JUDGMENT Ashok Bhushan, J.—We have heard Sri A. K. Gaur, the learned counsel for the appellant, learned standing counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Nitin Gupta, counsel appearing for respondent No. 3. 2. This special appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 27th January, 2003 passed by learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 4516 of 2003, Smt. Rajbiri Devi v. State of U. P. and others, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. 3. Facts giving rise to this special appeal, briefly stated, are : the appellant is elected Pradhan of Gaon Panchayat, Nistauli. A complaint was filed against the appellant by Ex-Pradhan and Up-Pradhan of Gaon Panchayat, Nistauli. The District Magistrate directed for holding a preliminary enquiry on the aforesaid complaint. The preliminary enquiry was conducted by District Agricultural Officer and a report was submitted to the District Magistrate in which misappropriation of funds and several other allegations were prima facie found true against the appellant. The District Magistrate issued a show cause notice to the appellant dated 1st July, 2002 which stated that petitioner has been found prima facie guilty of misappropriation of fund and other charges and appellant may show cause as to why his financial and administrative powers be not ceased exercising the power under Section 95 (1) (g) proviso of U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner submitted a reply to the show cause notice. The District Magistrate after considering the reply passed an order dated 13.1.2003 ceasing the administrative and financial power of the appellant after finding the appellant prima facie guilty of misusing her office by committing financial irregularities and misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 1,02,882. The appellant filed writ petition being Writ Petition No. 4516 of 2003 challenging the aforesaid order of the District Magistrate dated 13th January, 2003 and also the enquiry report dated 24th November, 2002 and show cause notice dated 1st July, 2002. The learned single Judge after hearing the appellant dismissed the writ petition against which the present special appeal has been filed. 4. The learned single Judge after hearing the appellant dismissed the writ petition against which the present special appeal has been filed. 4. Sri A. K. Gaur counsel for the appellant made following submissions in support of this special appeal : (i) The order of the District Magistrate dated 13th January, 2003 did not disclose that it considered the reply submitted by the appellant to the show cause notice and was passed in a mechanical and perfunctory manner. The learned single Judge also did not consider this aspect of the matter. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Smt. Sandhya Gupta v. District Magistrate and others, 1999 (2) AWC 913 . (ii) The allegations against the appellant are not based on any cogent material nor there is any evidence in support of the allegations, hence the administrative and financial powers of the appellant could not have been ceased. The expression found used in Section 95 (1) (g) proviso of the Act suggest that requisite prima facie findings must be arrived on consideration of preliminary enquiry report and the reply of the appellant and that not having been so, the order is vitiated in law. Reliance has been placed on Chunmun v. District Magistrate, Sonebhadra and another, 1998 (3) AWC 1892. (iii) There is no objective consideration of the reply of the appellant to the show cause notice by the District Magistrate while passing the order dated 13th January, 2003. The order of the District Magistrate is invalid and liable to be set-aside. 5. The learned standing counsel refuted the submissions raised by the counsel for the appellant and submitted that there was sufficient materials before the District Magistrate to make a prima facie opinion as contemplated under Section 95 (1) (g) proviso hence no error was committed in ceasing the financial and administrative power of the appellant. Learned standing counsel has submitted that District Magistrate has considered the reply of the appellant and the order shows application of mind and the submission of the counsel for the appellant to the contrary is not correct. 6. We have considered the submissions of counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. 7. All the submissions raised by the counsel for the appellant being inter-connected are being considered together. 8. 6. We have considered the submissions of counsel for both the parties and have also perused the record. 7. All the submissions raised by the counsel for the appellant being inter-connected are being considered together. 