JUDGMENT Biplab Kumar Sharma, J. 1. Violation of the right of equal consideration in the matter of awarding of punishment pursuant to common departmental proceeding is the grievance made in this writ petition. The departmental proceeding itself is not under challenge. It is only in respect of the order imposing the penalty of removal from service, later on modified to that of compulsory retirement, this writ petition has been filed involving the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the co-accused in the common departmental proceeding who was also removed from service like that of the Petitioner has been re-instated in service upon interference with the same by the departmental appellate authority, while the Petitioner has been denied the same very treatment although his case is also similarly circumstances and thus the same led to violation of the equality clause as enshrined in the Constitution of India. 2. Tracing back the history of the case, the Petitioner along with two others namely Shri H.C. Lal and Shri R.A. Shukla were taken up for a departmental proceeding on the charge of fraudulent payment through forged supply order against the original value of the order. At that relevant point of time, the Petitioner was holding the post of Accounts Assistant-II while Shri Shukla was holding the post of Accounts Assistant-I. The discrimination alleged is in reference to said Shri Shukla. 3. The charges levelled against the Petitioner and Shri Shukla by two separate Memorandums both dated 22.5.1982 are as follows: PETITIONER On 27.4.1982, Shri Alauddin Ahmed, Accounts Assistant Gd. II intentionally passed a bill amounting to Rs. 91981.46 submitted by M/s North Eastern Electrical and Hardware Stores, Sibsagar by making use of forged supply order and tempered Inspection Report causing thereby pecuniary gain to the supplier and loss to the commission and thus committing an act of fraud in conspiracy with the above supplier which constitutes gross misconduct and renders himself liable for disciplinary action under ONGC (CDA) Regulations, 1976. SHRI R.A. SHUKLA On 27.4.82 Shri R.A. Shukla, Accounts Assistant, Gd. I (U/S) in conspiracy with the supplier M/s North Eastern Electrical and Hardware Stores, Sibsagar arrange immediate payment against the bill for Rs. SHRI R.A. SHUKLA On 27.4.82 Shri R.A. Shukla, Accounts Assistant, Gd. I (U/S) in conspiracy with the supplier M/s North Eastern Electrical and Hardware Stores, Sibsagar arrange immediate payment against the bill for Rs. 91,981.46 submitted by the above firm in a fraudulent manner forging the supply order and the commission and wrongful pecuniary gain to the supplier which constituted gross misconduct and render himself liable for disciplinary action under ONGC (CDA) Regulation 1976. 4. Pursuant to a regular common departmental proceeding, the Petitioner was imposed with the penalty of removal from service and the same was affirmed on appeal. Likewise, Shri Shukla was also imposed with the penalty of removal which, however, was interfered with by the departmental appellate authority and he was re-instated in service and the period of removal from service was ordered to be treated as "on duty" for all intent and purposes. 5. It was under the aforesaid circumstances, the writ Petitioner had approached this Court by filing a writ petition registered and numbered as Civil Rule No. 2737/95 assailing the legality and validity of the order of removal from service. The basic thrust was that the co-accused Shri Shukla having been re-instated in service, the Petitioner had been discriminated in the matter of imposition of penalty. The writ petition was allowed by judgment and order dated 6.8.97 directing reinstatement of the Petitioner in service with all service benefits as was done in respect of Shri Shukla. 6. Being aggrieved, the Respondents preferred Writ appeal No. 586/97 and the same was allowed by judgment and order dated 5.8.99 setting aside the judgment and order of the learned single Judge. However, the matter was remanded back to the departmental appellate authority for consideration a fresh of the appeal of the Petitioner taking into account the grounds discussed in the order of the learned single Judge. The division Bench while disposing of the Writ Appeal as aforesaid observed in paragraph 8 and 9 of the judgment as follows: Now we come to the next question as to whether the cases of the Petitioner and Shri R. A. Shukla stood on the same footing or not. The division Bench while disposing of the Writ Appeal as aforesaid observed in paragraph 8 and 9 of the judgment as follows: Now we come to the next question as to whether the cases of the Petitioner and Shri R. A. Shukla stood on the same footing or not. We are constrained to observe that both parties have not placed sufficient materials on the record to give any finding either way as in our view, the best material which could throw light on the point would have been the enquiry report indicating culpability of the different delinquent officer involved in the enquiry. The charges may be same, but the finding and the extent of their involvement, indirectly which may have been found by the Enquiry Officer, could be different. Therefore, unless it could be seen, it would be difficult to come to a conclusion whether the cases of the two stood on the same footing or not. According to the Appellant no such occasion arose for the appellate authority to consider the matter on merit since the appeal preferred by the Petitioner was dismissed as highly belated appeal. The order communicated as passed on the appeal by the Appellant is on the record of the Civil Rule at Annexure-II to the writ petition. It is an order passed by the Regional Director dated 26.7.91. After narration of the fact that the Petitioner was charge sheeted and enquiry was held in which he was given opportunity and the charges were proved, it was observed that the Petitioner had not made any appeal in February, 