ORDER Dipak Misra, J. By this writ petition, the petitioners, namely, Balaghat Zila Sahkari Karamchari Sangh, Balaghat, and the Branch Manager have prayed for following reliefs: The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the records pertaining to issue of order dated 5-10-2002 as contained in Annexure P/8, and be further pleased to examine the same land to declare the said order as ultra vires to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and be further pleased to quash the impugned order. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be further pleased to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from directing the retirement of employees and officers of the District Co-operative Bank Balaghat on attaining the age of 58 years. A writ in the appropriate nature may kindly be issued commanding the respondents to permit the said employees to continue in the employment till they attain the age of 60 years. Any other reliefs which this Hon'ble Court deem fit in the circumstances of the case, may also be granted to the petitioners, together with the cost of this writ petition. We need not advert to the facts in detail except stating that by order dated 28-7-1998, Registrar Co-operative Societies, Madhya Pradesh (in short 'the Registrar') enhanced the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years, which was purported to be an amendment of Rule 72(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Employees Service Rules, 1982. Thereafter by order dated 5-10-2002 the same authority reduced the age of retirement from 60 years to 58 years. The validity and propriety of the aforesaid circular has been challenged on many a ground, namely, that uncanalized power has been conferred on the Registrar; that there was no necessity to introduce the concept of parity when only 11 banks had requested for reduction of age; that the said circular creates discrimination and has come into existence without considering the material data; and that the said circular is beyond the scope of powers conferred on the Registrar, and that the grounds which find mention are relatable to financial condition of the banks as well as to reduce the establishment cost of the banks and, therefore, a general circular of this nature could not have been issued. A return has been filed by the answering respondents contending, inter alia, that the Registrar has utilised the power on the basis of correct data and hence, the same cannot be declared as ultra vires on the backdrop of arbitrariness, irrationality and unreasonableness, the order passed on 26-11-2002 in W.P. No. 6323/02 has been brought on record as Annexure R-1 to show that the said controversy is no more res-integra. We have heard Mr. D.K. Dixit, Mr. K.K. Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate. Mr. Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on earlier occasion does not lay down the law correctly and therefore it requires reference to a larger Bench. Mr. Dixit learned counsel for the petitioners in connected matter in W.P. No. 7180/02 has contended that the power has been exercised by the Registrar in a most arbitrary manner and the said facet was not highlighted before the Division Bench and therefore, the matter requires to be referred to a larger Bench. Mr. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners appearing in W.P. No. 7213/02 is gone a step further by contending that section 55(1) deserves to be declared as ultra vires as that has conferred unbridled power on the executive. Mr. Masood Ali, and Mr. Manikant Sharma appearing for the respondents-Banks in certain writ petitions have supported the order passed in writ petition No. 6323/2002. First we shall deal with the submission whether section 55(1) of the Act should be declared as ultra vires. The said provision reads as under: 55. Registrar's power to determine conditions of employment in societies.-- (1) The Registrar may, from time to time, frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in a society or class of societies and the society or class of societies to which such terms and conditions of employment are applicable shall comply with the order that may be issued by the Registrar in this behalf. It is contended by Mr. R.K. Gupta with vehemence that when such unfettered power is reposed with the Registrar, inherent arbitrary exercise of power cannot be overlooked and thereby the frown of Article 14 is attracted. We have devoted some length to discuss the attractive submission of Mr. Gupta. It is contended by Mr. R.K. Gupta with vehemence that when such unfettered power is reposed with the Registrar, inherent arbitrary exercise of power cannot be overlooked and thereby the frown of Article 14 is attracted. We have devoted some length to discuss the attractive submission of Mr. Gupta. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Hemant Kumar Ganga Prasad Gupta vs. President, District Co-operative Central Bank, 1983 MPLJ 461 in paragraph 4 has held as under: Learned counsel for the petitioner has directed his challenge to the validity of the rules made by the Registrar u/s 55 by first contending that section 55 insofar as it confers on the Registrar powers to make rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in a society or a class of societies is itself ultra vires and void as it suffers from excessive delegation. Learned counsel argues that the power conferred is arbitrary as it contains no guidelines and provides for no hearing to the employees who cannot also appeal against the rules to any higher authority. In our opinion, the contention that section 55 suffers from excessive delegation and confers arbitrary power on the Registrar cannot be accepted. The Registrar is the highest in the hierarchy of officers appointed u/s 3 for administering the Act. He is expected to be well acquainted with the conditions prevailing in the Cooperative Societies and posted with the factual data necessary for formulating the terms and conditions of employment of employees of the societies. It is true that the rule making power does not oblige the Registrar to give any hearing to the employees and they have no right of appeal to any higher authority against the rules made by the Registrar. But from this alone, it cannot be said that the power conferred is arbitrary. We have already seen that the State Government has also been conferred power by section 95(2)(x) to prescribe qualifications for employees of a society or class of societies and the conditions of service subject to which persons may be employed by the Society. Now as the State Government holds a higher position that the Registrar who is appointed by the Government, the rules made by the Government u/s 95(2)(x) will prevail over the rules made by the Registrar u/s 55(1). Now as the State Government holds a higher position that the Registrar who is appointed by the Government, the rules made by the Government u/s 95(2)(x) will prevail over the rules made by the Registrar u/s 55(1). The State Government, therefore, has adequate check over the powers of the Registrar by making rules u/s 95(2)(x), in case it finds that the rules made by the Registrar require any modification. The State Government has so far made no rules under this provision except saying that the bye-laws made by the society relating to their employees must conform