GODA RAGHURAM, J. ( 1 ) W. P. NOS. 25745 of 2001, 18437 of 2001 and 26576 of 2001 and Batch, constitute three classes of disputes between the management of M/s. Hindustan Zinc Limited, visakhapatnam, a Government of India undertaking and the workmen of Lead smelter Unit at Visakhapatnam, an undertaking of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. ( 2 ) TWENTY employees of the Lead Smelter unit have filed W. P. No. 25745 of 2001 challenging the order of the Government of india dated 22-12-2000 granting permission for closure of the Lead Plant at visakhapatnam, under Section 25-O of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act ) with effect from 24-1-2001, on various grounds. Contesting the discharge of workmen on the closure of the Lead Smelter unit and disputing the claim of the management that redeployment of the workmen of the Lead Plant to other plants of the company was not possible, one of the recognised unions sought reference of the dispute under Sec. 10 of the Act, after conciliation in this regard failed. The government of India by its order dated 2-5-2001 referred a specified dispute for adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal-cum- labour Court, Visakhapatnam. Challenging this order of the Government of India, the management-Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , filed w. P. No. 18437 of 2001. Subsequent to dismissal of W. P. Nos. 375 and 520 of 2001 by the order of this court dt. 19-1-2001 (details of these writ petitions are being recorded in this judgment infra) and on the basis of the observations contained therein, some of the workmen of the closed unit approached the industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, visakhapatnam (for short the Tribunal ) under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act, for a declaration to treat their discharge with effect from 24-1-2001 as illegal retrenchment, for reinstatement to employment and other benefits. Against the entertainment by the tribunal of these claims as IDs, the management-Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , has filed w. P. 26576 of 2001 and Batch, seeking writs of Prohibition. ( 3 ) AS interconnected factual and legal positions fell for consideration in these three classes of writ petitions, this court heard all the writ petitions together and is disposing them by this common Judgment. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy and ms. ( 3 ) AS interconnected factual and legal positions fell for consideration in these three classes of writ petitions, this court heard all the writ petitions together and is disposing them by this common Judgment. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy and ms. V. Uma Devi, learned counsel for sri P. Sriraghuram, learned counsel for the petitioner - Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , Sri Ramesh ranganathan, learned Additional Advocate general instructed by Sri J. Ramachandra rao and Sri P. B. Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the workmen and Sri M. Rama reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the central Government. Chronology of facts leading to the writ petitions : ( 5 ) CLOSURE of the Lead Smelter Plant of the Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , was permitted by the order of the Government of India subject to conditions including that the offer of voluntary retirement (details of which in brief have been set out in the order) should be kept open up to the date of the closure and in addition the management should explore the possibility of redeploying some of the workers in other plants of the company. The order also required that all the dues of the workers including VRS compensation, retrenchment compensation etc. , should be paid at the time of retirement/separation of the worker from the company. ( 6 ) INITIALLY Hindustan Zinc Limited was a wholly owned Government of India undertaking. However, pursuant to the disinvestment policy, at present the stake of the Government of India in the company is in the order of 49. 92 per cent. The registered office of the company is at Udaipur, rajasthan State. The company owned several smelting and other units in the States of Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and orissa. Orissa mines have since been closed. The manufacturing activity of the company at Visakhapatnam commenced in 1977 and the main products of the undertaking at visakhapatnam are zinc and lead. ( 7 ) ON account of its extensively polluting nature, the undertaking of the company at visakhapatnam was directed to stop its operations by the order of the Andhra pradesh Pollution Control Board dated 7-6-1999. Prior to this order there were about 259 workmen in employment in the undertaking at Visakhapatnam. ( 7 ) ON account of its extensively polluting nature, the undertaking of the company at visakhapatnam was directed to stop its operations by the order of the Andhra pradesh Pollution Control Board dated 7-6-1999. Prior to this order there were about 259 workmen in employment in the undertaking at Visakhapatnam. After the cessation of operations consequent on the order of the Andhra Pradesh Pollution control Board, a VRS package was engendered along with redeployment of some of the workmen to other units of the company. Other workmen continued in employment though the operations of the undertaking ceased. They were being paid idle wages. ( 8 ) IN the aforesaid scenario an application dated 20-10-2000 was made by the management of the undertaking to the 1st respondent requesting permission for closure of the lead plant of the zinc-lead smelter. The undertaking in its application for closure made under the provision of section 25-O of the Act, detailed the circumstances in which permission for closure is sought. Among the reasons put forth are the order of the Andhra Pradesh pollution Control Board, the continuance of the workers though without work and payment of idle wages to them, the various efforts made and the alternatives pursued to meet the pollution control norms. The application further stated that on an assessment a further Rs. 150. 00 crores would be required to install the requisite level of pollution control devices, a level of investment that is not financially prudent and that there is no alternative to closure of the undertaking. ( 9 ) AT the hearing of the undertaking s applications for closure, representatives of the workmens Union were also heard and their objections considered. Eventually by the order dated 22-12-2000, Respondent no. 1 granted permission for the closure of the lead plant of the company, w. e. f. 24-1-2001, incorporating conditions which have already been adverted to. ( 10 ) THEREAFTER, in a circular dt. 26-12-2000 the management stated that the direction of respondent-1 as contained in its order dated 22-12-2000 that the management shall explore the possibility of redeployment of some of the workers in other plants of the company was examined, but was not found feasible and accordingly option is given to all workmen to opt for voluntary retirement in accordance with the conditions mentioned in respondent No. 1 s order dated 22-12-2000. The circular also requested the concerned workmen to send their option on or before 24-1-2001 and that if the option of any of the workmen is not received on or before the said date it would be presumed that the concerned workmen refuse to opt for voluntary retirement and appropriate orders would be passed by the management, terminating the services of such workmen from the rolls of the company. ( 11 ) SIXTY-SIX employees of the undertaking filed W. P. No. 375 of 2001 and nine employees W. P. No. 520 of 2001 challenging the management s circular dated 26-12-2000 and for a direction to accommodate the petitioners in any other plant of the company in the country. These writ petitions were considered together and by a common order dated 19-1-2001 were dismissed. This Court held that the decision whether it was or not feasible to redeploy the personnel of a closed unit of a company is essentially a managerial decision, interference with which is justified only on determination that the decision is irrational, arbitrary or founded on extraneous considerations. Such adjudication requires consideration of disputed facts and is therefore more appropriate before the tribunals constituted under the Act and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. On this reasoning while dismissing the writ petitions this court observed that as the conciliation of the dispute between the workmen and the management, in this area, had failed the Government may expeditiously consider the failure report and take appropriate steps under the provisions of the Act. This court also preserved liberty to the petitioners to seek redress before an alternative forum in respect of the grievances urged in the writ petitions. ( 12 ) CONTESTING the discharge of workmen consequent on the closure of the undertaking and disputing the claim of the management that redeployment of the workmen of the Lead Plant to other plants of the company was not feasible, the Zinc smelter Mazdoor Sangh, Visakhapatnam, one of the recognised union, raised a dispute before the conciliation officer. Conciliation proceedings failed. Thereupon the government of India by its order no. L 29011/7/2001/1r (M), dated 2-5-2001, in exercise of powers under Sections 10 (l) (d) and 10 (2-A) of the Act, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. Conciliation proceedings failed. Thereupon the government of India by its order no. L 29011/7/2001/1r (M), dated 2-5-2001, in exercise of powers under Sections 10 (l) (d) and 10 (2-A) of the Act, referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The dispute referred to is as under:"whether the demand of the Zinc smelter Mazdoor Sangh, visakhapatnam, for redeployment of lead Plant workers, who were retrenched on closure of the plant to other units is justified? If so, to what relief the Union is entitled?" ( 13 ) THE reference is numbered as ID no. 44 of 2001. ( 14 ) CHALLENGING the order of the government of India dated 2-5-2001 referring the dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication, W. P. No. 18437 of 2001 is filed by the employer - Hindustan Zinc Limited. ( 15 ) SOME of the workmen, subsequent to the dismissal of the writ petitions, approached the Tribunal under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act characterizing their discharge from service on voluntary retirement to which they opted, as retrenchment and seeking appropriate relief. Against the entertainment of such applications of workmen as industrial disputes, the management filed writ petitions seeking relief by issuance of writs in the nature of writs of Prohibition. These are writ petitions (W. P. Nos. 26576/01 and batch ). ( 16 ) I will now consider each of the three broad issues falling for consideration in the three classes of writ petitions, which have been heard together as involving overlapping aspects of fact and law. The first class in this batch is W. P. No. 25745 of 2001 wherein some workmen have challenged the order of the Government of India dated 22-12-2000 permitting closure of the undertaking. W. P. No. 18437 of 2001 is filed by the employer challenging the order of the government of India dt. 2-5-2001 referring the specified dispute raised by a union for adjudication of the Tribunal. W. P. No. 26576 of 2001 and batch are writ petitions filed by the employer challenging the Tribunal s jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the workmen preferred under Section 2-A (2) of the Act. W. P. No. 25745 of 2001: ( 17 ) GROUPS of workmen including the petitioners herein filed two "joint review applications" under Section 25-O (5) of the act seeking review of Respondent-1 s order dated 22-12-2000 according permission for the closure of the undertaking. W. P. No. 25745 of 2001: ( 17 ) GROUPS of workmen including the petitioners herein filed two "joint review applications" under Section 25-O (5) of the act seeking review of Respondent-1 s order dated 22-12-2000 according permission for the closure of the undertaking. These joint applications are dated 12-9-2001 (31 workmen) and 15-9-2001 (23 workmen ). As no decision was taken by Respondent-1 under Section 25-O (5) of the Act on the joint review applications, telegrams were issued by the workmen to Respondent-1 inter alia, on 24-9-2001,30-10-2001 and 22-12-2001, in substance, seeking a decision on the review applications. As per the material available on record the 1st respondent has not disposed of the review applications. At this stage, the writ petition is filed challenging respondent-1 s order dated 22-12-2000. ( 18 ) SECTION 25-O of the Act, the provisions of which need to be noticed for the resolution of the lis herein, is reproduced:"25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking : (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective to the appropriate government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner. Provided