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2003 DIGILAW 250 (PNJ)

Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab

2003-02-11

R.C.KATHURIA

body2003
JUDGMENT R.C. Kathuria, J. - Balwinder Singh, Balwinder Kaur, Kirpal Singh, Dalbir Kaur alias Biro, Fateh Singh and Paramjit Kaur alias Baljinder Kaur, petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 199 dated 30.10.2002 registered under Sections 498-A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code with Police Station Jhubal, District Amritsar and the consequential proceedings taken therein. 2. For adjudication of the present petition a few facts need to be noticed at the outset. Rajwinder Kaur daughter of Balbir Singh, resident of Village Panjwarh, Tehsil Tarn Taran, District Amritsar addressed a communication to the S.H.O. Police Station, Jhubal. It was stated therein by her that she was married with Balwinder Singh son of Kirpal Singh, resident of Patel Nagar, Yamuna Nagar, Haryana on 19.1.1997 at Panjwarh. At the time of her marriage, she was given a car and other dowry articles as per financial position of her parents. After marriage, she resided with her husband at Patel Nagar, Yamuna Nagar. After one and half years of her marriage, quarrel started between her on one side and her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law on the other side. Balwinder Singh had sold the car and when she questioned him about his, she was beaten by her husband, mother-in-law, Biro, father-in-law, Kirpal Singh, sister-in-law, Balwinder Kaur and brother-in-law, Fateh Singh and his wife Paramjit Kaur. Thereafter she was turned out of the house. She then returned to the house of her parents. After about four months, Balwinder Singh and Kirpal Singh came to her village. Both of them persuaded the complainant to compel her mother and brother to give Rs. 2 lacs to her husband as her husband wanted to open a shop of spare parts. After getting the money from her parents, while leaving her parents house, her husband told her that he would take her after a few days of the opening of the shop. Accordingly, he came to the village and took her with him to the matrimonial home. She lived with her husband for a period of fix months peacefully. Thereafter, again she was harassed by her husband, her parents-in-law and sister-in-law. She was beaten and turned out of the house and thereafter she returned to the house of her parents. Accordingly, he came to the village and took her with him to the matrimonial home. She lived with her husband for a period of fix months peacefully. Thereafter, again she was harassed by her husband, her parents-in-law and sister-in-law. She was beaten and turned out of the house and thereafter she returned to the house of her parents. On 8.10.2002, her parents in the company of other respectables of the village left her in the house of her husband as they had taken desire that she should settle down in the house of her in-laws. On the occasion of marriage of her uncles daughter, Rajneesh Kaur, she, her husband, Kirpal Singh, Biro, Balwinder Kaur had attended the marriage. Uncle of the complainant gave sufficient dowry to his daughter according to his status. The same was not tolerated by her husband and her in-laws. Thereafter, they pressed the complainant to bring Indica car and Rs. 1 lac for purchasing spare parts needed for sale at the shop of her husband. She was informed in clear terms that unless and until she brought these things, she would not be allowed to live in the matrimonial hone. She was again sent back to the house of her parents. Under these circumstances, she lodged the present report. 3. While seeking quashing of the FIR in question, it was pleaded on behalf of the petitioners that both the parties have arrived at a compromise and all their matrimonial disputes and litigation had come to an end. In support of the stand, affidavit (Annexure-P.2) of Rajwinder Kaur had been placed on record, wherein she had undertaken to get the FIR cancelled and make a statement in this regard in the High Court. On the basis of this affidavit, it was contended by the counsel representing the petitioners that in order to enable the parties to settle down in their matrimonial hone, the FIR be quashed. In support of the stand taken reliance was placed by him on Prabhdeep Singh v. Sukhwinder Kaur, 2003(1) RCR(Crl.) 92, wherein summoning of the petitioner-accused under Sections 498-A and 506 Indian Penal Code was quashed on the ground that proceedings initiated by respondent-wife were not bonafide. In support of the stand taken reliance was placed by him on Prabhdeep Singh v. Sukhwinder Kaur, 2003(1) RCR(Crl.) 92, wherein summoning of the petitioner-accused under Sections 498-A and 506 Indian Penal Code was quashed on the ground that proceedings initiated by respondent-wife were not bonafide. Notice was taken of the facts that compromise Annexure-P.1 revealed that dowry articles had been returned to the respondent and the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the petitioner had been withdrawn on the understanding that the parties would obtain divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Additionally, it was observed that the complaint did not contain any specific allegations with regard to the entrustment of any particular article of dowry to any particular individual. Therefore, the bald assertions made in the complaint would not be sufficient to constitute the offence under Sections 498-A and 506 Indian Penal Code and the Magistrate had summoned the petitioner-accused by passing a wholly cryptic order. Consequently, the complaint and summoning order were quashed. It would be apparent from the facts of the above case that it was not gone into whether the offence under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code was compoundable or not and rightly so because it was not agitated before the Honble Judge. 4. The other case to which reference was made on behalf of the petitioners is Ravinder Sood and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and another, 2003(1) RCR(Crl.) 94, wherein the petitioners had sought quashing of the complaint filed under Sections 406 and 498-A Indian Penal Code at Police Station, Central, Sector 17, Chandigarh and the consequential proceedings taken therein. In that case the marriage of petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 was solemnized at Chandigarh on 12.12.1996 and out of this wedlock a female child was born on 26.3.1998. On the date of pendency of the petition the child was living with her mother. Due to incompatibility in the temperament, the parties had been living separately since February 1998. Thereafter litigation ensued between the parties. The complainant-wife filed petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. She also filed a complaint against the petitioners which led to the registration of the FIR in question. Thereafter litigation ensued between the parties. The complainant-wife filed petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. She also filed a complaint against the petitioners which led to the registration of the FIR in question. While taking notice of the facts, it was stated that a decree of divorce had been granted to the parties by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act on 26.3.2002. The entire dispute between the parties had been settled and financial arrangements had been made part and parcel of decree of divorce. Counsel representing the parties before the Court agreed that there was no dispute pending between the parties and rather prayed that it would be in the interest of justice that criminal complaint, FIR and the consequential proceedings were quashed. Considering the submissions made, the Honble Judge came to the conclusion that criminal litigation had been resorted to by the complainant for the purpose of ultimate settlement and divorce proceedings and continuance of the proceedings would tantamount to harassment to the parties concerned. Support was sought in this regard from the observations made in Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, 1988(1) RCR(Crl.) 565, wherein it was laid down "it was for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the inherent of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely is be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 5. In Ajay Kumar Singla and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2000(2) A.I.J. 186, a Single Judge of this Court took notice of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Lal and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2000(1) RCR(Crl.) 92, wherein it was held that Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) which deals with compounding of offences provides two tables therein and only such offences as are included in the two tables can be compounded and none else, in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code providing that no offence shall be compounded except as provided for by this section. The above mentioned observations were sought to be distinguished from the facts of the case because the Honble Supreme Court made the observations during the pendency of the criminal appeal and that too after the appellant had been convicted in an offence under Section 326 Indian Penal Code which is a non- compoundable offence while the case in hand was still pending before the trial Court and for that reason conviction had not so far resulted. Taking notice of the affidavit filed by the respondent-complainant that she did not want to pursue the criminal proceedings and for that reason she had no objection to the quashing of the FIR in question, the Court observed that it was not required to grant leave to compound the offence. The Court also observed that though it could not grant permission to the parties to compound an offence which was not compoundable in terms of Section 320 of the Code but the Court was competent to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings before the conviction, and as the continuance of the proceedings would be an exercise in futility the FIR in question was quashed. Despite the fact that the State had filed a reply stating that charge sheet had been filed before the trial Court. Despite the fact that the State had filed a reply stating that charge sheet had been filed before the trial Court. In Ravinder Sood and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and another (supra), notice was also taken of the circumstances of the case of Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh v. Manveen Kaur (Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4391 of 1988), decided on 14.5.1999, wherein it was held as under :- "I.A. No. 5 of 1999 is allowed and petition for dissolution of marriage which is transferred to this Court is allowed to be amended accordingly. There will be a decree for dissolution of marriage between Manveen Kaur and Bhai Rajinder Pal Singh by mutual consent, as prayed. The parties have also recorded terms of compromise between them relating to payment of alimony, withdrawal of proceedings instituted by either party before any Court etc. The terms of compromise signed by both the parties and their advocates are taken on record. There will be an order in terms of the compromise so recorded. We also direct that Criminal Case arising out of F.I.R. No. 59 of 1994 dated 26.4.1995 under Section 406/499A/494 Indian Penal Code filed in the Police Station, Sector 26, Chandigarh which has been transferred to this Court is quashed. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly." 6. Taking into consideration the aforesaid ratio of law, the FIR and the proceedings consequential thereto were ordered to be quashed. 7. Before adverting to the facts of the present case the parameters which govern the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code have to be noticed. The Apex court in State of Haryana and others v. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal and others, 1991(1) RCR(Crl.) 383 (SC) had settled the parameters, principles and guide-lines for quashing of complaint, first information report and criminal proceedings which are as follows :- "1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constituted any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constituted any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceedings is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. Smt. Rajwinder Kaur, complainant in her affidavit, copy of which is Annexure-P.2, had stated three facts. Firstly, that she had lodged FIR No. 199 under Sections 406 and 498-A Indian Penal Code with Police Station, Jhubal against Balwinder Singh, Fateh Singh, Kirpal Singh, Paramjit Kaur, Balwinder Kaur, Fino etc. Secondly, that she would give a statement in the Honble High Court for the cancellation of the above mentioned case when the petition would be filed by Balwinder Singh. Secondly, that she would give a statement in the Honble High Court for the cancellation of the above mentioned case when the petition would be filed by Balwinder Singh. Thirdly, the date of hearing would be confirmed by Balwinder Singh then she would be ready to give a statement. These averments have been sought to be construed as compromise stated to have been arrived at between the parties as a result whereof the matrimonial dispute and litigation has come to an end. The stand taken on behalf of the petitioners in this regard is not borne out at all from the contents of the above affidavit and on this ground alone the facts of Ravinder Pal Soods case (supra) are entirely distinguished from the facts of the present case. 9. Even otherwise in the accusations made against the petitioners-accused in the report lodged, five circumstances are prominently brought on record, firstly that after Rajwinder Kaur had married with Balwinder Singh, quarrel between her and her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and husband of sister-in-law ensued when the husband of the complainant had sold the Maruti car given to her at the time of marriage by her parents. Secondly, when she protested to her husband and other accused, she was beaten and turned out of the house. Thirdly, she remained at the house of her parents for four months and thereafter her husband and father-in-law pressurised her, and obtained Rs. 2 lacs from her parents as it was represented by them that he had to open a shop of spare parts. Fourthly, that after she was taken to the matrimonial house, she lived for six months with them but she was again turned out of the house after she had been objected to beating. Thereafter, she returned to the house of her parents but was made to return to the matrimonial home on 8.10.2002 as her parents wanted to settle her in the matrimonial home. Fifthly, that her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law had attended the marriage of her uncles daughter Rajneesh Kaur and when they noticed that large number of dowry articles had been given to her by her father, a demand of Indica car and Rs. 1 lacs was made by them and the complainant was threatened that if she failed to meet the demand, she would not be allowed to live in the matrimonial home. 1 lacs was made by them and the complainant was threatened that if she failed to meet the demand, she would not be allowed to live in the matrimonial home. She was then beaten and forced out of the house. It cannot be said that the accusations made against the petitioners-accused are vague and were reported to by the complainant for the purpose of settlement in the divorce proceedings. 10. By now it is well settled that cruelty need not be physical and even mental torture or abnormal behaviour of the person involved can be termed as cruelty. In this case, the complainant had not only been beaten on several occasions but also had been consistently pressurised to bring more money from her parents and when she protested against the demand made, she was driven out of the house and the above named accused put a condition for her return to the house that the demands of money by them must be met by her. Therefore, it cannot be said that from the facts stated in the report lodged no case at all is made out in respect of the offences stated therein. 11. As the entire case of the petitioners-accused is based on the compromise, it is necessary to notice the position which has emerged from the judgments rendered by the Apex Court. When the compromise is accepted, it means the Court is allowing the parties to compound the offence involved. 12. In Ram Lal and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra) offence under Section 326 Indian Penal Code was sought to be compounded. Notice was taken in that judgment of the previous decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P., JT 1987(2) SC 361 and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2111. It was observed in paras 3 and 4 of the judgment as under :- "We are unable to follow the said decision as a binding precedent. Section 320 which deals with "compounding of offences" provides two Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it, and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the Court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two table can be compounded and none else. Only such offences as are included in the said two table can be compounded and none else. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes a legislative ban in the following term : "(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section." It is apparent that when the decision in Mahesh Chand (AIR 1988 SC 2111) (supra) was rendered attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid legal prohibition. Nor was attention of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Y. Suresh Babu (1987(2) JT (SC) 361) (supra) drawn. Hence those were decisions rendered per incuriam. We hold that an offence which law declares to be non-compoundable even with the permission of the Court cannot be compounded at all. The offence under Section 326, Indian Penal Code is, admittedly, non-compoundable and hence we cannot accede to the request of the learned counsel to permit the same to be compounded." 13. Dealing with the same question in Surendra Nath Mohanty and another v. State of Orissa, 1999(2) RCR(Crl.) 683, in para 8 of the judgment it has been observed as under :- "We reiterate that the course adopted in Ram Pujan v. State of U.P. (AIR 1973 SC 2418 : 1973 Cri LJ 1612) and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1988 SC 2111 : 1989 Cri LJ 121) (supra) was not in accordance with law. However, considering the fact that parties have settled their dispute outside the Court and the fact that 10 years have elapsed from the date of the incident and the further fact that appellants have already undergone 3 months imprisonment as per the sentence imposed on them, we think that ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone besides imposing a fine of Rs. 5,000/- on each of the accused under Section 326 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. We reduce the sentence as indicated above and direct that in default of payment of fine, the appellant concerned shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. We also refrain from imposing any separate sentence on the other counts of offences. Out of the fine amount, if realised, a sum of Rs. We reduce the sentence as indicated above and direct that in default of payment of fine, the appellant concerned shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. We also refrain from imposing any separate sentence on the other counts of offences. Out of the fine amount, if realised, a sum of Rs. 9,000/- also be paid to the injured as compensation." The judgments rendered in the above cases do not make any distinction with regard to the applicability of the provisions contained in Section 320 of the Code to the cases whether at the stage of investigation after registration of the case or after conviction of the accused. Rather, in clear term position of law has been clarified by observing that offences declared to be non- compoundable by law cannot be compounded even with the permission of the Court. 14. The matter needs to be looked into from another angle as well. Whether this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can ignore the bar created by other provisions of the Code or the law applicable in the given case. This question is not res integra. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 866, it was observed that "there is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code". 15. In Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1323, the Honble Supreme Court laid down as under :- "Section 482 of the Code under which the heirs of the deceased filed the application for compensation corresponds to Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the Statute which saves that power. A provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the Statute which saves that power. This is put in another form by saying that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject matter there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are advisedly to govern the particular subject matter. From this is will be clear that the application made by the heirs of the deceased for compensation could not have been made under Section 482 since Section 357 expressly confers power on the Court to pass an order for payment of compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein." 16. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 47, it was stated in clear terms that powers vested in the Court "should not be exercised as against express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." 17. Same principle emerges from the observations made in Mostt. Simirkhia v. Dolley Mokherjee, 1990(2) RCR(Crl.) 337; Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 736; Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 248; Dharampal v. Ramshri, 1993(1) RCR(Crl.) 696 and Gurcharan Singh Bhawani v. State, 2002(1) RCR(Crl.) 324 (FB). 18. It was also laid down in State of Haryana and others v. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal and others (supra) that what is not permissible under Section 482 of the Code cannot be achieved by resorting to Article 226 of the Constitution. 19. In Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2002(1) RCR(Crl.) 695, the question whether compounding the offences under Sections 452, 457 and 380 Indian Penal Code, which are not compoundable in terms of the provisions of Section 320 of the Code can be allowed in exercise of the powers vested under Section 482 of the Code in this court. While taking notice of the cases referred to in the judgment, pertinent observations of the apex Court in made in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another, 1998(4) SCC 409, were noticed in relation to the power vested in the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. While taking notice of the cases referred to in the judgment, pertinent observations of the apex Court in made in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another, 1998(4) SCC 409, were noticed in relation to the power vested in the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In that case the question arose whether the Apex Court can adopt a course so as to ignore the substantive statutory provisions even in cases where substantive rights of the litigants are involved. It was held in that case as under :- "However, the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to excise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed the Supreme Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. The Supreme Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute- settling. It is a "problem-solver in the nebulous areas" but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by the Supreme Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject." 20. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject." 20. After taking notice of the above observations, it was observed by this Court in para 11 of the judgment in Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) as under :- "It is not in dispute that this Court does not have power akin to the power vested in the Honble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Recourse to Section 482 of the Code can be made by the parties only if they are able to establish that continuance of the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the Court or ends of justice require such a course to be followed. The inherent power vested in this Court under Section 482 of the Code, in my view, cannot be invoked to bye-pass the mandatory provisions of law. By no stretch of imagination it can be construed that where the specific provisions of Section 320 of the Code bar a particular course of action by the Court, the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can allow that very course of action in total disregard of the mandatory provisions of the law for the sake of the parties on the ground that it facilitates them to settle the controversy. The Parliament in its wisdom has chosen to empower the Court to compound the offences tabulated in Section 320 of the Code. This Court would not bye-pass the mandate of the law by having recourse to Section 482 of the Code because the legislative mandate must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences." 21. The above conclusion would fully apply to the facts of the present case as well because offence under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code as such is not compoundable. With regard to the offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code, the amount involved is more than Rs. 250/- and for that reason it has been rendered non- compoundable in view of the provisions contained in Section 320(2) of the Code. With regard to the offence under Section 406 Indian Penal Code, the amount involved is more than Rs. 250/- and for that reason it has been rendered non- compoundable in view of the provisions contained in Section 320(2) of the Code. Therefore, from whatever angle the question is examined, the prayer made on behalf of the petitioners as such cannot be accepted. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in the petition and the same is consequently dismissed. Petition dismissed.