GORACHAND DE, J. ( 1 ) THIS hearing arose out of an application filed by the respondents praying for clarification/rectification/modification of the judgment and order dated 27-7-98 and 9-4-99 passed in the original Appeal. ( 2 ) INITIALLY the appeal (FMA 1428/99) by the plaintiffs was directed against the order No. 18 dated 14-7-1998 passed by Shri A. K. Dasgupta, Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 962/1998. By the said order the ld. Chief Judge while disposing of two separate applications-one filed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, praying for injunction, restrained both the parties and their respective agents and servants from blocking the passage from the main entrance gate of the suit premises, being premises No. 10, Pollock Street, Calcutta-700 001, running from West to East upto the staircase of the said building shown and demarcated in the sketch maps, filed by the respective parties, by parking any vehicle during office hours from 8 A. M. to 8 P. M. By the said order the ld. Judge also restrained the plaintiffs from obstructing the defendants and their men and agents from parking their vehicles in the car parking space or shade situated on the Eastern portion of the suit premises. It was clarified that the plaintiffs should not allow any third party or outsiders, friend or relation to bring their cars within the said space or shade without previous permission of the Court. It was also indicated in the said order that the passage from the main entrance gate to the staircase of the suit premises, shall however be used and enjoyed by both the parties as common passage and for ingress and egress of their respective vehicles. ( 3 ) AFTER the filing of the appeal an ad interim order was passed on 27-7-1998 restraining both the parties from interfering with the egress and ingress of the cars of each other through the passage and also from causing any obstruction in the passage by parking any car. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, after hearing the ld. counsel of both sides, the appeal was disposed of on 9-4-1999 confirming the interim order passed on 27-7-1998 with the modification that the respondents would not, during the pendency of the suit, be parking their cars in the car parking shade as shown in Annexure 'y' at Page 189 of the application. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, after hearing the ld. counsel of both sides, the appeal was disposed of on 9-4-1999 confirming the interim order passed on 27-7-1998 with the modification that the respondents would not, during the pendency of the suit, be parking their cars in the car parking shade as shown in Annexure 'y' at Page 189 of the application. It was clarified that the said order passed by the Court should not be treated to have finally decided the dispute between the parties in any respect, and all the points and contentions of the parties were kept open for adjudication by the trial Court. It was also clarified in the said order that the passage as shown in the said sketch, which is Annexure-'y' (common passage and private passage as described) should be treated to have been taken to be the 'passage' as referred to in the order. Direction was also given for expeditious hearing of the suit and liberty was given to the parties to take appropriate steps for inspection with a further direction upon the Court below to dispose of such application for inspection as early as possible. ( 5 ) SINCE confusion arose between the parties after the passing of the final order on 9-4-99, the respondents filed this application for clarification/rectification/modification of the judgment and order dated 27-7-1998 and 9-4-1999 and it was registered as CAN 4228/1999. ( 6 ) THE ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents argued at length clarifying the necessity of modification of the order passed by the Court on 27-7-1998 and 9-4-1999. On the other hand the ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs/appellants, however, challenged the application after using one affidavit-in-opposition and it was argued by the ld. counsel appearing on their behalf that no modification of the orders passed by this Court is necessary. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the ld. counsel of both sides and on perusal of the materials on record, we like to point out that the dispute raised in the interlocutory stage can only be decided after a full-fledged hearing of the suit and as such, there is no scope for going into the merits of the case in details in the manner argued. counsel of both sides and on perusal of the materials on record, we like to point out that the dispute raised in the interlocutory stage can only be decided after a full-fledged hearing of the suit and as such, there is no scope for going into the merits of the case in details in the manner argued. It is already pointed out in the order dated 9-4-99 that if any view is expressed at this stage with regard to the merits of the case that would definitely affect the decision of the trial Court. The ld. counsel for the respondents pointed out that a vital change was made in the order dated 9-4-1999 while confirming the interim order dated 27-7-1998 and thereby a confusion has been created as to whether the respondents are restrained from parking their cars within the car parking shade or in the passage. It is also pointed out that the appellants have been trying to claim that a portion of the passage is a part of the car parking shade and exclusively enjoyable by the appellants alone. Accordingly, the appellants have started obstructing the ingress and egress of the cars of the respondents in the building as well as parking their cars in any portion of the building outside the car parking shade by way of mala fide and wrongful interpretation of the order passed by this Court. So, the ld. counsel concluded that for the purpose of avoiding any misconception or wrongful interpretation of the order passed by this Court, necessary clarification by way of modification of the orders passed by this Court is necessary. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, the ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants drew the attention of the Court to the sketch map, which is Annexure 'x' to the application, and contended that the staircase of the building is situated almost on the middle portion of the passage running from West to East, and the portion of the passage beyond the staircase is described as 'private Passage'. It is also pointed out that to the left of the said private passage, there is a covered space which is described as Car Parking Shade. It is also pointed out that to the left of the said private passage, there is a covered space which is described as Car Parking Shade. So, it was contended that the plaintiffs have been claiming their exclusive right in the said car parking shade along with the passage connecting the said passage for the purpose of free egress and ingress of the cars from the shade. But the respondents by parking their own cars inside the passage leading upto the staircase of the building have been trying to block the egress and ingress of the cars into the said car parking shade. It is also pointed out that as the co-owners of the premises have been residing in the upper floor of the building and the respondents/defendants are merely tenants in respect of different parts of 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th floors, such tenants cannot obstruct the passage upto the staircase by parking their cars. It appears that taking care of these problems, this Court by the interim order dated 27-7-1998 injuncted both the parties from interfering with the egress and ingress of the car of the parties through the passage and also from causing any obstruction of the passage by parking any car and at the time of final disposal of the appeal on 9-4-1999, thought it fit to confirm the said interim order and for the purpose of clarification it was indicated that the passage as shown in the sketch map (Annexure 'y') as 'common Passage and Private Passage' should be treated to have been taken to be the 'passage' as referred in the order. So, the ld. counsel contended that there is no necessity of any further clarification. ( 9 ) IT is sufficiently clear from the submissions of the ld. counsel and also from the materials on record that the entire dispute centres round the question as to whether the respondents/defendants have any right to park their cars in the car parking shade or in the Eastern side of the passage beyond the stairs. By the ad interim order of stay, this Court directed both the parties not to interfere with the egress and ingress of the cars of each other through the passage and also from causing any obstruction of the passage by parking any car. By the ad interim order of stay, this Court directed both the parties not to interfere with the egress and ingress of the cars of each other through the passage and also from causing any obstruction of the passage by parking any car. At the time of final disposal of this appeal on 9-4-1999, it was clarified that the respondents would not during the pendency of the suit should park their cars in the car parking shade as shown in Annexure 'y' at page 189 of the application. In the said order it is also clarified that the passage as shown in the said sketch, which is Annexure 'y' (Common Passage and Private Passage as described) should be treated to have been taken to be the 'passage' as referred to in the said order. So, the cumulative effect of these orders is that during the pendency of the suit the respondents would not park their cars in the car parking shade shown in Annexure 'y' at Page 189 of the application; however, the passage described as 'common Passage and Private Passage' in the said Annexure 'y' was directed to be treated as passage. So, there was no order prohibiting parking of cars by the respondents in the common passage or private passage during the pendency of the suit. The only embargo is that the respondents would not park their cars inside the car parking shade. Or, in other words, there was no order restraining the respondents from parking their cars in the entire passage, but at the same time both parties have been restrained from interfering with the egress and ingress of the cars of each other through the said passage and also from causing any obstruction in the said passage by parking any car. So, there is no confusion in the orders passed by this Court on 27-7-1998 and 9-4-1999 and no further clarification of the orders is necessary. ( 10 ) THE application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs. ( 11 ) THE trial Court be directed to proceed with the case for final disposal in terms of the final order passed by this Court on 9-4-1999. ( 12 ) SAMARESH BANERJEA, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly.