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2003 DIGILAW 261 (ALL)

Ashok Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh

2003-02-05

JAGDISH BHALLA, Y.R.TRIPATHI

body2003
Y. R. TRIPATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, husband of opposite party No. 4, through this petition, has sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order No. 7476/ma. Ka. Ni de/da. Pa. Adhi/jach/2001-02 dated 22-9-2001, contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition whereby the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer entertaining an application of Smt. Namita Shukla against the order dated 13-10-1999 of Dowry Prohibition Officer, Lucknow rejecting her complaint against the petitioner, has cancelled the said order of 13-10-1999 purportedly in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. The petitioner has also prayed for issuance of a mandamus commanding the opposite parties 2 and 3 not to act upon the aforesaid order. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this petition are a few and lie in narrow compass. Indisputably the petitioner got married with opposite party No. 4 on 23-4-1998. It appears that after thier marriage, some differences arose between them and both the parties crossed swords against each other. The opposite party No. 4 made an application to the Dowry Prohibition Officer alleging demand of dowry on the part of the petitioner. The Dowry Prohibition Officer made an enquiry and found the allegations untenable and baseless. He accordingly concluded that the matter did not relate to the demand of dowry and rejecting the complaint of opposite party No. 4 informed the petitioner of the same vide his letter No. 719/po. K. Dahej/99-2000 dated 27-11-1999. Dissatisfied from rejection of her complaint by the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, the opposite party No. 4 agitated the matter before the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer , who got an enquiry made into the matter by a two member committee appointed by him and acting upon the report of the said committee concluded about the prima facie correctness of the allegations relating to demand of dowry on the part of the petitioner and treating the application of opposite party No. 4 as an appeal, cancelled the order dated 13-10-1999 passed by the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer whereby he had rejected the complaint of opposite party No. 4. Aggrieved from this order of the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, the petitioner has preferred this petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the same as also to direct the opposite parties 2 and 3 not to proceed further in the matter on the basis of the impugned order. Aggrieved from this order of the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, the petitioner has preferred this petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the same as also to direct the opposite parties 2 and 3 not to proceed further in the matter on the basis of the impugned order. ( 3 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Standing Counsel and the opposite parties 4 and 5, who appeared in person. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of his arguments, assailed the impugned order on the grounds that neither the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer had any appellate jurisdiction over the orders of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, nor was he vested with any power of enquiry, hence had no jurisdiction to make the order in question. Contrary to it, the opposite parties urged that the impugned order was well within the jurisdiction of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer as he being the head of Dowry Prohibition Officers, the powers exercised by him shall be deemed to be vested in him. ( 5 ) WITH a view to eradicating evil practice of giving and taking of dowry in marriage, the Parliament, to meet the long standing demand within and outside it, enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, hearinafter referred to as the Act. A perusal of various provisions of the Act goes to show that whereas the Act makes giving and taking of dowry punishable, it also takes within its ambit the demand of dowry and makes it penal. It also provides for settting up of a machinery responsible for administration of the Act as also to collect evidence and make complaints where allegations with regard to giving and taking of dowry or demand of dowry were prima facie correct. Section 8 of the Act empowers the State Government to appoint as many Dowry Prohibition Officers as it thinks fit for specific areas wherein they can exercise their jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) of that Section specifies functions, which can be performed by such Dowry Prohibition Officers. Sub-section (3) gives power to the State Government to confer, by notification, such powers of the police officers on the Dowry Prohibition Officers as it may specify in such notification. Sub-section (2) of that Section specifies functions, which can be performed by such Dowry Prohibition Officers. Sub-section (3) gives power to the State Government to confer, by notification, such powers of the police officers on the Dowry Prohibition Officers as it may specify in such notification. Then sub-section (4) of that Section empowers the State Government to constitute an advisory board for the purpose of advising and assisting the Dowry Prohibition Officers in the efficient performance of their functions. Section 10 of the Act gives power to the State Government to make rules through notification in the official Gazette for carrying out the purposes of the Act. ( 6 ) IT is not disputed that the State Government has appointed all the District Prohibition Officers in their respective districts as Dowry Prohibition Officers under sub-section (1) of Section 8-B of the Act. The post of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer is the creation of the Uttar Pradesh Dowry Prohibition Rules, 1999, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, framed by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 10 of the Act. The powers of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer have been defined in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Nowhere under the Rules, the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer has been given the power to sit in appeal over the orders of the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officers. A perusal of sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 5 of the Rules would go to show that the post of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer has been created simply to administer and co-ordinate the work among the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officers throughout the State. Since the appointment of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer is not made under sub-section (1) of Section 8b of the Act, he cannot be said to be vested with powers exercisable by the Dowry Prohibition Officers under sub-section (2) of Section 8-B of the Act. The function of Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer is, therefore, confined only to administer and co-ordinate the work among the Dowry Prohibition Officers, as provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Rules. In blacks Law Dictionary, the meaning of the word "administer" is "to manage". Similarly in "the Law Lexicon, the word "co-ordinate" has been assigned the meaning "to combine or integrate harmoniously". In blacks Law Dictionary, the meaning of the word "administer" is "to manage". Similarly in "the Law Lexicon, the word "co-ordinate" has been assigned the meaning "to combine or integrate harmoniously". From the Hindi Text of the Rules as also the background in which both these words have been used seem to cast a duty on the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer to manage and integrate harmoniously the functions of Dowry Prohibition Officers. Thus from the nature of functions to be performed by the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer as provided in the Rules, it does not appear that the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer has in any way been given the appellate jurisdiction over the Dowry Prohibition Officers. It has not been shown that either the appointment of the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer has been made under Section 8-B of the Act, or he has been empowered to work as Dowry Prohibition Officer. The fact that sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Rules provides for the Chief Probation Officer or any other suitable officer posted in Women Welfare Department of the State Government to be designated as Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer suggests that a person other than a District Probation Officer, who has been appointed as Dowry Prohibition Officer in his respective jurisdiction by the State Government, can also be appointed as Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer. In view of this, it cannot be said that the dowry Prohibition Officer includes the chief Dowry Prohibition Officer or that a Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer being above in hierarchy to Dowry Prohibition Officers will be deemed to have all those powers which a Dowry Prohibition Officer possesses by virtue of his appointment under Section 8b of the Act. ( 7 ) IT would also be pertinent to point out that clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 8b of the Act empowers a Dowry Prohibition Officer to collect such evidence as may be necessary for the prosecution of persons committing offences under the Act. Rule 8 of the Rules lays down that in all cases of complaints investigated by Dowry Prohibition Officers when there is a prima facie finding as to the commission of an offence, the report shall be submitted to the competent magistrate for prosecuting the offender along with the statements recorded, all other connected documents of the proceedings and a brief account of his findings. The said rule also provides that such a report of Dowry Prohibition Officer shall be deemed to be a report under Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974 ). Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act provides for taking cognizance of offences under the Act by a magistrate upon a police report of the facts. We thus notice that under Rule 8 of the Rules, a report submitted by the Dowry Prohibition Officer has been given the status of police report by fiction of law. Thus the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer being not a Dowry Prohibition Officer has no power under the Act or the Rules either to investigate a complaint or to submit any report of his findings to the magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under the Act. We are, therefore, afraid if the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer can impose his discretion on a Dowry Prohibition Officer by setting aside his order. In the absence of his appointment as a Dowry Prohibition Officer under Section 8b of the Act, the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, to our opinion, cannot perform the functions of Dowry Prohibition Officer more, so when the Rules framed by the State Government, of which he is the creation, clearly define his duties and functions. There is also no provision under the Act or the Rules, under which the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer can be said to have been vested with the appellate jurisdiction over the Dowry Prohibition Officers. ( 8 ) IT may be argued that from the objects of the Act it appears that it has been enacted to give benefit to an aggrieved party and if a Dowry Prohibition Officer despite there being sufficient material establishing the offence prima facie acts whimsically and does not submit his report for some extraneous considerations, the entire purpose of the Act would frustrate. The existence of a supervisory authority to exercise check over such a whimsical or arbitrary exercise of power on the part of a Dowry Prohibition Officer thus can be justified, but this reasoning too does not carry any weight. The existence of a supervisory authority to exercise check over such a whimsical or arbitrary exercise of power on the part of a Dowry Prohibition Officer thus can be justified, but this reasoning too does not carry any weight. Section 7 of the Act which deals with cognizance of offences itself is an answer to this question as it provides other modes also for taking cognizance of an offence by the competent magistrate, who is not preclude from taking cognizance of an offence under the Act on the complaint of an aggrieved party itself. Thus any whimsical or arbitrary exercise of power on the part of a Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer would not come in the way of the aggrieved party and it can straightway make the complaint to the magistrate competent to take cognizance in the matter. ( 9 ) IN view of the above, it cannot be held either that by virtue of his being senior in hierarchy or being vested with powers to administer and coordinate the work among the Dowry Prohibition Officers, the power of review is implicit or inherent in Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer. It is also found that the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer has adopted a novel procedure in this case. From his order, it is borne out that he had appointed a two member committee to enquire into the allegations made by the opposite party No. 4 against the petitioner. Sub-section (4) of Section 8b of the Act provides for constitution of an advisory board by the State Government to advise and assist the Dowry Prohibition Officers in the efficient performance of their functions. Neither the Act nor the Rules made thereunder anywhere permit the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer to appoint such a committee to investigate a complaint made by an aggrieved party. On this count also, the order of the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer cannot be said to be in accordance with the Act and the Rules. 9. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the impugned order dated 22-9-2001 (Annexure 1) passed by the Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer is without jurisdiction and unsustainable. The Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, in view of his functions specified in the Rules, had no authority to impose his conclusions on the Dowry Prohibition Officer and had also no power to sit in appeal over the finding of the Dowry Prohibition Officer. The Chief Dowry Prohibition Officer, in view of his functions specified in the Rules, had no authority to impose his conclusions on the Dowry Prohibition Officer and had also no power to sit in appeal over the finding of the Dowry Prohibition Officer. This being the position , the impunged order is found illegal and inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules referred to above. ( 10 ) THE writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order dated 22-9-2001 (Annexure 1) is hereby quashed. The opposite parties 2 and 3 are directed not to take any action against the petitioner on the basis of the said order. ( 11 ) THERE would be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. . .