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2003 DIGILAW 2270 (ALL)

SANJAY KUMAR v. STATE OF U P

2003-09-25

B.S.CHAUHAN, D.P.GUPTA

body2003
B. S. CHAUHAN, J. This writ petition has been filed for quashing order dated 12-9-2003 (Annexure-17), by which the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad has issued a direction to the petitioner to shift his premises for carrying on the business of the fireworks out of the residential area, otherwise his licence shall be deemed not to have been renewed and further to issue a direction to the respondents not to interfere with his business inside the city. 2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner is a licence holder for fireworks and it was valid only upto 31st March, 2003. In June 2000, need was felt that the licence under the provisions of the Explosives Act, 1884, should be shifted outside the residential/congested area and they should not be permitted to have their business within the densely populated area for the purpose of security and in larger public interest. Show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner alongwith other similarly situated persons and after giving an opportunity of hearing to him vide order dated 21-6-2000, (Annexure-1), the licence of the petitioner was cancelled. 3. However, it was made clear that within a period of 15 days, the licence holders should clear off their stock and after shifting their business outside the congested area, then they will be entitled to apply for the licence a fresh. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied, some of the licensees approached the appellate Court i. e. , Divisional Commissioner, Meerut and the matter was disposed of vide order dated 13-11- 2000, issuing a direction that in case licensees are willing to shift their business outside the congested area, they may be entitled for having a fresh licence, but to examine their grievances, it was directed to have a committee of officers including the City Magistrate, Police Officers and Fire Officer, and to examine as to whether it was in public interest to permit them to have their business on the places outside the residential area and then to consider their application for licenxce. 4. A similar order was passed in another connected appeal on 6th July, 2001, however, on 12-11-2001, the appeal was considered by the Divisional Commissioner, imposing certain conditions including the condition that the licensees shall shift out of the congested area. 4. A similar order was passed in another connected appeal on 6th July, 2001, however, on 12-11-2001, the appeal was considered by the Divisional Commissioner, imposing certain conditions including the condition that the licensees shall shift out of the congested area. The issue was again considered by the District Collector in respect of 23 licensees, it was held that under certain circumstances the order of the Divisional Commissioner, that the licence of the licensees are being renewed only upto 31-3-2002, and it pointed out that there will be committee of officials consisting of the Additional City Magistrate, Circle Officer, Police Station, Ghaziabad and Fire Officers and they were directed to submit a report. 5. The Divisional Commissioner again passed an order dated 8-8- 2003, directing the District Collector to decide the applications for renewal within a period of 30 days, on the basis of the report submitted by the committee and in case no order is passed, the licences shall be deemed to be automatically renewed. In pursuance of the order, the impugned order dated 12/15-9-2003, has been passed by the District Magistrate directing the petitioner and others not to run the business in the congested area which is thickly populated and in case they are willing to shift outside the city, applications for their renewal shall be considered, otherwise it will be deemed to have been rejected. Hence this petition. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri V. P. Srivastava, has submitted that the petitioner cannot be asked to close his business at the festival times i. e. , Dussehra and Diwali, which is the most conducive period for the business and more so, it is difficult for the petitioner to get an alternative accommodation outside the thickly populated area within such a short period. The order is neither rejecting the application for renewal nor renewing the application and the act does not envisage for passing such an order, therefore, the order is liable to be quashed. 7. On the contrary, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the order is appellable before the Divisional Commissioner. Petitioner has earlier approached several authorities several times, and no explanation can be made in this regard. Petition has been filed without exhausting the statutory remedies. Petitioner is being asked for the last 3 years to shift his business outside the thickly populate area. Petitioner has earlier approached several authorities several times, and no explanation can be made in this regard. Petition has been filed without exhausting the statutory remedies. Petitioner is being asked for the last 3 years to shift his business outside the thickly populate area. Order is being passed in the larger public interest, therefore, this Court should not grant any indulgence whatsoever. 8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is not a case of utter surprise, but shocking that the statutory authorities are not passing the order having strict adherence to the statutory requirement. The appellate authority had earlier passed the order that in case certain action is not taken by the Licensing Authority, the licence would be deemed to have been renewed automatically. 