JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. Does a law of procedure mandate an inflexible rigidity in principle to refuse accommodation to substantive justice in all situations, is the question posed in the present petition. By the order impugned herein, the learned court below has permitted the respondents to file a fresh affidavit by way of evidence in, the suit pending before it. According to the petitioners on a strict interpretation of Order 17 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 this is not permissible and therefore the said order is liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. I have heard Mr. H.L. Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Dr. G. Lal, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The essential facts are not in dispute. The respondents herein had filed a suit in the court of the learned Civil Judge Junior Division No. 1 Guwahati praying for a decree inter alia for ejectment of the petitioners from the suit premises recovery of has possession thereof and arrear of rent etc. The suit was later transferred to the court of the learned civil Judge, Junior Division No. 3, Guwahati and is still pending final disposal. On receiving the summons of the suit, the petitioners entered appearance and filed their written statement. Keeping in view the controversy involved in the instant petition it is permissible to skip details of the cases of the parties as set out in the pleadings. The suit, on a preliminary objection raised by the petitioners was dismissed on 29.5.2002 on an application filed by the respondents. Subsequently, it was restored to file and eventually fixed for evidence of the respondents-plaintiffs on 24.9.2002. 4. On the said date, i.e., 24.9.2002 the respondents filed a petition for adjournment which was granted with a cost of Rs. 100 and the suit, was next fixed on 9.10. 2002. On that day as well the respondents prayed for adjournment. The prayer was allowed with a cost of Rs. 100 fixing 27.11.2002 for evidence of the respondents-plaintiffs. On that date, the respondents-plaintiffs filed an affidavit of a witness, namely, the respondent No. 1/ plaintiff No. 1. This affidavit was in the form of evidence as contemplated under order 18 of the Code (after amendment). The prayer was allowed with a cost of Rs. 100 fixing 27.11.2002 for evidence of the respondents-plaintiffs. On that date, the respondents-plaintiffs filed an affidavit of a witness, namely, the respondent No. 1/ plaintiff No. 1. This affidavit was in the form of evidence as contemplated under order 18 of the Code (after amendment). The affidavit though filed/the deponent could not be administered the oath for the same due to paucity of time of the court and the suit was therefore next fixed on 12.12.2002 for swearing of affidavit and cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness. On that date, a prayer for time on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs was made, which was allowed again with a cost of Rs. 100 fixing 21.1.2003 for cross examination of witnesses of the respondents-plaintiffs. On 21.1.2003 a prayer was made on behalf of the respondents-plaintiff to file fresh affidavit of Respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 on the ground that as the earlier affidavit had not been sworn, there was no bar in filing a fresh affidavit and further in view of some mistakes in the earlier affidavit a fresh affidavit was necessary in the interest of justice. Objection was raised on behalf of the petitioners-tenant contending that as in the meantime the hearing of the suit had been adjourned on four occasions at the instance of the respondent-plaintiffs. If they were permitted to file fresh affidavit it would amount to granting them five adjournments, during the hearing of the suit which was not permissible under order 17 Rule 1 of the Code. It was also urged that as the affidavit had already been filed and accepted by the Court and a copy thereof has been served on the learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants, the prayer for filing of fresh affidavit should not be granted. 5. The trial court after hearing the parties deferred the order and have eventually 27.1.2003, by the impugned order allowed the prayer of the respondent-plaintiff to file a fresh affidavit. This is the order under challenge here. 6. Mr. 5. The trial court after hearing the parties deferred the order and have eventually 27.1.2003, by the impugned order allowed the prayer of the respondent-plaintiff to file a fresh affidavit. This is the order under challenge here. 6. Mr. Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously argued that as admittedly the respondents/plaintiffs had prayed for and were granted adjournments of the hearing of the suit on 24.9.2002, 9.10.2002 and 12.12.2002 and as they had filed their affidavit evidence on 27.11.2002, the learned court below had acted in contravention of order 17 Rule 1 of the Code in permitting the respondent-plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit. According to him, the prayer of the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit in place of one filed on 27.11.2002 tantamounts to a prayer for adjournment of the hearing of the suit on 27.11.2002 as well and in that view of the matter, as the impugned order has the effect of granting five adjournments in the hearing of the suit at their instance. It is clearly not sustainable in law in the face of the mandate of order 17 Rule 1 of the Code. He further argued that the respondents/plaintiffs having filed the affidavit evidence of Respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 on 27.11.2002 with a copy thereof served on the learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants and the said affidavit having been accepted by the Court for all intents and purpose, the learned court below ought not to have permitted the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit to file up the lacuna in the evidence. The learned counsel contended that administering of oath to the deponent of the affidavit filed on 27.11.2002 was only a formality which was to be completed by the Court and therefore the respondents/plaintiffs ought not to have been granted the opportunity of filing a fresh affidavit on such a plea, to the great detriment and prejudice of the petitioners-defendants. He maintained that the learned court below having fixed the suit for cross examination of the witness of the respondents-plaintiffs on the basis of the affidavit evidence, having accepted the affidavit so filed, had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in allowing the respondents/plaintiffs to substitute the said affidavit by a fresh one. He maintained that the learned court below having fixed the suit for cross examination of the witness of the respondents-plaintiffs on the basis of the affidavit evidence, having accepted the affidavit so filed, had acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in allowing the respondents/plaintiffs to substitute the said affidavit by a fresh one. The learned counsel also assailed the impugned order on the ground that the learned court below had not disposed of the application filed after the passing of the impugned order raising issues having a bearing on the correctness thereof. Mr. Maurya in support of his submission has mainly placed reliance of a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Rameshwar S/o. Kalyan Singh, Appellant v. The State of Rajasthan, Respondent, reported in. 7. Refuting the above contentions with equal force, Dr. Lal has argued that the revision petition, in the face of Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure (Amendment) Act, 2000 being against an interlocutory order is clearly not maintainable in law, and is liable to be rejected in limine. He further argued that having regard to the orders passed, Article 227 of the Constitution of India was also not invocable and therefore on this ground the revision petition deserves to be dismissed. Disputing the submission made on behalf of the petitioners-defendants that the learned trial court in permitting the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit had in fact granted five adjournments of the hearing of the suit at the instances of the respondent/plaintiff, the learned counsel argued that a bare perusal of the order sheet would show that the respondents/plaintiffs had sought for adjournments only on three dates i.e. 24.9.2002, 9.10.2002 and 12.12.2002. He maintained that the respondents/plaintiffs had duly filed the affidavit evidence on 27.11.2002 and the hearing of the suit on that date was adjourned for-want of time of the Court and not on the prayer made on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs. He urged that as the affidavit was in fact not sworn, it could not be construed to be an evidence in law and therefore a prayer was made to file a fresh affidavit on some mistakes being detected which was rightly allowed by the learned trial court. According to him, the impugned order is perfectly legal and valid and did not cause any prejudice to the petitioners/defendants. According to him, the impugned order is perfectly legal and valid and did not cause any prejudice to the petitioners/defendants. He argued that the impugned order does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction, and therefore, does not call for any interference of this court. He rested his submissions on a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Prem Bakshi and Ors. I Appellants v. Dharam Dev and Ors., Respondents, reported in and that of this court in Karabi Kannakar and Anr., petitioners v. Shibani Karmakar and Ors. Respondents, reported in 2003 (1) GLT 445. 8. The facts narrated herein above clearly suggest that the controversy had arisen in view of the prayer made on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff to file a fresh affidavit on 21.1.2003. Admittedly the hearing of the suit was adjourned on 24.9.2002, 9.10.2002 and 12.12.2002 at the instance of the respondents/plaintiffs. The affidavit evidence of respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 was submitted in court on 27.11.2002. It could not be sworn as the time of the court did not permit; The adjournment of that date was not on the prayer of the respondents/plaintiffs on the next date, i.e., 12.12.2002 the hearing was adjourned as indicated hereinabove on the prayer of the respondents/plaintiffs. Till that stage the petitioners/defendants had raised no objection. The materials on record revealed that on; 21.1.2003 the respondent No. 1/ plaintiff No. 1 was present in court and a prayer was made for filing a fresh affidavit on his behalf, the reasons being firstly, the earlier affidavit had not been sworn till then and secondly some inadvertent mistakes were necessary to be corrected. It appears that on 21.1.2003 no prayer for adjournment of the hearing of the suit was made