M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) WE have heard the learned Counsels representing the contesting parties as also the learned Government Pleader for respondents 2 and 3 on merits. ( 2 ) THE interesting issue that has been rather vehemently debated in this appeal centres around the aspect as to what is the duty of a judicial forum in the face of a delay condonation application. In this case, we refrain from saying a single word about the merits of the case as we would be required to remand the present proceeding to KAT and consequently, the appeal would still have to be heard on merits, and secondly, we are informed that a writ petition is pending wherein the vesting of land in the State has been challenged and in the light of this position, any observations by the Division Bench would have a far-reaching consequence to one or the other of the parties. ( 3 ) THE appellant is an ex-serviceman and he states that, according to him, the lands in dispute were being cultivated by his family and that, consequently, under normal circumstances, they would have been eligible for grant of occupancy rights. We qualify that this is the case of the appellant because, the contesting respondent has something else to say with regard to the factual position. The appellant further contends that since the application for grant of occupancy rights was not made, that the lands vested in the State. The appellant was an ex-serviceman, who was seriously injured and handicapped while in service, and according to him, he applied to the Government for grant of those very lands which came to be granted to him by order dated 18-2-1991. The appellant contends that after close to five years (4 years 10 months and 19 days to be exact), respondent 1 filed an appeal before the KAT being Appeal No. 117 of 1996, challenging the grant and in this appeal, he filed I. A. No. 2 for condonation of delay. The Tribunal, at paragraph 10 of its order, has observed as follows:"there was delay of 4 years 10 months 19 days in filing the appeal. The appellant filed LA. No. II seeking condonation of delay. The Tribunal, at paragraph 10 of its order, has observed as follows:"there was delay of 4 years 10 months 19 days in filing the appeal. The appellant filed LA. No. II seeking condonation of delay. In his affidavit, the appellant stated that he was not aware of the impugned order, that he learnt about the impugned order for the first time just before filing the appeal when he obtained the record of rights. We find from the records that appellant was not a party to the impugned order. It was not communicated to him. He has further sworn to the facts that the respondent 3 brought to the notice of the appellant about the impugned order in the proceedings in the suit, then he learnt about the order and thus there was delay in filing the appeal. Thus, under these circumstances, we pass the following:"the Tribunal thereafter proceeded to allow the appeal, set aside the order of grant and remanded the case to the Assistant Commissioner for de novo hearing. It is this order that was challenged by the appellant before the learned Single Judge, and the solitary contention raised was that there was gross delay in presenting the appeal, that the delay was not condonable, that in fact it has not been condoned, and that consequently, disposing of the appeal on merits without condonation of delay is absolutely wrong and illegal. The learned Single Judge has recorded rather curious reasoning wherein he has said that by virtue of the observations in paragraph 10, which have been reproduced by us, that it was apparent that the Tribunal had decided to condone the delay and even if it is not said so in so many words that this will have to be implied and that, therefore, the order on merits is not vitiated. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed. ( 4 ) MR. Patil, learned Counsel who represents the appellant, submitted before us that condonation of delay is not an empty formality. He states that where the delay is gross, that a judicial forum will be very cautious, invariably reluctant and would oftentimes even refuse to condone the delay unless cogent and convincing grounds are adduced indicating that there was sufficient cause for the delay. He states that where the delay is gross, that a judicial forum will be very cautious, invariably reluctant and would oftentimes even refuse to condone the delay unless cogent and convincing grounds are adduced indicating that there was sufficient cause for the delay. He reiterated before us the principles laid down by the Courts in a host of decisions wherein the Courts have held that delay can only be condoned provided just and sufficient cause is shown and the numerous other cases in which the courts have held that where an abnormally long period of time has elapsed, that interests of justice would require that delay cannot be condoned. His submission is that, unless the Court has passed formal order after applying its mind to I. A. No. 2 condoning the delay, that the appeal could not have been so much as heard on merits, and that the learned Single Judge was in error in having overlooked this very important aspect of the law. ( 5 ) MR. Kulkarni, learned Counsel who represents respondent 1, submitted before us that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are mere technicalities. He states that his client has filed I. A. No. 2 in which he has pointed out that he had no knowledge of the impugned order until very shortly before the appeal was filed and that, consequently, if the party had no knowledge of the order even for almost five years, that there is really no delay that is required to be condoned. His further submission is that, the Courts, particularly while dealing with rural folk such as the present litigants, must and should adopt a very liberal approach in matters of delay, because it is really the merits of the case that are predominant and not the technicalities and procedural aspects which are limited. Secondly, what he says is that it is not as though the Tribunal has