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2003 DIGILAW 265 (PNJ)

Hakam Singh v. Balwinder Singh

2003-02-12

R.L.ANAND

body2003
JUDGMENT R.L. Anand, J. - I have gone through the contents of the revision as well as the impugned judgment. No interference is called for in view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another, 2002(4) RCR(Crl.) 61. It was observed in Paras 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment as under : "12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction. The aforesaid sub-section which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross mis-carriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See AIR 1951 SC 196 : D. Stephens v. Nosibolla; AIR 1962 SC 1788 : K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh; (1973) 2 SCC 583: Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram; AIR 1975 SC 1854 : Patakalapti Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and AIR 1968 SC 707 : Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh). 13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial Court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave mis-carriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial Court took the opposite view. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial Court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdictional against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate Court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering re-trial of the Court." 2. Moreover, the counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any legal defect in the conduct of the proceedings by the trial Court. Dismissed. Revision dismissed.