that, nothing in this subsection shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of building, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the appropriate government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to the grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period, of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: provided that, where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of the Section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under subsection (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workmen who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this Section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days, average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. " ( 19 ) THE writ petition was filed on 18-12-2001 and admitted for consideration on 19-12-2001. The writ petition along with the batch was heard during 8th to 11th october, 2002, by which time on counter- affidavit was filed on behalf of the Union of india - the 1st respondent. It was reserved for judgment on 11-10-2002. A letter dated 31-10-2002 was circulated by the Additional central Government Standing Counsel sri Ratna Reddy stating that the 1st respondent had communicated para-wise remarks and these are required to be brought to the notice of this court. On this court s declining to take notice of para-wise remarks, learned Standing Counsel for the central Government sought time to file a counter-affidavit on more than one occasion. Eventually a counter-affidavit was filed on 11-12-2002 along with an application w. P. M. P. No. 31054 of 2002 seeking leave of this court to permit the belated filing of the counter-affidavit. At the persistent request of the learned Standing Counsel for the central Government the matter was again posted on 21-1-2003 and after hearing the learned Standing Counsel for the Central government the writ petition and batch were reserved for judgment. ( 20 ) THE application of the 1st respondent for leave of this court for belated filing of the counter-affidavits sets out a chronology of administrative circumstances in justification of the delay. It is required to record that none of the circumstances set out, justify the non-filing of the counter-affidavit upto nearly an year after the institution of the writ petition and service of notices. Admittedly the notices in the writ petition were received in January, 2002. ( 21 ) THE petitioners have categorically asserted that they, along with other workmen, had filed two "joint review applications" dated 12-9-2001 and 15-9-2001 seeking review of the order of closure dated 22-12-2000, under Section 25-O (5) of the Act. These joint review applications were sent by registered post acknowledgment due. Copies of the acknowledgment have also been enclosed as material papers to the writ petition. Thereafter they got issued reminder telegrams to the 1st respondent dated 24-9-2001 and 22-12-2001 seeking a decision on the joint review applications. Reminder telegrams were also sent on 30-10-2001. ( 22 ) THE counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent dated 10-12-2002 asserts that the review applications are not traceable and do not seem to have been received in the ministry. Thereafter they got issued reminder telegrams to the 1st respondent dated 24-9-2001 and 22-12-2001 seeking a decision on the joint review applications. Reminder telegrams were also sent on 30-10-2001. ( 22 ) THE counter-affidavit of the 1st respondent dated 10-12-2002 asserts that the review applications are not traceable and do not seem to have been received in the ministry. There is no response to the assertion regarding the reminder telegrams nor does the counter-affidavit address itself to the aspect that acknowledgement of the communication sent by registered post is also enclosed to the material papers. In the circumstances this court is constrained to record its disapprobation of the conduct of the 1st respondent both as regards the cavalier attitude in filing the counter- affidavit as well as the casual manner in which the contents in the writ petition and the material enclosed are considered while drafting the counter-affidavit. ( 23 ) ON the basis of material available on record this court concludes that "joint review applications" had been duly filed by the workmen including the petitioners but have not been considered by the 1st respondent within time or at all. This failure to dispose of the review applications in discharge of the statutory quasi-judicial obligation under Section 25-O (5) of the Act constitutes gross abdication of statutory responsibility by the 1st respondent. ( 24 ) HAVING failed in obtaining a decision on their joint review applications directed against the order of closure, from the 1st respondent, the petitioners instituted the writ petition challenging the order of the 1st respondent dated 22-12-2000 according permission for closure of the lead plant of the Hindustan Zinc Limited. The Order is challenged on the following grounds, in brief: (A) That the impugned order is passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 25 (O) of the act inasmuch as the management after keeping quiet for over 17 months since 22-7-1999, the date on which the lead plant was closed on account of the order of the Andhra pradesh Pollution Control Board, made an application as late as on 22-10-2000, to the first respondent to permit closure of the establishment which was already closed in July 99. (B) That apart from notices to some trade unions no general or individual communication to the workmen were issued before passing the impugned order, hence the closure order is illegal. (B) That apart from notices to some trade unions no general or individual communication to the workmen were issued before passing the impugned order, hence the closure order is illegal. (C) That the circular dated 26-12-2000, of the management (calling upon the workmen to exercise their option for voluntary retirement on or before 24-1-2001 failing which it will be presumed that the workman has refused to opt for voluntary retirement and appropriate orders will be passed by the management terminating his services from the rolls of the company), had coerced the workmen to unwillingly opt for voluntary retirement. The retirement should therefore be considered as retrenchment and the retrenchment being contrary to the provisions of the Act is invalid. (D) That the petitioners ouster from service must in the circumstances be treated as a retrenchment made in violation of Sections 9-A, 25-N and 25-O of the Act. (E) That as no genuine effort was made by the management to redeploy the workmen in other units, the condition in the order of closure was violated and their discharge must therefore be construed either as illegal termination or retrenchment from service. (F) That as the respondent management is an agency and instrumentality of the State, the retrenchment/ouster from service of the petitioners is in violation of the Constitution of India, being arbitrary, and (G) That as the two "joint review applications", dated 12-9-2001 and 15-9-2001, preferred by the workmen including the petitioners, to the 1st respondent u/sec. 25-O (5) of the Act seeking review of the 1st respondent s order dt. 25-O (5) of the Act seeking review of the 1st respondent s order dt. 22-12-2000 (permitting closure of the undertaking) have not been disposed of and as the order dated 22-12-2000 permitting closure of the undertaking remains operative and in force only for a period of one year from the date of such order, in view of the provisions of subsection (4) of Section 25-O, the petitioners and other workmen are entitled to be treated as having been restored as workmen of the undertaking as the order of closure has ceased to be operative with effect from 22-12-2001 (on expiry of one year from the date of the order of closure), particularly having regard to the fact that the respondent-management had not made any fresh application for permission for closure of the undertaking, after the expiry of the earlier period of closure; alternatively that the workmen are entitled to re-employment or preferential consideration for reemployment in the undertaking as they are deemed to be retrenched workmen, qua the provisions of section 25-H and as the provisions of Section 25-H in Chapter V-A are applicable even to industrial establishments to which the provisions of Chapter V-B are applicable, qua Section 25-S of the act. ( 25 ) THE first two grounds of challenge (A and B) are without substance. The A. P. Pollution Control Board by its order dated 7-6-1999 directed closure of operations of the lead Plant on account of the extremely polluting nature of its activities. This order was received by the undertaking on 12-6-1999. Consequent on the order, operations were stopped on 12-6-99. Despite the cessation of the manufacturing operations, the Company continued to pay idle wages to the workmen of the Lead unit. Alternatives were thereafter pursued by the undertaking including efforts to install equipment to facilitate achieving the requisite pollution control norms. After expert evaluation and assessment, the undertaking concluded that the additional investment of Rs. 150 crores required to install the necessary pollution control devises was not financially viable. In the circumstances the undertaking submitted the application dt. 20-10-2000 to the 1st respondent seeking permission for closure of the undertaking. Pursuant to the said application the 1st respondent directed notice to workmen represented by their unions. 150 crores required to install the necessary pollution control devises was not financially viable. In the circumstances the undertaking submitted the application dt. 20-10-2000 to the 1st respondent seeking permission for closure of the undertaking. Pursuant to the said application the 1st respondent directed notice to workmen represented by their unions. The Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Visakhapatnam, issued notice to the seven unions of the undertaking including to unions of which the petitioners were also members, intimating the unions regarding the application of the undertaking seeking closure. The Unions submitted their written objections to the Government of india. After consideration of the facts on record including the application of the undertaking and objections of the unions, the 1st respondent, granted permission for closure of the Lead Plant in exercise of powers under Sec. 25-O of the Act, subject to conditions that the offer of the voluntary retirement scheme should be kept open upto the date of closure, the management should explore the possibility of redeploying some of the workers in other plants of the company and all dues of the workers including VRS compensation, retrenchment compensation etc. , should be paid at the time of the retirement/separation of the workers from the company. ( 26 ) IN the context of the above facts, the petitioners allegation that the application for closure was made long after the actual closure of the undertaking or that there was no opportunity to workmen, cannot be countenanced. These contentions are therefore devoid of merit and are accordingly rejected. ( 27 ) ANOTHER grievance (contention E) urged by the petitioners is that contrary to the conditions in the order dt. 22-12-2000 the respondent-Management failed to continue the employment of the workmen of the Lead plant including the petitioners, by redeploying them to other units. This contention is equally devoid of merit. The condition incorporated by the 1st respondent in its order dt. 22-12-2000 is that the management should explore the possibility of redeploying some of the workers in other plants of the Company. The material produced on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3 - employers, discloses that committees were constituted for considering redeployment of various categories of employees of the Lead Plant such as Assistant Foreman, Chargehand, junior Chargehand, Operator, Senior tapper, Tapper, Crane Operator, Helper, etc. The material produced on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3 - employers, discloses that committees were constituted for considering redeployment of various categories of employees of the Lead Plant such as Assistant Foreman, Chargehand, junior Chargehand, Operator, Senior tapper, Tapper, Crane Operator, Helper, etc. Having considered the vacancy position at its other units it was seen that there were either no vacancies available or already surplus staff were employed in the respective positions in the other plants. Therefore by its communication dated 26-12-2000 the workmen were informed that it has not been found feasible to redeploy the workmen in any other plant of the Company and that the workmen are provided the option to opt for voluntary retirement in conformity with the condition incorporated in the Government s order dt. 22-12-2000. A copy of the Government order and the special Voluntary Retirement Scheme were also communicated to each workman calling upon the workman to submit his option on or before 24-1-2001 and duly intimating that in case option is not received by the said date, it would be presumed that the workman had refused to opt for voluntary retirement and appropriate orders would be passed terminating the workmen s service from the rolls of the Company. As demonstrably efforts were made for redeployment of the workmen of the Lead plant and as the record shows that such redeployment was rationally considered not possible by the management, the grievance that the conditions incorporated by the government in the order permitting closure, had not been complied with by the management, is misconceived. This contention is therefore rejected. ( 28 ) ANOTHER contention urged is that the petitioners were coerced to opt for VRS though they were unwilling to opt for it on threat of termination of service and therefore their termination should be considered as retrenchment and being contrary to the provisions of the Act, should be declared invalid. This contention is clearly misconceived. ( 28 ) ANOTHER contention urged is that the petitioners were coerced to opt for VRS though they were unwilling to opt for it on threat of termination of service and therefore their termination should be considered as retrenchment and being contrary to the provisions of the Act, should be declared invalid. This contention is clearly misconceived. Section 2 (oo) of the Act defines retrenchment as under:"2 (OO) retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workmen; or (B) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (BB) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of the employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (C) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. " ( 29 ) CHAPTER V-A and B of the Act deal with the aspect of lay-oft and retrenchment and special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure of certain establishments. The provisions of Sec. 25-C to 25-E do not apply to an industrial establishment to which Chapter V-B applies or to those establishments in which less than 50 workmen on average for each working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month or establishments which are of a seasonal character and in which work is performed only intermittently - vide section 25-A. ( 30 ) SECTION 25-K occurring in Chapter V-B of the Act enacts that the provisions of this chapter (V-B) shall apply to an industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which not less than 100 workmen were employed on an average for a working day in the preceding 12 months. Since the undertaking in question (the Lead Smelter Unit) is indisputedly, admittedly and demonstrably, an industrial establishment to which the provisions of Chapter V-B of the Act apply, the provisions of Sections 25-C to 25-E do not apply in view of the provisions of section 25-A. The provisions of Chapter V-B, which include Sections 25-K to 25-S, incorporate a special regime in respect of certain defined industrial establishments. Section 25-S enacts that the provisions under sections 25-B, 25-D, 25-FF, 25-G, 25-H and 25-J of Chapter V-A shall also apply as far as may be to industrial establishments to which the provisions of Chapter V-B applies. There are special provisions enacted in Chapter V-B covering the areas of prohibition of lay-off, conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen and for closure of an undertaking. These special provisions operate to govern the rights and liabilities and the validity of any action of the management or the workmen as the case may be, of industrial establishments governed by the provisions contained in chapter V-B. Thus where these special provisions cover a particular field, the provisions which may also apply as indicated in Section 25-S would not apply pro tanto. ( 31 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether, once an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which Chapter V-B applies, is closed down pursuant to a permission granted by the appropriate Government under section 25-O (2) or by deemed permission under Section 25-6 (3), pursuant to an application duly made to it by an employer, the resultant discharge from service, of workmen of such undertaking amounts to retrenchment either as defined in Sec. 2 (oo) or under Section 25-N. Section 25-O (8) enacts that when an undertaking is permitted to be closed down either under the express permission granted under subsection (2) or deemed permission under subsection (3) of the Section, every workman employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission for closure, shall be entitled to receive compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. In the case on hand, under the special VRS package, all the 172 employees on the rolls of the undertaking as on the date of the application for closure were entitled on opting, to receive VRS at 60% of the salary for every completed year of service. In the case on hand, under the special VRS package, all the 172 employees on the rolls of the undertaking as on the date of the application for closure were entitled on opting, to receive VRS at 60% of the salary for every completed year of service. This compensation is substantially higher than the compensation they are entitled to under Section 25-O (8) of the Act. In case they did not opt for the benefit of special vrs by the notified date 24-1-2001, their services would stand terminated and they would be entitled to the compensation under Section 25-O (8) of the Act. ( 32 ) IT requires to be noticed that section 25-FFF which specifies the compensation payable to workmen on closure of an undertaking (other than undertakings covered by provisions of chapter V-B), entitles the workmen of such undertakings to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F as if the workmen had been retrenched, (emphasis) In the light of this provision though the workmen of a closed undertaking are entitled to notice and compensation as if they were retrenched within the meaning of provisions of section 25-F, such workmen are not to be considered as having been retrenched except for purposes of the benefits of notice and compensation. ( 33 ) IN respect of industrial establishments governed by Chapter V-B, provisions setting out the rights and the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen have been enacted. ( 33 ) IN respect of industrial establishments governed by Chapter V-B, provisions setting out the rights and the conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen have been enacted. Section 25-N incorporates regulations in the area of retrenchment of workmen of industrial establishments governed by the provisions of Chapter V-B. These provisions are more vigorous than those provided in Section 25-F. Provisions of section 25-N read as under:"25-N Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen : (1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until, (a) the workman has been given three months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice; and (B) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (Hereafter in this Section referred to as the specified authority) as been obtained on an application made in this behalf. (2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner. (3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate government or the specified authority, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the persons interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (4) Where an application for permission has been made under subsection (1) and the appropriate government or the specified authority does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (5) An order of the appropriate government or the specified authority granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all the parties concerned and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (6) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workmen, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication. Provided that, where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any retrenchment has been refused such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice on retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if not notice has been given to him. (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of the Section, the appropriate government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the establishment or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to such establishment for such periods as may be specified in the order. (9) Where permission for retrenchment has been granted under sub-section (3) or where permission for retrenchment is deemed to be granted under sub- section (4), every workman who is employed in the establishment immediately before the date of application for permission under this section shall be entitled to receive, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days s average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. " ( 34 ) THE conditions precedent to retrenchment and the obligations consequent on retrenchment, under sec. 25-N are essentially similar to those in respect of closing down of an undertaking, under Sec. 25-O. The compensation payable in both the cases and the class of workmen to which such compensation is payable, is identical. The requirement of an application to the appropriate Government, the provision with regard to express or deemed permission, provisions with regard to the power of the appropriate Government to review an order granting permission as well as the power of the appropriate Government to disapply the provisions, are substantially similar both with respect to retrenchment of workmen and closure of an undertaking as seen from a comparative analysis of the provisions of Sections 25-N and 25-O. In case of retrenchment, the workman concerned is also required to be given a three months notice in writing indicating the reasons for such retrenchment, unless wages for such notice period have been paid to the workman, in the alternative. Sub-section (8) of Section 25-O enacts the entitlement of the workman of a closed undertaking, whether by an express permission under sub-sec. (2) or a deemed permission under sub-sec. (3), to the specified compensation. ( 35 ) A provision for compensation is enacted in Section 25-FFF (in Chapter V-A), which applies to undertakings of industrial establishments to which Chapter V-B does not apply. The provisions of Section 25-FFF are however to the effect that the specified class of workmen of a closed undertaking are entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 25-F as if the workmen had been retrenched. The provisions of Section 25-FFF are however to the effect that the specified class of workmen of a closed undertaking are entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 25-F as if the workmen had been retrenched. Similar provisions providing for compensation for workmen in case of transfer of undertakings are in contained section 25-FF where also the phraseology of the provision is to the effect that the specified class of workmen of an undertaking whose ownership or management was transferred would be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 25-F, as if the workmen had been retrenched. ( 36 ) THE question whether in case of termination of service consequent on the transfer of business or undertaking, the workmen of such undertaking are entitled to retrenchment compensation under Sec. 25-F in addition to the compensation under section 25-FF fell for the consideration of the supreme Court in Anakapalle Co-operative agriculture and Industrial Society v. Its workmen and others1. Construing the scope and effect of the words "as if" occurring in section 25-FF, the Constitution Bench of the supreme Court held that these words bring out the distinction between retrenchment as defined by Section 2 (oo) and termination of service consequent upon transfer with which the section deals. The Supreme Court held that though termination of service on transfer of an undertaking is not retrenchment, the workmen concerned are entitled to compensation as if the said termination was retrenchment. The court ruled that this provision has been legislated for the purpose of calculating the amount of compensation payable to such workmen rather than for providing for the measure of compensation once again. It was further held that Section 25-FF makes a reference to section 25-F for the said limited purpose, and therefore, in all cases to which Sec. 25-FF applies, the only claim which the employees of the transferred concern can legitimately make is a claim for compensation against their employer. ( 37 ) THE question whether the discharge and termination of service of all the workmen on account of the bona fide closure of business or on account of the transfer of the business constitutes "retrenchment" as defined in Section 2 (oo), fell for the consideration of a Constitution Bench of the supreme Court in Barsi Light Railway Co. , ltd. , v. K. N. Joglekar and another2. , ltd. , v. K. N. Joglekar and another2. The facts considered by the Supreme Court were as under: For and on behalf of the President of india through the Director of Railway Board a notice was issued to the Barsi Railway company Limited (for short the Company ) that the undertaking of the Company would be purchased and taken over w. e. f. 1-1-1954. Thereupon the Company served a notice on its workmen that consequent on the decision of the Government of India their services would be terminated w. e. f. 31-12-1953, subject to some of the staff of the Company being employed by the Government of India on such terms and conditions to be notified by it later. The Union thereupon sought retrenchment compensation under Sec. 25-F of the Act. The Civil Court, which was the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, ruled in favour of the workmen declaring their entitlement to compensation u/sec. 25-F. A Division Bench of the bombay High Court affirmed that the workmen were entitled to claim compensation u/sec. 25-F and that the company was liable to pay such compensation. The issue thus came to be considered by the Supreme Court. The supreme Court held that the expression "for any reason whatsoever" in Section 2 (oo) could not be interpreted to include the case of discharge of all workmen on account of bonafide closure of the business. ( 38 ) EARLIER in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, the supreme Court held that retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage, that the termination of the services of all workmen as a result of closure of the business could not therefore be properly described as a retrenchment, that though there is a discharge of workmen both when there is retrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to be awarded under the law not for discharge as such but for discharge on retrenchment and if retrenchment means in ordinary parlance discharge of surplus, it could not include discharge on the closure of business. Consequently no retrenchment compensation could be directed to be paid in case of bona fide total closure of the business, ruled the court. Consequently no retrenchment compensation could be directed to be paid in case of bona fide total closure of the business, ruled the court. Reiterating this ratio of the Pipraich case, the Supreme Court in Barsi case (supra) ruled as under:"in the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the intention was even to include a bonafide closure of the whole business, it would, we think, be divorcing the expression altogether from its context to give it such a wide meaning as is contended for by learned counsel for the respondents. What is being defined [in sec. 2 (oo)] is retrenchment, and that is the context of the definition. It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined. " ( 39 ) IN conclusion the Supreme Court held that it would be against the entire scheme of the Act to give the definition clause relating to retrenchment "such a meaning as would include within the definition termination of service of all workmen by the employer when the business itself ceases to exist. ( 40 ) IT must be noticed that the decision of the Supreme Court in Barsi case (supra) was delivered in the context of a fact situation arising in a legal environment prior to the amendment of the Act by the industrial Disputes (Amendment and miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 and the industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1956. The Supreme Court having noticed these amendments nevertheless held that the provisions of Section 25-FF as they were prior to the amendment, do not obligate payment of retrenchment compensation on a bona fide closure of a business. The Supreme Court having noticed these amendments nevertheless held that the provisions of Section 25-FF as they were prior to the amendment, do not obligate payment of retrenchment compensation on a bona fide closure of a business. ( 41 ) VENKATARAMANA Ayyar, J, writing for a four-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in pipraich (supra) elucidated the meaning and content of the expression "retrenchment" as per its ordinary acceptation, in the context of a plea that discharge of workmen on the closure of business also amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act and held that in its ordinary parlance "retrenchment" means discharge of surplus labour. This ratio was accepted and followed by s. K. Das, J, writing for a Constitution Bench in Barsi (supra), in the fact context of discharge of workmen consequent on transfer of a management or an undertaking. Thereafter, however, in a series of cases including The Workmen of Subong Tea estate v. Outgoing Management of Subong Tea estate, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. , v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee and State Bank of india v. N. Sundara Money the Supreme court ruled that discharge of workmen other than for being surplus would also amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act attracting the requirements of section 25-F of the Act. ( 42 ) IN a batch of civil appeals including punjab Land Development and Reclamation corporation Ltd. , Chandigarh v. Presiding officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others the question that fell for consideration of a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was whether the judgments of smaller benches of the Supreme Court in The Subong tea Estate, Delhi Cloth and General Mills and sundara Money cases (supra), were per incuriam the ratio of the larger Benches including the Constitution Bench in Barsi and Pipraich cases (supra ). Several fact situations fell for consideration of the supreme Court in The Punjab Land development case such as termination of service of a workman on the ground that the initial appointment was by an incompetent authority, termination for unsatisfactory service within the period of probation, termination for lack of confidence, termination for abandonment of service, termination on an invalid enquiry, termination in the terms of conditions of appointment and the like. ( 43 ) THE Supreme Court in The Punjab land Development case elucidated the ratio of Barsi and Pipraich (supra) as meaning that it is only discharge/ termination of workmen on closure or transfer of an undertaking that render such discharge/termination as outside the pale of "retrenchment" as defined in the Act and that the observations of the Supreme Court in Pipraich and Barsi with regard to the ordinary acceptation of the expression "retrenchment" meaning discharge on account of surplusage, were observations made in the context of the factual substrata of those cases and were not intended to restrict the scope of the expression "retrenchment" as amplitudinously defined in Sec. 2 (oo) of the Act. In identifying the aforesaid ratio of Pipraich and Barsi the supreme Court also relied on its decisions in santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala. An analysis of the judgment in Punjab Land development case (supra) shows that the ratio in Pipraich and Barsi that discharge of workmen on closure or transfer of an undertaking does not amount to "retrenchment" within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Act, has been reiterated and confirmed. ( 44 ) IN the light of the principles deducible from the decisions of the Supreme Court in anakapalle, Pipraich, Barsi and Punjab Land development cases (supra) and having regard to the fact that an exhaustive package of regulations regarding retrenchment of workmen have been enacted in Section 25-N of the Act, the conclusion is irresistible that discharge or termination of workmen consequent on a bona fide and valid closure of an undertaking to which the provisions of Chapter V-B apply, are entitled only to the compensation set out in sub-section (8) of Section 25-O of the Act. The discharge or termination of service of such workmen cannot be construed as "retrenchment" as defined in section 2 (oo) of the Act. These workmen are thus not entitled either to notice or the retrenchment compensation as provided for in Section 25-N of the Act, in addition to the compensation under Sec. 25-O (8 ). ( 45 ) SECTION 2 of the Act is the definitions clause which employs the standard phraseology "in this Act, unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context,. . . . . ( 45 ) SECTION 2 of the Act is the definitions clause which employs the standard phraseology "in this Act, unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context,. . . . . " the definitions contained in Section 2 are subject to a contrary intent manifest in the subject or context of the provisions of the act. The wide definition of "retrenchment" in Section 2 (oo) of the Act is equally subject to the context and subject matter of particular areas and circumstances dealt with by other provisions of the Act. Therefore in the light of the decisions of the supreme Court in Barsi, Piparaich and Punjab land Development cases (supra), in particular the observations of the Supreme court in Punjab Land Development case (supra) occurring at placitae (f) and (g) (at page 719 of the SCC report), the petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the workmen of the lead plant unit are entitled to the other benefits under Section 25-N of the Act in addition to the compensation they are entitled to under Section 25-O (8) of the act. ( 46 ) THE management s circular dated 26-12-2000 sensitising those workmen who do not opt for retirement under the special vrs package that they would be terminated from service, does not amount to any threat or coercion to induce them to go on voluntary retirement. It is merely a statement as to the inevitable consequence of the contemporaneous reality. The allegation that the options for retirement were obtained on coercion is therefore, without basis. Contention (C) is rejected. ( 47 ) THE provisions of Section 9-A are not attracted to a circumstance where the undertaking of an industrial establishment governed by provisions of Chapter V-B is bona fide and validly closed. Consequent upon the ratio enunciated in Pipraich, Barsi and Punjab Land Development cases (supra), it must follow that the discharge of workmen brought about consequent on a bona fide closure of the undertaking, does not amount to effecting any change in the conditions of service within the meaning of section 9-A of the Act and as such the provisions of Section 9-A are not attracted. The contention is rejected. The contention is rejected. ( 48 ) ANOTHER contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the employer - hindustan Zinc Limited being an agency and instrumentality of the State, the discharge of the petitioners and other workmen from service, constitutes arbitrary conduct as they were deprived of employment, which is their only source of livelihood. ( 49 ) THE record in this case discloses that the closure of the undertaking - the Lead plant of the Zinc-Lead Smelter Unit, became inevitable on account of the excessively polluting nature of its operations resulting in a closure order dt. 7-6-1999 by the A. P. Pollution Control Board. The workmen of the Unit were continued on idle wages for a period of over 17 months from 12-6-1999 while the management was exploring the possibility of operating the unit by installing the required level of pollution control mechanisms. It obtained expert advice, wherefrom it concluded that the additional investment of over Rs. 150 crores would not be financially viable. Left with no alternative it had to apply for permission for closure which was duly granted by the 1st respondent s order dated 22-12-2000. The management constituted a committee to explore the possibility of redeployment of the workmen of the Lead Unit, in its other plants. On an analysis of the factual situation it was revealed that there were either no vacancies in the appropriate categories of employment or some of those categories were already overstaffed. As redeployment was not feasible in the circumstances, the management offered the workmen a Special voluntary Retirement package which was much more beneficent to the workmen than the compensation obligated under sub- sec. (8) of Section 25-O - the compensation statutorily obligated on the closure of an undertaking. In the circumstances it cannot be held that the discharge of the workmen including the petitioners, constitutes arbitrary action on the part of the management. Whether an instrumentality of the State should be created or continued only for providing employment without any redeeming commercial or economic purpose is an area of economic and public policy. The constitution posits no linear obligation on the executive obligating a particular social or economic choice. This area belongs exclusively to the executive and is off-limits to curial intervention and administration. ( 50 ) THE last of the grounds of challenge/ contentions (G) will now be considered. The constitution posits no linear obligation on the executive obligating a particular social or economic choice. This area belongs exclusively to the executive and is off-limits to curial intervention and administration. ( 50 ) THE last of the grounds of challenge/ contentions (G) will now be considered. The court has already concluded earlier in this judgment that the joint review applications of the workmen including the petitioners, dated 12-9-2001 and 15-9-2001 were duly communicated to the 1st respondent, though in its counter-affidavit the 1st respondent stated that its records do not disclose the availability of such applications. It is unfortunate that the 1st respondent abdicated its statutory responsibility under section 25-O (5) and failed to take any decision on the joint review applications either by itself or by referring the applications to a tribunal for adjudication, as required under sub-section (5 ). ( 51 ) THE period within which the appropriate Government is required to consider an application for review preferred under Section 25-O (5) in the context of a statutory silence fixing a time for such decision by the appropriate Government, fell for the consideration of the Supreme court in Vazir Glass Works Limited v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union. The company - appellant before the Supreme court made an application to the government of Maharashtra (the appropriate Government) seeking permission for closure of its unit at Andheri under Section 25-O (l) of the Act. That application was rejected by the State government. The Company applied for a review of the order under Section 25-O (5) well within one year from the date of the order of rejection. The application was kept pending by the State Government for a considerable time and eventually (by an order passed after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the order of rejection) made a reference to the Industrial tribunal for adjudication of its order of rejection of closure. The question that fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court was whether the appropriate Government was entitled to take a decision on an application for review, preferred under Section 25-O (5) of the Act, at any point of time and after the period of one year from either an order of closure or an order of rejection of closure. The question that fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court was whether the appropriate Government was entitled to take a decision on an application for review, preferred under Section 25-O (5) of the Act, at any point of time and after the period of one year from either an order of closure or an order of rejection of closure. ( 52 ) THE Supreme Court ruled that the order of the appropriate Government by way of review either on an aggrieved party s application or on its own motion, must be made within the period of one year from the date of the order permitting or refusing closure. The reason for such conclusion of the Supreme Court has been set out (in para 30 of the AIR report), as under:"30. Since the decision made on an application for permission for closure is to remain operative only for a year, in our view, it will be only proper to hold that an order by way of review either on the aggrieved party s application or on own motion of the state Government, must be made within the said period of one year. Otherwise, the right to make fresh application for permission to close after expiry of one year from the date of rejection of permission for closure will lose its relevance. It also appears to us that anomalous situation may arise if the application for review, when presented within the said time frame of one year is allowed to be decided even after the expiry of the said time frame of one year when the order passed by the State Government has already ceased to be operative. As an illustration, it may be indicated that a party aggrieved makes an application for review of the order of the State government within a year during which the order is operative, but for some reason, such application is not disposed of within one year. After expiry of one year, the aggrieved party makes a fresh application for permission to close and on such application an order is made by the state Government or the party obtains a deemed order. This order on a fresh application, subject to any review of the same, will remain in force for one year. After expiry of one year, the aggrieved party makes a fresh application for permission to close and on such application an order is made by the state Government or the party obtains a deemed order. This order on a fresh application, subject to any review of the same, will remain in force for one year. If the State Government is permitted to pass order on the review application made against the first order when the right to make fresh application and to obtain and order has already accrued, any order on review to be enforceable must conform to the order passed or deemed to have been passed on subsequent application for permission to close. Any other order is not conceivable because an order by way of review supersedes the order reviewed but not the subsequent order on a fresh application made and such subsequent order being operative for the next one year cannot be by passed by any order of review of the earlier order. " ( 53 ) THE provisions of Section 25-O of the act as substituted by Act 46/82 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in a batch of civil appeals including Orissa textiles and Steel Ltd. , v. State of Orissa and others. While considering the aspect of constitutionality of the provisions of section 25-O the Constitution Bench in orissa Textiles case held that a review, either suo motu or on an application under section 25-O (5) of the Act, has to be disposed of within a reasonable period and on the analogy of the time limit for passing award, further held that a period of thirty (30) days would be a reasonable period for disposing of a review also. While upholding the constitutionality of Section 25-O, the supreme Court ruled that the expression "may" occurring in Section 25-O (5) of the act means "shall" and that there was no discretion in the appropriate Government not to pass an order in review, either itself or by way referring the matter to a Tribunal. While upholding the constitutionality of Section 25-O, the supreme Court ruled that the expression "may" occurring in Section 25-O (5) of the act means "shall" and that there was no discretion in the appropriate Government not to pass an order in review, either itself or by way referring the matter to a Tribunal. The Court also held that in exercising the power under Section 25-O (5) the appropriate Government performed a quasi-judicial function and would have to make an enquiry into all necessary facts, particularly into the genuineness and bona fides of the reasons stated by the employer, further that an opportunity of being heard would have to be given to the employer, workmen and/or interested persons and that the order of review would have to be in writing giving reasons. Interpreting subsection (4) of Section 25-O, which was also challenged as unconstitutional by the employers, the Supreme Court held that the provision was constitutional as under subsection (4), the order of the appropriate government would remain in force for one year from the date of its order permitting or declining closure and at the end of the said period it was open to the employer to again apply for permission for closure. ( 54 ) IN the light of the decision in Orissa textiles Ltd. , (supra), the failure of the 1st respondent to decide upon the joint review applications dated 12-9-2000 and 15-9-2000, preferred by the workmen including the petitioners constitutes a gross and condemnable failure and abdication of mandatory statutory obligations by the 1st respondent. Having regard to the ratio of vazir Glass Works and Orissa Textiles cases (supra) the 1st respondent ceased to have jurisdiction and power to dispose of the joint review applications now, as the period of one year from the date of the order of closure by the 1st respondent (22-12-2000) expired. ( 55 ) IN view of the decisions of the supreme Court in Pipraich and Barsi (3 and 2 supra) reiterated in Punjab Land Development (supra) discharge or termination of workmen on a bona fide closure of an undertaking does not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sec. 2 (oo) of the Act. ( 55 ) IN view of the decisions of the supreme Court in Pipraich and Barsi (3 and 2 supra) reiterated in Punjab Land Development (supra) discharge or termination of workmen on a bona fide closure of an undertaking does not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of sec. 2 (oo) of the Act. The wholesale discharge of workmen on the bona fide closure of the Lead Plant, consequent on the order of the A. P. Pollution Control Board dated 7-6-1999 and the order of the 1st respondent dated 22-12-2000 permitting closure of the undertaking under Sec. 25-O of the Act, brings about a permanent cessation of the employer and employee relationship between the undertaking and workmen. Consequently though the order of closure dt. 22-12-2000 does not survive after a period of one year from the said date in view of provisions of Section 25-O (4), the workmen including the petitioners are nevertheless disentitled to claim reemployment or restitution to service in the lead Plant Unit, also for the reason that their discharge from service consequent on the order of closure dt. 22-12-2000 is not retrenchment within the meaning of sec. 2 (oo) of the Act and therefore they are not entitled to the benefits of Section 25-H, notwithstanding that the provisions of section 25-H are applicable even to the industrial establishments to which the provisions of Chapter V-B apply in view of the provisions of Section 25-S of the Act. ( 56 ) ANOTHER plea urged as part of contention-G by Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, learned Addl. Advocate General for the petitioners is that as Sec. 2 (cc) defines "closure" as meaning the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof and as the order of the 1st respondent dt. 22-12-2000, permitting the closure of the lead plant unit does not bring about a permanent closure of the undertaking but is operative only for a period of one year from the date of the order [sec. 25-O (4)], there is, in fact and law, no closure of the undertaking as defined in section 2 (oo) and therefore the discharge of the workmen including the petitioners amounts to retrenchment warranting compliance also with the requirements of section 25-N. Failure to comply with the said provision renders their "retrenchment" invalid. Consequently they are entitled to reinstatement. This contention is equally devoid of merit. Consequently they are entitled to reinstatement. This contention is equally devoid of merit. The Supreme Court in Barsi and Pipraich (supra) laid down the principle which was reiterated in Punjab land Development (supra) that discharge of workmen on closure or transfer of undertaking does not amount to retrenchment. Following these principles I have already concluded supra, that the petitioners are not entitled to any of the benefits under Section 25-N, in addition to the benefits under Section 25-O (8) of the Act. It is a well settled principle that a definitions clause in an enactment is subject to the context and particular provisions of the enactment or specific subject matters that fall for consideration. Closure of an undertaking governed by the provisions of Chapter V-A, and as dealt with in sec. 25-FFA and FFF is not limited in point of time, closure of such undertaking is permanent. A period of one year is prescribed in Sec. 25-O (4) for the operation of an order of the appropriate Government, expressly or by implication permitting closure, under Section 25-O (2) or (3) [in respect of undertakings governed by chapter V-B]. Thus it is that the general definition of "closure" in Section 2 (cc) must be construed as confined to closure of an undertaking governed by the provisions of chapter V-A and not an undertaking governed by the provisions of Chapter V-B. On the above analysis this aspect of the petitioner's contention does not commend itself to acceptance by this court. Conclusions: (1) The failure of the 1st respondent in taking a decision on the joint review applications dated 12-9-2000 and 15-9-2000 of the workmen including the petitioners, is an abdication of statutory responsibility by the 1st respondent in an area in which the 1st respondent is obligated to take a decision before the expiry of one year from 22-12-2000 - the date on which it passed the order permitting closure of the Lead Plant unit of the Hindustan Zinc Limited. (2) The 1st respondent's order dated 22-12-2000 is not invalid on account of the fact that the employer made an application for permission for closure, belatedly. (3) The provisions of Section 25-O have been complied with as all