overlooked the delay condonation application, because paragraph 10 in terms reproduces the grounds adduced for condonation of delay and sets out the fact that respondent 1 had pointed out that he had no knowledge of the order until shortly before the appeal was filed and that, consequently, the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the Tribunal has, in effect, condoned the delay and that not having stated so would not in any way alter the position. ( 6 ) THE learned Government Pleader submitted that there are rules of propriety which are attached to judicial proceedings and he further submitted that it is very necessary that there must be due compliance in respect of the legal requirements and that, if any of these are bypassed or overlooked or ignored, that the High Court ought not to condone the same as it would create a wrong precedent and furthermore it would amount to according the approval or imprimatur of the High Court to something that the law does not approve of. He advanced the submission that irrespective of the fact that in an appropriate case, the Court may take a lenient view or that in other cases, the Court may even refuse to condone the delay that it could not be left to guess-work insofar as the order must reflect due application of mind and brief reasons as to why the decision in question was taken. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel, what we need to observe is that, delay condonation is not an empty formality and we need to reiterate the position that once the limitation period had expired, that it has the effect of extinguishing certain rights and it also has the effect of creating a bar with regard to the maintainability of certain proceedings and as has been repeatedly pointed out by the English Courts, it also creates a reverse right of immunity in the opposite party after the period of limitation expires and all of these cannot be lightly dealt with or interfered with. Simultaneously, we need to point out that the Courts cannot afford to overlook the statutory requirements under the guise of a liberal approach. Judicial discretion will certainly take care of every aspect, factual and legal, and if in a given case, the Court is required to extend a degree of compassion or if in a given case, the Court is required to make certain allowances, that can certainly be done as long as the facts and circumstances justify it. Similarly, we need to again send out a reminder that the Courts are under obligation to consider the factual and legal angles, particularly the grounds that have been adduced in support of the application for condonation of delay and the grounds on which the application may have been opposed. Similarly, we need to again send out a reminder that the Courts are under obligation to consider the factual and legal angles, particularly the grounds that have been adduced in support of the application for condonation of delay and the grounds on which the application may have been opposed. It is a well-settled principle of law that the Court should evaluate the facts and then take a decision that is in consonance with legal tenets. This requirement again cannot be bypassed. There is no question of assuming that the Court in question has applied its mind or for that matter that it would have come to a particular conclusion. The learned Single Judge was not justified in recording that it was obvious to him that the Tribunal would have condoned the delay. In the instant case, there is no mention as to whether or not I. A. No. 2 had been opposed and if so, on what grounds, and there is no mention as to what were the reasons why the Tribunal decided to condone the delay of almost 5 years. We refer to the requirements of the laws because, the Courts have, on many occasions, pointed out that where an abnormally long period of time had elapsed, that the doctrine of finality would apply or that after an abnormally long period of time, that interest of justice would require that the order should not be touched and there are several other angles which need consideration. We need to observe here that if all of these principles come to be ignored, the unfortunate result would be that the statutory provisions and the principles that we have had occasion to briefly refer to would not only be rendered meaningless, but in effect, that legal provision such as limitation would be abnormally lengthened. This is not the scheme of law which the Courts can condone. We have taken the trouble to elaborate all these principles only in order to clarify the position that this Court is not to be misunderstood of having adopted a very technical approach, but there are very valid, substantial, solid and cogent reasons why we have taken this view. In doing so, we have only culled out the principles and restated the law. In doing so, we have only culled out the principles and restated the law. We also fully endorse the submission canvassed by the learned Government Pleader when he points out that strict compliance with procedural and statutory requirements must be adhered to and that there cannot be any compromise in this area. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position, the result would be that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the learned Single Judge are both set aside. The appeal before the Tribunal is restored to file, the remand order having been set aside. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 10-6-2003 in the morning session, when the Tribunal shall thereafter fix the date for hearing having regard to the fact that it is an old litigation and that the appeal deserves to be disposed of expeditiously. The Tribunal, however, will ensure that the parties are heard on I. A. No. 2 and that a speaking order is passed thereafter on merits as far as I. A. No. 2 is concerned, after which the Tribunal will proceed according to law. The appeal succeeds to this extent and stands disposed of. No order as to costs. The office/learned Government Pleader are directed to retransmit the records to the Tribunal forthwith. --- *** --- .