S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE employer and the insurer being aggrieved by the order of the workmen's Compensation Commissioner (for short 'the Commissioner'), chickmagalur, dated 20-7-2002 made in Case No. KA PA KA F-22/1997, have preferred this miscellaneous first appeal under Section 30 (i) of the workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE Commissioner by the order under appeal has held that the husband of the first respondent and father of respondents 2 and 3 died in the course of employment and on that basis, has determined and awarded the compensation in a sum of Rs. 1,10,136. 00 with 12% simple interest. ( 3 ) THE first respondent on her behalf and on behalf of her two children, submitted a petition to the Commissioner alleging that she and her late husband by name Tukra were agricultural labourers and they were working in the estate of the 1st appellant, who is a coffee planter owning coffee estate. On 28-4-1997, Tukra while cutting the grass on the bank of a tank situate in the estate, slipped into the tank and was drowned and as a consequence he died, and his corpse was recovered on 29-4-1997. She further stated that the applicants 2 and 3 are minor children born out of the wedlock between her and deceased Tukra, and that Tukra at the time of his death was 35 years old. She also stated that deceased Tukra was earning daily wages of Rs. 42. 75p. ( 4 ) ON lodging of the above petition, the Commissioner issued notice to the appellants herein. The first appellant in response to the notice put in appearance and filed statement of objection contending that Tukra did not die on 28-4-1997 as alleged by the applicants, but, he died only on 29-4-1997 which was a holiday. According to the first appellant, tukra died on 29-4-1997, because he drank too much liquor and after such drink he went to the lake to swim and while swimming he was drowned and died. According to the first appellant, tukra died on 29-4-1997, because he drank too much liquor and after such drink he went to the lake to swim and while swimming he was drowned and died. The second appellant which is the Insurance Company also filed statement of objections, in which it was contended that there was no relationship of employer and employee between the deceased tukra and the first appellant; 29-4-1997 was a holiday for the workers in the estate and, therefore, it could not be said that Tukra died in the course of employment. ( 5 ) THE Commissioner on the basis of the above pleadings of the parties framed the following issues for trial: ( 6 ) THE first respondent-applicant examined herself and also examined an independent co-worker in the estate. The writer of the estate was examined on behalf of the 1st appellant. Both first respondent and her witness specifically stated that Tukra while cutting grass on the bank of the tank on 28-4-1997, slipped into the tank, was drowned and died. The evidence of the first respondent and her witness exactly reflect what was stated in the claim petition filed before the Commissioner to which reference is already made above. Therefore, there is no need to repeat the evidence of the first respondent and her witness. At this stage itself, it needs to be noticed that though the witnesses were cross-examined, nothing which could support the claim of the first appellant-estate owner was elicited from the witnesses. In fact, the evidence of the independent witness examined on behalf of claimants that Tukra died while cutting the grass in the course of employment on 28-4-1997, is not at all contested in the cross-examination. The evidence of writer of the estate is in line with the pleading of the 1st appellant. The Commissioner having appreciated the rival pleadings, the evidence on record, oral and documentary, has held in favour of the applicant-respondents. ( 7 ) I have heard learned Counsel for appellant and perused the order of the Commissioner impugned in this appeal and records. Nothing was elicited from the cross-examination of the witnesses of the claimants to discredit the credibility of their evidence. The documentary evidence produced before the Commissioner by the appellants are scanty and in no way support the case of the appellants. Nothing was elicited from the cross-examination of the witnesses of the claimants to discredit the credibility of their evidence. The documentary evidence produced before the Commissioner by the appellants are scanty and in no way support the case of the appellants. ( 8 ) BE that as it may, this appeal is preferred under Section 30 of the act. No appeal would lie to this Court under Section 30 of the Act against the order of the Commissioner unless the substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. In the memorandum of appeal, the appellants have framed the following question purported to be substantial question of law that arises for decision in this appeal:" (a) The evidence on record, the Exhibits R-1 to R-4 and the investigations carried out by the Competent Authority under law clearly shows that the said Tukra died on 29-4-1997, due to the drowning while swimming in the estate tank on the holiday. The evidence on record shows that the death of the said Tukra was not arising out of the employment injury during the course of his employment. In the circumstances, whether the Workmen's Compensation commissioner, contrary to the evidence on record justified in holding that the said Tukra, died on 28-4-1997 during the course of employment". ( 9 ) IT is trite, the question raised in the above paragraph, could hardly be a question of law much less a substantial question of law. Suffice it to state that in the instant case, the relationship of employer and the employee between the first appellant and the deceased Tukra at the relevant point of time is not disputed. Having regard to the pleadings of the parties before the Commissioner, the factual question that arises for consideration and decision is whether Tukra died in the course of the employment, that is to say, while cutting grass on 28-4-1997 as claimed by the applicants or whether he died on 29-4-1997, which was a holiday, after he drank liquor too much and went to the tank to swim and in that process he was drowned and died, as claimed by the first appellant. The above question is a pure question of fact. The above question is a pure question of fact. The only thing to be seen is whether the finding recorded by the Commissioner on the above question of fact, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the kind of evidence placed before him could be sustained or could be condemned as perverse for want of legal evidence. ( 10 ) I have perused order of the Commissioner impugned in this appeal. The Commissioner has referred to oral and documentary evidence and has applied his mind. The Commissioner has believed the version of the first applicant who is the widow of the deceased Tukra who is said to be an illiterate woman and the evidence of the co-worker. The point urged before the Court falls within the domain of appreciation of the evidence on record and trusting the same. It does not involve any question of law much less any substantial question of law. Of course, a finding not rested on substantial legal evidence, could be attacked on the ground that it tantamounts to an error of law. That principle could not be applied to the present case because the finding recorded by the Commissioner could not be regarded as perverse for want of legal evidence. Be that as it may, it is not that this Court should step in under Section 30 of the Act and set at naught the order made by the Commissioner, a statutory Authority, for each and every error or irregularity that may be found in the order or in the procedure leading to the order. It is trite that the Act is beneficial legislation intended to sub-serve the interest of the employees who die in the course of employment. In that view of the matter, it is not appropriate for the Appellate Court to interfere with the order of the Statutory Authority lightly in the absence of substantial and weighty grounds. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants placing strong reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of United India Insurance company Limited, Bangalore v Sridhargadde Basappa and Another would contend that the question brought before the Court should be regarded as a substantial question of law warranting admission of the appeal. The above judgment in no way supports the contention put forward by the learned Counsel. The above judgment in no way supports the contention put forward by the learned Counsel. That was a case where the claimant had asserted that he was an employee of the employer concerned which fact was denied by the employer. That is not the situation in this case. As already pointed out, the relationship between the deceased Tukra and the first appellant as the employer and the employee is not in dispute. If that relationship is conceded, then, what is to be seen is whether the deceased died in the course of employment as claimed by the claimants or he died outside the course of employment. That question was fairly considered and decided by the Commissioner. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The compensation money deposited in this Court shall be remitted to the Commissioner forthwith in order to enable the Commissioner to disburse the same to the claimants in ac- cordance with law. --- *** --- .