JUDGMENT : The 4th defendant in O.S.No. 646/86 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Cuddapah, the purchaser of 3/4th share in items 3 and 4 of the plaint B schedule property, is the appellant in the Second Appeal. The appellant died pending the Second Appeal and the legal representatives are brought on record and the said legal representatives at present are prosecuting the present Second Appeal. 2. At the outset, Sri Rajasekhar, counsel representing the appellants in the Second Appeal had drawn my attention to Ground No. 16(1) to (c) of the Memorandum of Grounds of Second Appeal and had contended that when sufficient properties were available to the family, any acquisition made by any one of the members of the family should be presumed to be properties of the family. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on Mallappa Girimallappa Betgeri v. R. Yellappagouda Patil1. The learned counsel also had taken me through the findings which had been recorded by the appellate Court and had assailed the said findings recorded on the ground that the reversal of the well considered findings of the trial Court had been done by the appellate Court without proper appreciation of evidence. The learned counsel also had taken me through the oral evidence of P.W. 1 to P.W. 3, D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 and also the documentary evidence - Exs. A-1 to A-19 and Exs. B-1 to B-7. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that in the absence of any evidence relating to the fact that the property covered by Ex. A-12 is the separate property of the plaintiff, the findings recorded by the appellate Court cannot be sustained. 3. Per contra Sri Prasad, the learned counsel representing the 1st respondent/plaintiff had drawn my attention to the recitals of Ex. A-12 and had contended that it is not the case of the other side that the plaintiff was the Manager of the family. There mere fact that certain other properties were there of the family is not a ground to treat the plaint B schedule properties also as family properties in the light of the clear evidence of P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 and also the recitals of Ex. A-12. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the findings recorded by the appellate Court and had pointed out that basing on the reply notice Ex. A-12. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to the findings recorded by the appellate Court and had pointed out that basing on the reply notice Ex. A-19, at paragraph 36, a specific finding had been recorded that there is no question of granting the relief of partition even in relation to plaint A Schedule lands in the light of the fact that it is clearly mentioned in the reply Ex. A-19 that there was already partition and hence there is no necessity to again partition the plaint A schedule lands. The learned counsel also submitted that as far as working out equity is concerned, the said question does not arise at all since the clear finding recorded by the trial Court is that the plaint B schedule properties are the exclusive properties of the plaintiff and hence he is entitled to recovery of possession of items 3 and 4 of plaint B schedule also and in such a case the concept of joint family or co-parcenery or working out equities as though it is a general suit for partition will not arise at all. 4. Heard both the counsel and also perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record. 5. The facts in nutshell are that the 1st respondent in the Second Appeal - plaintiff, instituted the suit for partition to divide the plaint A schedule property into four equal shares and to allot one share and deliver the same to the plaintiff and to declare the plaintiff's title to the plaint B schedule property and also direct the 4th defendant - present Appellant, to deliver 3/4th share in items 3 and 4 of plaint B schedule and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of items 1, 2 and 5 of the plaint B schedule and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff of the partitioned A schedule property and for costs of the suit. It was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 3 are brothers. They were the sons of one Sigmala Subbigadu. The plaint A schedule properties were their ancestral properties as their father got the said properties in a partition with his brothers. It was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 3 are brothers. They were the sons of one Sigmala Subbigadu. The plaint A schedule properties were their ancestral properties as their father got the said properties in a partition with his brothers. Their father died in 1949 and after the death of their father, their sister Pedda Rajamma was managing the family for some time until the 1st defendant attained majority. Subsequently, there was a partition of the A schedule properties by metes and bounds for the purpose of convenience and each brother was enjoying the portions allotted to them separately. They were also paying cist separately. While so, the 2nd defendant borrowed money from Pabbaparam Narayana on the security of his land and when he was unable to discharge the loan, the plaintiff cleared the loan and took possession of the said property of Ac. 0-13 cents. Subsequently, in 1958 the plaintiff purchased the plaint B schedule lands from one Narasaramaiah for valid consideration and thus the plaint B schedule properties are his self-acquired properties. The defendants became jealous of the plaintiff as he purchased the B schedule properties. Therefore they were causing obstacles to him in enjoyment of the properties. Though the defendants had no manner of right, title or possession, the defendants 1 to 3 had highhandedly sold an extent of Acs. 1-62 cents to the 4th defendant and the sale is not binding on the plaintiff. hence the suit. 6. Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statement pleading that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 3 were brothers and members of a Hindu Joint Family having equal shares in all the properties and the 1st defendant was in the Government service upto 1984 and so the plaintiff was managing the joint family and not their sister Pedda Rajamma. 6. Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statement pleading that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 3 were brothers and members of a Hindu Joint Family having equal shares in all the properties and the 1st defendant was in the Government service upto 1984 and so the plaintiff was managing the joint family and not their sister Pedda Rajamma. It is next contended that on account of differences since last six or seven years, small portions of land were being enjoyed by the defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiff without actual partition and the plaintiff was paying cist on behalf of the joint family and the B schedule land was purchased with the income of the joint family and for the benefit of the joint family and as the plaintiff refused to advance money for the education of the sons of the defendants 2 and 3, the defendants 1 to 3 sold away 3/4th share to the 4th defendant for proper consideration and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled for declaration of his title to B schedule property and he is not entitled to the relief of injunction and there is no cause of action to file the suit and so the suit has to be decreed for partition of the plaint schedule properties with correct extents except items 3 and 4 of the plaint B schedule. 7. The 4th defendant filed a written statement contending that he was a bona fide purchaser of an extent of Acs. 1-72 cents in relation to items 3 and 4 of the plaint B schedule properties on 11-11-1982 for valid consideration. 8. On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following Issues were settled:(1)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for division of A schedule properties into four equal shares and allotment of one share to him-(2)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title to the B schedule property-(3)Whether the plaintiff is already in possession of his 1/4th share-(4)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction and also items 1, 3 and 5 of B schedule properties-(5)Whether the 4th defendant is a bona fide purchaser of items 3 and 4 of B schedule property-(6)To what relief-On behalf of the plaintiff, P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-19 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-19 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-6 were marked and the Court of first instance passed a decree for partition and aggrieved by the same the plaintiff filed A.S.No. 52/89 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Cuddapah and the appellate Court on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence had partly allowed the Appeal declaring the title of the plaintiff to the plaint B schedule property and granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaint B schedule lands and directing the 4th defendant to deliver possession of items 3 and 4 of the said B schedule to the plaintiff and the relief of partition had been negatived on the ground that there was already partition of plaint A schedule properties and aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal is filed. 9. The substantial questions of law which had been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellants can be specified as hereunder:(1)Whether the lower appellate Court erred in reversing the decree of the lower Court when the presumption under Hindu Law is that in the absence of any other source of income, any property acquired by the member of the family who is in possession of entire joint family property, is deemed to be joint family property as held by the Apex Court in the decision referred supra-(2)Whether the plaintiff is estopped from questioning the sale deed Ex. B-1 executed by defendants 1 to 3 in respect of their 3/4th share only, excluding his 1/4th share in items 3 and 4 of the plaint B schedule properties-(3)Whether the lower appellate Court erred in ignoring the rights of the bona fide purchaser for value and seeking equities in a partition suit and erred in decreeing the suit against the 4th defendant also- 10. I had gone through the findings recorded by the appellate Court at paragraph 9 of the Judgment. The evidence of P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 and also D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 had been dealt with in detail and Exs. A-1 to A-19 and Ex. I had gone through the findings recorded by the appellate Court at paragraph 9 of the Judgment. The evidence of P.W. 1 to P.W. 3 and also D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 had been dealt with in detail and Exs. A-1 to A-19 and Ex. B-1 to B-7 also had been discussed at length and in view of the clear documentary evidence, coupled with the evidence of P.W. 1 supported by P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 and on the strength of Ex. A-12 and the other supporting documents i.e., Exs. A-1 and A-2 - cist receipts, Exs. A-3 to A-8 - other cist receipts, Exs. A-9 to A-11 - cist receipts, Ex. A-13 - office copy of notice, Ex. A-14 - Adangal extract, Ex. A-15 - discharged pronote, Ex. A-16 - receipt issued by Corporation Bank, Ex. A-17 - notice issued by Corporation Bank, Ex. A-18 - encumbrance certificate and Ex. A-19 - reply notice, finding had been recorded that the plaint B schedule properties are the separate properties of the plaintiff. No doubt, certain portions of the evidence had been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant relating to the management of the affairs of the family, but it is not the specific stand taken by the other family members - the contesting defendants, that the plaintiff had been the manager of the family and in the absence of the same, in the light of the recitals of Ex. A-13 and also the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 supporting the evidence of P.W. 1, it cannot be said that any such presumption as raised by the appellant can be accepted in the present case. it is needless to say that the other family members had not preferred any Second Appeal. The purchaser alone had preferred this Second Appeal contending that he is the bona fide purchaser. He had also raised a ground stating that he is entitled to the relief of equity in the event of having a general partition of all the family properties. The purchaser alone had preferred this Second Appeal contending that he is the bona fide purchaser. He had also raised a ground stating that he is entitled to the relief of equity in the event of having a general partition of all the family properties. The lower appellate Court also had appreciated the evidence of D.W. 1 to D.W. 7 and had specifically stated that the evidence of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 may throw some light on the affairs of the family, but the other evidence is more or less general in nature and the contradictory nature of the statements also had been pointed out. These are all factual aspects and unless the appreciation of the evidence by the lower appellate Court is pointed out to be totally erroneous, the factual findings recorded may have to be accepted. The lower appellate Court also had recorded a finding that in the light of the contents of Ex. A-19 reply notice, the plaint A schedule properties are being enjoyed separately and there is no necessity of again partitioning the said plaint A schedule lands. In the light of the same, it is needless to say that the relief of general partition in the case of family properties cannot be granted and in such a case the question of invoking the right to equity by a purchaser on the ground that his purchase is bona fide, will not arise at all. In the decision referred supra, while dealing with presumption in relation to new acquisition of joint family, it was held by the Apex Court that in the case of a new acquisition by the manager of joint family in his own name with no independent source of income, presumption arises that the new acquisition is joint family property. But, in the light of the clear evidence available on record, when a finding had been recorded by the appellate court in the light of Ex. A-12 coupled with the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 supporting the evidence of P.W. 1, it cannot be said that this decision can be applied to the facts of the case especially in the absence of evidence that at the relevant point of time the plaintiff was managing the affairs of the joint family. A-12 coupled with the evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 supporting the evidence of P.W. 1, it cannot be said that this decision can be applied to the facts of the case especially in the absence of evidence that at the relevant point of time the plaintiff was managing the affairs of the joint family. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the Judgment and decree of the appellate Court are well considered on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence and the findings recorded by the appellate Court do not suffer from any legal infirmity and inasmuch as the appellant/4th defendant cannot be said to be a bona fide purchaser in the facts and circumstances, the appellant is not entitled to any equity as such and since the Second Appeal is devoid of merits the same is dismissed, in the facts and circumstances, without costs.