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2003 DIGILAW 264 (RAJ)

Mahendra Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan

2003-02-19

PRAKASH TATIA

body2003
JUDGMENT 1. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners submitted their candidature for appointment to the post of Transport Sub-Inspector in pursuance of advertisement dated 15.10.01 issued by RPSC, Rajasthan Public Service Commission, (for short as "RPSC"), Petitioners submitted that all the petitioners are eligible candidates and they were declared successful in written examination. Petitioners were also called for interview by the RPSC. The petitioners appeared in the said interview conducted by RPSC. As required by Rule 17(2) of Rajasthan Transport Subordinate Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules of 1963"), and required by interview letter, the candidates were required to produce their original certificates at the time of interview failing which the candidate could not have been permitted to face the interview and his candidature is required to be rejected by the RPSC. The RPSC instead of rejecting the candidature of candidates, who did not produce the original documents at the time of the interview, included the names of those defaulting candidates in the select list and declared those candidates provisionally selected for the said post. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, in the advertisement issued on 15.10.01 itself, the eligibility and other requirements have been given. In sub-clause(4) of condition no. 13, it is mentioned that all-the candidates should furnish the requisite certificates of eligibility with respect to qualifications before the interview Sub-clause (2) of R.17 also provides that candidates are required to submit the applications and that should be complete in all respects and should be in accordance with instructions issued by RPSC. It is also. provided in sub-clause (2) of R.17 that candidate is required to ensure himself/herself that he/she fulfils all the conditions regarding age, educational qualifications, experience, number of chance, if any etc. etc. as provided in the rules and if the candidate is allowed to take examination it shall not entitle the candidate to take presumption of eligibility. It is provided that Commission shall scrutinise the applications of such candidates only who qualify in the written examination and shall call only the eligible candidates to viva-voce test, if any. Sub-clause (3) of R.17 of the said Rules provides that decision of the Commission in respect of admission of a candidate to an examination, eligibility and consequent admission to viva-voce, if any, shall be final. Sub-clause (3) of R.17 of the said Rules provides that decision of the Commission in respect of admission of a candidate to an examination, eligibility and consequent admission to viva-voce, if any, shall be final. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, the Commission had left with no option but to reject the candidature of those candidates who failed to produce the documents on or before the date of interview. 3. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that RPSC unequivocally again in the interview call letters issued to the candidates very clearly mentioned that, in case candidates will not come with original certificates, their candidatures shall be rejected and will not be permitted to appear for viva-voce test. Emphasis was further given in the interview call letter itself by giving note in block, that candidates should come with all the certificates otherwise they will be declared ineligible, therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, in these circumstances, action of RPSC permitting them to furnish the original certificates subsequent to the date of interview is illegal. It is also submitted that RPSC had no jurisdiction to declare the result as provisional result or declare a candidate selected provisionally. If such candidature of these candidates is rejected, the petitioners who are ranking below those candidates will get selection on the post. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, as per rule 17(2) of the rules of 1963, the candidate is supposed to not only possess the eligibility for the post on the last date fixed for submitting the application but is also supposed to have relevant certificate in his possession, failing which he cannot be treated as a eligible candidate. Therefore, the petitioners prayed that the result declared by the RPSC by including the names of those candidates who did not produce original documents at the time of interview be quashed and RPSC be directed to declare result of the candidates who produced the original documents at the time of interview and if petitioners names find place in select list their names be recommended for appointment to the post. 4. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent RPSC did not dispute, rather admitted, that the candidate must fulfil the eligibility on the last date fixed for submitting application form but seriously contested the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding effect of not submitting certificates by the candidate at the time of the interview and submitted that possession of relevant certificate at the time of submitting the application form or at the time of interview has nothing to do with eligibility of the candidate. Non-production of those certificates is only a default of the candidate and on the basis this default of the candidate, the RPSC has a right in itself to cancel candidature of the candidate. The RPSC has not considered any candidate who did not possess the requisite qualification on the last date of submission of application. The RPSC, as per rule 2, is required to obtain the applications from the candidates and in case incomplete application is received, it can be rejected at initial stage. Even the RPSC has been given power to scrutinise the application of the candidates later on and can call only eligible candidates to viva-voce test. The requirement of producing certificates in original and copies whereof itself is not the eligibility of the candidate but they are the proof of eligibility of candidate. If it is mentioned in the interview letter that candidature of candidate shall be rejected if he fails to produce the original certificate at the time of interview, then this is nothing but permissive power of RPSC to cancel the candidature of defaulting candidate and not the mandatory condition against the RPSC. It is also submitted that as provided in sub-clause (kh) of condition no.1 of the interview letter, it is dear that requirement of production of certificate by the candidates may entail the candidate for rejection of candidature at the discretion of Commission. But there is no bar against the RPSC in permitting candidates to produce original certificates later on. Further opportunity to produce original certificates was given to all those candidates who could not produce the original certificate at the time of interview. The RPSC thereby only gave chance to produce certificate to the candidates who are more meritorious than the petitioners and this is not in violation of any rule rather by this permission only meritorious candidates will be selected. The RPSC thereby only gave chance to produce certificate to the candidates who are more meritorious than the petitioners and this is not in violation of any rule rather by this permission only meritorious candidates will be selected. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that writ petition of the petitioners deserves to be dismissed as the petitioners have not impleaded the candidates who were selected in the interview and were placed in provisional select list. 5. I have considered the rival submissions. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that RPSC under the Rules of 1963 is required to cancel the candidature of the candidate who failed to produce the original certificates at the time of interview is concerned, it is devoid of any force as there is no rule which mandates RPSC to cancel the candidature of defaulting candidate leaving no discretion with the RPSC to take decision on default of candidate. There is no rule which prohibits RPSC from giving further time for production of certificates of eligibility. In fact, Sub-Rule (ii) of Rule 4 read with Sub Clause (d) of Sub Rule (i) of Rule 4 makes the distinction clear between "Qualifications" and "establishing candidate's eligibility". So far as qualifications of the candidates who are declared provisionally pass, there is no dispute even by the learned counsel for the petitioners. As per Rule 4 (i) (d), RPSC is required to give notice to the candidates with respect to what steps are required to be taken by the candidates to establish their eligibility. Sub-Rule (ii) of Rules of 1963 empowers RPSC to give further instructions, in addition to the instructions given in the Sub-Rule (i), including with respect to instruction for steps to be taken by the candidates to establish their eligibility. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is just contrary to the Sub Rule (ii) of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1963. 6. It appears that petitioners are under an impression that the requirement of production of original certificates at the time of interview is one of the conditions of eligibility of a candidate for selection to the post of Transport Sub-Inspector. Under this impression, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in the cases of (1) Bhupindra Pal Singh and ors. Vs. Under this impression, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in the cases of (1) Bhupindra Pal Singh and ors. Vs. State of Punjab and ors. reported in 2000(5) SCC, 262 and the Judgment delivered in the case of (2) Ashok Kumar Sharma and anr. Vs. Chandra Shekhar and ors. reported in 1993 Supp. (2) SCC, 611 and the judgment and order passed in review petition filed in the case of Ashok Kumar judgment case by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (3) 1997(4) SCC, 18 and the judgment of this Court (by me) delivered in the case of SBCW Pet. No. 2804/02, (4) Man Singh Vs. State decided on 3.12.02 [reported in 2003(1) RLR 588] , wherein it has been held that eligibility of candidate has to be determined as on the last date fixed for receipt of application for selection to the post. So far as the legal position that candidate must possess the requisite qualification and eligibility on the last date fixed for submitting the application form, law is well settled and the learned counsel for the respondents is not disputing it. It is submitted by learned counsel for respondent that the respondents has not considered and declared pass any of the candidates who did not possess the requisite eligibility on the said last date. It is also dear from the submission of learned counsel for petitioners that even it is not the case of petitioners that any of the candidates, who was not possessing the requisite qualification on the last date fixed for submitting application has been declared passed by the respondent. Therefore, the Judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner have no application to the facts of this case. 7. Next question is whether time fixed for submitting documents in this case completely debars selector from giving time to the candidates from submitting the required documents after the date fixed for the interview ? Or, it is permissive power of the selector which empowers the selectors to cancel the candidature of the defaulting candidate ? In my opinion, object of fixing time limit for submitting the relevant documents at the time of interview is not for securing rejection of the candidature of the eligible candidate of technical ground. Or, it is permissive power of the selector which empowers the selectors to cancel the candidature of the defaulting candidate ? In my opinion, object of fixing time limit for submitting the relevant documents at the time of interview is not for securing rejection of the candidature of the eligible candidate of technical ground. The eligibility criteria are the paramount consideration for selection of candidates, which is required to be fulfilled by the candidates. When merit of candidates is pitted against the technicalities of law by which lesser meritorious candidates want to exclude the meritorious candidates, them merit is required to be preferred against the technicalities of law so that if meritorious candidate himself has not incurred disqualification or created situation, by which he becomes dis entitled for said selection, then such meritorious candidate must get opportunity of appointment. The mandatory requirement in the process of selection is the eligibility of the candidate which cannot be compromised. The petitioners are not disputing the eligibility of the provisionally selected candidates but submit that the candidates who did not submit their original certificates at the time of the interview became ineligible. For selection of a meritorious candidate from amongst eligible candidates, the eligible candidates are required to pass through process of selection. Each selection processes has its known procedure which ensures a fair treatment to all eligible candidates. In this process of selection candidates are required to discharge their obligations, in which one of the obligation is to do the things in time frame program so that process of selection may be