8. It is necessary to take into consideration the statutory provisions and the scheme underlying the said provisions governing the enquiry against Pradhan and power to cease financial and administrative powers. Chapter VII of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act deals with external control. Section 95 of the Act enumerates various modes of external control exercised by the State Government on Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Member of Gram Panchayat and on different bodies of village panchayat. Extensive amendments were made by U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994 in the Act. Section 95 (1) (g) provided for removal of a Pradhan on various grounds as enumerated in Clause (g). Prior to amendments affected by U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994, there was provision of suspension of a Pradhan in sub-clause (gg) of Section 95 (1) of the Act. Section 95 (1) (g) as it existed prior to amendment by U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994 is extracted below : “(g) remove a member of a Gaon Panchayat or a Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he : (i) absents himself without sufficient cause from more than three consecutive meetings or sittings ; (ii) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reasons whatsoever, or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude ; (iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by this Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest ; (iv) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics, or (v) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5A.” 9. The scheme underlying in the aforesaid provisions was to the effect that no action under Clause (g) for removal of Pradhan was contemplated except after giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. The scheme underlying in the aforesaid provisions was to the effect that no action under Clause (g) for removal of Pradhan was contemplated except after giving reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. However, before taking action for suspension under sub-clause (gg), only a prima facie satisfaction with the ground on which action is proposed under Clause (g) was required. In case removal proceedings against a Pradhan were either pending or contemplated, the State Government was empowered to suspend a Pradhan if it was prima facie satisfied with the ground on which action is proposed. By U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994, the power of suspension of Pradhan was done away and new provision by way of proviso to sub-clause (g) was inserted. Section 95 (1) as it exists after the amendment by U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994 is quoted as below : “95. By U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994, the power of suspension of Pradhan was done away and new provision by way of proviso to sub-clause (g) was inserted. Section 95 (1) as it exists after the amendment by U. P. Act No. 9 of 1994 is quoted as below : “95. Inspection.—(1) The State Government may : (a) cause to be inspected an immovable property owned, used or occupied by a (Gram Panchayat), or a joint committee or a Nyaya Panchayat or any work in progress under the direction of such (Gram Panchayat) or Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat ; (b) by an order in writing call for and inspect a book or document in the possession or under the control of a (Gram Panchayat) or a Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat ; (c) by an order in writing require a (Gram Panchayat) or a Joint Committee or a Nyaya Panchayat to furnish such statement, reports or copies of documents, relating to the proceeding or duties of the (Gram Panchayat) or such committee of Nyaya Panchayat as it thinks fit ; (d) record in writing for the consideration of a (Gram Panchayat) or Joint Committee any observation which it thinks proper in regard to the proceedings or duties of such Gram Panchayat or Joint Committee ; (e) institute any enquiry in respect of any matter relating to (Gram Sabha), (Gram Panchayat) or Nyaya Panchayat ; and (f) or dissolve any (Gram Panchayat), Joint Committee, Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or Nyaya Panchayat if in the opinion of the State Government such (Gram Panchayat), Joint Committee, Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or Nyaya Panchayat has abused its position or has continuously failed to perform the duties imposed upon it by or under this Act or if its continuance is not considered desirable in public interest ; (g) remove a Pradhan, Up-Pradhan or member of a Gram Panchayat or a Joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he : (i) absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings ; (ii) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reasons whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude ; (iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest ; or (iii-a) has taken the benefit of reservation under sub-section (2) of Section 11-A or sub-section (6) of Section 12, as the case may be, on the basis of a false declaration subscribed by him stating that he is a member of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or the Backward Classes, as the case may be ; (iv) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics ; or (v) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5A : Provided that where, in an enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed, a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities such Pradhan or Up-Pradhan shall cease to exercise and perform the financial and administrative powers and functions, which shall, until he is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry, be exercised and performed by a committee consisting of three members of Gram Panchayat appointed by the State Government : Provided that : (h) no action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed ;” 10. For exercising the power under proviso to Section 95 (1) (g), an enquiry is contemplated in such manner as may be prescribed. Rules have been framed in exercise of power conferred by Section 110 read with Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Act, namely, Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members) Enquiry Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1997). Power of suspension could have been resorted to by the State Government on prima facie satisfaction of the charges. The power under proviso is not akin to suspension but is confined to cessation of financial and administrative powers of Pradhan. After suspension of financial and administrative powers although Pradhan holds the office but is unable to exercise financial and administrative powers. The proviso contemplates exercise of power after enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed and secondly, when it is prima facie found that Pradhan has committed financial and other irregularities. Thus two conditions are required to be satisfied before invoking the power under proviso, i.e., holding of an enquiry in the manner prescribed and Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to refer to the manner of holding an enquiry as contemplated in the proviso. 11. Rule 2 (c) of Rules, 1997 defines an Enquiry Officer. ‘Enquiry Officer’ means the District Panchayat Raj Officer or any other district level officer, to be nominated by the District Magistrate. The power vested in the State Government under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act has been delegated to all the District Magistrates by notification dated 30th April, 1997. Rule 3 pertains to procedure relating to complaints. Rule 4 refers to preliminary enquiry. Rule 4 provides that State Government may, on receipt of a complaint or report referred to in Rule 3 or otherwise order the Enquiry Officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules, 1997 is extracted below : “4. Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules, 1997 is extracted below : “4. Preliminary Enquiry.—(1) The State Government may, on the receipt of a complaint or report referred to in Rule 3, or otherwise order the Enquiry Officer to conduct a preliminary enquiry with a view to finding out if there is a prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. (2) The Enquiry Officer shall conduct the preliminary enquiry as expeditiously as possible and submit his report to the State Government within thirty days of his having been so ordered. 5. Where the State Government is of the opinion, on the basis of the report referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 or otherwise that an enquiry should be held against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan or Member under the proviso to Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 95, it shall forthwith constitute a committee envisaged by proviso to Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the Act and by an order ask an Enquiry Officer, other than the Enquiry Officer nominated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, to hold the enquiry.” 12. Rule 6 deals with the procedure for the enquiry. The power under proviso to Rule 95 (1) (g) is to be exercised by the State Government after receipt of the preliminary enquiry report. It is incumbent on the State Government to forthwith constitute a committee envisaged by proviso to Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 if it is of the opinion on the basis of preliminary enquiry report that an enquiry should be held against a Pradhan. Conjoint reading of Rules 4 and 5 makes it clear that if it is found that there is prima facie case for formal enquiry in the matter, committee contemplated under the proviso to Clause (g) should be constituted. The object underlying the aforesaid Rule is that in case Pradhan is prima facie found to be indicted, he should not exercise the financial and administrative power and the power should be entrusted to a committee. The aforesaid is for the object of protecting the funds and functions of Gaon Panchayat. The committee is constituted to discharge those functions so that affairs of the Gram Panchayat may not suffer. The Committee so constituted is entitled to continue till Pradhan is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry. The aforesaid is for the object of protecting the funds and functions of Gaon Panchayat. The committee is constituted to discharge those functions so that affairs of the Gram Panchayat may not suffer. The Committee so constituted is entitled to continue till Pradhan is exonerated of the charges in the final enquiry. Although neither Rule 4 nor Rule 5 of 1997 Rules expressly provides for associating the Pradhan with preliminary enquiry or giving any opportunity before forming the opinion, the District Magistrate after receipt of preliminary enquiry report has given an opportunity to the appellant to have his say by way of caution. It is to be noted that while exercising power under sub-clause (gg) for suspension of Pradhan, no opportunity was needed which has been clearly laid down by Division Bench of this Court in Salig Ram Mishra v. Collector, Deoria, 1985 ALJ 1267. It was held in paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment : “2. It has been urged by the counsel for the petitioner that before passing the impugned order of suspension the petitioner should have been given a show cause notice. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. The proviso occurring below sub-section (4) of Section 95 of the Act reads thus : “(i) no action shall be taken under Clause (f), Clause (g) or Clause (h) except after giving to the body or person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed ; (ii) no action shall be taken under Clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist.” The difference in the requirement of Clauses (i) and (ii) is apparent on the plain language thereof. Clause (i) contemplates reasonable opportunity of show cause being given against the action if it is proposed under Clause (g) or Clause (h). It does not require such an opportunity being given before passing an order of suspension pending enquiry under Clause (gg). The only requirement for passing an order under Clause (gg) as contained in Clause (g) exist. In the instant case powers of the State Government have admittedly been delegated on the Sub-Divisional Officer. It does not require such an opportunity being given before passing an order of suspension pending enquiry under Clause (gg). The only requirement for passing an order under Clause (gg) as contained in Clause (g) exist. In the instant case powers of the State Government have admittedly been delegated on the Sub-Divisional Officer. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the said officer has clearly recorded a finding in regard to the prima facie satisfaction as contemplated by Clause (ii) of the proviso aforesaid.” 13. In the present case, the District Magistrate before passing the impugned order ceasing the financial and administrative power had given a show cause notice to the petitioner, hence the question as to whether the notice was required or not has not arisen nor the counsel for the parties have made their submissions on the question as to whether it is mandatory to issue a notice before taking a decision to cease the financial and administrative power, hence we have neither gone into this question nor are expressing any opinion on the above issue in the present case. 14. The substance of submissions of counsel for the appellant is that the District Magistrate has not referred to the reply of the appellant submitted in reply to the show cause notice nor has recorded findings with regard to prima facie guilt of the appellant. The impugned order of the District Magistrate dated 13th January, 2003 discloses that the District Magistrate has referred to the preliminary enquiry report as well as the reply of the appellant. Prima facie satisfaction of the District Magistrate that appellant is guilty of abusing the office of Pradhan and of committing financial irregularities and embezzlement of an amount of Rs. 1,02,882 has also been recorded. The submission of the counsel for the appellant that the order of the District Magistrate shows non-application of mind cannot be accepted. Much emphasis has been laid down by counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Smt. Sandhya Gupta’s case (supra), specifically paragraphs 9 and 10. The counsel for the appellant emphasised following observations of paragraph 9 of the said judgment : “9. ........................................ Much emphasis has been laid down by counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Smt. Sandhya Gupta’s case (supra), specifically paragraphs 9 and 10. The counsel for the appellant emphasised following observations of paragraph 9 of the said judgment : “9. ........................................ The petitioner submitted the reply to the show cause notice but no objective view of the matter appears to have been taken by the District Magistrate as he has passed the order in a most mechanical, cursory and perfunctory manner by observing that the reply furnished by the petitioner was not satisfactory.” The aforesaid observations were made by this Court in the above case while considering the writ petition which was filed against the order dated 14.11.1998 passed by the District Magistrate removing the petitioner of that writ petition from the office of Pradhan. The order impugned in the writ petition of Sandhya Gupta’s case (supra) was passed under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act. For an order under Section 95 (1) (g) removing a Pradhan, finding has to be recorded on specific ground as enumerated under the Act. In accordance with 1997 Rules, the order of removal is passed after holding a final enquiry in which charge-sheet is issued and Pradhan is given opportunity to bring his evidence. The order contemplated under Section 95 (1) (g) is a final order, which requires consideration of the reply of Pradhan also. No exception can be taken to the above quoted observations in Sandhya Gupta’s case (supra) by this Court. However, the said ratio is not attracted in a case where power is exercised under Section 95 (1) (g) proviso. The power under proviso is only by way of an interim measure and i.e., on consideration of preliminary enquiry report. The State Government (District Magistrate) has only to be prima facie satisfied on the basis of the enquiry report that Pradhan has committed financial and other irregularities. At the stage of exercising the power under proviso, the District Magistrate is not to record any conclusive finding of guilt, what is required is only a prima facie satisfaction. 