1985 nor he had been able to produce any proof of submission of any such appeal. It was further observed, had he filed an appeal he could seek personal hearing with the Regional Director within a reasonable time. Therefore, the reason for non-disposal of the appeal in February, 1985 is an afterthought. Thus the appeal dated 25.3.91 was rejected. Subsequently, another appeal preferred by the Petitioner was also dismissed as indicated earlier. A perusal of the said order clearly indicate that it was on the ground of delay that the competent authority did not look into the merits of the matter. Thus the appeal dated 25.3.91 was rejected. Subsequently, another appeal preferred by the Petitioner was also dismissed as indicated earlier. A perusal of the said order clearly indicate that it was on the ground of delay that the competent authority did not look into the merits of the matter. In our view, it would be appropriate for the appellate authority to consider the same on merit and the authority could have also considered the other aspect of the matter which has been raised and dealt with by the learned single Judge as to whether the cases of the Petitioner and the Respondent R.A. Shukla stood on the same footing or on a different footing. In such matter, in our view, the authorities at first instance should examine the merit first on the basis of the record with them, father then to go into the question in the writ proceeding without there being sufficient material on the record. In view of the discussion held above, we set aside the order passed by the learned single Judge with direction to the appellate authority to consider the appeal of the Petitioner/Respondent on merit taking into consideration the grounds which have been discussed in the order of the learned single Judge. Since the matter has been pending since long, the appellate authority is directed to pass appropriate order within a period of 4 months. 7. As per the directions contained in the said judgment and order of the Division Bench, the impugned order dated 29.11.99 has been passed holding that the case of the Petitioner does not fall on the same footing as that of Shri Shukla. However, the penalty of removal was reduced and substituted by compulsory retirement as of the date of removal from service i.e. 22.1.1985. It was further ordered that the period of suspension from 18.5.1982 to 13.12.1982 shall be treated as "Non Duty". It is the legality and validity of the said order dated 29.11.99 which is under challenge in the present writ proceeding. 8. I have heard learned senior counsel Mr. C. Barua appearing for the writ Petitioner and Mr. R.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. Referring to the charges levelled against the Petitioner and Shri Shukla, Mr. It is the legality and validity of the said order dated 29.11.99 which is under challenge in the present writ proceeding. 8. I have heard learned senior counsel Mr. C. Barua appearing for the writ Petitioner and Mr. R.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. Referring to the charges levelled against the Petitioner and Shri Shukla, Mr. Barua submitted that the charges against both of them being more or less same, the Petitioner should have been treated alike in the matter of imposition of penalty but unfortunately he was discriminated while Shri Shukla was granted the favour by the departmental appellate authority. According to Mr. Barua such violation strikes at the very root of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further submission of Mr. Barua is that the impugned order dated 29.11.99 is in violation of the directions contained in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 586/97. Mr. Barua submitted that as per the said directions, the appellate authority was to consider all the relevant materials as to whether the case of the Petitioner and Shri Shukla stood on the same footing or on a different footing. The appellate authority instead of examining the merits of the respective cases, passed the impugned order in a most arbitrary and mechanical manner, submitted by Mr. C. Barua, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner. Mr. Barua finally submitted that although the earlier order of removal from service passed against the Petitioner was converted to that of compulsory retirement, the Petitioner is not much benefited inasmuch as had he been in service, he would have continued till attaining the age of superannuation on 1.6.2002 instead of 22.1.85 and thus upon ordering reinstatement of the Petitioner in service with proforma fixation of pay etc. and even without any back wages, the Petitioner would be benefited in respect of his final settlement dues including pensionary benefits. 9. On the other hand Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents submitted that the Petitioner having not challenged the enquiry proceeding, the impugned order dated 29.11.99 will have to be judged on the touchstone of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. 9. On the other hand Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents submitted that the Petitioner having not challenged the enquiry proceeding, the impugned order dated 29.11.99 will have to be judged on the touchstone of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. He submitted that irrespective of the charges levelled against the Petitioner and said Shri Shukla, it is the culpability, which was taken into consideration towards imposition of the penalty against the Petitioner and thus there was nothing wrong in passing the impugned order dated 29.11.99. He further submitted that neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority is required to give detailed reasons in their orders in case of agreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Producing a copy of the enquiry report Mr. Roy submitted that as per the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Shri Shukla was exonerated from the charges