completed in time. Therefore, to complete the selection process in time, and time bound program is given by the selectors by fixing date, by which the candidate may submit application form, deposit requisite fees, may submit documents etc. Therefore, mere mentioning at various places, that in case of non-production of original certificates at the time of the interview, the candidature of candidate shall be rejected, appears to be a "permissive" power given to selectors to cancel the candidature of the defaulting candidate and not a mandate against the selector that the selector shall have no option to extend the time for submitting to documents for the candidates and the selector is bound to reject the candidature of the defaulting candidates. Learned counsel for the respondent rightly relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case State of M.P. Vs. Azad Bharat Finance Co. and anr. reported in AIR 19676 (sic ?) SC. 276 , wherein, while interpreting the statutory provisions containing the word "shall", the Supreme Court observed that 'shall' does not always mean that the provision is obligatory and not permissive. While interpreting the words 'liable to confiscation' with prefix "shall" as available in Section 11 of the Opium Act, Hon'ble Apex Court held that this is permissive power and authority is permitted to take action and not obligatory for the authority to necessarily take the action. 8. View taken above finds support if it is examined from another angle. The term "shall be rejected" is a term in terrorem against the candidates so that the candidates strictly comply with condition of submitting documents in time and if the selectors decide to cancel candidature of the defaulting candidates, the candidates may have notice of consequence of their default. In the light of above reasoning, conclusion is that the words "shall be rejected" used indicate permissive power of the selectors, either to reject the candidature of the defaulting candidate or may grant further time to all defaulting candidates to submit the documents. These permissive power of the selectors do not give corresponding right to the defaulting candidates to compel the selectors to extend the time fixed for submitting the certificates. 9. The Division Bench in the judgment delivered in the case of (6) Miss Neeta Midha Vs. Gramothan Teachers Training School, Sangaria and ors. reported in 1991(1) RLR 428 = AIR 1992 Raj. 20 held that petitioner-appellant, after passing her Higher Secondary Examination, applied for taking up Basic Teachers Training course. She alleged that she filled up her form in time and submitted it before 13.8.90 which was the last date for that purpose, but she submitted her Bona fide Resident certificate on 17.9.90 i.e. after the last date for declaration of result on the basis of merit, which was 31.8.90. She was not given admission. The Division Bench held that mistake had been committed by the petitioner. In spite of the specific instructions that her bona fide certificate should be submitted with the Form, she failed to submit it before even the finalisation of the result. She was not given admission. The Division Bench held that mistake had been committed by the petitioner. In spite of the specific instructions that her bona fide certificate should be submitted with the Form, she failed to submit it before even the finalisation of the result. On these facts, the Division Bench held that petitioner is not entitled for any relief. That was the case where the candidate who himself/herself committed a mistake of not producing the relevant documents at the relevant time and still wanted to challenge the action of respondents by which his/her candidature was rejected whereas the facts of this case are just reverse. Here, in present case, the selector has decided to permit the candidates to produce the certificates afterwards and defaulting candidates are not seeking direction against the respondents that the RPSC be directed to extend the time limit fixed for filing the certificates. Therefore, the above judgment also does not help the petitioners. It is further relevant to mention here that in case it is held that in view of the condition mentioned in interview call letter, the time fixed for submitting documents cannot be extended then it will only give chance to less meritorious candidate in place of meritorious candidates, which will be unjust and will also be against larger public interest. 10. Next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that provisional declaration of result of the candidates is illegal on the ground that there is no provision in the Rules under which result can be declared provisionally. The contention of the petitioners deserves to be rejected only on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners merely because of provisional declaration of the result by the RPSC. Further more, Rule 17(2) of the Rules of 1963 specifically provides for grant of provisional permission to the candidates to appear in the examination. The interview letter itself, on the basis of which even the petitioners faced the interview, very clearly provides that this is a provisional interview. Holding of provisional interview is also not provided in the Rules but petitioners accepted call letters foil provisional interview and appeared in interview without any objection because it suits the petitioners. The interview letter itself, on the basis of which even the petitioners faced the interview, very clearly provides that this is a provisional interview. Holding of provisional interview is also not provided in the Rules but petitioners accepted call letters foil provisional interview and appeared in interview without any objection because it suits the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not satisfy this court that if the grant of further time to the defaulting candidates to produce the relevant certificates is not found wrong then how the petitioners have locus standi to challenge the provisional declaration of the result by the respondent no. 2 RPSC ? Learned counsel for the respondents was very much right when he says that rule cannot cover each and every contingency and there may be certain blank spaces, which could be filled up by selectors and until & unless the action itself is so unreasonable and affects the merit of selection and permits selection of ineligible candidates or gives arbitrary favour to someone it cannot be challenged. Thus, giving one more chance to the all defaulting candidates to produce original certificate in this case, by no stretch of imagination, can be condemned. 11. Therefore, in view of above, present writ petition has no force and is hereby dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******