15. The word ‘prima facie’ has been defined in Law Lexicon (P. Ramanatha Ayer, 1997 Edition) which is as follows : “Prima facie (Lat). At the stage of exercising the power under proviso, the District Magistrate is not to record any conclusive finding of guilt, what is required is only a prima facie satisfaction. 15. The word ‘prima facie’ has been defined in Law Lexicon (P. Ramanatha Ayer, 1997 Edition) which is as follows : “Prima facie (Lat). At first sight ; on the first appearance ; on the fact of it ; so far as can be judged from the first disclosure ; presumably ; a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary.” 16. The scheme of 1997 Rules shows that the prima facie opinion is to be formed on the basis of only preliminary enquiry report. The stage of giving detail opportunity to Pradhan does not arise before proceeding with regular enquiry as contemplated under Rule 6. The detail regular enquiry is to be held in accordance with Rule 6 which contemplates collecting of documentary and oral evidences including summoning of documents and other materials. For exercise of power under proviso to Rule 95 (1) (g), only thing to be seen is as to whether there are prima facie grounds for holding an enquiry. At this stage, opinion formed is not any conclusive or final opinion. The detail examination including the consideration of detail reply of Pradhan is not contemplated. Without there being any provision of taking detail evidence, it is not appropriate to take any final opinion regarding charges being made out or not, only a prima facie satisfaction is to be there. Rules 1997 further clarifies that purpose of holding a preliminary enquiry is only to find out if there is prima facie case for a formal enquiry in the matter. Thus, what is to be seen in the preliminary enquiry is as to whether a prima facie case for holding formal enquiry is made out against the Pradhan, i.e., Pradhan is prima facie found to have committed financial and other irregularities. Obviously, the enquiry must relate to the grounds as mentioned in Section 95 (1) (g). In view of the above, the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the District Magistrate ought to have recorded findings regarding the reply submitted by the appellant cannot be accepted. Obviously, the enquiry must relate to the grounds as mentioned in Section 95 (1) (g). In view of the above, the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the District Magistrate ought to have recorded findings regarding the reply submitted by the appellant cannot be accepted. The show cause notice was issued to the appellant and reply was asked for by the District Magistrate by way of caution for effectively exercising the power under proviso. We have also gone through the preliminary enquiry report filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition as well as the letter dated 29th November, 2002 filed as Annexure-2 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application. The preliminary enquiry report does find that Pradhan has prima facie committed financial and other irregularities and the holding of formal enquiry in the matter was just and proper to safeguard the interest of the Gaon Panchayat. 17. The reliance of the counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Chunmun’s case (supra) also does not help the appellant in any manner. What was laid down in the aforesaid judgment was that expression “prima facie” read with expression “any enquiry held by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed” used under first proviso to Section 95 (1) (g) unequivocally suggest that requisite prima facie finding must be arrived at on consideration of preliminary enquiry report submitted by District Panchayat Raj Officer under Rule 4 (2) of 1997 Rules. In the present case, the District Magistrate has formed its prima facie satisfaction on the basis of preliminary enquiry report. It was laid down that the power under the first proviso has to be exercised by the District Magistrate on the basis of the enquiry held by such person and in such manner as prescribed by rules. In the aforesaid case, it was held that Junior Engineer was not competent to hold a preliminary enquiry under Rule 4, hence his report cannot form any basis for exercising the power under proviso to Section 95 (1) (g). The aforesaid case is, thus, clearly distinguishable and not attracted in the facts of the present case. 18. In view of what has been said above, none of the submissions raised by counsel for the appellant has any substance. The aforesaid case is, thus, clearly distinguishable and not attracted in the facts of the present case. 18. In view of what has been said above, none of the submissions raised by counsel for the appellant has any substance. We do not find any error in the order of learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. The District Magistrate has validly exercised the power under first proviso to Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act and no error can be found in action taken by the District Magistrate. The learned single Judge himself has directed that formal enquiry against the petitioner be held as expeditiously as possible. 19. In view of the aforesaid, no error was committed by the learned single Judge. We do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.