JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. 1. By this writ application, the petitioners, two employees of the respondents (one has since retired during the pendency of the writ application) have prayed for setting aside the communications issued by respondents being Annexures P-5, P-6 and P-7 by which the representations of the petitioners for step up against pay revision were rejected. The petitioners complain that after the pay revision was effected, it was noticed that one Sri R.N. Dey, Man No. 120020, who is junior to the petitioners in terms of seniority list, was getting higher salary. By a letter dated October 18, 1997, the petitioner No.1 brought such anomaly to the knowledge of the respondents and since the respondents failed to take any step, the petitioner No.1 again on 15th September, 1998 sent a reminder. Thereafter, several reminders were sent by the petitioner No. 1. Ultimately, by Annexure 'P-5', the letter dated March 30, 2001, the respondent No.5 communicated the result of the consideration of the representations of the petitioners informing that a committee was constituted by the respondents authority to resolve the anomalies arising out of pay revision and the petitioners cases were examined by the committee along with others but were not recommended for stepping up. The annexure P-5 further disclosed that recommendation of the committee was accepted by management and duly implemented. 2. The petitioners made a fresh representation through their lawyers on 26th November, 2001 but ultimately, by letter, dated 4th April, 2002 the representation of the petitioners had been turned down. 3. Being dissatisfied, the petitioners have come up with the instant writ application. 4. Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, at the very outset, contended that the petitioners being senior to one Sri R.N. Dey, it was a fit case where the respondents authority ought to have favourably considered the representation of the petitioners and passed an order of stepping up the petitioners by one increment. 5. This writ application has been opposed by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-opposition. The specific defence of the respondents is that the petitioners did not exercise option pursuant to a circular dated April 26, 1993 whereas Sri R.N. Dey, who is junior to the petitioners, had exercised such option. 5. This writ application has been opposed by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-opposition. The specific defence of the respondents is that the petitioners did not exercise option pursuant to a circular dated April 26, 1993 whereas Sri R.N. Dey, who is junior to the petitioners, had exercised such option. According to the respondents, consequent to such option, the annual increment of Sri R.N. Dey has fallen few months ahead of those of petitioners and as such, the petitioners are drawing lesser basic pay. The respondents thus contend that the petitioners having decided not to exercise option pursuant to the circular dated April 26, 1993, now cannot blame the respondents that Sri R.N. Dey, an officer, junior to the petitioners is getting higher basic salary. The respondents contend that if the petitioners had also exercised option, such irregular event would not have occurred. In affidavit-in-reply, the specific case of the petitioners is that the circular dated April 26, 1993 relating to option was never circulated and, as such, the petitioners 'were not aware of existence of such circular. 6. In view of such defence taken in affidavit-in-reply, this court permitted the respondents authority to place material before this court to show that circular dated 26th April, 1993 was duly circulated. Pursuant to such liberty, the respondents authority has filed supplementary affidavit asserting that such circular was made known to all the departments. The petitioners in their counter affidavit have denied such fact. 7. Therefore, the first question that falls for determination in this writ application is whether the circular dated April 26, 1993 relating to the option was duly circulated amongst the officers who were going to be affected. 8. After going through the materials on record, I find that huge number of officers have exercised option pursuant to the circular dated April 26, 1993. Although the petitioners have seriously disputed the fact that such circulars were circulated, after taking into consideration the fact that the officers in large number have exercised such option, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners that they were unaware of such circular and that the same was not circulated in accordance with law. If the aforesaid circular was not published, in such a case, it was not possible for so many officers to exercise such option. If the aforesaid circular was not published, in such a case, it was not possible for so many officers to exercise such option. I, thus, overrule the contention of the petitioners that the circular dated April 26, 1993 was not duly published. 9. The next questions are whether the petitioners can be given right of option even after the expiry of the period mentioned in the circular for exercising such option and whether even if the petitioners had not exercised such option, it is a fit case where an order of step up should be passed. 10. It appears from the pleadings, specifically paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioners affirmed on March 10, 2003 and the supplementary affidavit of respondents affirmed on 3rd March, 2003 that the company accepted options beyond the period of one month stipulated in the said circular from various officers but such benefit had not been given to the petitioners. It further appears that senior officers who did not opt but were superseded by their juniors were granted a step up in salary by allowing one increment to avoid discrimination. At page 32 of the writ application names of five officers who were granted step up has been mentioned and the respondents have asserted that their cases were compared, considered and sanctioned by management. 11. I further find substances in the contention of Mr. Dutta that in view of office Memorandum of Government of India being GI, MF, OM, No. F2(78)-E-III(A/66) dated February 4, 1966, the petitioners are entitled for stepping up of their salary. The aforesaid memo is quoted below: Removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of senior on promotion drawing less pay than his junior.- (a) As a result of application FR-C. [Now FR 22(1) (a)(1)].- In order to remove the anomaly of a Government servant promoted or appointed to a higher post on or after 1-4-1961 drawing a lower rate of pay in that post than another Government servant junior to him in the lower grade and promoted or appointed subsequently to another identical post, it has been decided that in such cases the pay of the senior officer in the higher post should be stepped up to a figure equal to the pay as fixed for the junior officer in that higher post. The stepping up should be done with effect from the date of promotion or appointment of the junior officer and will be subject to the following conditions, namely:- (a) Both the junior and senior officers should belong to the same cadre and the posts in which they have been promoted or appointed should be identical and in the same cadre; (b) The scales of pay of the lower and higher posts in which they are entitled to draw pay should be identical; (c) The anomaly should be directly as a result of the application of FR 22-C. For example, if even in the lower post the junior officer draws from time to time a higher rate of pay than the senior by virtue of grant of advance increments, the above provisions will not be invoked to step up the pay of the senior officer. The orders refixing the pay of the senior officers in accordance with the above provisions shall be issued under FR 27. The next increment of the senior officer will be drawn on completion of the requisite qualifying service with effect from the date of refixation of pay." 12. In the last affidavit-in-reply affirmed on March 31, 2003 on behalf of the respondents at paragraph 8 of page 10 it was stated that there was no step up file. However, from the document marked Annexure 'A' in reply on behalf of the petitioners affirmed on 10th March, 2003 at pages 14, 15 and 16 it would appear that the respondents company issued various letters to Sri R.Roy, Sri Baidyanath Pal and Sri A.K. Roy regarding stepping up of pay though they had not exercised option. At the bottom of those letters it has been specifically stated that the copy forwarded to step up file. I thus, find substance in the contention of Mr. Dutta that a step up file in maintained by the respondents and that if the step up file was produced, it would reflect that apart from the cases referred to by the petitioners there are various other cases where the company had granted step up to the seniors who were receiving less amount as a consequence of not exercising option. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, in this connection, has relied upon several decisions showing that even in cases where a junior gets more than a senior, stepping up has not been approved by the Apex Court. He has relied upon the following decisions in this connection: a) Union of India vs. R. Swaminathan, reported in AIR 1977 SC 3554. b) Union of India vs. O.P. Saxena, reported in AIR 1997 SC 2978 . c) Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Sujit Baran Mukherjee & Ors., reported in JT 1997 (3) SC 210. d) Union of India vs. Sushil Kumar Pal, reported in AIR 1998 SC 1925 and e) Union of India vs. M. Suryanarayana Rao, reported in AIR 1998 SC 2992 . 14. In the case of Union of India vs. R. Swaminathan (supra) juniors availed of ad hoc promotion in the cadre on refusal by the senior. Under such circumstances, the juniors were getting increased pay for such ad hoc officiating promotion. In such a situation, it was held that the seniors were not entitled to stepping up. In my view, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision cannot have any application to the present case as in this case there has been no question of any ad hoc promotion in favour of Sri R.N. Dey nor is there any case of refusal of promotion by the petitioners. 15. In the case of Union of India vs. O.P. Saxena (supra) it is held that where the source of promotion of junior and senior officers was different, senior in the original cannot be stepped up. In the present case, source of promotion of petitioners and Sri R.N. Dey is not different but the same and, as such, the respondents cannot take the aid of the said decision. 16. In the case of Union of India vs. Sushil Kumar Pal (supra) the Apex Court was dealing with a situation where junior was getting more pay than senior due to his earlier ad hoc promotion. Therefore, the principle laid down in such a case cannot be applicable to the present one. 17. In the case of Union of India vs. M. Suryanarayana Rao (supra) the junior was getting more pay on account of such junior's ad hoc promotion which was the subject matter of the earlier case. Therefore, the principle laid down in such a case cannot be applicable to the present one. 17. In the case of Union of India vs. M. Suryanarayana Rao (supra) the junior was getting more pay on account of such junior's ad hoc promotion which was the subject matter of the earlier case. Therefore, for the selfsame reason principle laid down in the said case cannot have any application to the fact of the present case. 18. In the case of Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. Sujit Baran Mukherjee (supra) the junior was getting more pay because of special pay received by him in the pre-revised pay scale. In such a fact, it was held that seniors are not entitled to stepping up. In my view, the case in hand is factually different and it is not a case of the respondents that Sri R.N. Dey was getting a special pay in the pre-revised scale. 19. Mr. Ghosh also relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Gurusharan Singh vs. New Delhi Municipal Corporation, [JT 1996(1) SC 647], State of Hariyana vs. Ram Kumar Manna, [JT 1997(3) SC 450] and State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [ 2000(9) SCC 94 ], in support of his contention that the petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs claimed herein. The sum and substance of the principles laid down in those decisions is that the concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. Thus, if any authority is shown to have committed any illegality in favour of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim same illegality in their favour. 20. Therefore, the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh are of no avail to his clients. 21. After taking into consideration, the entire facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the petitioners being admittedly senior to R.N. Dey, it is a fit case of stepping up of the petitioners by one increment in view of option exercised by Sri R.N. Dey. Even if the petitioners have not exercised option, for that reason, they cannot be forced to take lesser amount of pay simply because a junior to them has exercised option. These are the cases, where, in my view, the principle of step up should be invoked. 22. Even if the petitioners have not exercised option, for that reason, they cannot be forced to take lesser amount of pay simply because a junior to them has exercised option. These are the cases, where, in my view, the principle of step up should be invoked. 22. I, thus, quash the impugned orders passed by the respondents authority and direct the respondents authority to step up the scale of the petitioners by one increment for the purpose of removing anomalies. 23. The writ application thus succeeds. 24. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however no order as to costs. After this order is passed, the learned Advocate for the respondents prays for stay of operation of this order. In view of what have been stated above, I refuse such prayer. Let xerox certified copy of this order be given to the parties within one week from the date of making of such application. Writ application succeeded. Application for stay refused.