9. Similarly, in the impugned order, the licensing authority has passed the order that in case the petitioner does not shift his business outside the thickly populated area his application for renewal of license shall be deemed to have been rejected. 10. It is settled legal proposition of law that unless that statute provides for a deeming clause, the Court should be very slow in accepting such a contention, as laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U. P. , 1995 (2) JCLR 569 (All) : 1995 (1) Civil and Revenue Cases 732. The Court held that had the intention fiction/deeming sanction/refusal, specific in the Act or the Rules. In absence of any statutory provision/rule, it should not be construed as to provide for a fiction in such an eventuality. 11. More so, creating a fiction by judicial interpretation may amount to legislation, a field exclusively within the domain of the legislature. (Vide State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, AIR 1994 SC 1 ; and Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. Marketing-cum-processing Service Society Ltd. , (1999)6 SCC 82 ). 12. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 , the Honble apex Court observed as under : "it is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. 12. In Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 , the Honble apex Court observed as under : "it is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe that legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Court. " 13. Even if the statute provides for a legal fiction/deeming provision, it must be limited to the purposes indicated by the context and cannot be given a larger effect. (Vide Radhakissen Chamria and others v. Durga Prasad Chamria and another, AIR 1940 PC 167; State of Travencore- Cochin v. S. V. Cashewnut Actory Quilon, AIR 1953 SC 333 and Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1955 SC 661 ). In Modi Cement Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, AIR 1998 SC 1057 , the Honble apex Court explained the distinction between the "deeming provisions" and `presumption and held that the distinction was well discernible. 14. Similar view has been taken by the Honble apex Court in State of Kerala and others v. Dr. S. G. Sarvothama Prabhu, AIR 1999 SC 1195 ; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mysodet (P) Ltd. , AIR 1999 SC 1271 and Garden Silk Mills Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, (1999)8 SCC 744 . 15. Rule 165 of the Explosive Rules, 1983, provide that if an application for renewal has been filed within time and it is not being disposed of by the licensing authority, the licence shall be deemed to be in force until such date as the licensing authority renews the licence or until an intimation that the renewal of the licence is refused and is communicated to the applicant. The rules provide for a fiction only for the transitory period, but neither the Explosives Act nor the rules framed thereunder envisage deemed cancellation or deemed renewal of a licence, thus the authorities have been passing the order without complying the requirement of the statutory provisions which cannot be held to be a sign of good governance. 16. The rules provide for a fiction only for the transitory period, but neither the Explosives Act nor the rules framed thereunder envisage deemed cancellation or deemed renewal of a licence, thus the authorities have been passing the order without complying the requirement of the statutory provisions which cannot be held to be a sign of good governance. 16. The Divisional Commissioner i. e. , appellate authority in his order dated 12th November 2001, had imposed large number of conditions and one of them contained in Clause 5 has been that the application of the licensees for the renewal shall be considered only if they shift from the present premises to a safer place and close their business in the existing premises. 17. The said order had never been challenged by any of the licensees and attained finality. We fail to understand as on what basis the petitioner can claim any relief at subsequent stage and how he can be permitted to agitate the issue that the said condition was not binding upon him. 18. Undoubtedly, in the instant case the petitioner is being asked for the last 3 years to shift his business outside the thickly populated area and the order is being passed in the larger public interest and it is settled legal proposition that the public interest is much higher than the interest of the individual. We fail to understand how the petitioner has not yet made an appropriate arrangement for shifting his business outside the thickly populated area. There is nothing on record to show that during the last 3 years, any attempt has been made by the petitioner to shift his business outside the densely populated area. 19. Undoubtedly, orders are being passed time and again only in larger public interest and the public interest is the Supreme law and Courts should not come to rescue such an individual, if the public interest demands for a particular action on the part of the statutory authority. 20. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not require any interference by this Court. 21. 20. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order does not require any interference by this Court. 21. Needless to say, that if petitioner makes an alternative arrangement and shifts his business outside the densely populated area and satisfies the licensing authority that he would fulfill all the conditions for grant of licence and his application shall be considered for renewal strictly in accordance with law. Petition dismissed. .