AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) DATE of the coming into operation of the sanctioned scheme or any provision thereof, the scheme or such provision shall be binding on the sick industrial company and the transferee company or, as the case may be, the other company and also on the shareholders, creditors and guarantors and employees of the said companies. Such sub-section came into force in 1994. Mr. Majumdar contended that since there is a question of amalgamation, the sica cannot only be applicable in respect of the sick industrial company but also in respect of the company with whom it was merged or amalgamated, having so, the Industrial disputes Act cannot be made applicable. So far as seeking permission from the Ministry of labour is concerned, he further contended that effect of any other Act cannot be made applicable in such circumstances. Therefore, the very jurisdiction or the authority of the secretary is under challenge. ( 2 ) THIS writ petition has been moved before this Court upon notice to the company by saying that the prayer for seeking permission by the authority of MMTC is neither just nor can be considered by the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, Government of India. The union has also made a representation to the company on april 24, 2003, with a copy to the Secretary, ministry of Labour, Government of India. The contention of the petitioners is that when the scheme of amalgamation is approved by the bifr, being a quasi-judicial authority, the same cannot be interfered with by an administrative authority in the garb of an application for permission of closure. ( 3 ) FROM the list of dates as well as from annexure P4, being an order of the BIFR, I find the amalgamation of the two companies, the midco and the MMTC, was effected on April 1, 1994, and the MIDCO became a division of mmtc. The BIFR sanctioned the rehabilitation-cum- amalgamation/merger scheme on April 8, 1996. ( 4 ) MR. Majumdar, learned counsel, appearing in support of the petitioners, has taken me to Section 18 (8) of the Sick Industrial companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, to establish that such Act says, on and from the specified under sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act. According to me, there is a reason for fixing such period. Operation of suspension of legal proceedings, etc. According to me, there is a reason for fixing such period. Operation of suspension of legal proceedings, etc. , cannot be made for an indefinite period to prejudice a right cause of any of the parties including the employer or employee. This proviso is made for the purpose of creating checks and balances, which is apparent from the Act itself. Having so, I do not find any reason to construe the Act differently. The communication of the closure of the proceeding in April, 1997, cannot extend the period of proceeding before the BIFR. On the other hand, having not yet been challenged, the pendency of the proceeding before the BIFR is no more available. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to me, the case of the petitioners cannot be appreciated on the strength of such submission because Section 22 being a prohibitory section in respect of any proceeding fixes a period for such prohibition in the proviso under sub-section (3) thereunder. Sub-section (3) of Section 22 includes consideration of the scheme under Section 18 or where any such scheme is sanctioned thereunder for due implementation of the scheme, etc. The declaration under the proviso says that any suspension of any proceedings shall not be made for a period exceeding two years, which may be extended by one year at a time so that the total period shall not exceed seven years in the aggregate. Mr. Majumdar has taken an additional point by saying that the proceeding of the BIFR finally closed in April, 1997. Therefore, even assuming for the moment that the time period exists yet till such period has not expired. Upon verifying such document, I find that this is nothing but declaration of closure before the BIFR which has got nothing to do in respect of the period the writ petitioners-union, being MMTC employees union, and the secretary of such union, made this writ petition challenging the letter impugned dated April 8, 2003, whereunder the general manager (p) referred the matter to the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, government of India, for obtaining permission for closure under Sub-section (1) of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The grounds are annexed with the notice. It was also informed to the secretary-general of the union by a letter dated April 9, 2003. Both the letters are marked as annexure P-14 to the writ petition. ( 6 ) MR. The grounds are annexed with the notice. It was also informed to the secretary-general of the union by a letter dated April 9, 2003. Both the letters are marked as annexure P-14 to the writ petition. ( 6 ) MR. Panja, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent company, has first of all drawn my attention to a very recent supreme Court judgment in Hindalco industries Ltd. v. Union of India 2002 (2) SCC 578 : 2003-I-LLJ-1129. Therein I find that a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, is necessary for the purpose of inquiry into the correctness of the facts stated by the employer in his notice and also all other relevant facts and circumstances including the employer's bona fides. Opportunity of hearing is to be afforded to the employer, workmen and all persons interested. The words "the appropriate Government after making such inquiry, as it thinks fit", give the Government a discretion about the nature of the intended inquiry and not the discretion to dispense with the inquiry. It was further held that the review power is not to be restricted to the word " may", on the other hand it has been construed as "shall". Thereby the review is mandatory under certain circumstances. It was further held that under Section 25-O, a discretion is left for the appropriate Government to review or refer the order to the Tribunal rejected. It was also held that in exercising this power the government performs a quasi-judicial function and provision for review and/or reference was in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or Article 32 and, therefore, provided adequate protection against arbitrary exercise of power. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, two things are clear from the judgment. Firstly, the appropriate government is the authority to enquire and come into conclusion. Secondly, whatever order is to be passed by the Government is to be performed as a quasi-judicial function which straightaway goes against the submission of mr. Majumdar that whenever the BIFR has passed the quasi-judicial order it cannot be interfered with by the appropriate authority by way of an administrative action. However, this court inclines to go to the scope and ambit of section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act. In section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, sub-sections (2) and (5) are mostly relevant for the purpose in this regard. However, this court inclines to go to the scope and ambit of section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act. In section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act, sub-sections (2) and (5) are mostly relevant for the purpose in this regard. ( 8 ) IN sub-section (2), it has prescribed that where an application for permission for closing down an undertaking is sought for from an appropriate Government after making an inquiry, as it thinks fit, and after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employment, the workmen and persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interest of the general public and other relevant factors, by order or for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and workmen. In sub-section (5), the appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman make a review in granting order or refusing to grant order under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to the tribunal for adjudication. ( 9 ) MR. Majumdar, on behalf of the petitioners, is little bit apprehensive in view of sub-section (3) of Section 25-O of the Act where a time period of 60 days from the date of which the application is made for granting permission is provided because of the reason that there is a deeming provision for the expiry of the period of 60 days. Even I find from the copy of the order of the Deputy Director, ministry of Labour, Government of India, that certain particulars are called for from the employer and 60 days' period for taking decision is stated to be commenced from the date of receipt of the above-mentioned sanctioned documents in the Ministry. Such letter was written on April 28, 2003, and the communication was made on May 12/13, 2003. Assuming for the moment, the same was received on the very date when it was served, the time period of 60 days will expire in the month of July, 2003. Therefore, it is correct to say that the application for intervention of the writ jurisdiction is premature. ( 10 ) MR. Assuming for the moment, the same was received on the very date when it was served, the time period of 60 days will expire in the month of July, 2003. Therefore, it is correct to say that the application for intervention of the writ jurisdiction is premature. ( 10 ) MR. Panja has proceeded one stage further by saying that in asking for such particulars the authority concerned has statutory power under Rule 76 (c) sub-rule (3)of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. I find from there that employer concerned shall furnish to the authority to whom the application for permission has been made. Such further information as the authority considers, is necessary for the authority concerned to arrive at a decision on the application as and when called for by such authority so as to enable the authority to communicate the permission or refusal to grant permission within the period specified in sub-section (5) of Section 25-M. Mr. Panja further pointed out that under Section 25-O that there can be a closure for the entire establishment or a part of such establishment. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, in coming into conclusion, i find that all the questions are to be decided by an appropriate inquiry by the authority concerned. Such authority will go into the facts whether the entire establishment will be closed or it will not be fully closed but partially. If it is partially closed the petitioners may not be affected by such closure. If the petitioners are aggrieved by any closure, they have every right to review. Review has been declared as mandatory, not directory. Even thereafter, the scope and ambit of making an application under the writ jurisdiction either in Article 226 or in article 32 is available as per the decision in hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (supra ). If at this stage, the writ Court interferes it will be tantamount to a simultaneous proceeding when the statutory authority is entitled to go into the question. Hence, the only question available is determination of jurisdiction of such authority which can be decided at the threshold because it is a question of law for which no affidavit is needed. I hold the Governmental authority has jurisdiction. Hence, the only question available is determination of jurisdiction of such authority which can be decided at the threshold because it is a question of law for which no affidavit is needed. I hold the Governmental authority has jurisdiction. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, taking into the totality of the matter, I am of the view that not only no interim order will be passed but also the writ petition at this stage cannot be sustained. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, this order will not debar the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction afresh as per the ratio of the judgment reported in hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (supra), if so advised. ( 14 ) PARTIES are entitled to take all the points taken in this writ petition before the authority concerned before fmalisation of the decision by such authority. ( 15 ) PHOTOCOPY of the letters dated April 28, 2003, and May 12/13, 2003, filed today in court be kept with the record. ( 16 ) LET xeroxed certified copy of this judgment be supplied to the parties by the department within seven days from the date of putting in requisition for drawing up and completion of the order as well as the certified copy thereof.