on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs. The request was only for allowing them to file a fresh affidavit of Respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1. A perusal of the orders dated 27.11.2002 and 12.12.2002 indicates that the suit was fixed for swearing of affidavit and cross examination of the deponent witness. Admittedly therefore, no oath had been administered to the deponent in support of his affidavit evidence. Had no prayer been made to file a fresh affidavit in normal course the affidavit filed on 27-11.2002 would have been sworn and the respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 would have been cross examined. Admittedly therefore, no oath had been administered to the deponent in support of his affidavit evidence. Had no prayer been made to file a fresh affidavit in normal course the affidavit filed on 27-11.2002 would have been sworn and the respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 would have been cross examined. The respondent No. 1 plaintiff No. 1 being present in court on 21.1.2003 as well, had the fresh affidavit been filed on that date and sworn, the hearing of the suit could have been proceeded with, if the petitioners/defendants ; were ready to cross examine the witness. It has to be noticed at the cost of repetition that, no prayer for adjournment of the hearing of the suit had been made on 21.1.2003. The learned trial court, as the impugned order reveals, while permitting the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit took note of the fact that the suit had not been adjourned at their instance on 27.11.2002 and 21.01.2003 and that as •the earlier affidavit had not been sworn either before the court or before the oath Commissioner, it was a mere piece of paper and not an affidavit. In passing the impugned order the lower court also noticed that on 21.1.2003, the witness of the respondents/plaintiffs was present in court and that he had not been cross examined. 9. What is the probative value of the unsworn affidavit filed by the respondent/plaintiffs? This assumes importance in view of the amendment of the Code requiring filing of examination in chief of every witness in 'the form of an affidavit as comprehended under Rule 18 thereof. A bare reading of Rule 4 of order 18 predicates that the affidavit of the witness would be construed to be his evidence in examination in chief on which he would be cross examined and re-examined if necessary. The purpose of administering oath to the witness in support of the contents of the affidavit is to bind him down therewith as well as to add credence to the statements made therein. The affidavit of the witness without being sworn before the court or the proper authority for the purpose would in my view lack in credibility and probative value. The witness though may be competent to adduce evidence, the contents of the' unsworn affidavit would not constitute evidence in support of the relatable facts. The affidavit of the witness without being sworn before the court or the proper authority for the purpose would in my view lack in credibility and probative value. The witness though may be competent to adduce evidence, the contents of the' unsworn affidavit would not constitute evidence in support of the relatable facts. If that be so, what purpose will such an affidavit serve for a party in a suit, more particularly when in view of the amendment of Rule 18 of the Code, the evidence of a witness in his examination in chief has to be compulsorily given in the form of an affidavit. In my considered opinion, therefore, the unsworn affidavit of respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 filed on 27.11.2002 already on the record of the suit carried no credibility or probative value in support of the case of the respondent/plaintiff. 10. It is time now to turn to the decision of the Apex Court in Rameswar S/o. Kalyan Singh v. The State of Rajasthan (supra). The question posed in that case relates to admissibility of evidence of a girl aged about 7/8 years in connection with the allegation of rape on her. The learned trial court recording her testimony did not administer oath to her as it was of the opinion that she did not Understand the sanctity of an oath. Referring to the proviso to Section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 (as it was then) which provided that where a child witness under 12 years of age did not understand the nature of oath or affirmation it need not be administered the same and that absence or oath or affirmation would not render in admissible any evidence given by such witness, the Apex Court ruled that an omission to administer an oath even to an adult affects only the credibility of the witness and not his competency as such the Apex court held as above also in the context of Section118 of the Evidence, Act laying down who under the law are competent, to testify as well as Section13 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873 providing that omission to take any oath or make any affirmation or any irregularity whatever in the form in connection therewith would not invalidate any proceeding or render any evidence inadmissible. The Indian Oaths Act, 1873 has been repealed by the Oaths Act, 1969 and Section 13 of the earlier Act has been replaced by Section 7 of the later Act. 11. The ratio of the above decision of the Apex Court therefore is that if there is an omission or irregularity in the matter of oath or affirmation, the same would not render any evidence of a witness inadmissible but would touch the credibility of an witness. 