S.K. KAR, J.— This second appeal was admitted by for mutating the following substantial question of law. "Whether the lower appellate court has correctly interpreted the provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 while giving its findings on adverse possession. 2. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the both sides and perused the relevant case record. 3. Shorn of avoidable details, case for the appellants (plaintiff before original Court) is that a plot of land (described in schedule A & B of the plaint and hereinafter called the 'suit land) was partly the tenancy land of their father Haji Abbas Ali Sheikh under the lease-holder Musstt. Kasiman Nessa, gifted to plaintiff No. 1 and partly purchased land from proforma defendant No.7. 4. That defendant No.l Asmat Ali alias Hasmat Ali, approached the plaintiffs for permission to occupy the suit land which was vacant at that time on a promise that he will vacate the same as when required by the plaintiffs and accordingly was allowed to occupy the entire suit land with effect from month of Aswain Kartik in the year 1381 B.S. That subsequently in the month of Chaitra 1389 B.S. and then again in Baishakha of 1390 B.S. when he was asked to vacate the suit land defendant No. .l refused to do so and hence the suit for declaration of title and recovery of Khas possession demolishing structures along with other reliefs. 5. The defendants 1 to 6(a) and 8 presenting separate written statements raised usual legal pleas and denied the allegations on the plaint other than those specifically admitted in the W.S. Defendant No. 1 averring that he was possessing the suit land on his own right since 1951 after the death of his foster father Late Alimuddin who was in possession next before him and that there was no question of possessing under permissive permission. He denied title or possession in favour of the plaintiffs. "Vide para 20,1 of the W.S., however, it was contended that Khatian, if any, was obtained being in collusion with settlement staff and that Alimuddin, the foster father of defendant No. 1, was possessing the land since 1951 constructing houses thereupon openly and within the knowledge of plaintiffs and thus right, even if any in favour of plaintiff, has since been extinguished by adverse possession over 33 years by defendant. Evidently it is a case of alter-native, if not conflicting, defence that was taken in the suit. 6. Proforma defendants No. 2-5,6(a) and No.8 in their joint written statement supported the pleadings of defendants No. 1 and stated that defendant No.8, Sirajul Haque, occupied a portion of the suit land and defendant No. 1 was in occupation by constructing his house and cultivating the remaining part of the land for last 33 years by way of adverse possession openly. Proforma defendant No.7 and proforma defendant No.6 (d) pleaded that the 'B' schedule land was purchased by the plaintiffs from him but it was mortgaged with the principal defendant No.2 by the plaintiffs in the year 1381 B.S. Lower court did not accept W.S. by defendant No.7 and defendants No.6 (a) to (c) for being not signed and verified properly. Initially suit was filed showing defendant No. 1 as the only principal defendant and others as the proforma defendants. But later on most of the defendants were made principal defendants excepting two of them and an amended plaint was presented. 7. On these pleadings of the parties the trial court framed following issues: "1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties. 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation. 3. Is there any cause of action? 4. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form. 5. Whether the defendant has been possessing the suit land since 1951. 6. Whether the plaintiffs have right title and interest over the suit land. 7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree as prayed for. 8. To what relief, if any the parties are en-titled ? Additional Issue. 9. Whether the defendant No.l has been possessing the suit land adversely against the interest of the plaintiffs." 8. Learned first appellate court took up, it appears, issues 5 and 9 for reappraisal of the evidence and held that it is a case of adverse possession reversing the finding of trial court to that effect. First appellate Court also held that purchase of part of suit land from proforma defendant No.7 was not proved due to inadmissibility of relevant sale-deed, Ext. 21 and as such ownership of suit land was not proved etc. 9. The trial court examined altogether 17 witnesses (11 P.Ws, 5 D.Ws and 1 C.W.) Documentary evidence are Exts. 1 to 30 by plaintiff and ext. 'ka' by defendant. 21 and as such ownership of suit land was not proved etc. 9. The trial court examined altogether 17 witnesses (11 P.Ws, 5 D.Ws and 1 C.W.) Documentary evidence are Exts. 1 to 30 by plaintiff and ext. 'ka' by defendant. 10. The all issues were answered in favour of the plaintiffs and the suit was decreed on contest with costs. On appeal by the first appellate court reversed the findings on issues No. 6,5 and 9 and consequently passed the impugned judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit. Hence this second appeal. 11. Substantial question of law formulated in this appeal has been restricted to a legal scrutiny of the verdict given by the first appellate court on adverse possession. Findings on other issues in the suit have not been challenged here. It will be seen from the impugned judgment that the learned counsel for the respondent placed before the first appellate court the scope and ambit of Article 65 of Limitation Act and submitted that as defendant/respondent, Hasmat AH intended to defeat the title of the plaintiffs, burden is heavy on him to prove by convincing and concrete evidence any claim of adverse possession failing which the plaintiff cannot be non-suited merely on the ground that plaintiffs were unable to prove their possession within 12 years. That the suit being based on title once the title is established the onus will shift on the respondent/defendant to prove any case of adverse possession ripening into acquision of title in his favour. 12. A claim of adverse possession will vary from case to case depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it was held that mere possession, however long does not necessarily mean that it would be, adverse against the true owner. (Rf. AIR 1995 SC 73 ). It was also held by Hon'ble Apex Court and the law still holds the field that a person pleading adverse possession has no equity in his favour. Refer AIR 1996 SC 869 (para 36). In law it is for the party claiming to plead and establish title by adverse possession. 13. The Legal source to claim title by plea of adverse possession is Sec. 27 read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963) and Sec. 27 goes as follows-: "27. Refer AIR 1996 SC 869 (para 36). In law it is for the party claiming to plead and establish title by adverse possession. 13. The Legal source to claim title by plea of adverse possession is Sec. 27 read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act (36 of 1963) and Sec. 27 goes as follows-: "27. Extinguishment of Right to property: At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." And the period of much limitation is given by Art. 65 of the schedule of said Act. Article 65 reads as follows: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which Period begins to run 65. For possession twelve years When the possession of immovable or the defendant property or any becomes adverse to interest therein the plaintiff. based on title. Thus, article 65 provides that 'when the possession of a defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can institute a suit based on title to recover the possession of immovable property or any interest therein, if he comes within 12 years of setting up of such claim of adverse possession, else his right will otherwise extinguish thereafter if not so agitated. Adverse possession really means a hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in content so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. In Era Malappa Vs. Sriram, Hon'ble High Court of Andhrahad very rightly held that adverse possession is a mixed question of facts and law and not law alone and was therefore, got to be pleaded and proved. There cannot be any variance between pleading and proof ( AIR 1993 SC 1449 ). It is needless to say that there should be a starting point in time denying title of true owner to compute the period of twelve years to run out for acquisition of title by adverse possession as provided by column 3 of Art. 65 of Limitation Act. 14. It is needless to say that there should be a starting point in time denying title of true owner to compute the period of twelve years to run out for acquisition of title by adverse possession as provided by column 3 of Art. 65 of Limitation Act. 14. A study of the impugned judgment will show that learned first appellate court although rejected the contentious of learned counsel appearing for the respondent plaintiff before him the reasons given for that were neither sound nor adequate. The evidence on record were not discussed in its proper perspective but only opinions were expressed which is not proper appreciation of evidence by an appellate court but expression of a perverse reasonings for the views expressed. On the other hand, if we look into discussions of evidence given by the trial court in connection with relevant issues No. 5 and 9, we will find the discussions are more logical and appropriate. 15. In his evidence (deposition) D.W.5, the contesting respondent/principal defendant No. 1, has stated that suit land is possessed by him for 40/45 years (deposing on 29.6.93) and it was given to his mother Nurneha Khatoon by Kalimen Nissa, mother of Abdul Bari Sarkar (D. W.4) in gratis in presence of persons, namely, D.W.4, late Daraduddin Sarkar and Alimuddin (father of defendant No. 5) and thereafter his mother was possessing it by constructing houses. So he failed to trace out or to assert in his evidence on oath any case of adverse possession. D.W. 5 stated further that he had no knowledge in whose name the Khatian of suit land stands and admitted that he never paid any revenues for the suit land. He admitted also that the defendants have no documents to support interest in the suit land. So, his pleadings are at variance with his statements on oath to claim title on principle of adverse possession. Law just does not permit it. 16. D.W. 1 stated defendant reclaimed the suit land 25/30 years back. D.W. 2 stated suit land was possessed by Alimuddin father of defendant No. 1 for 30/35 years and thereafter defendant No. 1 is possessing it. There is, thus, absolutely no evidence to prove any claim of adverse possession leading to the inevitable presumption of a permissive possession or encroachment etc. in the alternative. D.W. 2 stated suit land was possessed by Alimuddin father of defendant No. 1 for 30/35 years and thereafter defendant No. 1 is possessing it. There is, thus, absolutely no evidence to prove any claim of adverse possession leading to the inevitable presumption of a permissive possession or encroachment etc. in the alternative. The pleading is thus not substantiated and law does not permit a litigant to travel beyond his pleadings. 