witnesses and Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 is the relevant provision and a power of attorney can appear as a witness in his personal capacity though not in his capacity as a Power of attorney. In the decision referred (7 supra) it was held that the General Power of Attorney holder cannot be permitted to represent the party in the suit and to depose on his/her behalf, but it is always open to the General power of Attorney holder to appear as a witness in his/her personal capacity to speak about the facts which are in his/her personal knowledge about the case. ( 16 ) IN the present case on hand, the General Power of Attorney holder himself had instituted the suit by signing the plaint and had prosecuted the litigation up to the second Appeal. But however, in view of the fact that at the second appellate stage, general Power of Attorney holder died, a memo was filed and now the original plaintiffs are being represented by a counsel as appellants in the second appeal. But however, in view of the fact that at the second appellate stage, general Power of Attorney holder died, a memo was filed and now the original plaintiffs are being represented by a counsel as appellants in the second appeal. Representing as party to the litigation as a general Power of Attorney holder is some thing different from figuring as witness to speak to certain facts, which are within his knowledge. These are two different aspects altogether. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down, no doubt normally it is advisable and desirable that parties to the litigation enter into the witness box for the purpose of establishing their own. case. But however, there may be other peculiar circumstances in which certain other parties who are having complete knowledge of the facts of a particular case may be examined. In all such cases, reliefs cannot be refused to either of the parties on the sole and mere ground of non-examination of a party if the court is satisfied on the other material available on record that such party is entitled to relief. It is needless to observe that each case may have to be decided depending upon its own facts and circumstances. It may be that in a particular set of facts an adverse inference may be drawn but it cannot be said that in all the cases that can be a general rule. As already observed by me, no doubt it is always better to examine the parties but if the parties to the litigation are the wife of the party or the husband of the party or any other person closely concerned with the facts and circumstances of a particular case they can be definitely examined for the purpose of establishing the case of a particular party. What I had expressed above is only just illustrative and it cannot be said to be exhaustive since all such circumstances cannot be enumerated comprehensively. In the present case, the suit was instituted by two plaintiffs and they had examined the power of Attorney holder. What I had expressed above is only just illustrative and it cannot be said to be exhaustive since all such circumstances cannot be enumerated comprehensively. In the present case, the suit was instituted by two plaintiffs and they had examined the power of Attorney holder. It is pertinent to note that the appellate court had reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court observing that all the revenue records produced by the appellants are suspicious in view of the fact that the Power of Attorney holder was the Sarpanch of the Village and the Village Munsif was a close relative of the said Power of Attorney holder. I had already expressed my opinion that such findings recorded by the appellate court rejecting voluminous and overwhelming documentary evidence on such a ground cannot be sustained. But however, none concerned with the revenue records had been examined and none of the plaintiffs had also been examined. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that this is a fit matter where opportunity could be given to the appellants-plaintiffs to examine themselves or any one of them if they choose to do so as also permit the appellants-plaintiffs to place further evidence before the court so as to satisfy the court about the authenticity of the records produced by them before the court. It is needless to say that equally the respondents-defendants also are entitled to put forth necessary evidence in this regard inasmuch as the appellants-plaintiffs are being permitted to let in further evidence. ( 17 ) IN view of the findings recorded by me, the matter is remanded to the court of first instance for the purpose of enabling both the parties to let in necessary evidence in the light of the observations made by me supra. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Second Appeal is allowed to the extent; indicated above. No order as to costs.