12. What would be the utility of a piece of evidence without any probative value even if, admissible in law. If due to absence of an oath or affirmation, the credibility of a witness is in doubt will his evidence inspire confidence in the mind of the Court while adjudicating issues between the parties in a suit or proceeding ? I think not. As in the case in hand, the respondents/plaintiffs, as required under the law, have adduced affidavit evidence of the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1, his unsworn affidavit would lack in probative value and though admissible in law would be useless for them. In the facts of the present case, I, therefore, do not consider that the above decision of the Apex Court assists the learned counsel for the petitioners in supporting his submission that the respondents/plaintiffs having filed the affidavit on 27.11.2002, it being admissible in evidence even in absence of the oath, the learned court below ought not to have permitted the respondent/plaintiff to file a fresh affidavit. 13. Next, whether the learned court below in permitting the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit had granted five adjournments of the hearing of the suit as contended. The order sheet reveals that no adjournment was prayed for by the respondents/plaintiffs on 27.11.2002 and 21.1.2003. In fact on 21.1.2003 the respondents/plaintiffs were prepared to file, fresh affidavit and the witness, Respondent No. 1/ plaintiff No. 1 was also present in Court, The hearing had to be adjourned in view of the objection raised by the petitioners/defendants to the prayer for filing a fresh affidavit. As alluded above, the hearing on 27.11.2002 had to be shifted for want of time of the court. To hold, in the above premises, that the prayer for filing a fresh affidavit on 21.1.2003 would pre-suppose a prayer for adjournment on 27.11.2002 by the respondents/plaintiffs would be acting on, hypothesis. As alluded above, the hearing on 27.11.2002 had to be shifted for want of time of the court. To hold, in the above premises, that the prayer for filing a fresh affidavit on 21.1.2003 would pre-suppose a prayer for adjournment on 27.11.2002 by the respondents/plaintiffs would be acting on, hypothesis. As referred to above, had the respondents/plaintiffs been allowed to file the fresh affidavit on 21.1.2003 and their witness been cross examined on the same date, there would have been no scope to contend that more than three adjournments had been granted to them. When the respondents/plaintiffs had not prayed for an adjournment on 27.11.2002 and 21.1.2003 and were ready to file the fresh affidavit on 21.1.2003 and their witness was present in court, I cannot persuade myself to concur with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that by passing the impugned order, the learned court below had granted five adjournments to the respondents/plaintiffs. 14. The considerations which weighed with the learned court below in passing the order are in my view relevant and logical. The witness of the respondent No. 1/plaintiff No. 1 had not been cross examined till then and I fail to see how, by permitting the respondents/plaintiffs to file a fresh affidavit, the petitioners/defendants could have been prejudiced. The impugned order has been passed in the interest of justice and there is no jurisdictional error in it. Order 17 of the Code is an integral part of a procedural law. The law procedure, as is well settled, is the handmaid of justice and is meant to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it. The classical passage in the matter of Sangram Singh Appellant v. Election Tribunal Kotah and Anr., Respondents in this regard (Para 16) is extracted herein below :- "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure', something designed to facilitate justice and further its end ; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; nor a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it". 15. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it". 15. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Ganesh Trading Co., Appellant v. Moji Ram, Respondent, reported in observing that, procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. The amendment of the Code introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1999 and by the Code of Civil procedure Amendment Act, 2002. Though essentially for the purpose of expeditious disposal of Civil suits and proceedings, the above fundamental principles of law perhaps cannot be overlooked or sidelined. A fine balance has to be struck between the pressing necessity of expeditious disposal of Civil Suits and proceedings and the soleman obligation adhering to the basic principles of administration of justice. The following extracts from the treatise on Nature and object of Civil Procedure and Sources Civil procedural law from Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Para-1 Page 9 and Para 14, Page 22 would be apposite for the purpose : "Civil Procedural Law is pervasive in the sense that it is ubiquitous and inevitably enters into every other branch of law, except criminal law. It provides the appropriate machinery for access to the courts in order to obtain the appropriate relief or remedy and to sustain and uphold the rules of substantive law. All legal relations, transactions', happenings and events may ultimately have to be determined or adjudicated upon by the appropriate Courts or tribunals according to the applicable rules of law, and the methods and machinery for securing this determination or adjudication are regulated by civil procedural law." "The term "inherent jurisdiction" is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction of the court exercisable at common law or conferred on it by statute or rules of court, for the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are regulated by statute or rule of court". "In sum, it may be said that the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them". 