representative unions including those of which the petitioners are members, had been issued notices on the application of the employer dt. 22-10-2000 seeking permission of the 1st respondent, for closure. (3) The provisions of Section 25-O have been complied with as all representative unions including those of which the petitioners are members, had been issued notices on the application of the employer dt. 22-10-2000 seeking permission of the 1st respondent, for closure. (4) The discharge of the workmen of the Lead Plant of Hindustan Zinc ltd. , including the petitioners, from service, consequent on the closure of the undertaking as permitted by the 1st respondent's order dated 22-12-2000, does not amount to retrenchment nor does such discharge attract the provisions of section 25-N of the Act. (5) The workmen were not coerced to opt for voluntary retirement and all the workmen have, of their own volition, opted for the VRS and have accepted the benefits of such vrs. (6) The management made rational efforts for redeployment as per the condition in the order dt. 22-10-2000 (sic. 22-12-2000) and the inability to redeploy, does not constitute illegal termination or retrenchment. (7) The discharge of the workmen including of the petitioners consequent on the order of closure does not attract the provisions of section 9-A of the Act. (8) The discharge of the workmen from service does not constitute arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct on the part of the Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , and (9) The petitioners are not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of section 25-H as their discharge from service does not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. W. P. No. 18437 of 2001: ( 57 ) THE employer - Hindustan Zinc Ltd. , challenges the order of the Government of india dt. 2-5-2001 referring the specified dispute (supra) for adjudication by the Tribunal. The petitioner- management challenges the order contending that all the 172 employees of the lead Plant unit opted for VRS, that the benefits under the VRS package are more beneficent than the compensation package available under Section 25-O (8) of the Act and as all the employees opted for VRS and received the benefits, they ceased to be employees of the company and consequently the question of their retrenchment does not arise. According to the writ petitioner, when an employee of his own goes out of the organisation pursuant to exercise of option for VRS, there is thereafter no relationship between the management and such employee and therefore no dispute exists or is apprehended on which a reference could be made as was done by the impugned order of the Government of India. ( 58 ) SECTION 10 of the Act confers power on the appropriate Government, which in the case on hand is the Government of India, to refer, inter alia, to a Tribunal for adjudication, where it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and by an order in writing. ( 59 ) CONSIDERED in its statutory context the condition precedent to the formation of an opinion by the appropriate Government, is the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. Mere ritualistic recital in the order of the appropriate Government as to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute does not inhibit judicial review nor would preclude a scrutiny behind the recital to determine whether factually there was material before the appropriate Government to have rationally come to a conclusion as to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute. The discretion inhering in the appropriate government is neither unfettered nor an arbitrary discretion. As the exercise of power under Section 10 is pursuant to a statutory grant, implicit in its exercise is the requirement that the appropriate government must act reasonably, not capriciously or arbitrarily or according to whims or fancies. The order of reference made by an appropriate Government is open to invalidation in judicial review on a showing affirmatively that either the appropriate Government had no material before it, had not applied its mind rationally to the material before it, or had not taken note of certain vital facts which it ought to have taken note of. If there is no existing or apprehended industrial dispute at the time the order of reference is made, the reference could be invalidated. If there is no existing or apprehended industrial dispute at the time the order of reference is made, the reference could be invalidated. Though the power of the appropriate Government to make an order of reference is administrative in character, if the Court exercising judicial review finds that the Government had acted in clear contravention of the provisions of law, had taken the decision on extraneous or irrelevant consideration or has eschewed relevant considerations while forming its opinion as to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute, this court would be well within its jurisdiction to invalidate the order of reference. The above are the general principles contouring the power of the appropriate Government in forming its opinion as to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute and of the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 60 ) SECTION 2 (k) of the Act defines an "industrial dispute" to mean"any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between the employers and workmen or between the workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. " ( 61 ) IN National Engineering Industries Ltd. , v. State of Rajasthan and others the Supreme court reiterated the settled principle thus"it is the existence of the industrial dispute which would clothe the appropriate Government with the power to make a reference and the Industrial tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended, the appropriate Government lacks the power to make any reference. "the Supreme Court also rules that"the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and no apprehension which would be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. " ( 62 ) IN Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K. P. Madhavan Kutty and others the supreme Court reiterated the principle that high Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition on an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and no apprehension which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. ( 63 ) AGAIN the question fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in a somewhat different factual context in secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar barat and others. The Joint Secretary of the appellant Tea Association was dismissed from service for disobeying an order of transfer. He complained against the dismissal to the Labour Commissioner, government of West Bengal. The matter was referred to conciliation. The employer contended that the complainant was not a workman. A failure report ensued upon which the Joint Labour Commissioner recommended a reference. Eventually the state Government by its order declined to make a reference concluding that the employee in question was not a workman. The workman moved the High Court and a learned single Judge directed the appropriate Governmenl to make a reference as to whether the employee was a workman. The Division Bench affirmed the direction issued by the learned single Judge. The matter thus came to be considered by the Supreme Court in appeal. Reiterating the principles enunciated in State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy the Supreme Court concluded that the Government in its order declining to make an order of reference had considered all relevant circumstances and facts in coming to the conclusion that the employee was not a workman and therefore no reference could be made to the Tribunal and that in the circumstances the order of the government was impeccable and was not liable to be interfered with by the High court. The appeal was accordingly allowed. The law on the aspect of the power of the appropriate Government to make a reference and the judicial reviewability of such an order was summarised by the supreme Court (in Para-7 of the SCC report), as under :"7. The law on the point may briefly be summarised as follows: (1) The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference. (2) The order of the appropriate government making a reference under section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial order. (3) An order made by the appropriate government under Section 10 of the act being an administrative order no its is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (4) If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the court may in a given case consider the case for a Writ of Mandamus. (5) It would, however, be open to, a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute. . . . . . . . . . . the meaning of the Act. " ( 64 ) IN the case on hand all the employees exercised their option for the benefits of voluntary retirement and had on such acceptation, severed the employer - employee relationship and had also received and encashed the cheques representing the vrs payments as well as other terminal benefits. Therefore, they could not be considered to be workmen of the petitioner. There was also a valid and bona fide closure of the undertaking consequent on an order of closure passed by the Government of india, as concluded by this court supra in relation to W. P. 25745 of 2001. This court has also come to the conclusion that the discharge of workmen on the valid closure of an undertaking does not amount to retrenchment. In the circumstances and in particular in view of the provisions of section 2 (k) defining an "industrial dispute", there was no existing or apprehended industrial dispute that could be referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, warranting exercise of power by the Government of India under Sec. 10 of the Act. ( 65 ) CONSEQUENT on the above analysis the order of the 1st respondent dated 2-5-2001 referring the specified dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, visakhapatnam, is invalid and is accordingly set aside. ( 65 ) CONSEQUENT on the above analysis the order of the 1st respondent dated 2-5-2001 referring the specified dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, visakhapatnam, is invalid and is accordingly set aside. W. P. No. 26576 of 2001 and Batch: ( 66 ) AFTER the order of the Government of india dt. 22-12-2000 permitting closure of the lead plant the management communicated a circular dt. 26-12-2000 advising all workmen to give their option for voluntary retirement by the specified date failing which it would be presumed that they have refused to opt for voluntary retirement and such of those workmen who had not opted would be terminated from service. Against the circular the unions issued a strike notice on 5-1-2001. The notice was subsequently withdrawn by the letter dt. 12-1-2001 after conciliation proceedings were held on 11-1-2001 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour (Central), Visakhapatnam. Thereafter all the 172 employees opted for voluntary retirement under the Special Voluntary retirement Scheme - II by submitting applications with a declaration seeking compensation as per the scheme. All the applications for voluntary retirement were accepted by the management. The payments due to each of the workmen under the scheme were determined and paid in a farewell function organised by the management. According to the management, apart from the cheques towards the benefits due to the workmen under VRS, a gold coin and a wrist watch were also presented to those workmen who attended the function. For the few workmen who did not attend the function a public notice was issued by the management in the local daily newspaper "eenadu". Thereafter the amounts of VRS compensation and other final settlements in respect of the other workmen were credited to their respective s. B. Accounts where their salaries were regularly being credited. The amounts credited to the account of the workmen by cheques were also encashed by each of the workmen and debited to the company's account. The amounts were also subsequently withdrawn by the workmen. The management asserts that those workmen who had not attended the farewell function also collected the other gifts provided by the management viz. , the memento of a gold coin and a wrist watch from the office of the company, an assertion that is not denied. Every employee also received the arrears amounts on salary revision. The management asserts that those workmen who had not attended the farewell function also collected the other gifts provided by the management viz. , the memento of a gold coin and a wrist watch from the office of the company, an assertion that is not denied. Every employee also received the arrears amounts on salary revision. Thereafter some of the workmen issued a telegram to the company requesting the management to take back the VRS amounts and insisted for employment. Responding to this request the management replied to the workmen that reemployment is not possible. ( 67 ) AT this stage some of the workmen filed Writ Petition Nos. 375 of 2001 and 520 of 2001, which were dismissed by this court on 19-1-2001 as already stated. ( 68 ) AT the instance of one of the unions, the appropriate Government - the government of India, made an order of reference of the specified dispute to the tribunal, under Section 10 of the Act by its order dt. 2-5-2001. This order of reference has been challenged by the management in w. P. NO. 18437 of 2001, which writ petition has also been considered supra in this judgment. ( 69 ) SOME individual workmen, however, filed independent applications on the file of the Tribunal under Section 2-A (l) of the Act seeking a declaration that"the forced and coerced resignation dated 24-1-2001 as retrenchment, therefore illegal, mala fide and ab initio void and cannot be justified and further direct the management to take me back into employment with continuity of service and all other attendant benefits and pass such other order or orders on this Honourable Tribunal deems fit and proper in the interest of justice with costs. " ( 70 ) THE several claims of the independent workmen preferred under Section 2-A (2) of the Act have been numbered as industrial disputes by the Tribunal. The broad contentions of the workmen (which are identical) are- (A) After the de facto closure of operations of the lead plant in July, 1999, junior workmen and administrative staff have been transferred to other units and the remaining senior workmen were coerced and forced to submit resignations voluntarily by the management. Such forced resignation is contrary to the provisions in Fourth Schedule to the Act and amounts to adoption of unfair labour practices within the meaning of the Fifth Schedule to the act. Such forced resignation is contrary to the provisions in Fourth Schedule to the Act and amounts to adoption of unfair labour practices within the meaning of the Fifth Schedule to the act. (B) The forced resignation amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Chapter V-B of the Act. (C) None of the grounds put forth by the management in applying for permission for closure of the undertaking, are rational. Under identical conditions including economic conditions other plants of hindustan Zinc Ltd. , in the country are being continued and therefore the order of the Government of india dt. 22-12-2000 granting permission for the closure is neither in the public interest or in the interest of the workmen. (D) In view of the threat of termination of service contained in the management's circular dated 26-12-2000 the workmen were left with no alternative except to submit their resignations. Immediately thereafter the workmen (claimants before the Tribunal) submitted a protest letter asserting that the forced resignation was not voluntary. (E) The workmen are willing to deposit the amounts received by them to the Hon'ble Tribunal, and (F) As the workmen have been illegally terminated on 24-1-2001, as they are all of prime age and it is difficult to secure alternate employment and need economic support, they should be granted the reliefs. ( 71 ) IN this batch of writ petitions seeking writs in the nature of Prohibition, the management seeks interdiction of the entertainment and continuance of the industrial disputes by the Tribunal, preferred by the workmen under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act. ( 72 ) THE broad grounds urged in support of the reliefs sought in these writ petitions are as under: (I) The petitioner - company being a central Government Undertaking, section 2-A (2) of the Act has no application as this provision was introduced into the Act by the andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 32 of 1987, for the purpose of State industries. (II) Each of the applications preferred by the workmen under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act is an abuse of the process of the court. Having voluntarily accepted VRS-II and having taken the benefits under the same, the workmen disentitled to seek the reliefs claimed. (II) Each of the applications preferred by the workmen under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act is an abuse of the process of the court. Having voluntarily accepted VRS-II and having taken the benefits under the same, the workmen disentitled to seek the reliefs claimed. (III) As none of the employees was discharged, dismissed, retrenched or otherwise terminated from service but have voluntarily gone out of employment, by accepting voluntary retirement under a special scheme envisaged for the purpose, no claim is maintainable under Section 2-A (2 ). (IV) In view of the reference of a specified dispute by the Central government by its order of reference dt. 2-5-2001, the individual disputes under sec. 2-A (2) are not maintainable. (V) After the order of the Central government dt. 22-12-2000 granting permission for closure of the undertaking under Section 25-O of the Act and after such order was acted upon by the Management and the workmen - the latter by accepting VRS and taking the benefits thereunder, the Industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 2-A (2) of the Act. ( 73 ) THE first contention regarding the non-applicability of Sec. 2-A (2) to an industrial dispute as defined in Sec. 2 (k) read with Sec. 2-A of the Act, in relation to hindustan Zinc Ltd. , a Government of India undertaking, is wholly misconceived. The industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a legislation enacted by the Parliament pursuant to the field of legislation referable to Entry-23 of list III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh schedule read with Art. 246 of the constitution of India. The Act has been amended by the Industrial Disputes (A. P. Amendment) Act, 1987 (A. P. Act 32 of 1987 ). The Act was reserved by the Governor of andhra Pradesh on 24-4-1984, for consideration of the President and the assent of the President of India was received on 22-7-1987, which assent was published in the a. P. Gazette on 27-7-1987. In view of the provisions of Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution, the provisions of Sec. 2-A (2) as incorporated in the Act by the A. P. Amendment Act 32/87 is valid and operative. There is nothing in the phraseology of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 2-A, which limits the applicability of its provisions to "state industries" as contended by the petitioner. There is nothing in the phraseology of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 2-A, which limits the applicability of its provisions to "state industries" as contended by the petitioner. ( 74 ) THE legislative field enumerated under Entry 22 of List III of the Seventh schedule reads as under: "22. Trade Unions; induindustrial and labour disputes. " ( 75 ) WITHIN the legislative field enumerated in Entry-22 of List III, the legislature of the State has, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, legislative power to enact laws. There is nothing in the provisions of the Constitution or in the Act, brought to the notice of this court, which diminutes such plenitudinous legislative power including in the area of legislation for adjudication of industrial disputes in respect of industrial undertakings of a Federal government. But for the enactment by the parliament of the Industrial Disputes Act and subject to the provisions of Art. 254 (2), the State Legislature was competent to enact the entirety of Industrial Disputes Act (qua the concurrent legislative field enumerated in Entry 22 of List III read with Art. 245 of the Constitution) for its operation within the territory of Andhra Pradesh. Under the provisions of Art. 254 (2) and in the context of the A. P Amendment having received the assent of the President, the provisions of section 2-A (2) operate proprio vigore even against any provisions of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, enacted prior to the A. P. Amendment Act. The contention of non- applicability of Sec. 2-A (2) to the petitioner - company is therefore without merit or force. ( 76 ) CONTENTION (iv) of the petitioner, that in view of the order of reference dt. 2-5-2001 of the Government of India, individual disputes under Section 2-A (2) of the Act are not maintainable, is also devoid of merit and force. The dispute which has been referred by the Government of India's order dated 2-5-2001 is whether the demand of a union for redeployment of the workers of the Lead plant who were retrenched on the closure of the plant to the other units, is justified and if so what relief could be granted? The applications of the workmen under sec. 2-A (2) are for a declaration that their resignations dt. The applications of the workmen under sec. 2-A (2) are for a declaration that their resignations dt. 24-1-2001 being forced and coerced, amount to retrenchment, such retrenchment is illegal and therefore for a direction that they should be taken back into employment together with attendant benefits. The scope of the reference is distinct and dissimilar to the scope of the claims made by the workmen-respondents herein in their applications under Sec. 2-A (2) of the Act. The contention is therefore rejected. ( 77 ) THE other three contentions (ii), (iii) and (v), could be considered together and in the context of the relief in the nature of Writ of Prohibition, sought by the petitioner. ( 78 ) THE writ of Prohibition is of great antiquity, forming part of the process by which the King's courts restrict courts of inferior jurisdiction from exceeding their powers - per Akin LJ in R v. Electricity commissioners. The Writ of Prohibition is more ancient than the writ of Certiorari and is contemporaneous with the origin of english law. It was conceived and formulated for the purpose of preventing usurpation of jurisdiction. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and generally lies before the challenged proceedings have culminated in a decision. Prohibition is a remedy for want of jurisdiction in an inferior Tribunal or court. Traditionally mere peripheral want of jurisdiction was not considered sufficient; a decision was considered to be a nullity for the purpose of prohibition only if the want of jurisdiction appears on its face - see london Corporation v. Cox. Dixon J, in parisienne Basket Shoes Proprietary Ltd. v. Whyte stated -"when prohibition is based upon want of jurisdiction it means that the proceedings are coram non judice, that a judgment or order when given or made, would be void. " ( 79 ) IN its ordinary application a writ of prohibition is issued before the inferior tribunal has made its decision. In such cases, the remedy cannot, of course, be used as a means of challenge to the 'merits of the case', i. e. , the correctness of the decision. The order can be issued only when it is apparent, already at this stage, that the lower court had no jurisdiction. It also lies where a 15. (1924) 1 K. B. 171 16. (1867) LR 2hl 239. 17. (1938) 59 CLR 369. The order can be issued only when it is apparent, already at this stage, that the lower court had no jurisdiction. It also lies where a 15. (1924) 1 K. B. 171 16. (1867) LR 2hl 239. 17. (1938) 59 CLR 369. defect in procedure has occurred but the defect must be 'so vicious as to violate some fundamental principle of jurisdiction'. ( 80 ) THE principles governing prohibition have been considered in a vast array of precedents. In S C Prashar and another v. Vasanthsen Dwarakadas and others a Division bench of the Bombay High Court came to consider a challenge to a notice of the income Tax Officer issued under Section 34 of the Income Tax Act (IT Act) calling upon the firm to submit returns of its total income. The notice was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed in the Act for the exercise of the power of issuing such notice. It was argued in defence of the notice that no writ is maintainable and that the remedy is to pursue the remedies under the IT Act. In the context of the issues presented before it, the Division Bench of the Bombay High court surveyed the extant principles enunciated in precedents and held that a patent want of jurisdiction entitles the petitioner to obtain immediate relief from the High Court, even though he could raise the plea of want of jurisdiction in a higher tribunal and even though, as the English cases pointed out, he may have acquiesced in the want of jurisdiction. Writing for the division Bench, Chief Justice Chagla stated that the want of jurisdiction must be a patent one and as in the case before it, the want of jurisdiction was undoubtedly a patent one, the High Court would not only be right in exercising its discretion to interfere but according to the English courts it would be the duty of the court and its obligation to prevent an authority from assuming jurisdiction which it patently does not possess. ( 81 ) IN Isha Beevi and others v. Tax Recovery officer and others, the impugned orders that fell for consideration of the Supreme Court were notices of commencement of recovery proceedings by attachment of certain properties. ( 81 ) IN Isha Beevi and others v. Tax Recovery officer and others, the impugned orders that fell for consideration of the Supreme Court were notices of commencement of recovery proceedings by attachment of certain properties. These notices were issued by the district Collector functioning as the Tax recovery Officer, in purported exercise of the power under Rule 48 in the Second schedule to the IT Act, 1961. Final orders could be passed after the affected parties had opportunity to object, under Rule 11. In the circumstances, the impugned proceedings could be interdicted by exercising prohibition jurisdiction only if they are demonstrated to be entirely without jurisdiction. Considering the issues presented to it, the Supreme Court held -"the existence of an alternative remedy is not generally a bar to the issuance of such a writ or order. But, in order to substantiate a right to obtain a writ of prohibition from a High Court or from this court, an applicant has to demonstrate total absence of jurisdiction to proceed on the part of the officer or authority complained against. It is not enough if a wrong section or provision of law is cited in the notice or order, if a power to proceed is actually there under another provision. "concurring with the High Court, which dismissed the writ petition, the supreme Court held that as the Tax recovery Officer had the jurisdiction to consider the issues including the objections put forth by the affected assessees and as there was no patent and total want of jurisdiction on the part of Tax Recovery officer demonstrated, no writ of prohibition will lie. ( 82 ) IN U. P. Sales Tax Service Association v. Taxation Bar Association, Agra and others the supreme Court culled out some broad principles with regard to exercise of prohibition jurisdiction. It held -"the High court has power to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent a court or tribunal from proceedings further when the inferior court or tribunal (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction, (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice, (c) proceeds to act under a law which itself ultra vires or unconstitutional or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of the fundamental rights. " ( 83 ) IN determining the want of jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal or a potential for exceeding its jurisdiction it is necessary to identify the jurisdictional parameters of such tribunal. The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the existence of a particular condition or a particular state of fact and a question then arises whether the inferior tribunal can give itself jurisdiction by erroneously deciding the existence of the condition or the fact upon which its jurisdiction depends. A tribunal must decide the collateral question whether the condition is satisfied or the fact exists which gives it jurisdiction. Whether such determination on the jurisdictional fact is conclusive depends upon the extent of the jurisdiction conferred on the inferior tribunal by the legislation in question. The principles regarding elucidation of the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal have been stated with great lucidity by Lord Esher m. R. in R v. Commissioners for Special purposes of the Income Tax as under:"when an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, if first established by act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may invest the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. When the Legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned, it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction. " ( 84 ) IN Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh a constitution Bench of Supreme Court quoted with approval and followed the above principle stated by Lord Esher M. R. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar/speaking for the Constitution Bench held-"it is manifest that the answer to the question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors. " ( 85 ) THE question that fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in this case was whether an inam village (Shrotriem) is an "inam estate" and is exclusively within the jurisdiction of settlement Officer and of the Tribunal on appeal and the civil courts have no jurisdiction to determine it or retry it. In setting out extent of the jurisdiction of the settlement Officer and of the appellate tribunal under the provisions of the Madras estates (Abolition and Conversion into ryotwari) Act, 1948, the Supreme Court held, at para 28 of the AIR report, as under:" (28) Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the settlement Officer under Section 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an "inam village", he has of necessity to decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by Section 9 (1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of Section 9 (1) the property in question being an "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of any appeal to the tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, but no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceedings in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. The determination by him of the second question whether the "inam village" is an inam estate is, however, within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts if clearly barred. " ( 86 ) THE Act is an endeavour to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics for dispute resolution and has set up the necessary infrastructure to ensure that the energy of partners in production are not dissipated in endless and counter productive battles and to facilitate industrial justice towards creating a climate of goodwill. The Act has provided the machinery and forum for investigation of industrial disputes and for settlement thereof. The composition of the Labour court or Tribunal under Sections 7 and 7-A ensures the availability of a trained and qualified judicial persona for the resolution of the disputes presented to the adjudicating bodies under the Act. On an analysis of the legislative intent, the text and structure of the Act, it must follow that the legislation has conferred upon the Labour Court or tribunal under the Act the jurisdiction to initially determine the jurisdictional facts as a step towards adjudication on the merits of disputes presented. On an analysis of the legislative intent, the text and structure of the Act, it must follow that the legislation has conferred upon the Labour Court or tribunal under the Act the jurisdiction to initially determine the jurisdictional facts as a step towards adjudication on the merits of disputes presented. ( 87 ) PRECEDENTS on the scope of Section 10 of the Act are to the effect that issues incidental to the aspects specified in an order of reference for adjudication fall within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, which are empowered to determine questions which go to the root of their jurisdiction and that on the determination of such points would depend the question as to whether the labour Court or tribunal has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the points referred to it for adjudication. Even in respect of a claim presented under Section 2-A (2) of the Act, the Labour Court would have an identical jurisdiction to determine, as a preliminary issue, the existence of the jurisdictional facts upon which its jurisdiction to determine the claim rests. ( 88 ) IN recognition of the reality that the decision on a preliminary issue itself takes long years which are thereafter impugned in writ petitions leading to further delay in the adjudication of the main dispute, courts have, in recent years, laid down the principle that to ensure speedy disposition of industrial disputes the Labour Courts or the Tribunals should desirably and preferably decided all the issues in a dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues - vide Cooper engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe and d. P. Maheswari v. Delhi Administration. These observations and directions do not posit an invariable rule that in all cases the preliminary and main issues should be adjudicated simultaneously. Occasions and situations may arise when it is prudent, pragmatic or in the interest of both the management and the workmen, that an issue going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Tribunal, should be considered and determined as a preliminary issue. Wherever such situation is present, the Labour Court ought and should decide such issue as to the jurisdictional facts going to the root of its jurisdiction to adjudicate, as a preliminary issue. Wherever such situation is present, the Labour Court ought and should decide such issue as to the jurisdictional facts going to the root of its jurisdiction to adjudicate, as a preliminary issue. ( 89 ) ON application of above principles, the issues arising under contentions (ii), (iii) and (v) of the writ petitions eminently fall within the jurisdiction of Labour Court- cum-Industrial Tribunal, Visakhapatnam. The Tribunal has the competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon these issues. As it has the jurisdiction in the area, no writ of prohibition could normally issue. ( 90 ) HAVING regard to the various questions that fell for consideration in w. P. 25745 of 2001, and the fact that the parties therein have pressed for resolution of the issues, this court has while dismissing the said writ petition recorded its conclusions on the various issues that were urged for the consideration of this court. These conclusions would of necessity bind the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, visakhapatnam while adjudicating upon the issues presented to it in the various claims made by the workmen of the Lead Plant of hindustan Zinc limited in the I. Ds before it, including the issue regarding its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims. ( 91 ) IT requires to be noticed that all the petitioners in W. P. No. 25745/01 except petitioners Nos. 14 and 20 had earlier filed a writ Petition No. 375 of 2001 along with others challenging the proceedings of the management dt. 26-12-2000 (calling upon the workmen of the Lead Plant to exercise their option for voluntary retirement package by the specified date, failing which they would face termination from service.) further, all the petitioners except petitioners nos. 1 and 9 to 11, in W. P. 25745/01 have also filed claims under Section 2-A (2) of the act, which have been numbered as IDs, before the Tribunal. It is against the entertainment of these IDs along with other ids by the Tribunal that writ petitions have been filed by the Hindustan Zinc Ltd, before this court seeking a writ of prohibition. In w. P. 25745/01 the petitioners have urged and pressed for adjudication by this court, issues and disputes which also form the substrata of the claims and reliefs sought under Section 2-A (2) of the Act. In w. P. 25745/01 the petitioners have urged and pressed for adjudication by this court, issues and disputes which also form the substrata of the claims and reliefs sought under Section 2-A (2) of the Act. This court on a satisfaction that the various contentions and challenges are inextricably inter linked, considered them and recorded its findings and conclusions, in W. P. 25745/01. The conclusions of this court on such issues bind the Tribunal. ( 92 ) IN the circumstances no useful purpose is served by recourse to the ritual of relegating the petitioner-Hindustan Zinc ltd. , in W. P. 26575/01 and batch, to put forth its objections to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal or on the merits of the claims of the respondents/workmen. Therefore, though on the basis of precedents, this court is satisfied that in respect of contentions (ii), (iii) and (v) of the petitioner, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate, as these contentions have already been considered and answered against the workmen, in w. P. 25745 of 2001, nothing remains for the tribunal to decide, on the claims of the workmen. ( 93 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case and on the analysis above, W. P. 26576 of 2001 and Batch, are allowed. The industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, visakhapatnam be prohibited from proceeding with the adjudication of I. D. Nos. 57, 58, 64, 77, 69, 60, 66, 71, 70, 62, 68, 61, 67, 75, 65, 76, 56 and 74 of 2001; 1 to 10 and 12 to 24 of 2002, on its file. Having regard to the conclusions recorded in W. P. No. 25745 of 2001 the claims of the workmen in the above IDs are misconceived and they are not entitled to any relief thereunder. The IDs shall accordingly be dismissed. ( 94 ) IN the result W. P. No. 25745 of 2001 is dismissed. W. P. Nos. 18437 of 2001 and 26576 of 2001 and Batch, are allowed. No order as to costs.