NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE Management of the Karnataka State Road Transport corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation for short) feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 4. 10. 1999 in Writ Petition No. 4033 of 1994 has preferred this writ appeal. ( 2 ) THE events leading to the filing of the Writ Petition be noted briefly as under:- the vehicles belonging to M/s. C. P. C. Limited, Mangalore, the 3rd respondent herein were taken over by the Government of karnataka by virtue of the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (For short the Act) and they were handed over to the Deputy General Manager and Divisional Controller, ksrtc, Hassan Division, Hassan. The predecessor of Respondents 2 (a) to 2 (e), namely, late Sri K. Madhava was an employee of the 3rd respondent as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act and Sri K. Madhava was declared as employee of the appellant-corporation and as a result, late K. Madhava reported for duty as an employee of the Corporation on 8. 12. 1976 and on attaining the age of superannuation, he retired from service on 27. 6. 1981. After his retirement, Sri K. Madhava made an application before the prescribed authority under Payment of Gratuity Act for payment of gratuity. The appellant - corporation as well as the 3rd respondents were impleaded as persons liable to pay the gratuity. The application of Sri K. Madhava was opposed by the appellantcorporation by contending that Sri K. Madhava did not put in the requisite qualifying service of 5 years and therefore, he is not eligible for payment of gratuity. The original authority, accepting the above contention, held that the appellant-corporation is not liable to pay the gratuity and Sri K. Madhava could claim gratuity only against 3rd respondent, the erstwhile owner. The 3rd respondent, being aggrieved by the said finding and order of the original authority preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act. The Appellate Authority reversed the said order of the original authority holding that the appellant-corporation is also liable to pay the gratuity to the worker for the entire period of his service by its order dated 29. 11. 1993. The Corporation, being aggrieved by the said order of the appellate Authority preferred Writ Petition No. 4033 of 1994. The Appellate Authority reversed the said order of the original authority holding that the appellant-corporation is also liable to pay the gratuity to the worker for the entire period of his service by its order dated 29. 11. 1993. The Corporation, being aggrieved by the said order of the appellate Authority preferred Writ Petition No. 4033 of 1994. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended on behalf of the appellant-corporation that since late Sri K. Madhava did not put in qualifying service of five years at the time of his retirement on 27. 6. 1981, the corporation was not liable to pay gratuity. It was also contended on behalf of the appellant - Corporation that the service rendered by Sri K. Madhava in the establishment of the erstwhile employer, namely, the 3rd respondent herein should not be taken into account for computing the qualifying service for the purpose of payment of gratuity. The learned Single Judge finding no merit in the above contention of the Corporation, dismissed the writ Petition by the order under appeal dated 4. 10. 1999. Hence, this Writ Appeal by the Corporation. ( 3 ) WE have heard Sri Arun Govindraj, learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant-Corporation and learned Counsel for the respondents. The same contentions which were pressed into service before the learned Single Judge were reiterated before us also by the learned Counsel. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents supported the order of the learned Single Judge. ( 4 ) IN the light of the rival contentions of the learned Counsel, the only question that arises for our decision is whether the opinion handed down by the learned Single Judge is in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) read with sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act or not? Sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act read as follows:- 19 (3) Every person who is a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), and has been immediately before the commencement of this Act exclusively employed in connection with the acquired property, shall, on and from the notified date, become an employee of the corporation on the same terms and conditions applicable to the employees holding corresponding posts in the corporation. Any person not willing to become such an employee of the Corporation shall be entitled to retrenchment compensation as provided in the Industrial Disputes Act. Provided that the number of workmen that shall become employees of the Corporation under this sub-section shall not exceed the following scale, the junior most being excluded:- scale per Vehicle 1. Drivers 1. 5 2. Supervision staff and Managers 0. 1 3. Ministerial and Secretariat staff 0. 1 4. Technical staff including Foreman 2. 75 19 (8) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (3), the services of every person other than the persons referred to in sub-section (3) employed in connection with the acquired property immediately before the notified date shall stand terminated on and from the notified date and if any such person whose services are so terminated is enitled to any payment by way of gratuity or retirement benefit or for any leave not availed of, or for any other benefits, such person may enforce his claim against his employer under whom he was employed in connection with the acquired property immediately before the notified date but not against the corporation. ( 5 ) A careful reading of the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 19 makes it clear that the liability of the erstwhile employers is kept intact despite absorption of thier services as contemplated under the Act. But sub-section (8) of Section 19 undoubtedly makes a departure in the case of those persons whose services are absorbed by the Corporation under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act. There is no controversy between the parties that late sri K. Madhava was a workman within the meaning of that term as defined under sub-section (8) of Section 2 of the Industrial dispute Act, 1947 and his services were engaged by the erstwhile employer immediately before commencement of the Act. If these two basic facts are not in dispute, it goes without saying that the service rendered by late Sri K. Madhava squarely falls within the exception carved out in sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act. If these two basic facts are not in dispute, it goes without saying that the service rendered by late Sri K. Madhava squarely falls within the exception carved out in sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act. Admittedly, late Sri K. Madhava became an employee of the corporatoin by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act and therefore, the exception made under sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act are attracted and if it is so, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge, the liability to pay the gratuity with regard to such person is fastened on the Corporation and not on the former/erstwhile employer. Of course, sub-section (8) of section 19 of the Act does not state in explicit terms that the liability to pay the gratuity is fastened on the Corporation if a personss absorption into service of the Corporation falls under sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act. But, in order to give such meaning and content to the exception made by the Legislature in cases of a person whose services are absorbed under sub-section (3) of section 19 of the Act, the principle of purposive construction should be applied. Otherwise, the benefit envisaged by the Legislature in favour of a person whose services stand absorbed in the Corporation by force of the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act will never reach the beneficiary and such an interpretation is impermissible in law. The enactment in sub-section (8) of Section 19 of Act, it is trite, is a beneficial enactment intended to subserve a particular well defined category of employees who fulfill the definition of workman as defined under sub-section (8) of Section 2 of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. It is well settled principle that in interpreting the statutes, if two or more interpretations are possible or permissible, the Court should adopt the one which is favourable to the beneficiary under the statute. Looking from that angle also, no exception can be taken to the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on the provision of sub-section (8) of Section 19 of the Act. In conclusion, we do not find any substantive error in the opinion of the learned Single Judge. The Writ Appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost. --- *** --- .