levelled against him, while the Petitioner was held guilty of the charges levelled against him. It was upon consideration of this aspect of the matter, the appellate authority ordered re-instatement in service in respect of Shri Shukla, but the same could not be done in respect of the Petitioner in view of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Mr. Roy submitted. He further submitted that on the basis of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, culpability on the part of the writ Petitioner is writ large, but on the other hand the Enquiry Officer held Shri Shukla not guilty of the charges. If upon such consideration the appellate authority while ordering re-instatement of Shri Shukla in service did not do so in respect of the Petitioner, no fault could be attributed, submitted by Mr. Roy. Mr. Roy finally submitted that Shri Shukla has also been removed from service pursuant to his conviction in a criminal case which has been up-held by this Court and thus there is no question of considering the case of the writ Petitioner in reference to the case of Shri Shukla for the purpose of re-instatement in service. However, Mr. Barua submitted that such removal from service of Shri Shukla pursuant to his conviction in a criminal case is in respect of a different charge altogether and has got nothing to do with the issue involved in the present writ proceeding. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. However, Mr. Barua submitted that such removal from service of Shri Shukla pursuant to his conviction in a criminal case is in respect of a different charge altogether and has got nothing to do with the issue involved in the present writ proceeding. 10. I have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. I have also considered the materials on record including the enquiry report as furnished by Mr. P. K. Roy, learned Counsel for the Respondent. The observations made by the Division Bench towards disposal of the writ Appeal referred to above are note-worthy. The Division Bench did not subscribe to the findings of the learned single Judge by which the earlier writ petition preferred by the Petitioner was allowed on the ground that the order of removal passed against the petitioner was violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Such a finding was recorded by the learned single Judge in reference to the order of reinstatement in service passed in respect of Shri Shukla. The Division Bench clearly opined that it would be appropriate for the appellate authority to consider the matter on its own merit on the basis of materials which could through light on the point and the same would be the enquiry report indicating the culpability of the Petitioner and Shri Shukla. The enquiry report was not placed before the Division Bench. I have gone through the enquiry report wherein a clear finding has been recorded in respect of Shri Shukla holding him not guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Enquiry Officer while declaring Shri Shukla not guilty of the charge observed as follows: Therefore, I personally feel that there was no attempt on he part of Shri Shukla to influence Shri Allauddin Ahmed for passing the bill. This is just passing on the bucks by Shri Allauddin Ahmed to Shri Shukla, Therefore, I will like to give benefit of doubt to Shri Shukla, and declare him not guilty. On the other hand the Enquiry Officer has attributed guilty on the part of the Petitioner. In the statement of allegation against the Petitioner in reference to the charge levelled against him which is quoted above, the bill in question was directly received by the Petitioner on 26.4.1982 and passed the same for the amount of Rs. 91981.70 p immediately on 27.4.82 without scrutinising the relevant records. In the statement of allegation against the Petitioner in reference to the charge levelled against him which is quoted above, the bill in question was directly received by the Petitioner on 26.4.1982 and passed the same for the amount of Rs. 91981.70 p immediately on 27.4.82 without scrutinising the relevant records. He then passed the bill with the payment order straight to the F.A.R for his authorisation of payment without routing the bill through the Accountant and that he intentionally failed to point out the striking off the typed amount in the inspection report and the discrepancies relating to the number and date of supply order. As per the said statement of allegation not only the Petitioner failed to verify the correctness of the rate but he also will fully suppressed the original supply order and used forged supply order and tempered inspection report to pass the bill with the inflated amount than the actual amount. Enquiry Officer has recorded the Culpability of the Petitioner as follows: Shri Allauddin Ahmed, Acctt. Asstt, Gd-II is an old employee of ONGC and is working in Accounts Section since July, 1967 and there by the then he would have been well aware of the fact that addition, subtraction and deletion on papers connected with finance & Accounts needs first examination and attention. While passing the bill he had overlooked the deletion, addition made in the inspection report without proper authentication. Further, he did not care to match the different dates showing on the supply order as well as in the inspection report. This is the first and the formost function of a person who passes any bill, for payment, to verity incorporated documents and check not only items, quantity, amount but also any entry made (over writing) by deleting any figure in the documents without proper authentications. Therefore I consider that this is negligence of the duty on the part of Shri Allauddin Ahmed. Further, if Shri Allauddin Ahmed had any doubt regarding the cost of the starter, he should have get it clarified from his superior and not only confined himself to get clarification from his near college, as stated by him. He had ample of time and opportunity to get his doubt clarified, even after the bill was passed from his superior after hearing from Shri Shukla Ex. No. 3 and 3(a) next day about it. He had ample of time and opportunity to get his doubt clarified, even after the bill was passed from his superior after hearing from Shri Shukla Ex. No. 3 and 3(a) next day about it. This add to his negligence in discharge of his duty. 11. On perusal of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, two things emerged namely, Shri Shukla was not held guilty of the charge, while the Petitioner was not exonerated of the charge levelled against him and was held to be negligent in discharge of his duty. Thus the culpability in respect of both the persons which was directed to be looked into by the Division Bench of this Court in its judgment and order dated 5.8.99 passed in W.A. No. 586/97 varies on the face of the enquiry report. While the Petitioner was not exonerated of the charge levelled against him, Shri Shukla was exonerated of the charge levelled against him. This being the position the Petitioner cannot take the plea of discriminatory treatment in respect of imposition of penalty. Had it been a case of equal culpability in respect of both Shri Shukla and the Petitioner, such a plea could have been legitimately raised and perhaps could have been persuaded to be accepted. 12. I may gainfully refer two decisions of the Apex Court as reported in AIR 1997 SC 1030 (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Arora) and AIR 1997 SC 2229 (Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of Indian Ltd. and Ors.). In the case of Ashok Kumar Arora (supra), the Apex Court observed as follows: At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings receded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate Court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is visited because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topics and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. There is catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topics and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to few decisions of this Court on this topic viz., State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao (1964) 3 SCR 25 ; ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ), State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1976) 1 SCR 521 ; ( AIR 1975 SC 2151 ), Corporation of city of Nagpur v. Ramachandra, and Nelson Motis v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1981 . The Enquiry Officer on appraisal of the materials before him held that the Respondent was actively involved and a brain behind procuring false medical certificates and medical bills not only for himself but for other employees and on the basis of which the reimbursement claims were made by the Respondent and other employees. The Corporation sanctioned these reimbursement claims of the various employees which had resulted into monetary loss to the Corporation. Before the Enquiry Officer except the Respondent other employees of the Corporation admitted the charges and consequently a minor penalty was awarded to them. The Respondent contested the charges levelled against him and denied that he was instrumental in cheating or committing forgery of the medical bills. On consideration of report and findings of the Enquiry officer, the Disciplinary authority took a lenient view in respect of other employees. Having regard to the involvement of the Respondent in the entire episode, the Disciplinary Authority awarded him the penalty of dismissal from service. The order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority against the Respondent was also affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Curiously enough, the High Court in its impugned judgment compared the case of the Respondent with the other employees who have been awarded a lesser penalty and opined that there is a discrimination resorted to by the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of awarding the punishment. It is this action of the Disciplinary Authority in awarding the penalty being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this reasoning, the High Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SLR 685 ( AIR 1984 SC 1499 ) and the passage therefrom was reproduced in the impugned judgment which is distinguishable on facts. In support of this reasoning, the High Court placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SLR 685 ( AIR 1984 SC 1499 ) and the passage therefrom was reproduced in the impugned judgment which is distinguishable on facts. We have gone through the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 27th May, 1993 and were of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The High Court has totally overlooked the finding of the Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the Disciplinary Authority that the Respondent was instrumental in obtaining forged medical bills not only for himself but also for other employees and he was the main actor being the cheating to the Corporation. It is because of this finding the Disciplinary authority, in our opinion, rightly considered the award of penalty/punishment to the Respondent differently than the other employees who although got the benefit of reimbursement on the forged bills but they accepted their guilt before the Enquiry Officer. Having regard to the face and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed serious jurisdictional error while interfering with the quantum of punishment. There is neither any discrimination resorted to by the Disciplinary Authority nor the punishment awarded to the Respondent was disproportionate to his misconduct. The impugned judgment and order of High Court, therefore, are unsustainable. In the case of Balbir Chand (supra), the Apex Court observed as follows: It is further contended that some of the delinquent were let off with a minor penalty while the petition was imposed with a major penalty or removal from service. We need not go into that question. Merely because one of the officers was wrongly given the lesser punishment compared to others against whom there is a proved misconduct, it cannot be held that they too should also be given the lesser punishment lest the same mistaken view would be repeated. Omission to repeat same mistake would not be violative of Article 14 and cannot be held as arbitrary or discriminatory leading to miscarriage of justice. It may be open to the appropriate higher authority to look into the matter and take appropriate decision according to law. Omission to repeat same mistake would not be violative of Article 14 and cannot be held as arbitrary or discriminatory leading to miscarriage of justice. It may be open to the appropriate higher authority to look into the matter and take appropriate decision according to law. In the instant case also, as against the exoneration of Shri Shukla from the charge levelled against him, the Petitioner was not so exonerated. Thus there was nothing wrong on the part of the appellate authority in awarding the penalty to the Petitioner differently then Shri Shukla. The appellate authority has not committed any jurisdictional error in passing the impugned order. There is neither any discrimination resorted to by the appellate authority nor the punishment awarded to the Petitioner is disproportionate to his misconduct. Even assuming that Shri Shukla was let off and the Petitioner was thus discriminated, same will not come in aid of the Petitioner inasmuch as a lesser punishment given to another Officer would not entitle the concerned officer a lesser punishment least the same mistake and view would be repeated. As has been observed by the Apex Court, omission to repeat same mistake would not be violative of Article 14 and cannot be held as arbitrary or discriminatory leading to miscarriage of justice. It would be open for appropriate authority to take appropriate decision in-accordance with the law which in the instant case has been so taken by the appellate authority in passing the impugned order dated 29.11.99. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, directions should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting, a wrong right but would be perpetuating another wrong. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be pressed into service in such cases. The concept of equal treatment pre-supposed existence of similar legal foot-hold. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in exonerating and or letting off Shri Shukla from the charge levelled against him, the Petitioner cannot strengthen his case by introducing a concept of negative equality. He will have to establish strength of his case on his own merit and not by claiming negative equality. 13. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in exonerating and or letting off Shri Shukla from the charge levelled against him, the Petitioner cannot strengthen his case by introducing a concept of negative equality. He will have to establish strength of his case on his own merit and not by claiming negative equality. 13. Coming to the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner that the impugned order dated 29.11.99 does not give reasons towards arriving at the finding, I may gainfully refer to the decisions of the Apex Court as reported in AIR 1987 SC 2043 (Ram Kumar v. State of Harayana); 1991 Suppl (2) SCC 12 (Indian Institute of Technology v. Union of India and Ors.) and (1995) 6 SCC 279 (State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Prabhu Dayal Grover). In all these decisions, the Apex Court while dealing with the question of recording of reasons by the authorities towards passing an order on the basis of the enquiry report has held that in case of concurrence with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, it is not necessary for the said authority to again discuss the evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. In the instant case as has been noticed above, the Enquiry Officer exonerated Shri Shukla from the charge levelled against him but the Petitioner was not so exonerated and thus he was held guilty of the charge levelled against him. When the appellate authority accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given by him, it was not necessary for the appellate authority to again discuss evidence, reiterate the same findings and give the reasons for the findings. There was no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concurrence with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In the impugned order dated 29.11.99, it has been clearly reflected that the authority in terms of the directions as contained in the Division Bench judgment re-examined the case in detail on merit and that he had considered the case of Shri Shukla as well as that of the Petitioner. In the impugned order dated 29.11.99, it has been clearly reflected that the authority in terms of the directions as contained in the Division Bench judgment re-examined the case in detail on merit and that he had considered the case of Shri Shukla as well as that of the Petitioner. The clear finding recorded in the impugned order is that the role played by the Petitioner was vital in passing the fictitious bills and arrangement of payment thereof and thus his case did not fall on the same footing as that of Shri Shukla. Such finding recorded in the impugned order cannot be said to be devoid of any reason more particularly after having noticed the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. However the period of suspension ordered to be treated as 'Not Duty' shall not create any break in service and the Petitioner will be entitled to all admissible pensionary benefits taking his compulsory retirement to be effective from 22.1.1985 and the said period will not stand on the way. 14. For the forgoing reasons I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.