16. In the above treatise while dealing with the sources of Civil Procedural Law the inherent jurisdiction of the Court was acknowledged as one of such sources. The above exposition of law therefore clearly proclaims that a rule of substantive justice cannot be rendered sterile due to inflexible and exaggerated devotion to the rule of procedure. Procedural law though entitled to its premium due has to be subservient to the cause of substantive justice in deserving cases. As a matter of fact, one has to compliment the other but in case of a confrontation the rule of substantive justice, within permissible limits, must prevail. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the learned trial court in passing the impugned order has acted within its jurisdiction on relevant and germane considerations and therefore, the same does not warrant any interference by this court in the instant petition. 17. Before parting the objection raised on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs with regard to the maintainability of the revision petition needs to be dealt with. In Prem Bakshi and Ors. v. Dharam Dev and Ors. (supra) the question which had fallen for consideration before the Apex court was whether the order passed by the learned trial court allowing amendment of the plaint in the suit involved therein was revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Act of 1976. v. Dharam Dev and Ors. (supra) the question which had fallen for consideration before the Apex court was whether the order passed by the learned trial court allowing amendment of the plaint in the suit involved therein was revisable by the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Act of 1976. The Apex Court observed therein that in view of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 115, the High Court should not vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue in course of a suit or other proceedings except where the orders made would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding or would have occasioned a failure of justice or caused irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. In the facts of that case it was held that the order assailed before the High Court was neither one which if passed in favour of the revision petitioner would have finally disposed of the case nor had resulted in failure of justice or irreparable injury and therefore the order of the High Court interfering with the order of the learned trial court allowing the amendment, was set aside. 18. This court in Karabi Karmakar and Anr. v. Shibani Karmakar and Ors. (supra) was dealing with Section 115 of the Code after its amendment in 1999 and 12002. While noticing that after the said amendments, Clause (b) to the proviso to the Section 115(1) with regard to (sic) of justice or causing of irreparable injury by the interlocutory order had been deleted, it was held that in view of the new look provided to Section 115 by the aforementioned amendments, even if an order suffers from jurisdictional error or a failure of justice or irreparable injury was caused to the party seeking interference of the High Court Under Section 115 of the Code, such a relief would not be available to him and the High Court would not interfere unless the order sought to be revised was such that had it been made in favour of the revision petitioner, "the suit or other proceeding" would have been decided in his favour. 19. The instant application has been filed also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. The instant application has been filed also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Having exhaustively deal with the impugned order on its merit, I do not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the preliminary object more particularly as Article 227 of the Constitution of India is also sought to be invoked by the revision petitioners. However, even assuming that the instant application is one under the aforementioned Article of the Constitution, I am afraid having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the order impugned herein, the same is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of the supervisory power of this Court as comprehended by the said provision of the Constitution. The impugned order does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction. There is no patent illegality or error m procedure as well. The impugned order does not exhibit any capricious exercise of authority or perversity in approach. This court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution does not assume the role of an appellate court. The parameters within which the Court has to dwell are well 'delineated. The materials on record in my view do not justify exercise of such power in the instant case. 20. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the petition is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed