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2003 DIGILAW 260 (PAT)

Mangal Singh Munda v. State Of Bihar

2003-03-05

NARAYAN ROY

body2003
Judgment Narayan Roy, J. 1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and J.C. to Standing Counsel No. 7 for the respondents and considered the counter-affidavit 2. The orders as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 are under challenge whereby and whereunder the disciplinary authority has started a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner even after conclusion of the earlier departmental proceeding culminating into exoneration of the petitioner. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was earlier proceeded against departmentally and the matter was enquired into and after submission of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority dropped the departmental proceeding against the petitioner by exonerating him and he was released from suspension vide order as contained in Annexure-5 dated 7-9-2000. Learned Counsel further submitted that the order as contained in Annexure-5 was passed by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, the earlier order passed by the disciplinary authority as contained in Annexure-5 could not have been reviewed vide orders as contained in Annexures 1 and 2. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents stating therein that on close scrutiny of the matter, it was found that the earlier proceeding initiated against the petitioner was not completed in all respects and the State Government considered it fit to enquire into the matter again. It is also stated that the petitioner was proceeded against departmentally with the approval of the Chief Minister of the State of Bihar whereas the order of suspension has been revoked after taking approval of the Minister of the Department. 5. In a departmental proceeding, the Departmental Head is the disciplinary authority and from Annexure-5, it appears that a decision was taken by the disciplinary authority exonerating the petitioner from the charges levelled against him. Once the enquiry is concluded and the enquiry report is submitted, it is obligatory upon the disciplinary authority either to act upon the enquiry report or to direct for fresh enquiry after giving opportunity to the delinquent employee. But in the given case, it appears that on submission of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority was in complete agreement with the enquiry officer and he being satisfied that the charges were not proved against the petitioner, dropped the proceeding and exonerated him from the charges levelled against him. It does not appear to be a case where the disciplinary authority was not fully satisfied with the enquiry report. It does not appear to be a case where the disciplinary authority was not fully satisfied with the enquiry report. 6. The matter since was concluded by exonerating the petitioner by the disciplinary authority, the decision taken by the disciplinary authority was not subject to review and a fresh departmental enquiry, therefore, is not maintainable. The decision taken in the departmental enquiry tantamounts to a judicial order and the same cannot be varied at the sweet will of the authority, who was empowered to impose punishment. 7. In the case of Bachhittar Singh V/s. State of Punjab and Anr., (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 395), the Apex Court faced with the similar facts held: "Before we deal with the grounds we may State that the High Court was of the opinion that the proceedings taken against the appellant were made up of two parts: (a) the enquiry (which involved a decision of the question whether the allegations made against the appellant were true or not) and (b) taking action (i. e., in case the allegations were found to be true, whether the appellant should be punished or not and if so in what manner. According to the High Court the first point involved a decision on the evidence and may in its nature be described as judicial while the latter was purely an administrative decision and that in so far as this was concerned there was no reason why the State Government was incompetent to change its decision "if it though administratively advisable to do so". We cannot accept the view taken by the High Court regarding the nature of what it calls the second part of the proceedings. Departmental proceedings taken against a Government servant are not divisible in the sense in which the High Court understands them to be. There is just one continuous proceeding though there are two stages in it. The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established. That stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned. The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established. That stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned. The High Court accepts that the first stage is a judicial proceeding and indeed it must be so because charges have to be framed, notice has to be given and the person concerned has to be given an opportunity of being heard. Even so far as the second stage is concerned Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution requires a notice to be given to the person concerned as also an opportunity of being heard. Therefore this stage of the proceeding is no less judicial than the earlier one. Consequently any action decided to be taken against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is a judicial order and as such it cannot be varied at the will of the authority who is empowered to impose the punishment. Indeed, the very object with which notice is required to be given on the question of punishment is to ensure that it will be such as would be justified upon the charges established and upon the other attendant circumstances of the case. It is thus wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of action against a person found guilty of any charge at a departmental enquiry as an administrative order." Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh (supra), this question was again considered in the case of Brij Mohan Prasad and Anr. V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board and Ors., (1998 (2) BUR 804; 1998 (1) PLJR 622) and it was held that decision taken by the disciplinary authority amounted to -a judicial order and that was not to be reviewed. 8 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after hearing the parties at length and also in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court and also by this Court, it is held that the orders impugned as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 are unreasonable, arbitrary and wholly without jurisdiction. 9. In the result, this application is allowed and the orders impugned as contained in Annexures 1 and 2 are set aside. No costs.