S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellants. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel representing the respondents who has appeared at this stage has also been heard. ( 3 ) PERUSED the record. ( 4 ) THE facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this Special Appeal lie in a narrow compass. ( 5 ) THE Writ Petition No. 52755 of 2002 giving rise to this appeal had been filed by the present appellants praying for the quashing of the order dated 31. 10. 2002 passed by the District Judge, chandauli-the appointing authority contemplated under Rule 15 of the U. P. Subordinate Civil courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 as amended dispensing with the services of all the ad hoc appointees in the ministerial cadre w. e. f. 1. 11. 2002. ( 6 ) THE appellants had also prayed for a direction requiring the respondents which included the district Judge, Chandauli, to regularise their services on the post of Clerks and Stenographers and restraining them from terminating their services. ( 7 ) IN their writ petition, the appellant Nos. 1 to 12 had asserted that except Manoj Kumar Gupta and Rajendra Kumar Srivastava-the petitioner Nos. 13 and 14, the remaining petitioners had been appointed on ad hoc basis as clerks in the civil court, Chandauli, by the District Judge during the period 14. 7. 1999 to 15. 9. 1999. So far as Rajendra Kumar Srivastava and Manoj kumar Gupta were concerned, it had been asserted that they had been appointed as stenographers by the District Judge on ad hoc basis on 23. 7. 1999 and 25. 8. 1999 respectively. It is not disputed that in the appointment letters issued in favour of the petitioners-appellants it had been clearly indicated that the appointment on the post of clerk on ad hoc basis was for a period of 3 months or till the date of regular appointment whichever was earlier. This appointment was in the time scale of pay of Rs. 3,050-4,090. It is also not disputed that in the aforesaid appointment letters it had also been clearly indicated that their (appointees) services were liable to be terminated at any time without any notice. This appointment was in the time scale of pay of Rs. 3,050-4,090. It is also not disputed that in the aforesaid appointment letters it had also been clearly indicated that their (appointees) services were liable to be terminated at any time without any notice. ( 8 ) SINCE the regular appointments could not be made, the period of ad hoc appointment of petitioners-appellants was excluded vide separate orders for a period of 3 months subject to the other conditions referred to herein above. These appointments on ad hoc basis had been made on the strength of the permission granted by Honble the Chief Justice of the High Court. ( 9 ) THE petitioners had pressed their claim on the strength of the provisions contained in the U. P. Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of U. P. Public Service commission) Rules, 1979 specially the amendments incorporated therein vide the Uttar Pradesh regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001, whereby the cut off date earlier fixed was substituted with the date "june 30, 1998". ( 10 ) IT has been urged that although the petitioners-appellants had been appointed after the cut off date i. e. , 30. 6. 1998 yet they were entitled for the regularisation of their services as they had completed 3 years of continuous service on 20. 11. 2001, by which date the Third Amendment rules, 2001 had come into force as these rules became effective from 20. 12. 2001. It was also urged that the cut off date "30. 6. 1998" which was substituted in place of 1. 1. 1977 was arbitrary and on the strength of this date, their claim for the regularisation could not be negatived. ( 11 ) THE claim of the petitioners had been contested by the respondents asserting that they had not been appointed by adopting any process of selection as prescribed under the Rules of 1947 as amended. Further none of the petitioners had been appointed on or before the cut off date, i. e. , 30. 6. 1998 and their claim for regularisation of their services, under the Rules of 1979 as amended was not tenable in law. Further none of the petitioners had been appointed on or before the cut off date, i. e. , 30. 6. 1998 and their claim for regularisation of their services, under the Rules of 1979 as amended was not tenable in law. ( 12 ) IT was further asserted that the cut off date was a matter of executive policy of the State which was given a statutory force by incorporating it in the Rules framed and could not be held to be arbitrary simply because of the time gap elapsing between the earlier date and the date which was substituted. It was also urged that the petitioners who had been appointed on ad hoc basis were bound by the terms and conditions subject to which the appointments had been given to them and since their appointment was only by way of an interim arrangement and clearly de-hors the statutory Rules of 1947, their claim for regularisation of their services was totally misconceived and deserved to be rejected. ( 13 ) THE learned single Judge, drawing support from the observations made in the decision of the apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Permeswarn Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305 , had come to the conclusion that in almost all the service Rules in the State of U. P. , the recruitment year begins from 1st July and, thus, fixing 30. 6. 1998 as a cut off date, i. e. , prior to the commencement of the new recruitment year could be a valid criteria. ( 14 ) IT was further observed that the proposed amendment substituting the cut off date did not create two classes of persons. It created only one class of persons who possessed requisite qualification for regular appointment at the time of ad hoc appointment and had been directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or before 30. 6. 1998 and was continuing in service as such on 20. 12. 2001 and had further completed 3 years of service. From the scheme under-lying the amendment only one class of person had been taken up for consideration for regularisation, i. e. , a person who fulfilled all the 3 conditions given in Rule 4 of the Rules of 2001. 6. 1998 and was continuing in service as such on 20. 12. 2001 and had further completed 3 years of service. From the scheme under-lying the amendment only one class of person had been taken up for consideration for regularisation, i. e. , a person who fulfilled all the 3 conditions given in Rule 4 of the Rules of 2001. ( 15 ) THE learned single Judge was also of the view that all the petitioners had been appointed on ad hoc basis without following the prescribed procedure of appointment and without inviting the applications from the open market. All of them were aware of the fact that their ad hoc appointment was only for a period of 3 months and could continue only till regular selection. ( 16 ) EACH of the petitioners had got the opportunity to apply in the competitive examination for his being appointed on regular basis. Thus, the appointments in question had been made in particular exigencies of service for specific periods and subject to express condition that it was liable to termination at any time without any prior notice and in any case on regular appointment being made. The learned single Judge was of the further view that the case could not be taken to be a fit case for the exercise of the extraordinary equity Jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 17 ) THE learned single Judge upheld the cut off date in question as valid and negativing the claim of the petitioners for regularisation dismissed the writ petition. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that the petitioners were entitled to the protection provided under the provisions contained in the Regularisation Rules as amended referred to hereinabove as all the petitioners had completed three years service before the Uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of U. P. Public Service Commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001 came into force. ( 19 ) SO far as the aforesaid aspect of the matter is concerned, the submission made is based on sub-clause (3) of Rule 1 which had been substituted vide the Third Amendment Rules, 2001. ( 19 ) SO far as the aforesaid aspect of the matter is concerned, the submission made is based on sub-clause (3) of Rule 1 which had been substituted vide the Third Amendment Rules, 2001. The newly substituted Rule 1 has to be read as a whole and all the three conditions contemplated therein have to be satisfied before an ad hoc employee can be taken to be eligible for regularisation of his services adjusting him as against a permanent or temporary vacancy which had to be filled up otherwise by making a regular appointment. In order to defeat the claim of any person for appointment as against an existing permanent or temporary vacancy according to the provisions contained in the relevant service rules regulating the recruitment and appointment, the person appointed on ad hoc basis seeking the regularisation of his service and consequential absorption against that vacancy has to satisfy all the three conditions out of which the first one is to the effect that such an ad hoc appointee had been directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or before June 30, 1998 and was continuing in service, as such, on the date of commencement of uttar Pradesh Regularisation of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the public Service Commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001. ( 20 ) NONE of the petitioners-appellants satisfied the first condition. Further it had to be ensured that the petitioners in order to establish that they had completed the requisite three years service were not entitled to take into account that period during which they were being continued on ad hoc basis on the strength of an interim order granted in a writ petition which now stands dismissed. A person falling in the category of the petitioner who is allowed to continue on the strength of an interim order granted in a proceeding which is ultimately dismissed cannot be entitled to add that period during which he was so continuing to hold the post on ad hoc basis on the strength of such an interim order while calculating the three years period indicated in Clause (3) of the newly substituted Rule 1. An interim order lapses with the dismissal of the proceeding in which it is granted and in any case, cannot be taken to be a substitute of a statutory requirement. An interim order lapses with the dismissal of the proceeding in which it is granted and in any case, cannot be taken to be a substitute of a statutory requirement. ( 21 ) THE submission made in this regard by the learned counsel for the appellant is devoid of merit and is not at all acceptable. ( 22 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has next contended that the petitioners claim for regularisation could not be negatived on the strength of the cut off date in question that is to say 30. 6. 1998 which had been arbitrarily fixed. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, a division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Subedar Singh and Ors. v. District judge, Mirzapur and Ors. , 1997 (1) ESC 655 (All), while considering the earlier cut off date which was 1. 10. 1986 which had been fixed in the Regularisation Rules of 1979 as amended by the Second Amendment Rules, 1989, had upheld that date as valid negativing the contention that it was arbitrary. This was clearly indicated in paragraph No. 20 of the judgment. It was further observed that the benefits of Regularisation policy visualised in the Statutory Rule cannot be extended by judicial pronouncement since its extension would amount to legislation which does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Division Bench further negatived the contention that the ad hoc employees were entitled to be considered for regularisation because the work was still available in the ministerial establishment of the district courts indicating further in this connection that the appointment ought to be made as per the recruitment rules and not by regularisation of the services of the ad hoc employees in an arbitrary manner. In other words, it had been emphasised that regularisation of services cannot be made a method of recruitment when statutory rules are available regulating the method of recruitment and appointment. The division Bench relying upon the observations made in the case of Harpal Kaur Chahal (Smt.) v. Director, Punjab Instructions, Punjab and Ors. , (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 706, had observed that the ad hoc employees could not claim the benefit of illegal orders on the strength of the fact that some of such employees were given the benefits of regularisation. , (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 706, had observed that the ad hoc employees could not claim the benefit of illegal orders on the strength of the fact that some of such employees were given the benefits of regularisation. The Apex Court had indicated in the aforesaid decision that Article 14 cannot be extended to legalise the illegal order though others had legally got the benefit of illegal order. ( 23 ) IN the aforesaid connection, it may also be noticed that in its decision in the case of chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr. , (1995) 1 SCC 745 , the Honble apex Court had observed as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. . . . . the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 24 ) IT may further be noticed that the decision in the case of Subedar Singh (supra), was challenged before the Apex Court without any success. The Apex Court in its decision in 2001 (1) ESC 7, had dismissed the appeal challenging the order of the Division Bench in the case of subedar Singh (supra) observing that illegal/irregular appointees are not entitled to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. It was emphasised that when the appointment to such posts in question is governed by a set of Statutory Rules, it is unthinkable that the District Judge would adopt the extra constitutional method of appointment and that also, by maneuvering and by deputing the copyists to do some other job and replace them by fresh recruitments. It was also observed ". . . . . . . . . . the so called regularisation rules, in our opinion, does not intend to regularise the services of the illegal and irregular recruits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 25 ) SINCE the cut off date fixed in the regularisation rules by Second Amendment Rules, 1989 had been upheld, on the same reasoning which had been affirmed even by the Apex Court as indicated herein above, the cut off date in question in the present case is liable to be upheld. Further, we are not inclined to interfere with the findings of the learned single Judge on the question of the holding the substituted cut off date as valid which have been arrived at taking into consideration the relevant aspects. ( 26 ) AT this stage, it may also be noticed that in its decision in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. v. and Ors. ( 26 ) AT this stage, it may also be noticed that in its decision in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. v. and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 579, reiterating its earlier view in the case of R. N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, AIR 1972 SC 1767 , the Apex Court had clearly indicated that there can be no regularisation de-hors the rules. ( 27 ) THE petitioners-appellants who had accepted time bound appointments on ad hoc basis subject to the condition that their services were liable to be terminated without any notice, had no right to hold the post. They did not fall within the zone of eligibility so as to secure a right envisaged under the Statutory Regularisation Rules for being considered for absorption against a vacancy in a temporary or permanent post if found fit negativing the right of any person selected on regular basis to be appointed as against that vacancy. ( 28 ) TAKING into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record in their totality including the facts and circumstances noticed in the impugned judgment, we are clearly of the opinion that no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference in the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge. ( 29 ) THIS intra-court special appeal is devoid of merit which deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. .