17. A look into finding of the original (trial) court to that effect will show that after proper appreciation of evidence it came to a logical conclusion on facts that there was neither pleading nor proof of any case of adverse possession. In connection with issues No. 5 and 9 the court of Origin (Munsiff) observed as follows: "12. Issue No. 5 and additional issue No. 9 : The defendant No. 1 in para 13 in the W.S. submitted that after the death of his foster father he was in possession of the suit land since 1951 but the evidence adduced from the side of the defendants did not disclose any specific year. There are same contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses in this respect. On the other hand, the plaintiffs averred in their plaint that the defendant No. 1 came into possession of. the suit land as permissive possessor in the month of Aswin or Kartik 1381 B.S." 18. Now, coming to critically assess the appreciation of evidence made by learned First Appellate Court, it will be seen that in order to over-rule the logical arguments advanced (as recorded in the judgment) by learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff Mr. D. K. Ghosh, the impugned judgment recorded views, inter alia, as follows: "The evidence of Sahadul SK. (d.w.2) disclosed that since 32-35 years more so the appellant is possessing the suit land with assertion of adverse to the interest of the true owner. The proforma defendant No. 8 who came to dock as D.W. 3 supported the case of the appellant and disclosed that the appellant is enjoying the suit land from the day of his father where nearby he has got homestead land. The evidence of Abdul Bari Sarkar an aged person of 61 years and who by profession is an advocate shows that the appellant is all along possessing the suit land and other lands. The evidence of Abdul Bari Sarkar an aged person of 61 years and who by profession is an advocate shows that the appellant is all along possessing the suit land and other lands. From the day of his father which shows a clear equivocal evidence that the possession of the appellant over suit land is adverse to the real owner for which he has not acknowledged the. ownership of the plaintiffs which commenced in wring and is being maintained against the right." 19. A plain reading to the argumentation made by learned first appellate Court, in my opinion, gives the impression of an uncalled for perverse finding on distortion of facts and unacceptable logic. Learned first appellate court failed to record and discuss the infirmities, if any, in the judgment of trial court before given its own views. 20. A further case of perversion is observed in the impugned judgment, although its relevancy in this substantial question of law being remote, when the impugned judgment went ahead to reject the contention of the plaintiffs/respondents before it (present appellants before this court) by holding. "The purchased of 6 bigha of land shown in the Schedule B of the plaint by the plaintiffs from proforma defendant No. 7 Rustom AH through Ext. 21 lacks material bearing in the subject matter in as much as the said document under Ext. 21 is a Photostat copy of the original deed which is not admissible in the eye of law. The said documents of purchase deed has not been proved into evidence either by any of the attesting witnesses for which I am of the firm opinion, that through document under Ext. 21 no transfer of ownership can be accepted." The relevant document undoubtedly is a photocopy but it was admitted into evidence being proved in Original' (which generally means original is produced before court, verified with the photo copy by comparing and accepted to the satisfaction of the court concerned as true copy of the original) and without any objection from the opponent side. Therefore, there was no occasion for the first appellate court to record such a wrong view to support its final conclusion to be arrived at. It will be worth mentioning in this context that executor of this document, Ext. Therefore, there was no occasion for the first appellate court to record such a wrong view to support its final conclusion to be arrived at. It will be worth mentioning in this context that executor of this document, Ext. 21, deposed in favour of the plaintiff as p.w. 10 and admitted in his pleading the execution of this document specifically conferring title to the vendee but with a preservation that the vendee mortgaged the land to the defendants of the suit. So, there was misreading of evidence also by the appellate court. There is enough evidence of title in favour of plaintiffs where as none in favour of contesting defendants. 21. To conclude, the impugned judgment will demonstrate total ignorance of the concept of adverse possession as contained in Article 65 of Schedule attached to the Act read with provision u/s 27 of the Limitation Act. 1961. The learned District Judge was wholly in error in coming to the findings and reversing the decision of original court. Learned first appellate court resources to a pick and choose policy while discussing the evidence. The trial court held, although not discussing entire volume of evidence, and I find on a reading of evidence, rightly, the plaintiff could adduce better and weightier evidence to show title in their favour whereas the contesting defendants, through claimed title on their own failed to adduce any evidence in support of pleadings. The allegation of collusion in recording the names of plaintiff in settlement record remained not proved. Save and except the admitted question of possession defendant adduced no evidence, oral or documentary, to establish title. 22. In the result, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree of First Appellate Court is set aside. The judgment and decree of Court of the court of origin (Munsifr) is restored and affirmed. No costs. Order of status que in the context passed earlier on 15.7.94 would stand vacated. 23. Lower Court records (both) to be sent back.