JUDGMENT : S.N. Srivastava, J. Present petition has been instituted assailing the orders dated 14.7.2003, passed by Managing Director, Respondent No. 2 as also the order dated 12.6.2003, passed by Regional Manager Respondent No. 3. 2. Petitioner, who had entered into the service of the bank in the year 1977, was working at the relevant time as Asstt. Field Officer, in Khandauli Branch of U.P. Sahkari Gram Vikas Bank Ltd. District Agra and while posted as such, he handled certain loan matters in the years 1991 and 1994 sought by one Dhan Singh. Subsequently, some complaint by one subscribing himself as Dhan Singh was received at the end of Respondent No. 3, i.e., Regional Manager on Tahsil Diwas making imputations of financial irregularities against the Petitioner and one Ashok Kumar Rana in the matter of payment of certain loan to one Dhan Singh, resident of Nagla Lodh District Agra. Upon receipt of the complaint, notices were issued to the Petitioner on 19.9.2002, directing him to appear on 25.9.2002 and explain his conduct. It is alleged that the Petitioner could not appear on the date fixed as the said notice was served to him belatedly on 30.9.2002. However, it is alleged that the Petitioner submitted his explanation on 30.9.2002 the substance of which was that the allegations embodied in the complaint were all false and baseless. It would appear from the record that the order dated 12.6.2003, made by the Regional Manager Respondent No. 3 vivified the matter by which the Petitioner was fastened with the delinquency of indulging in certain irregularities in the transaction of repayment of the loan granted to the loaned member and he was enjoined to deposit Rs. 9,000 in the bank. Aggrieved by the order, it is alleged, the Petitioner went up in appeal and the Managing Director who is arrayed as Respondent No. 1, directed initiation of disciplinary enquiry appointing Regional Manager, Aligarh Branch as enquiry officer vide order dated 14.7.2003. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and also Sri H. R. Misra for the Respondents. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner canvassed that the loans related back to the year 1991 and 1994 and therefore, the complaint made against the Petitioner is too belated and cannot be entertained. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and also Sri H. R. Misra for the Respondents. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner canvassed that the loans related back to the year 1991 and 1994 and therefore, the complaint made against the Petitioner is too belated and cannot be entertained. He further canvassed that the complaint is actuated by improper motive and the dealing done by the Petitioner was scrupulous and simple inasmuch as the amount of loan was accordingly disbursed to Dhan Singh from whom the buffalo concerned was purchased. It was further canvassed that in case the complainant was aggrieved by any of the conduct or action of the Petitioner, he could have made the complaint to the higher authority and in that event, he could not have received the second instalment. He further submitted that the aforesaid Dhan Singh also transacted second loan for purchase of Buffalo and in connection with the second loan also, no grievance was articulated and the belated complaint appears to have been induced by improper motive. It has been further submitted that disciplinary enquiry having been completed, the Petitioner was taxed with the liability of depositing Rs. 9,000 and disciplinary enquiry for the second time ordered by the appellate authority in appeal would amount to vexing the Petitioner twice in the same matter. On the other hand, Sri H. R. Misra, tried to vindicate the impugned orders sating across the bar that the complaint made against the Petitioner was substantiated in the preliminary enquiry and that the final enquiry has now been ordered in which the Petitioner would have full play to have his say to resist or repudiate the allegations. 5. Before addressing the rival contentions, it would be apt to delve into the relevant Rules framed by U.P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. under the Regulation 102 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. Rule 81 (1) of the U.P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules, 1976, envisages that enquiry officer shall be appointed by the appointing authority or an officer authorised by the appointing authority qualified with the proviso that the officer at whose instance disciplinary action was commenced shall not be appointed as enquiry officer. Rule 81 (1) of the U.P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules, 1976, envisages that enquiry officer shall be appointed by the appointing authority or an officer authorised by the appointing authority qualified with the proviso that the officer at whose instance disciplinary action was commenced shall not be appointed as enquiry officer. Rule (1) (a) postulates the enquiry officer shall observe the principles of natural justice for which it shall be necessary that the employee shall be served with a charge-sheet containing specific charges, the evidence in support of each charge and he shall be required to submit explanation in respect of the charge within a reasonable time which shall be not less than 15 days. Rule 81 (1) (b) bespeaks that such employee shall also be given opportunity to produce at his own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given opportunity of being heard in person if he so desires. Clause (c) of the aforestated Rule 81 (1) indicates that if no explanation in respect of charge-sheet is received or the explanation submit is unsatisfactory the competent authority may award him punishment considered necessary. 6. So far as the contention that the order dated 12.6.2003, passed by the Respondent No. 3 was made without affording opportunity of hearing and was made contrary to the principles of natural justice, is concerned, it has been contended by Sri H. R. Misra that the enquiry initiated on the complaint of Dhan Singh was in effect a preliminary enquiry in which the imputation made against the Petitioner was held good and he was taxed with the liability of depositing Rs. 9,000. From a perusal of the order dated 12.6.2003, it transpires to me that the Respondent No. 3 issued orders of recovering the amount from the Petitioner on the basis of directions received from the head office by means of the letter dated 29.5.2003. It does transpire that upon the complaint the Regional Manager must have held fact-finding enquiry and in consequence the Petitioner was required to appear and submit his explanation and therefore, if any enquiry has been conducted, it savours of a preliminary enquiry which according to the settled view does not necessarily bring into play the principles of natural justice in all rigidity. 7. 7. The next submission of the learned Counsel revolves round the argument that charge-sheet has not been drawn as yet. It would crystallize from the impugned order passed by the Respondent No. 1 that the impugned order contained direction to the enquiry officer to complete the enquiry within three months. The impugned order was passed on 14.7.2003, and stipulated period has already expired. In my considered view, it would meet the ends of justice if necessary direction is issued to the enquiry officer to complete the enquiry expeditiously. 8. The second limb of the argument made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Respondent No. 1 before whom (alleged) appeal was preferred against the impugned order passed by the Respondent, had illegally made orders directing disciplinary enquiry. From a bare reading of the order passed by the Respondent No. 3, it does appear to me that the order directing disciplinary enquiry and appointing enquiry officer was passed by the Respondent No. 1 as an authority clothed with the power of appointing authority. It also surfaces from the text of the impugned order that it was passed pursuant to the Resolution No. 8 dated 7.7.1999 of committee of management by which the Managing Director exercising his power of initiating regular disciplinary enquiry and by the self-same order, he appointed the enquiry officer. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also canvassed that the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Services Regulations, 1975, are applicable and the impugned orders are contrary to the Statute. Sri H. R. Misra appearing for the opposite parties urged that the U.P. Rajya Sahkari Bhumi Vikas Bank Employees Service Rules, 1976, have been framed in exercise of power under Regulation 102 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975, and under the aforesaid Rules, 1976, the Managing Director is fully competent to pass the order. Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, 1976 envisages that the committee of management may delegate to the Chairman, Executive Committee or the Secretary/Managing Director subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose all or any powers conferred upon it by these rules. Rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules, 1976 envisages that the committee of management may delegate to the Chairman, Executive Committee or the Secretary/Managing Director subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose all or any powers conferred upon it by these rules. Again Rule 18 of the Rules, 1976, postulates that "(1) subject to the regulations, the appointment shall be made by (a) the committee of management, the executive committee or officer authorised by the committee of management or (b) such authority as may be specified in the Act, Rules or the bye-laws; Provided that the letter of appointment shall, in all the cases other than that of the Managing Director be issued by the Managing Director/Secretary.... My attention has also been drawn to definition clause contained in Regulation 2 in which appointing authority has been defined to mean 'committee of management' or any other authority which is empowered under these rules, the Act, the Rules or the Bye-laws of the bank or by the resolution of the managing committee, to make appointment. The fact that the Managing Director ordered regular disciplinary enquiry pursuant to Resolution No. 8 of the committee of management does indicate that the power had been delegated to the Managing Director who accordingly acted in exercise of the power conferred upon him. In connection with the proposition that it was the committee of management of the Bank which is empowered to make appointment etc. the quintessence of what has been held by the Supreme Court in State of Assam etc. Vs. Kripanath Sarma and Others etc., AIR 1967 SC 459 , may be considered. It was observed by the Apex Court that "Even so, in law, the appointing authority is only the Assistant Secretary, though the power is to be exercised on the advice or recommendation of the Committee. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any different intention appearing from the fact that the appointment has to be made on the recommendation or advice of the committee. The appointing authority would still be the Assistant Secretary and no one else, and there is no reason why, if he is the appointing authority, he cannot dismiss those appointed by him.... The appointing authority would still be the Assistant Secretary and no one else, and there is no reason why, if he is the appointing authority, he cannot dismiss those appointed by him.... It is too patent from Rule 81 (1) that the disciplinary proceedings against an employee shall be conducted by inquiring officer appointed by the appointing authority or by an officer of the Bank authorised by the appointing authority. The departmental proceeding, in the instant case, has been ordered by the Managing Director who, it has not been disputed, is clothed with the power of appointing authority. In the fact situation, it cannot be assumed that the Managing Director had no power vested in him to order disciplinary enquiry or that the Petitioner was vexed twice over the self-same matter or that the authority had passed the impugned order in appeal. In consequence, I converge to the conclusion that the order initiating disciplinary enquiry passed by the Respondent No. 1 has been rightly passed accordingly and in strict observance of the provisions of the Regulations. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has not drawn attention to any aspect, which may indicate that the regular disciplinary enquiry has been ordered against the provisions of the Regulations or the same has been ordered in antagonism of the principles of natural justice. I do not entertain any misgiving that the regular disciplinary enquiry would be held in accordance with the provisions embodied in the Regulations in which the Petitioner would have ample opportunity to contest or repudiate or resist the charges against him and to prove his innocence in the enquiry and that the principles of natural justice would be fully observed in letter and spirit. 9. It has been lastly submitted that impugned order dated 12.6.2003 directing recovery from the Petitioner could not be passed. As stated supra, it is explicit from the record that the impugned order was passed pursuant to some directions received from the head office contained in letter dated 29.5.2003. It is also eloquent that direction seems to have been issued acting on the fact finding report submitted by the Respondent No. 3 and subsequently, it appears, decision was taken to direct initiation of regular disciplinary enquiry having regard to the grievous nature of the allegations. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner invoked in aid certain decision in vindication of his submissions made across the bar. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner invoked in aid certain decision in vindication of his submissions made across the bar. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are Shiv Narain Shukla v. District Asstt. Registrar Cooperative Societies, U.P. 1996 (2) AWC 684 ; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei 1967 (1) SLR 465 ; State of Assam and Another Vs. J.N. Roy Biswas, (1976) 1 SCC 234 ; Ram Nath Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2002) 3 AWC 2078 ; Sri C. D. Prabhu v. Dy. Commissioner South Kanara Bangalore and Anr. 1969 (3) SLR 362 and State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 330 . I have carefully glanced through the decisions cited above and considering the rule flowing from the rulings aforestated, I would confine myself to saying that the above decisions do not render much assistance to the Petitioner in the perspective of the controversy involved in those cases which bear no resemblance to the controversy involved in the instant case. 10. So far as contention of bias alleged against the Respondent No. 3 is concerned, from a perusal of the explanation (Annexure-5 to the petition) submitted by the Petitioner in response to the notice issued by the Respondent No. 3, it does not appear that any such ground was agitated by the Petitioner and the subsequent plea appears to be an afterthought decocted with a view to screening himself. In the circumstances, the plea of bias does not hold ground and cannot be lapped up. Besides, it is obvious from the record that final regular disciplinary enquiry has been entrusted to Regional Manager, Aligarh and in the circumstances, there should be no surviving grievance. 11. As a result of foregoing discussion, the petition is partly allowed. In view of the fact that a regular departmental enquiry has been ordered to be conducted, the impugned order dated 12.6.2003, which envisages recovery from the Petitioner, is accordingly quashed and it is directed that the disciplinary authority shall pass appropriate order in the light of the finding contained in the enquiry report in accordance with regulations. In the perspective of what has been discussed, it would be appropriate to observe that the disciplinary authority shall ensure that the enquiry against the Petitioner is completed expeditiously in accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations. In the perspective of what has been discussed, it would be appropriate to observe that the disciplinary authority shall ensure that the enquiry against the Petitioner is completed expeditiously in accordance with the provisions contained in the Regulations. In case charge-sheet has not yet been framed and served, the said exercise shall be processed and completed within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.