to the rules made by the Registrar u/s 55(1). The fact that the State Government itself has not made any rules u/s 95(2)(x) only goes to show that in the opinion of the State Government, the Registrar has not exercised his power arbitrarily and the rules made by him are reasonable. The second check on the power of the Registrar is furnished by the laying requirement u/s 95(3). Although sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 95 relate to the power of the State Government to make rules, sub-section (3) of section 95 is wider in scope which refers to all rules made under the Act and requires them to be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly. Sub-section (3), in our opinion, will cover the rules made by the Registrar u/s 55. A provision for laying the rules made under an Act is a method of control exercised by the Legislature over the rule making authority and if such a control is kept it has been held that the power of make rules cannot suffer from excessive delegation: N.K. Papiah and Sons vs. Excise Commr. We are clearly of opinion that the rule making power conferred on the Registrar by section 55(1) does not suffer from excessive delegation. Determined not to abandon any indefatigable spirit of persuasion Mr. Gupta submitted that the judgment rendered by the Full Bench requires reconsideration as the Full Bench have not taken note of the decision rendered in the case of AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, . Determined not to abandon any indefatigable spirit of persuasion Mr. Gupta submitted that the judgment rendered by the Full Bench requires reconsideration as the Full Bench have not taken note of the decision rendered in the case of AIR India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Others, . Bestowing our anxious consideration on the reasonings ascribed by the Full Bench and taking note of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Nergesh Meerza (supra), we are of the considered view that the ratio and analysis made by the Full Bench in the case of Hemant Kumar (supra) has to hold the field and the said judgment in our considered opinion does not require reconsideration. Hence, we impel the above submission of Mr. Gupta. It is contended by Mr. Dixit as well as Mr. Trivedi that the circular should be lanceted being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We have been taken through section 95 of the Act by the learned counsel to show that the action was not taken by the Registrar in conformity with the aforesaid provision. To reinforce the aforesaid submission reliance has been placed on the decision of the learned Single Judge rendered in the case of B.B. Soni vs. State of M.P., 1986 MPLJ 347 . To appreciate the aforesaid submission, we think it apposite to refer to section 95 which deals with the Power to make rules. The said section authorises the Government to make rules for conduct and regulation of the business of such society or class of societies and for carrying out all or any of the purposes of this Act. A specific reference has been made to clause (x) of the aforesaid section. Clause (x) of sub-section (2) of section 95 reads as under: (x) prescribe [qualification and disqualification] for members of the committee and employees of a society or class of societies and the conditions of service subject to which persons may be employed by societies. The age of superannuation had been fixed at the age of 58 years. The Registrar vide circular dated 28-7-1998 enhanced the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. The circular dated 5-10-2002 is of the similar language. The Division Bench in W.P. No. 6323/02 while dealing with the validity of the section has held as under: Learned counsel for petitioners has also challenged the order dated 5-10-2002 as arbitrary. The Registrar vide circular dated 28-7-1998 enhanced the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. The circular dated 5-10-2002 is of the similar language. The Division Bench in W.P. No. 6323/02 while dealing with the validity of the section has held as under: Learned counsel for petitioners has also challenged the order dated 5-10-2002 as arbitrary. The grievance of the learned counsel is that the order does not reflect that it is based on any relevant criteria or that the Registrar had any material before him to come to the conclusion that the economic condition of the District Co-operative Central Bank needed measures to be taken for financial discipline. It is mentioned in the order that to bring uniformity in the age of retirement, it was proposed to reduce the age from 60 years to 58 years. Relevant considerations have also been referred to in the order passed by the Registrar. As held by this Court in Hemant Kumar Ganga's case (supra), the power to make rules and issue orders u/s 55 conferred on the Registrar is in the nature of legislative power. The Full Bench in Sevaram Totaram Pargir vs. Board of Revenue, 1983 MPLJ 645 has also ruled that the power exercised u/s 55(1) by the Registrar is statutory. Since the Registrar has exercised the power having regard to the circumstances enumerated in the order, no ground calling for interference in the rule framed by the Registrar is made out. We therefore, do not find any merit in this petition. An assiduous submission has been made by Mr. Dixit and Mr. Tamrakar to refer the matter to a larger Bench. On anxious perusal of the grounds and the contentions raised, we do not think that the law laid down in the case of Seoni District Co-operative Bank Officers and Employees Association (supra) does not correctly lay down the law. On the contrary, we are inclined to follow the same law as it is a binding precedent. It is also submitted that the circular dated 5-10-2002 is not based on relevant criteria. The provision has not been laid down on the table of the Legislative Assembly in accordance with law. We have carefully perused the circulars. They run in same fashion. The first circular, as it appears, was passed by the same authority by following a particular mode. The provision has not been laid down on the table of the Legislative Assembly in accordance with law. We have carefully perused the circulars. They run in same fashion. The first circular, as it appears, was passed by the same authority by following a particular mode. The second or subsequent has come into existence by adopting the similar method. The approach has been the same while issuing the circulars. Hence, we are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. We do not think it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We have been apprised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as far as the employees/petitioners are concerned they are serving in certain banks which are financially sound and there is no justification to reduce the age of superannuation. We are not inclined to delve into the aforesaid arena inasmuch as the Registrar has issued the circular to bring uniformity. That apart the said circular has been given the stamp of validity by the Court on every occasion. In this backdrop, we are only inclined to observe that the petitioners may approach the Registrar, if so advised, by submitting a representation to modify the circular in accordance with law. The writ petitions are accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs.