JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—This application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Act) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been filed by the applicant for condonation of delay, if any, in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act. 2. Brief facts leading to the presentation of this application are that in a dispute between the parties which was referred to arbitration, the arbitrator announced the award on 10.10.2002. The applicant filed an application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the award. However, such application has not been filed within three months of the making of the award or from the date of receipt of an unsigned and unauthenticated copy of the award. The applicant claims that from the date when he received the authenticated copy of the award, the application has been filed within time, but in any case, if it is found that it has not been so filed, the delay in filing the application may be condoned. 3. The application was resisted by the non applicant. In its reply, the non applicant claims that there is no cause for condonation of delay in filing the application. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the relevant record. 5. It was contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant was prevented from filing the application under Section 34 of the Act for the reason that signed copy of the award was not delivered to it by the arbitrator and from the date of receipt of signed/certified copy of the award, the application had been filed within limitation and in any case within four months of the date of award, therefore, delay, if any, in filing the application may be condoned. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent had contended that copy of awards though not signed/authenticated, had been delivered to the applicant well in time i.e. on 3.12.2002 whereas the application under Section 34 of the Act had been filed on 10.3.2003, i.e. beyond three months of the receipt of copy of award. Therefore, the application is clearly barred by time and there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay as prayed for. 7. Therefore, the application is clearly barred by time and there is no sufficient cause to condone the delay as prayed for. 7. Sub-section 3 of Section 34 oi the Act which provides the period of limitation to file application to set aside an arbitral award, reads as under: "(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter." 8. It is clear on a bare reading of sub-section 3 supra that it prescribes the limitation of three months for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. The Court is empowered to extend the time limit to make such application by a further period of thirty days on being satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months. In either case, the time shall start running from the date on which the arbitral award is received by the party seeking to set aside the award. Thus the date of receipt of arbitral award is the crucial date for computing the period of limitation for filing the application under Section 34 of the Act. 9. Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act provides as under : "After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party." 10. It is clear from the above provisions that the arbitrator is under an obligation to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to each of the parties. It is thus the date of deliver of such copy which shall be the date of "receipt of the arbitral award" for the purpose of sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, the period of limitation shall start running from such date. 11. It is thus the date of deliver of such copy which shall be the date of "receipt of the arbitral award" for the purpose of sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, the period of limitation shall start running from such date. 11. In Union of India v. M/s. Punjab Communications Ltd. and others, 2003 (1) S.L.J. 679, this Court, while dealing with a similar question as , in hand, held as under : "25. It is evident from a bare reading of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act that the period provided therein for making the application for setting aside the award will be computed from the date when arbitrators award had been received by the party intending to file objections. Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act makes it obligatory on the part of the arbitrator to deliver a signed copy of the award to each party The time shall start running against a party for the purpose of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act from the date of receipt of such copy. In the case in hand, it is evident from the contents of the correspondence already referred to hereinabove that a copy of the award was faxed by the arbitrator to the parties and a photo copy was sent through post on the date of making of the award. Thus, the arbitrator had supplied unauthenticated copy of the award to the parties and for the purpose of filing the application the time shall not run from the date of delivery of such copy Since the signed copy was received by the objector on 31.1.2000, therefore, the limitation will start running from 31.1.2000. Counted from this date the objection petition has been filed within the prescribed period." 12. In the case in hand, there is no dispute that the arbitral award sought to be assailed was made on 10.10.2002. In view of the above legal position, it was not for the applicant to apply for a certified/signed copy of the award but it was duty of the arbitrator to deliver a signed copy of the award to each of the parties. The arbitrator, however, supplied an unsigned/unattested copy of the award to the applicant on 3.12.2002. In view of the above legal position, it was not for the applicant to apply for a certified/signed copy of the award but it was duty of the arbitrator to deliver a signed copy of the award to each of the parties. The arbitrator, however, supplied an unsigned/unattested copy of the award to the applicant on 3.12.2002. Supply of such a copy being violative of the mandate of sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act, the limitation for filing the application under Section 34 of the Act will not start running from 3.12.2002 but from 15.1.2003 when a certified copy of the arbitral award was delivered to the applicant as per the averments in the application duly supported by affidavit and not specifically denied by respondent. The application for setting aside the said award was filed by the applicant on 10.3.2003, well within the prescribed period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the award. Therefore, there is no question of condonation of delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act. 13. As a result, this applications, which appears to have been filed as an abundant precaution, is misconceived and is accordingly disposed.