L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisions arise out of the same proceedings before the Court of the principal Junior Civil Judge, Kamareddy. ( 2 ) THE respondents herein filed O. S. 61 of1994 against the petitioner for the relief of declaration of title, recovery of possession and permanent injunction. The petitioner was served with notice but she did not respond. In view of the same, she was set ex parte and ultimately ex parte decree was passed on 11-9-1998 in the suit. Respondents also filed E. P. 34 of 2000 for execution of the decree in O. S. 61 of 1994. The decree was executed on 24-12-2000 by delivery of possession of the suit schedule property; through the Bailiff of the Court. ( 3 ) THE petitioner came to know about thefact of the suit having been decreed ex parte and the execution of the decree only at that stage. She filed an application to set aside the orders passed in E. P. 34 of 2000. Since there was delay, she filed E. A. 502 of 2000 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The same was dismissed by the trial Court on 13-10-2000. Aggrieved thereby she filed c. R. P. 4449 of 2000. This Court dismissed the C. R. P. through orders dated 21-12-2000 taking the view that it was not permissible to file an application to set aside an order passed in execution of the suit and that Rule 13 of Order 9 has no application to execution proceedings. It was, however, left open to the petitioner to take appropriate steps to get the ex parte decree set aside. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner filed anapplication under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree dated 11-9-1998. Since there was delay of 1334 days by the time the application came to be filed, she filed LA. 343 of 2002 under Section 5 to condone the same. The trial Court dismissed the LA. 343 of 2000 through order dated 26-12-2002. The same is challenged in C. R. P. 200 of 2003. ( 5 ) ALLEGING that the petitioner wasinterfering with their possession despite the order of permanent injunction, the respondents filed E. P. 7 of 2002 under order 21 Rule 32 CPC against the petitioner. The trial Court dismissed the LA. 343 of 2000 through order dated 26-12-2002. The same is challenged in C. R. P. 200 of 2003. ( 5 ) ALLEGING that the petitioner wasinterfering with their possession despite the order of permanent injunction, the respondents filed E. P. 7 of 2002 under order 21 Rule 32 CPC against the petitioner. On finding that the petitioner, judgment- debtor has violated the decree of injunction, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against her through its order dt. 26-12-2002. The same is challenged in C:r. P. 198 of 2003. ( 6 ) SHRI A. Sudershan Reddy, learnedcounsel for the petitioner submits that on receiving the notice, the petitioner had engaged an advocate and for reasons best known to him, he did not file Vakalat and on account of his lapse the ex parte decree came to be passed. When she came to know about the existence of an ex parte decree and when she was sought to be dispossessed in the execution process she prayed the execution court by filing E. A. 502 of 2002, may be under a wrong advice, and ultimately the present application came to be filed. He" submits that the trial court ought to have condoned the delay having regard to the fact that the petitioner was not conversant with the court procedure. Insofar as the order in e. P. 7 of 2002 is concerned, the learned counsel submits that the suit schedule property was an open land and though the petitioner did not interfere with the same in any manner, the respondents have filed the application to harass her. It is also his case that once the proceedings for setting aside the ex parte decree are pending, the trial court ought not to have entertained E. P. 7 of 2002 at all. ( 7 ) SHRI M. Rajamalla Reddy, learnedcounsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the Trial Court was left with no alternative except to pass an ex parte decree since there was no response from the petitioner despite several adjournments. It was only two years thereafter that they have filed E. P. 34 of 2000 and got the decree executed on 21-10-2000. It was only two years thereafter that they have filed E. P. 34 of 2000 and got the decree executed on 21-10-2000. It is his case that whatever may have been the justification for not filing an application to set aside the ex parte order in E. P. the petitioner did not offer any explanation worth its name in her not filing the application at least after the dismissal of the CRP. As regards proceedings initiated under Order 21 rule 32, he submits that though the possession was delivered to the respondents and though there existed injunction in their favour, the petitioner continued to interfere with their possession and as such they were compelled to file E. P. 7 of 2002. According to him, the Trial Court had taken into account all the surrounding circumstances and passed the appropriate orders and the same does not call for any interference. ( 8 ) A perusal of the facts narrated abovewill indicate that the suit which was filed in 1994 came to be decreed ex parte in 1998. It was not as if the petitioner was not served with the notice in the suit. It is also not the case where the trial court had decreed the suit within a short time after its having been filed. The parties resided in the same town where the court is located. The suit remained on the file of the Court for 4 years before it came to be decreed ex parte. No explanation worth its name was offered by the petitioner as to how she was prevented from contesting the suit for a period of 4 years. The contention that she engaged an advocate and he did not file Vakalat is too spacious to be accepted. ( 9 ) BE that as it may, when she came toknow about the execution of the decree she approached the Court by filing E. A. 502 of 2000 for condonation of delay in filing an application to set aside the execution. The same was dismissed by the executing court. This Court in C. R. P. 4449 of 2000 through its order dated 21-12-2000 upheld the view taken by the trial Court. However, it was left open to the petitioner to pursue her remedies through ex parte decree. The same was dismissed by the executing court. This Court in C. R. P. 4449 of 2000 through its order dated 21-12-2000 upheld the view taken by the trial Court. However, it was left open to the petitioner to pursue her remedies through ex parte decree. ( 10 ) AN important aspect of the matter isthat though this Court permitted the petitioner to work out her remedies against ex parte decree through its order dated 21-12-2000, the application to set aside the ex parte decree came to be filed only on 6-6-2002, by which time there was a delay of nearly 1334 days. Hardly any explanation was offered for not filing an application for over a period of one and half years subsequent to the dismissal of the C. R. P. The trial Court had taken all these aspects into account and had dismissed the LA. ( 11 ) NORMALLY, Court would be inclined tocondone delay in filing applications to set aside ex parte orders so that the parties are given an opportunity to get an adjudication of the matter on merits. However, an enormous delay of 4 years hardly with an explanation acceptable in law, is difficult to be condoned. Further, by the time the application came to be considered by the court, the decree for delivery of possession stood executed and any indulgence by this court would have the effect of putting the entire clock back by several years. The same is not permissible at the instance of a person who did not exhibit proper diligence. I do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the Trial Court in LA. 343 of 2002. The CRP is accordingly dismissed. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not interfered with the possession of the respondents insofar as the land in question is concerned nor does she propose to interfere with the same in future. Recording the said statement, the order of the trial Court in e. P. 7 of 2002 is set. aside and CRP 198 of 2003 is allowed. It is however, made clear that in the event of the petitioner s interference with the possession of the respondents as regards suit schedule property, it shall be open to them to take such steps as are open to them in law.