JUDGMENT : S.N. Srivastava, J. The Petitioner has rushed to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against impugned order dated 21.11.2000 passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Jaunpur on vacuous ground that the Consolidation Authority concerned did not accede to the prayer contained in the application preferred by the Petitioner that decision on application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act should precede the disposal of the appeal on merits. 2. The facts draped in brevity are that against mutation of the name of the Petitioner over plot No. 251 situated in village Ghanshyampur Tahsil Badlapur District Jaunpur, the Respondent No. 3 filed a belated appeal after a lapse of about 4 and 1/2 years impugning therein the order dated 12.9.1986 passed by the Consolidation Officer u/s 12 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act with accompanying application for condonation of delay and the affidavit. Close on the heels of the above appeal, the Petitioner also preferred objection/counter-affidavit to the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act followed by application dated 21.11.2000 seeking decision as a prologue to disposal of the appeal on merits. The said application did not find favour and was rejected by means of the order dated 21.11.2000 studded with the observation that both the application and the appeal would be decided by a composite order. Aggrieved, the Petitioner has preferred the instant petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has cited decision rendered in Smt. Munaki Devi and Anr. v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1990 BR 243, in vindication of his stand that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was under a duty in law to dispose of the application u/s 5 of Limitation Act before deciding the appeal on merits. Per contra, Sri S. K. Dubey learned Counsel for the opposite parties relied upon the decisions rendered in Sajjan Kumar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Muzaffarnagar 1997 (1) AWC 294, Abdul Karim Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (2003) 1 AWC 516 and Laxmi Kant v. State of U. P., 2003 (95) RD 374 , to hammer home the point in support of his contentions that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation rightly passed the order both the applications u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and the appeal could be heard together and disposed of by a composite order. 4. 4. The first case referred to by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 is a decision in Sajjan Kumar v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Muzaffarnagar and Ors. In this case, similar question was debated before the learned single Judge who taking cue from the decision rendered in Smt. Munaki Devi and Anr. v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and Ors. 1990 RD 243 quintessentially held that there is no bar that the authority concerned cannot hear the arguments on the application filed for condonation of delay as well as on the merit of the case. It was further observed that in case the delay is not to be condoned the authority concerned may reject the application and if however, the authority concerned finds that the application for condonation is to be allowed it can decide the case on merit. Another decision bearing resemblance to the controversy involved in this petition is the decision rendered in Laxmi Kant v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2003 (95) RD 374 . In the instant case also, similar contention stared the learned single Judge that the Settlement Officer of Consolidation having not condoned the delay in filing the appeal has no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits and the said authority could not have even considered the question of delay at the time of hearing of appeal on merit. The learned single Judge after scanning various decisions held the view that no error was committed by the appellate authority in considering the question of limitation as well as merits together. Reverting to the submissions made across the bar by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and the citation referred to by him in support of his stand, it may be noticed at the risk of repetition as observed by the learned single Judge in Laxmi Kant (supra) that the said decision does not lay down that both the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the appeal on merit cannot be taken up together excepting that it does lay down that the decision on application u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act shall precede the disposal of the appeal on merits. This position has not been disputed nor does it surface from the text of the impugned order that the Settlement Officer of Consolidation at all intended to decide the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the appeal on merits by a composite order. It necessarily follows and cannot be disputed that when both the application and appeal are taken up the authority shall clinch the question of limitation before dwelling on the merit of the appeal. Here it should be clarified that taking up both the application and the appeal together does not imply that the authority has been spared of the requirement to satisfy itself about the sufficiency of cause warranting condonation of delay in a particular case. 5. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner called in aid yet another decision of this Court rendered in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 122 of 2003, Radhey Shyam v. Kamleshwar, decided on January 24, 2003, reported in 2003 (94) RD 227, in order to convince me on the point at issue. At this stage, it must be observed with clarity that every case has its peculiar feature and decision is rendered in the context of that peculiar facts and circumstances and the observations in a judgment is to be understood in the perspective of the facts of that particular case. A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law and not otherwise. The case of Radhey Shyam (supra), dealt with an altogether different point and has not bearing on the present issue inasmuch as in the case under reference, the Court was concerned with huge delay of about 19 years and taking into reckoning certain vital aspects that the party concerned was not a necessary party in the case and further that the main stay of the claim of that party was as a matter of fact through Gaon Sabha, and it was as a sequel thereto that it was held that the Court ought to have dealt with the issue of limitation as a prologue to decision of appeal on merits. By this reckoning, the much capital cannot be made out of this observation. Besides, in that case from perusal of the order stated to have been passed on merit in appeal did not reveal that the aspect of condonation of delay was dealt with by the authority concerned. By this reckoning, the much capital cannot be made out of this observation. Besides, in that case from perusal of the order stated to have been passed on merit in appeal did not reveal that the aspect of condonation of delay was dealt with by the authority concerned. The decision aforestated therefore, cannot be invoked to his advantage by the learned Counsel. 6. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite obvious that the Petitioner filed objection studded with prayer to first dwell on the question of condonation of delay. No doubt, the appeal was filed after an efflux of more than four years but without allowing the authority to go into the substantiality of the grounds taken for condonation of delay, stampeded into filing the instant petition, which appear to me too frivolous to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. I would not forbear from expressing that this Court perceives the action in rushing to this Court as a device to forestall expeditious disposal of the dispute. In my considered view, the impugned order was quite innocuous and without frills so as to warrant the belief that the authority intended to override the mandatory provisions of the Limitation Act by ordering that both the application u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act as well as the appeal on merit shall be taken up together and this order does not indicate that it was intended to prejudice the Petitioner in any manner whatsoever. 7. As a result of foregoing discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that the authority shall decide both the applications u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act as well as the appeal on merits in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. If it so happens that the Defendant is able to make out a case by showing sufficient cause, in that event, in the composite order so passed, the authority concerned shall in the first part of the order, unfold reasoning for satisfying itself about sufficiency of the cause. It is expected that the parties shall co-operate and contribute their mind to expeditious disposal of the case. The Presiding Officer shall take all steps so that no excuse could be taken hold of apply for adjournments.