ORDER Dipak Misra, J. Being dissatisfied with the order dated 18-3-1999 passed by the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (in short 'the Tribunal') in M.A. No. 133/96 whereby it has reviewed its order passed in O.A. No. 538/94, the State of Madhya Pradesh and its functionaries have visited this Court for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the same. The facts as are discernible from the order passed in the Original Application and review application and the pleadings putforth by the parties are that the respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the applicant') was working as the Assistant Superintendent in the office of the Directorate Health Services, Bhopal. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on a singular charge. The Director in-charge of Health Services imposed the punishment of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect vide order dated 16-3-1992, Annexure P-1. The said order was challenged in appeal before the State Government and the appellate authority found the appellant guilty of charge but converted the punishment into a minor one i.e. stoppage of increments without cumulative effect. The said order was given effect to. While the matter stood thus, the Director of Health Services by order dated 11-5-1994, Annexure P-5, reviewed the order dated 16-3-1992 passed by the Director in-charge of Health Services as well as the order dated 16-2-1994 whereby the order of the State Government was given effect to. He recalled both the orders on the ground that the original order of punishment was passed by the authority who had no jurisdiction to pass such order. After passing of the aforesaid order the applicant was promoted by order dated 11-5-1994 to the post of Superintendent in the Directorate of Health Services. In the meantime the order recalling the punishment, which was passed by the Director, Health Services was rectified by the Director himself on 7-10-1994. Because of this correction the promotion, which was conferred on the applicant, was withdrawn and he was reverted to his original post. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the applicant approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 538/94. The Tribunal after taking note of contentions raised by the applicant, which were resisted by the State Government declined to interfere. Because of this correction the promotion, which was conferred on the applicant, was withdrawn and he was reverted to his original post. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the applicant approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 538/94. The Tribunal after taking note of contentions raised by the applicant, which were resisted by the State Government declined to interfere. Thereafter he preferred an application for review, in the application for review the gravamen of contention was that the original order was passed by the authority who had no jurisdiction and, therefore, it was a nullity and hence, the doctrine of merger was not attracted and hence, the order of recall by the competent authority, namely, the Director of Health Services was valid and there was no justification to modify the same. The aforesaid contention was found favour by the Tribunal and it came to hold that the order was based on wrong premises and, therefore, the facts and circumstances warranted recall of the same. Being of this view the Tribunal allowed the review application, restored the order passed by the Director of the Health Services on 11-5-1994 whereby he had recalled the order of punishment and promoted him Questioning the defensibility of the aforesaid order it is submitted by Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate that the Tribunal has fallen into gross error in exercise of power of review inasmuch as it has really dealt with the score of facts in detail though the concept of review does not so envisage. It is his submission that the order of punishment passed by the Director-in-charge of the Health Services merged with that of the appellate authority and when that order was conceded to by the applicant having not called in question before the Tribunal the Director who was the original authority/disciplinary authority could not have acted as if sitting in appeal over the appellate authority's order and as the same has been done the Tribunal has wholly erred in its ratiocination while expressing the opinion that the doctrine of merger holding that the original order was ab initio void and, therefore, the order passed in appeal was also void ab initio. In support of the aforesaid contentions Mr. Yadav commended us to the decision rendered in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Shiv Chander Kapoor Vs. Amar Bose, . Mr. In support of the aforesaid contentions Mr. Yadav commended us to the decision rendered in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, and Shiv Chander Kapoor Vs. Amar Bose, . Mr. Dipak Awasthy, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-applicant supporting the order passed by the Tribunal contended that the Tribunal is justified in exercising the power of review as in the original order of the Tribunal certain facets were not adverted to. It is further canvassed by him that when the initial order is a nullity the doctrine of merger would not be attracted. Apart from above it is contended by him that the matter may be remitted to the appellate authority to reconsider in accordance with the quantum of punishment inasmuch as the charge relates to submission of charge sheet. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar we have carefully perused the order passed by the Tribunal in the Original Application. On a perusal of paragraph six of the order of the Tribunal it is manifest that the Tribunal had adverted to the factum of the order passed by the appellate authority. We think it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the said paragraph: ...In the instant case the applicant had challenged the orders of DHS before the State Govt. The appeal against the above order of DHS had been disposed of by the State Govt, by its orders dated 4-11-1993 vide Annexure A-8. Needless to say that the State Govt, is not subordinate to the DHS. Therefore, the DHS had no authority or jurisdiction to review the order of his predecessor, which was a subject matter of appeal before the State Govt., and the appellate authority, State Govt., is not subordinate to DHS. There cannot be two opinions that while passing review order Annexure A-11 Dr. Haq had exceeded his jurisdiction in the matter. The order Annexure A-11, therefore, is ab initio void, hence non-est. This legal position seems to have been brought to the notice of Dr. Haq during his discussion with the Up-Lokayuktha and others. Thereupon Dr. Haq, appreciating the legal position, rightly proceeded to cancel the illegal order (Annex. A-11) passed by him. Declaration to this effect has been made in Annexure A-1. In view of the aforesaid legal position the order Annexure A-1 insofar it cancels Annexure A-11 is justified, proper and valid order.... Haq during his discussion with the Up-Lokayuktha and others. Thereupon Dr. Haq, appreciating the legal position, rightly proceeded to cancel the illegal order (Annex. A-11) passed by him. Declaration to this effect has been made in Annexure A-1. In view of the aforesaid legal position the order Annexure A-1 insofar it cancels Annexure A-11 is justified, proper and valid order.... From the aforesaid it is perceptible that the Tribunal dwelled upon the aspect that the appellate authority of the State was higher authority and hence, Director could not have cancelled the order. Ordinarily review application is entertained if any error is manifest or patent on the face of the order. The Tribunal in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the order passed in review application has held as under: 13. From the narration of above mention facts it is crystal clear that the Director Dr. P.S. Soan when he passed the order dated 16-3-1992 (Annexure A-3) imposing the penalty of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect without following the procedure laid down in Rule 14 of CCA Rules 1996, was not a regular Director, but he was holding current charge of Director Health Services as it evident from the order dated 18th February, 1991 Annexure A-4. The Dr. P.S. Soan was regularly appointed as Director Public Health vide order dated 4th June 1993 (Annexure A-5) supra. Now it is well established that the order dated 16-3-1992 imposing the penalty of stoppage of three increments was passed by an incompetent authority. The said order of imposing penalty was ab initio void and illegal. Therefore, the order passed in appeal directing the Director to impose the penalty of stoppage of three increments with non-cumulative effect (Annexure A-8) was also void ab initio. In the capacity of appellate authority the State could have very well taken note of the fact that the order dated 16-3-1992 was passed by the authority who not competent to pass such order. Therefore, the order passed in appeal was also void ab initio. Since the order of the Tribunal passed on 18-6-1996 is based on wrong premises, therefore, the said order of the Tribunal is reviewed and recalled, as the principle of merger was not applicable in the present case. Therefore, the order passed in appeal was also void ab initio. Since the order of the Tribunal passed on 18-6-1996 is based on wrong premises, therefore, the said order of the Tribunal is reviewed and recalled, as the principle of merger was not applicable in the present case. The point in issue in the case was that the foundation of the order imposing penalty of Annexure A-3 is itself was or was not ab initio void. The reasonings putforth by the Tribunal is that earlier order was passed on wrong premises. If a particular ground was not urged and the Tribunal proceeded to decide the controversy when facts were in existence, we are of the considered opinion that the same cannot be a ground for review. Power of review encapsules the power by which a manifest error is rectified but not a roving discussion is required as if the same authority or court is sitting in appeal It is well settled in law that a review of judgment which proceeded upon an incorrect exposition of law is not permissible either under Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC or u/s 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In this context we may profitably refer to the Division Bench decision rendered in the case of Dev Krishna and Another Vs. Dhani Ram Saligram, wherein it has been held as under: A Court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly, Secondly, if a point is arguable and has not been argued by the parties and the Court has taken a view in agreement with the actual wording, no review lies simply because the actual wording may not be quite correct or the appearances have to be qualified by explanation or some other evidence, Thirdly, a mistake to be apparent, should be one which has only to be pointed out to be corrected immediately, without any argument. If the court has entered into a discussion of the pros and cons and has justified one of the two alternative views then certainly the mistake, if any, is not apparent or patent. In view of the aforesaid we are persuaded to hold the review application did not warrant interference. Ordinarily on the aforesaid ground alone we would have allowed the writ petition but for sake of completeness we think it appropriate to deal with the order on merits. In view of the aforesaid we are persuaded to hold the review application did not warrant interference. Ordinarily on the aforesaid ground alone we would have allowed the writ petition but for sake of completeness we think it appropriate to deal with the order on merits. We are disposed to do so as we have devoted some time on hearing on merits also and the facts stated here are not in dispute. In the case of S. S. Rathore (supra) the Constitution Bench in paragraph 13 expressed thus : 13. A 3-Judge Bench decision in the case of Somnath Sahu Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, is an authority in support of the position as accepted by the two Constitution Bench judgments referred to above. There, it was held in the case of a service dispute that the original order merged in the appellate order of the State Government and it is the appellate decision, which subsisted and became operative in law and was capable of enforcement. That judgment relied upon another decision of this Court in support of its view Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., . From the aforesaid ratio it is plain as day that the original order merges with appellate order. It is the original order which becomes operative in law and is capable of enforcement. In the case of Shiv Chander Kapoor three Judge Bench of the Apex Court speaking through J.S. Verma, J. (as his Lordship then was) in paragraphs 22 and 23 has held as under: 22. There is another aspect of the matter. The Controller's permission when granted to create a limited tenancy u/s 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise. It is, therefore, for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceeding. Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the plea of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforceability cannot be doubted. In Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edn. At pp. 351-53, there is an illuminating discussion of this topic. Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the plea of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforceability cannot be doubted. In Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edn. At pp. 351-53, there is an illuminating discussion of this topic. It has been pointed out that 'void' is meaningless in an absolute sense; and 'unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders'. In the words of Lord Diplock, the order would be presumed to be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue. On a reading of the aforesaid decision it rings as a bell that even a void order is presumed to be valid unless rectified the presumption of validity remains attached to it. In the present case the appellate authority passed the order. It is not disputed that the appellate authority has jurisdiction to pass the order. The order passed by the appellate authority was not assailed on the contrary it was accepted. In such a situation doctrine of merger applies as it is the order of the appellate authority which became operative. In our considered view the Tribunal has grossly erred in reviewing its order on the bedrock that the original order was passed by an authority who had no competence to pass the order. We have no doubt in our mind that the order passed by the Tribunal is vulnerable. Now we shall proceed to deal with the alternative submission of Mr. Awasthy. It is urged by him that the charge was a minor one but he has suffered immensely and therefore, the matter be remitted to the appellate authority for the purpose of consideration of quantum of punishment. It is well settled in law that Courts should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is absolutely perverse and shocking to the conscience. In the present case the State Government has reduced the punishment from a major one to minor one. It is well settled in law that Courts should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is absolutely perverse and shocking to the conscience. In the present case the State Government has reduced the punishment from a major one to minor one. We have been apprised at the Bar that the petitioner has been promoted on the regular basis in the year 1996- In view of this, it is not a fit case where we should interfere by commanding the appellate authority to reconsider the matter with regard to the quantum of punishment. In the wake of the preceding analysis the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal contained in Annexure P13 is quashed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed